Konsequenzen von Staatsreformen für die demokratische Steuerungsfähigkeit. Vergleichende Analyse zu vier Schweizer Kantonen

In the last decade the public body has undergone changes along the lines of New Public Management concepts in the context of the reform of state structures and processes. The consequences of such reforms for democratic steering capacities have been discussed controversially. On the one hand, scholars argue that NPM strengthens democratic steering capacities while critics on the other warn that NPM reduces just such capacities. Our research analyses this question in the context of case studies about reform activities in four Swiss cantons. The results provide evidence of neither an improvement in nor a reduction of democratic steering capacities through NPM reforms. On the whole, the observed changes in democratic steering capacities proved to be marginal, in either direction.     

Governance and Coercion

The present article departs from the assumption often found in literature concerning governance, which is that coercion is the quintessence of government and that, therefore, the growing importance of new forms of governance in policy formulation and implementation will lead to the adoption of softer policy instruments. This hypothesis will first be discussed in the wider context of the instrument choice literature, whereby an opposing view is derived. The two competing hypotheses are then tested in a comparison of the alcohol control policy designs of the Swiss member states, i.e. the cantons. The results of a multivariate regression analysis show that strong governance structures understood as networks embracing both public and private actors lead to the adoption of restrictive policy designs that must be enforced by public authority and as such cannot be employed by non-public governance actors. It is concluded that in their evaluation of policy instruments, governance actors follow a logic of consequentiality rather than a logic of appropriateness.     

Federalism and regional interest intermediation in Brazilian public policies

Brazil became a highly decentralized country following democratization and the 1988 Constitution. The consequences of decentralization at the federal level are quite clear: the federal government is facing financial constraints and difficulties in building governing coalitions, allowing the Presidents to govern and to implement public policies, especially those concerning fiscal control. At the level of the states, however, the results of decentralization are quite heterogeneous given the country's high degree of regional inequality. The article identifies the cleavages and tensions surrounding federal–state relations, as well as the mutual dependency of the states and the federal government. It argues that the Brazilian experience of political and financial decentralization has contributed to the prospects of democratic consolidation and has forced the federal government to negotiate and compromise with subnational governments the implementation of national policies. On the other hand, the Brazilian experience highlights the constraints of decentralization in countries with deep‐rooted regional disparities. Furthermore, the financial weakness of the federal government which has been brought about by decentralization and by fiscal control brings new tensions to the federal arrangements and to public policies. Copyright © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Rethinking Federalism: Changing Power Relations Between the Center and the States

India's federalism during the last 50 years had two phases:three decades of centralized federalism followed by cooperativeand competitive federalism. Unitary features of India's Constitutionand planned development led to strong central dominance in thefirst phase, with the states in a subordinate position. Themomentum of impressive initial growth did not last. The late1970s saw a weakened Congress party, the emergence of coalitionpolitics, and a shift in the Center-states power balance. Growthfollowed liberalization and moves toward decentralization, butthis was accompanied by an accentuation of regional disparitiesand fiscal imbalances. A major factor in the negative resultshas been weaknesses in the intergovernmental transfer system.Desirable reforms, which maintain moves toward decentralizationand greater states' autonomy, are explored here.     

Municipal debt in Switzerland: new empirical results

Switzerland has experienced extensive institutional reforms at the local level that could influence local debt. These reforms have included municipal mergers, greater inter-communal cooperation, reformed political decision-making mechanisms, and the introduction of new public management measures. Many of these reforms originated at the cantonal level. However, the institutional diversity among Swiss municipalities hardly has diminished. A cross-sectional analysis for the 137 largest Swiss cities and villages in 2004 shows that direct democratic rights and a high degree of fiscal autonomy lead to a lower level of local debt. There is no statistical support for the hypothesis that reforms following the new public management guidelines had an effect on debt levels.     

Die Zentralisierung der Staatstätigkeit in einer Referendumsdemokratie: Evidenz aus der Schweiz

Previous theoretical and empirical research has shown that policymakers have incentives to centralize government activities in order to weaken the competitive pressure of fiscal federalism. We argue that referendums reduce the possibilities for collusion among representatives and the ability of higher level policy-makers to attract additional responsibilities. Empirical results from panel data for Swiss cantons between 1980 to 1998 support this hypothesis. The centralization of government activity, measured by budgetary outcomes, is significantly reduced by a fiscal referendum. This holds in the case of public revenue and its components, but also for public expenditure, in particular public education spending.     

Bremse oder Gaspedal? Eine empirische Untersuchung zur Wirkung der direkten Demokratie auf den Steuerstaat

This article analyzes the relationship between the different forms of direct democratic participation and the size of the tax state in the Swiss cantons for the period from 1983 to 2000. The analysis distinguishes between the different effects of the financial referendum and the initiative. Theoretical arguments suppose that the financial referendum curb the tax state, whereas the initiative is expected to contribute to its growth. Pooled time series analyses show that legal conditions of direct democratic participation in general and especially the legislation on financial referenda are much more important than the frequency of plebiscites for the explanation of the different sizes of the tax states in the cantons. As an additional result of the analyses, the impact of direct democracy on the tax state turns out to be much larger in the 1990s compared to the decade before.     

Lijphart goes regional: Different patterns of consensus in Swiss democracies

This article addresses the relationships among the main political institutions of the two dozen cantonal democracies which constitute the Swiss federal state. By replicating Lijphart's analysis in the Swiss subnational context, the article seeks to explain the relationships of the political-institutional variables in the Swiss cantons. The main finding of the article is that in contrast to international comparisons, the cantons cannot be classified along the continuum of majoritarian and consensus democracies. However, the Swiss cantonal democracies practice clearly distinguishable forms of power sharing. Based on a factor analysis and a cluster analysis, it is possible to distinguish a two-dimensional pattern of cantonal democracies and five groups of cantons. Although there are a number of different procedures to achieve political stability through division of power in the cantons, the different characteristics of power sharing can, essentially – and with reference to Switzerland's central institutions – perfectly well be situated on a single axis; namely, on that between pronounced direct citizen involvement and broadly supported government coalitions.     

The 2015 National Elections in Switzerland: Renewed Polarization and Shift to the Right

The 2015 election to the Swiss Parliament marks a return to an already observed trend that was only interrupted in 2011: a shift to the right and an increase in polarization. The vote share of the nationalist-conservative Swiss People's Party (SVP) has now reached a historical height of 29.4% (+2.8). This note discusses why cantons matter in the Swiss national elections, and to what degree elections have become nationalized. Institutionally, the 26 cantons serve as electoral districts. This leads to a highly disproportional electoral system and has magnified the minor vote shifts to a slightly more pronounced shift in seats, with the right now holding a tiny majority of 101 of 200 seats in the first chamber. The two winners, the SVP and the Liberals, also had most campaign funds at their disposal. They were able to guide an extensive nationwide campaign in which they advocated their core issues instead of candidates. Other parties only advertised at the cantonal level.     

Independent and competing agencies: An effective way to control government

Controlling government is a primary focus of the politico-economic literature. Recently, various political institutions have been analyzed from this perspective, most importantly balanced budget rules, fiscal federalism, and direct democracy. However, one type of institution has been neglected so far: elected competitors to the government. Such institutional competition between the government and an independent agency can be found at the Swiss local level, where finance Commissions compete with the government. In some parts of Switzerland, local finance commissions can ex ante criticize government projects and bring alternative policy proposals onto the political agenda, which are then voted on by the citizens. Thus, they become strong competitors to the government. We econometrically investigate this institutional setting by comparing the 26 Swiss cantons. We find the power of the local finance commission to have an economically relevant, statistically significant and robust negative effect on the tax burden and on public expenditures.     

The Role of Semi-Direct Democracy in Shaping Swiss Federalism: The Behavior of Cantons Regarding Revision of the Constitution, 1866-1981

Swiss federalism operates as a semi-direct democracy involvingreiterated constitutional choice by the people and the territorialunits. In this respect, the Swiss federal process is uniquein comparison to other federal systems. An analysis of constitutionalreferenda and constitutional initiatives conducted from 1866to 1981 was undertaken in order to characterize the politicalbehavior of Swiss cantons concerning the referenda that havealtered the original Constitution of 1848. The behavior of thecantons may be explained by their sociopolitical features. Threegroups of cantons are distinguished by their pattern of behaviortoward proposed revisions of the federal Constitution. In addition,a comparison was made of the similarity and divergence of thecantons with the pattern of behavior of the entire federationin order to measure the degree of cohesion of the Swiss partnership.Strikingly, some of the cantons with a minority subculture weremore frequently in the winning coalition than were some cantonsthat share more of the characteristics of the majority culture.The Swiss federal process is found to strengthen nation-buildingby means of the continual adaptation, along with some innovation,of the original constitutional design on the part of the peopleas a whole and the cantons.     

On the link between fiscal decentralization and public debt in OECD countries

Excessive borrowing by subnational governments is considered to be one of the perils of fiscal decentralization. On the other hand, fiscal decentralization might ensure the fiscal stability of the public sector by constraining Leviathan governments. Since the impact of decentralized government on fiscal outcomes is therefore ambiguous from a theoretical perspective, we explore this question empirically with a panel of 17 OECD countries over the 1975–2001 period. Our findings suggest that expenditure decentralization significantly reduces public indebtedness, whereas tax decentralization and vertical fiscal imbalances are insignificant.     

The fiscal effects of statehood: New Mexico and Arizona, 1903–1919

The residents of US territories often vote against statehood for fear government will use its greater sovereignty to impose a heavier tax burden. On the other hand, public choice theory predicts that fiscal decentralization limits government’s size. The financial reports of New Mexico and Arizona were examined before and after statehood in 1912. Graphical and regression analyses of the ratios of receipts and expenditures to property values and US GNP suggest that the relative price of government rose far more in the two new states than in a control state, Nevada, thus supporting the claims of statehood’s opponents.     

Fiscal Decentralization and Natural Disaster Mitigation: Evidence from the United States

How decentralized government structure influences public service delivery has been a major focus of debate in the public finance literature. In this paper, we empirically examine the effect of fiscal decentralization on natural disaster damages across the U.S. states. We construct a unique measure of decentralization using state and local government expenditures on natural resources, which include investment in flood control and mitigation measures, among others. Using state‐level panel data from 1982 to 2011, we find that states that are more decentralized in natural resource expenditures have experienced more economic losses from floods and storms. This effect is only pronounced in states that are at higher risks of flooding. Our findings suggest that fiscal decentralization may lead to inefficient protection against natural disasters and provide implications for the assignment of disaster management responsibilities across different levels of government in the U.S. federal system.     

Stumbling block or stepping stone? The influence of direct democracy on individual participation in parliamentary elections

This paper evaluates whether direct democracy supplements or undermines traditional representative democracy. While a first approach assumes that a culture of active direct democracy stimulates citizens’ political interest and ultimately bolsters participation in parliamentary elections, a competing hypothesis proposes a negative relationship between the frequency of ballot measures and electoral participation due to voter fatigue and decreased significance of elections. Our multilevel analysis of the 26 Swiss cantons challenges recent studies conducted for the U.S. states: In the Swiss context, where direct democracy is more important in the political process than the less salient parliamentary elections, greater use of direct democratic procedures is associated with a lower individual probability to participate in elections. Furthermore, by distinguishing between short and long-term effects of direct democracy, we show that the relationship observed is of a long-term nature and can therefore be seen as a result of adaptive learning processes rather than of instantaneous voter fatigue.     

Factors Driving the Promotion of Hydroelectricity: A Qualitative Comparative Analysis

In the wake of the COP21 conference in Paris, the transition to a low‐carbon energy supply remains a central issue on the political agenda. The deployment of renewable energies is often challenged by multiple issues (e.g., public acceptance, landscape protection, and so forth). Political actors try to overcome such challenges with various measures; however, the policy instruments used vary greatly in their strength. This article questions what factors lead to the adoption of strong policy instruments promoting hydroelectricity. Explanatory factors are derived from Kingdon's multiple streams framework and are analyzed with fuzzy‐set qualitative comparative analysis within the Swiss cantons. The findings show that the strength of policy promoting hydroelectricity depends on the conjunction of mainly two factors: ambitious climate targets and an already well‐established hydroelectricity sector that generates large tax revenues for the cantons. Depending on the context, the strength of left‐wing and green parties as well as the current level of exploitation play an important role with the aforementioned factors.     

The Impact of State Debt Management on Debt Activity

This article addresses the impact that state debt management has on the debt activity of a state debt program. A quantitative measure of state debt management is developed and used in analysis of state debt activity. The study finds that states with decentralized debt management issue more long-term debt as compared to states with other forms of debt management. The study also investigates the impact other institutional variables have on state debt activity and highlights the interaction effects of these variables with the institutional debt management variable. The study finds that the effects of previously tested variables such as the number of public authorities and constitutional debt limitations on debt activity are altered if the form of debt management is considered.     

Vertical influence or horizontal coordination? The purpose of intergovernmental councils in Switzerland

ABSTRACT

In 1993, the Swiss cantons established the conference of cantonal governments (KdK). While the literature on Swiss federalism generally acknowledges the important role of the KdK, little is known about its specific purpose, in particular compared to other, older intergovernmental councils operating in Switzerland. We therefore investigate the purpose of the KdK and contrast it with two other intercantonal conferences with nationwide scope, namely those on education and finance. To do so, we trace two of the most important federal reform processes of the last decade: the latest renewal of fiscal equalization and educational harmonization. We find a division of labour between the KdK and policy-specific councils. While the former aims at vertical political influence, the latter primarily engage in genuine horizontal policy coordination. This flexible and smooth interplay of the two types of councils has contributed to further strengthening the political role of the cantons in the Swiss federation.     

Problems of transnational policymaking: Environmental policy in the European Community

Abstract. Environmental protection is inherently a cross-border issue, which might be thought to create opportunities for transnational regulation. This has significant potential consequences for European integration. However, two contrasting trends can be identified. On the one hand, the increasing magnitude of environmental problems, along with growing public and elite awareness of these issues, are generating responses which put the European Community at the centre of a process of 'regulation'. It is intended that this role should grow in the twin contexts of the Single Market and of increasing interaction with Eastern Europe with its vast pollution problems. On the other hand, however, the kind of 'political' policy intervention which environmental protection requires has not really developed. EC environmental policies have thus far been rather weak in both formulation and, especially, implementation, and even existing gains are likely to come under increasing pressure from the trend towards economic deregulation characteristic of the Single European Market project. Probably the most significant impact of Community efforts in the environmental field has been to encourage the convergence and strengthening of national regulation among member states, more than to create distinct European policy processes and institutions.     

Interstate Spillovers,Fiscal Decentralization,and Public Spending on Medicaid Home‐ and Community‐Based Services

This article examines the interstate spillover effect of Medicaid expenditures for home‐ and community‐based services (HCBS) and tests the relationship between fiscal decentralization and public spending. Based on the theory of interstate strategic interaction, an empirical model is specified that explicitly accounts for interdependence in states’ spending decisions. The model is estimated by applying spatial econometric methods to panel data for the 50 U.S. states for 2000–2010. Findings show a positive interdependence in state HCBS expenditures that is contingent on similarity in citizen ideology between states. Fiscal decentralization, measured by transfer dependence and revenue autonomy, is positively related to Medicaid HCBS spending.