El referéndum en latinoamérica: Un análisis desde el derecho comparado

This paper tells of the proliferation in recent decades, formulas referendums in Latin American constitutions. The comparative analysis of this mechanism to identify severalunique features in the treatment of this formula of direct democracy, which distinguish it from reflections from other disciplines. For now the simple regulation has meantaltering the form of state and government of various constitutional systems of our region.     

Referendums and the Political Constitutionalisation of the EU

Abstract:  This article argues that European integration has triggered a dual constitutionalisation process in Europe. One is the revision of national constitutions to accommodate the integration project at the national level. The other is the construction of transnational rules to regulate novel inter-state relationships at the European level. EU referendums are contextualised in such a duel constitutionalisation process. At the domestic level, EU referendums handle the debates on national constitutional revision. At the transnational level, these popular votes ratify supranational constitutional documents. The article comparatively analyses three types of EU referendums—membership, policy and treaty referendums—according to this analytical framework, exploring the campaign mobilisation of voters, national governments, and transnational institutions, and examining the legal and political interaction between referendums and European integration. A key finding is that, as the dual constitutionalisation process deepens and widens, entrenched domestic players and restrained transnational actors are under increasing pressure to 'voice' themselves in EU referendums.     

Theorizing Sovereignty and European Integration

This article examines the relationship between the concept of sovereignty and the process of European integration. It is argued that the nature of this relationship has been both mutually informative and transformative. As a particular understanding of sovereignty has influenced and determined the perception of European integration, i.e., its conceptualization, so the process of European integration has reflected back on sovereignty and entailed its rethinking. This poses a particular challenge for legal theorists: how to pin down the meaning of sovereignty and European integration so as to put both in the best conceptual and normative light. The article begins by looking at the traditional perspective on sovereignty and how this has been challenged by European integration. The focus then shifts from sovereignty to European integration in order to examine how different perspectives on sovereignty, when used as an epistemic lens for understanding the process of European integration, have produced uneven conceptions of this integration. Finally, the article concludes by making a choice between the various conceptions of sovereignty and European integration. It is argued that the best conception of European integration is offered by the constitutional form of a union founded on pluralist sovereignty.     

National Constitutional Courts in supranational litigation: A contextual analysis

The article examines the role of national constitutional courts in supranational litigation. It firstly illustrates their value and situates well‐known judicial doctrines affecting their jurisdiction in the context of the normative claims, policy agenda and institutional framework promoted by the European Union. Against this background, it gauges the potential of national constitutional courts in countering the process of intergovernmental and technocratic encroachment of national constitutional democracies characterising the most recent evolutionary stages of the European integration process. It is claimed that constitutional courts are in the position of reinforcing, resisting or correcting Union measures with a detrimental impact on national constitutional principles. After having identified in correction the approach more coherent with their constitutional mandate, the article highlights a disturbing paradox: in remaining faithful to their constitutional role, constitutional courts contribute to the sustainability of a comprehensive institutional setting corroding the idea of constitutional democracy on which they are premised.     

共和与民主宪政

共和国是千百年来政治法律家们所追求的政权组织形式。共和主义可以使各种社会政治资源得以充分利用。民主是人民当家作主 ,自己决定自己的事业 ,是近现代人们所推崇的政体的主流形式。宪政主义的核心是废除绝对主权 ,强调对宪法限制统治权 ,确认并保护人民的权利。共和与民主并不矛盾 ,民主是共和的重要组成部分 ,没有民主就没有共和 ,但民主必须受到节制 ,共和必须接受民主的洗礼 ,民主共和必须由宪法予以确认。在宪政的体制下发扬民主 ,完善共和 ,是建设现代文明国家的基本要求。     

The use of referendums in Ireland: an analysis

The referendum is a phenomenon which is becoming increasingly normalised in the constitutional practice of many countries. Ireland is an EU member state with particularly extensive experience of the referendum as a decision-making tool. To date, it has held 39 referendums on a variety of issues – ranking it among the top four states in Western Europe in this regard.

This article seeks to review the emergence of referendums in Ireland as a decision-making instrument and to ask what constitutional, legal or institutional factors have led to referendums enjoying such comparatively extensive use there. It seeks to examine which political issues have formed the subject of referendums in Ireland, and to investigate what kinds of issues have succeeded in gaining electoral approval and what kinds have not. The extent of electoral participation in (and thus representativity of) Irish referendums is also scrutinised, and factors affecting participation rates examined.     

The Unfreedom of the Moderns in Comparison to Their Ideals of Constitutional Democracy

The paper is a critical survey of the last ten years of research on the principles of legitimacy of constitutional democracy and their application in practice in Europe and North America. A constitutional democracy is legitimate if it meets the test of two principles: the principles of democracy or popular sovereignty and of constitutionalism or the rule of law. There are three contemporary trends which tend to conflict with the principle of democracy and thus diminish democratic freedom. There are three responses to the lack of legitimacy of these three trends. The first is to downplay the principle of democracy in order to endorse the three trends. The second is to uphold the principle of democracy, in the form of deliberative constitutional democracy, in order to criticise aspects of the three trends and to call for further democratisation. The third trend deepens this critical response by tying the test of democratic legitimacy more closely to case studies of attempts by citizens to exercise their democratic freedom.     

A European Constitutional Patriotism? The Case Restated

Abstract:  Especially since the failure of the European Constitutional Treaty, the idea of a European constitutional patriotism has become subject to ever more intense criticism. This article argues that many of the criticisms of the idea of a European constitutional patriotism have been based on philosophical misunderstandings (both of the notion of constitutional patriotism as such, and of the role it could play in Europe) or rely on implausible empirical claims. Accordingly, the normative idea of constitutional patriotism is first clarified; second, the article discusses some of the most common normative and empirical traps when trying to 'transfer' constitutional patriotism from a domestic nation-state context to the supranational level, as well as the tendency to overburden constitutional patriotism with expectations of solidarity and deliberative democracy; third, an EU-specific post-sovereign, pluralist version of constitutional patriotism is defended against critics who see even such a vision as insufficiently sensitive to value pluralism and cultural diversity.     

Post‐Sovereignty and the European Legal Space

The political constitution of the European polity has become strained in recent years by insistent pressures on its institutional capacity to resolve social problems. The article examines the EU's polity crisis in the context of the development of a distinctive modern conception of secular constitutional authority, focused on the ideal of sovereign self‐determination. As the work of Neil MacCormick illustrates, the EU provides a radical challenge to the on‐going capacity of the concept of sovereignty to provide a framework to address problems of legitimacy. The article explores the nature of this challenge, its historical context and its consequences with reference to debates over the nature of constitutional pluralism. It sets out a path to the renewal of the European constitutional debate through a re‐consideration of secular constitutional authority and the necessity of its connection to the idea of sovereignty. The article seeks to re‐engage in the task of ‘questioning sovereignty’.     

宪政视角下的听证权初探

听证权是一种从宪法正当程序和其他基本权利中推导出的宪法性权利,是保障其他权利实现的权利,是人民实现当家作主的一种程序性权利。听证权的制度化建立在主权在民的深厚法理基础之上,集中体现了控制国家权力和保障人权的宪政理念,它能够加快民主决策、民主管理和民主监督的宪政化步伐,对实现社会正义、形成宪政秩序具有极其重要的作用,因而是宪法实施的重要制度机制。     

论宪法之代议制度原则

从分析宪法原理和各国民主政治制度的实践出发 ,指出代议制度应是宪法的基本原则 ,因为人民主权原则只是解决了主权的归属问题 ,并未说明民主的实现方式。在当代各国 ,基本采用代议(代表 )制的形式来实现民主 ,并且以不同的形式体现在宪法之中 ,政治体制的确立、国家机构的组成同代议 (代表 )制度原则密切联系。依据历史进程 ,对代议制度原则的内涵进行了深入的分析。各国宪法对代议制度的体现方式是各异的 ,这是由各国的国情所决定的 ,在此基础上 ,对代议制度原则进行了深入的评析     

Constitutional democracy and the legitimacy of judicial review

It has long been argued that the institution of judicial review is incompatible with democratic institutions. This criticism usually relies on a procedural conception of democracy, according to which democracy is essentially a form of government defined by equal political rights and majority rule. I argue that if we see democracy not just as a form of government, but more basically as a form of sovereignty, then there is a way to conceive of judicial review as a legitimate democratic institution. The conception of democracy that stems from the social contract tradition of Locke, Rousseau, Kant and Rawls, is based in an ideal of the equality, independence, and original political jurisdiction of all citizens. Certain equal basic rights, in addition to equal political rights, are a part of democratic sovereignty. In exercising their constituent power at the level of constitutional choice, free and equal persons could choose judicial review as one of the constitutional mechanisms for protecting their equal basic rights. As such, judicial review can be seen as a kind of shared precommitment by sovereign citizens to maintaining their equal status in the exercise of their political rights in ordinary legislative procedures. I discuss the conditions under which judicial review is appropriate in a constitutional democracy. This argument is contrasted with Hamilton's traditional argument for judicial review, based in separation of powers and the nature of judicial authority. I conclude with some remarks on the consequences for constitutional interpretation.I am indebted to John Rawls and Burton Dreben for their helpful advice and their comments on an earlier draft of this paper.     

Constitutionalism and Dissonances: Has Europe Paid Off Its Debt to Functionalism?

Abstract The negative outcomes of the French and Dutch referenda on the Constitutional Treaty have opened a period of profound constitutional disenchantment in relation to the EU. This impression seems confirmed by the recent Presidency Conclusions of the European Council which, although salvaging many important solutions contained in the Constitutional Treaty, explicitly sanction that ‘the constitutional concept . . . is abandoned’. In the light of this context, what role could the constitutional scholarship play? How to make sense of a polity in which the claims of constitutionalism as a form of power are politically unappealing though legally plausible? This article tries to respond to these questions by reaffirming functionalism as a valid analytical and normative perspective in facing the current constitutional reality of European integration. The analytical value associated with functionalism is evidenced by testing against the current context of the EU legal framework the accounts for EU constitutionalism which postulate functional equivalence between the EU and the Member States. The normative potential of functionalism, then, is discussed by arguing that there may be a value worth preserving in a degree of functional discrepancy between the EU and state constitutionalism and, notably, that the transformative and civilising dividend inherent in functionalism could still be exploited, at least in certain areas of EU policy making. Finally, the article suggests that the difficulties in accounting for EU constitutionalism in the light of state‐centred constitutional theory could be regarded as symptoms of European integration marking a moment in the theoretical evolution of constitutionalism.     

Unpopular Sovereignty?

Popular sovereignty was presented in modern constitutional discourse as a mode of collective action. It was supposedly manifest in the power to constitute, control and dismantle governments. Important strands of contemporary constitutional theory, notably legal constitutionalism and deliberative democracy, have taken leave of this tradition. They have severed the connection between sovereignty and action. What remains of popular sovereignty is fundamental rights and values, or dispersed networks of deliberation. This is based on the the idea that the place of power is ‘empty’ and legitimised on the principle of including ‘All-Affected-Interests’. The very concept of sovereignty thus becomes unpopular. This contribution aims to re-establish the link between popular sovereignty and action by examining sovereignty's emancipatory telos, its majoritarian mode of operation and its dependence on political citizenship.     

Constitutionalising EU Executive Rule‐Making Procedures: A Research Agenda

The existence or non‐existence of procedural rules for executive rule‐making in the EU is not merely a ‘technical’ question free of constitutional value choices. This article argues that constitutional principles, such as transparency, openness and participatory democracy, highlighted by the Treaty of Lisbon constitute decisive normative standards for the design of administrative procedures in the EU, with a considerable impact on substantive outcomes. We apply such principles to executive rule‐making procedures in the EU, highlight the salience of this discussion and argue that systematisation of executive rule‐making procedures is needed in order to implement constitutional principles in a complex and plural environment.     

Popular Constitutionalism's Hard When You're Not Very Popular: Why the ACLU Turned to Courts

Through a case study of the early American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), this article examines the empirical ramifications of constitutional scholars' recent exhortations to "take the Constitution away from the courts" in order to promote democratic deliberation about constitutional meaning. While it is now one of the most prominent examples of a litigation-based interest group, the ACLU began its existence demonstrating a commitment to constitutionalism outside the courts. Through coding a decade's worth of meeting minutes and examining archival sources, I demonstrate that the ACLU's mounting unpopularity rendered extrajudicial politics impossible, precipitating the ACLU's shift toward litigation. The ACLU's move toward litigation, despite its early devotion to political activism outside the courts, suggests that it is not always possible for political actors to make constitutional arguments without courts. Furthermore, the ACLU's use of courts to publicize and dramatize its constitutional arguments demonstrates that litigation may actually promote popular deliberation about constitutional meaning. These political realities both highlight and contradict two empirical assumptions underlying arguments about the normative desirability of restricting courts' involvement in constitutional politics. First, the state is not a neutral arena in which all political actors are equally free to pursue their constitutional visions through majoritarian processes. Second, courts may facilitate (rather than hinder) popular deliberation about constitutional questions.     

欧洲近现代历史上宪政民主政制的生成、建构与演进

宪政民主政制与社会经济发展之间的关系,是一个值得深入进行理论探讨和实证研究的新课题。本文对西方宪政民主的起源、生成与演变史做了一个鸟瞰式的回顾,为探究宪政民主与经济发展之间的关系提供一些背景知识。在从词源和辞义上辨析了西方文字中的"constitution"以及以及与之对应的中文"宪法"和"宪政"的基本含义之后,本文对英国、法国和德国近现代宪政民主政制的生成、建构和演变史做了一些简略的历史考察,并在最后一部份对近现代欧洲历史上宪政民主政制下的法律制度的生成原因做了理论的和历史的分析。     

Asking the Sovereignty Question in Global Legal Pluralism: From “Weak” Jurisprudence to “Strong” Socio‐Legal Theories of Constitutional Power Operations

The article examines recent theories of legal and constitutional pluralism, especially their adoption of sociological perspectives and criticisms of the concept of sovereignty. The author argues that John Griffiths's original dichotomy of “weak” and “strong” pluralism has to be reassessed because “weak” jurisprudential theories contain useful sociological analyses of the internal differentiation and operations of specific legal orders, their overlapping, parallel validity and collisions in global society. Using the sociological methodology of legal pluralism theories and critically elaborating on Teubner's societal constitutionalism, the author subsequently reformulates the question of sovereignty as a sociological problem of complex power operations communicated through the constitutional state's organization and reconfigured within the global legal and political framework.     

European Writers on Their Meetings with Stalin

The Constitution of the Russian Federation states that citizens are to exercise their rights of local self-government by means of referendums, elections, and other forms of direct expression of their will through electoral and other local self-government bodies. The Law on General Principles of Organization of Local Self-Government in the Russian Federation of 28 August 1995, adopted as an extension of constitutional norms, defines the following: the role of local self-government in establishing democracy; the legal, economic, and financial foundations of local self-government; and the general principles of its organization.     

The greater good?: issues of proportionality and democracy in the doctrine of necessity as applied in Re A

This article examines the criminal law doctrine of necessity as applied in the conjoined twins case (Re A (Children) (Conjoined Twins: Surgical Separation) [2000] 4 All ER 961). It determines that the public law principle of proportionality underlies the doctrine, but identifies the preservation of life as the guiding principle behind the Court of Appeal's use of necessity in Re A. The article is critical of this elevation of the preservation of life under the doctrine of necessity and argues for an alternative conception of necessity based upon fundamental constitutional principles such as human rights and democracy. The principle of democracy has particular pertinence to the issue of necessity because it may be endangered by this common law justificatory defence. This conflict between democracy and necessity, it is argued, further supports the need for the constitutional value of democracy to play a key role in any application of necessity in future cases.