法律实证主义的强立场——兼评拉兹《法律的权威》

在法律与道德的关系上,拉兹认为有效法律的鉴别标准完全排除道德论证,这就是拉兹的渊源论.渊源论表明所有的法律都具有渊源,渊源论的论据来自权威论.权威以理由为基础,是改变行为理由的能力.法律也要主张权威,法律主张合法性权威是它的一个本质特征.权威性理由是排他性理由,排除了道德因素的可能性,权威论支持了渊源论.权威论受到了来自包容性实证主义者和德沃金的批评,他们的争论共同推进了对法律与道德关系问题的研究.     

Legal Positivism, Law's Normativity, and the Normative Force of Legal Justification

In this article, I distinguish between a moral and a strictly legal conception of legal normativity, and argue that legal positivists can account for law's normativity in the strictly legal but not in the moral sense, while pointing out that normativity in the former sense is of little interest, at least to lawyers. I add, however, that while the moral conception of law's normativity is to be preferred to the strictly legal conception from the rather narrow viewpoint of the study of law's normativity, it is less attractive than the latter from the broader viewpoint of the study of the nature of law. I then distinguish between a moral and a strictly legal conception of the normative force of legal justification, and argue that legal positivists may without contradiction embrace the moral conception, and that therefore the analysis of the normative force of legal justification need not be a problem for legal positivists. I conclude that, on the whole, we have reason to prefer legal positivism to natural law theory. I begin by introducing the subject of jurisprudence (section 1). I then introduce the natural law/legal positivism debate, suggesting that we ought to understand it as a debate about the proper way to explicate the concept of law (section 2). I proceed to argue that legal decision-making is a matter of applying legal norms to facts, and that syllogistic reasoning plays a prominent role in legal decision-making thus conceived (section 3). Having done that, I discuss law's normativity (section 4), the normative force of legal justification (section 5), and the relation between the former and the latter (section 6). I conclude with a critical comment on Joseph Raz' understanding of the question of law's normativity (appendix).     

法律实证主义与规范理论——规范性的三个难题

在现代法律理论中,规范性既意味着法律对行为的影响,也用以表达有别于事实的另一世界。有关法律规范性的争议可分解为三个相互关联的理论难题:制裁与义务是否具有同样的规范作用?是否只有一般性的法律规则才具有规范性?哲学实证主义与法律实证主义对规范性的理解是否相同?通过思考这些难题可以得出结论:规范问题不同于价值问题,法律实证主义能够在探讨规范问题时坚持价值无涉的立场;法律的规范性不能化约为唯一一种规范作用,对此有必要进行更加精致的研究。     

Law as a Social Construction and Conceptual Legal Theory

Law and Philosophy - A currently popular view among legal positivists is that law is a social construction. Many of the same legal philosophers also argue that before one can study law empirically,...     

哈特/德沃金之争与法律实证主义的分裂——基于“分离命题”的考察

哈特与德沃金之争及其所开放出来的问题构成了当今英美法律哲学研究的理论坐标。哈特/德沃金之争的核心在于法律与道德有无必然的关联,哈特认为法律与道德不存在必然的关联;而德沃金认为,承认规则既无法识别原则也不是一个社会规则,法律与道德存在必然的关联。法实证主义在回应德沃金的批判时,在承认规则识别法律之判准的内容上发生了分歧,分裂为排他性与包容性的法实证主义。     

Trial by Slogan: Natural Law and Lex Iniusta Non Est Lex

Norman Kretzmann's recent analysis of the natural lawslogan ``lex iniusta non est lex' (an unjust law is nota law) demonstrates the coherence of the slogan andmakes a case for its practical value, but I shallargue that it also ends up showing that the sloganfails to mark any interesting conceptual or practicaldivision between natural law and legal positivistviews about the nature of law. I argue that this is ahappy result. The non-est-lex slogan has been used toexaggerate the extent of disagreement about the natureof law and has diverted critics of natural law theoryfrom recognizing that the main disagreement betweennatural lawyers and legal positivists centres ontheories of practical reason and how they affect ourunderstanding of the relationship between law andmorality. This extends the debate about the nature oflaw somewhat beyond the traditional boundaries ofphilosophy of law, but these boundaries are due inpart to the diversion created by debate over thenon-est-lex slogan. Recognizing that the non-est-lexslogan fails on its own to mark any interestingpractical or conceptual division between natural lawtheories and legal positivism should therefore focusand encourage debate on matters of genuine substancebetween these outlooks. The disagreement, however, mayturn out to be primarily metaphysical and explanatoryand not normative in nature.     

包容性实证主义法学之承认规则类别研究

包容性法律实证主义者认为法律效力的判准包括两类:作为主要类别的“系谱类判准”以及作为次要类别的“内容类判准”。经由承认规则的系谱类判准,包容性实证主义法学理论论证了法律效力乃是由一些明确的社会事实决定的;经由承认规则的内容类判准,其展示了道德包容于法律的另一种可能路径,使法律与道德的可能分离论点得到了进一步说明。     

Farewell to the Exclusive-Inclusive Debate

In recent years there has an ongoing debate between two versionsof legal positivism. According to one, called exclusive positivism,whenever the law refers to morality, the law necessarily directsits subjects to an external, non-legal, standard, because thereis a conceptual impossibility in incorporating moral standardsinto the law. According to the rival inclusive positivist position,such incorporation is possible, and therefore moral standardscan be (although they need not be) part of the law. In thisarticle I argue that both views are mistaken since they bothassume that whenever words like ‘equality’, ‘justice’etc. appear in the law they refer to moral standards. Rather,I argue, these words refer to legal standards, which are differentfrom the moral standards. As a result the question of the possibilityof incorporation can be avoided, and the debate between exclusiveand inclusive positivists put to rest.     

Form and Agency in Raz’s Legal Positivism

As two parts of one overarching legal positivist project, it is likely assumed that the constitutive elements of Joseph Raz’s analysis of the rule of law are compatible with his thinking on the nature of legal authority. The aim of this article is to call this assumption into question by reading Raz in light of the core, if under-recognised, preoccupation of the jurisprudence of Lon Fuller: namely, the latter’s concern to illuminate the relationship between the distinctive form of law and human agency. This not only opens up a new engagement between Raz and Fuller that was far from exhausted within debates about law and morality, but also reveals tensions between Raz’s analysis of the rule of law and his analysis of legal authority that proponents of Raz’s legal positivism need to address.     

Does the Unconstrained Legal Actor Exist?

Abstract. The unconstrained legal actor, typically a judge, is a central character in modern jurisprudence. He is feared by legal formalists, legal positivists, and Ronald Dworkin alike. He is lauded by some legal realist and critical legal studies theorists. Stanley Fish says that all of this theorising is pointless because the unconstrained legal actor cannot exist. My paper evaluates Fish's arguments for this surprising position.     

法律论证中的权威与正确性——兼论我国指导性案例的效力

法律论证既需要运用权威理由,也需要运用实质理由来证立法律命题。法律渊源是最重要的权威理由,它通过说明法律命题之来源的方式来证明后者的初步有效性。制定法与先例构成了法律论证之权威性框架的主要部分,制定法属于规范权威,而先例属于事实权威,它们在司法裁判中一般只需被指明。同时,法律论证的正确性宣称决定了法律论证也必须运用有效的实质理由,即对法律命题内容的正确性进行证立。这种论证既可以是法律体系内的论证,也可以是超越体系的论证。法律论证旨在于平衡权威与正确性,其中权威论证具有初步的优先性但并非不可推翻,权威性的强度与相关正确性论证的负担成正比。以此来分析,我国的指导性案例介于规范权威与事实权威之间,它的效力是一种"准制度拘束力"。     

现代法理学中“法律权威”问题的困境——以哈特对奥斯丁的批判为线索

哈特和奥斯丁之间的学术公案恰当地重启了法律权威的论题。在哈特的批判性审视之下，法律权威的问题陷入了困境：要倡导法律主治，就需要树立法律权威，但到目前为止，现代法理学的各派理论却都无法有效地证明法律是如何拥有权威的。产生这一困境的根本原因在于人们对个人自律的道德价值的信奉。     

约翰·奥斯丁法哲学再探

约翰·奥斯丁是现代西方法理学中的重要人物,分析法学的创始人,以提出"法律命令说"而著名,他的法哲学长期以来一直受到人们的批判,这些批判主要来自于两大阵营:一是形形色色的自然法学家;另一是一些后起的法律实证主义者。这些批判影响巨大,以致遮蔽了奥斯丁法哲学的本来面目。其实,"法律命令说"并非奥斯丁法哲学的核心与标志,纵使人们批驳倒了"法律命令说",对奥斯丁的法哲学整体来说损害也并不大。奥斯丁的代表性思想是:倡导对法律进行分析性研究,主张建构起一般法理学与法律教义学,最终使法学成为一门科学。在众多的批判之下,奥斯丁的上述代表性思想不仅没有失去生命力,反而保持着旺盛的生命力,以致在现代西方法理学中,奥斯丁仍然是一个人们无法绕过的思想家。     

Was Inclusive Legal Positivism Founded on a Mistake?

In this paper, I present a new argument against inclusive legal positivism. As I show, any theory which permits morality to be a condition on legality cannot account for a core feature of legal activity, namely, that it is an activity of social planning. If the aim of a legal institution is to guide the conduct of the community through plans, it would be self-defeating if the existence of these plans could only be determined through deliberation on the merits. I also argue that, insofar as inclusive legal positivism was developed as a response to Ronald Dworkin's critique of H. L. A. Hart's theory of law, it was founded on a mistake. For once we appreciate the role that planning plays in legal regulation, we will see that Dworkin's objection is based on a flawed conception of legal obligations and rights and hence does not present an objection that inclusive legal positivists were required to answer.     

董必武的司法权威观

董必武强调,维护法律与司法权威,是加强国家法制建设的客观要求;要维护司法权威,就必须树立司法的社会公信力,缺乏公信力的司法,必然导致司法权威的丧失;要维护司法权威,就必须切实加强审判监督和社会监督,建立健全必要的内部与外部监督机制;要维护司法权威,就必须正确处理有错必纠与维护法院生效裁判的关系,既高度重视涉法信访工作,又要维护司法审判活动的严肃性;要维护司法权威,最重要的就是必须坚持党对司法工作的领导,保证司法机关依法独立地行使司法权。     

Dissent and the Anarchic in Legal Counter-Culture: A Peircean View

The author analyses the role of dissent and anarchic thinking in modern legal culture. Such notions traditionally convey opposition to established authority and are essential for all free and open societies. In fact, the right to dissent and practising anarchic beliefs exist insofar as a true right of confrontation is guaranteed by the legal system. In this perpective, the author suggests some correspondences between dialogic thinking, that Peirce says allows all ideas to grow semiotically, and the development of the role of dissent in the legal culture. Generally speaking, the question concerns the well-known Peircean dichotomy between chance/spontaneity and lawfulness. This thesis is exemplified in detail looking at the history of US law, at its outset the direct consequence of a legal counter-cultural movement against British common law. Moreover, the possibility of dissent is written into the United States constitution. At least three modes of dissent are built into American law as legal counter activities: (1) voices of nondominant religions, (2) dissent within the legal system, e.g., dialogue among and within the courts, (3) challenging the legal system sanctioned by the right to civil disobedience and by other forms of reaction against an oppressive government.     

Why The Axioms and Theorems of Arithmetic are not Legal Norms

Ronald Dworkin has long criticized legal positivists for theirefforts to distinguish between legal and non-legal standardsof conduct that are incumbent on people. Recently, Dworkin hasbroached this criticism in his hostile account of the debatesbetween Incorporationist Legal Positivists and Exclusive LegalPositivists. Specifically, he has maintained that Incorporationistscannot avoid the unpalatable conclusion that the axioms andtheorems of arithmetic are legal norms. This article shows whysuch a conclusion is indeed avoidable and why Dworkin's criticismis therefore wide of the mark.     

论和谐社会建构中司法的克制主义立场

我国和谐社会的建构是以法治为基础的,而法治就是法律主治.当前我国法治社会建构初级阶段的特定时代背景要求倡导严格法治主义的法治理念,法律解释的权威根源于法律文本自身,严格法治主义的法治理念表现在司法领域中,就是强调司法对法律文本含义的严格贯彻,这需要我们重视文义解释的法律解释方法,遵循文义解释方法优先性的元规则.严格法治主义的这一法律解释立场需要捍卫司法克制主义,文义解释方法的优先性元规则是需要我们倡导司法的克制主义立场,这也是实现司法方法科学化和维护法律权威的要求.