Don't Sweat the Details! Enhancing Congressional Committee Expertise Through the Use of Detailees

In contrast to the dramatic growth in the size and influence of the executive branch over the past 40 years, congressional committee staffing levels are at an all‐time low. Faced with growing demands to produce legislation and to conduct oversight of executive branch policymaking, Congress can and does supplement its existing staff by borrowing personnel, known as detailees, from federal agencies. Using an original dataset of detailees from 1997 to 2015, we analyze the degree to which congressional committees rely on detailees to increase legislative capacity. We find that committees in the House and Senate use detailees in different ways to further both legislative and oversight initiatives.     

A Race for the Regs: Unified Government,Statutory Deadlines,and Federal Agency Rulemaking

Theory suggests that Congress should delegate more policymaking authority to the bureaucracy under unified government, where lawmakers are less worried about the president orchestrating “bureaucratic drift.” Yet, all unified governments come to an end, making broad delegations potentially advantageous to future lawmaking coalitions (“coalitional drift”). We seek to assess how lawmakers simultaneously limit the risk of each of these pitfalls of delegation. Our answer is rooted in Congress’s ability to spur agency rulemaking activity under unified government. Specifically, we expect statutes passed under unified government to require agencies to issue regulations quickly and for enacting coalitions to use oversight tools to influence agency policy choices. Such “proximate oversight” allows coalitions to cement policy decisions before a new election changes the configuration of preferences within Congress and the executive branch. We assess our argument using unique data on both congressional rulemaking deadlines (1995–2014) and the speed with which agencies issue regulations (1997–2014).     

The Debate over Police Reform: Examining Minority Support for Citizen Oversight and Resistance by Police Unions

Researchers have argued that the creation of citizen oversight often involves debate between those that support its use and the police which do not. Police unions, for example, have a long history of objecting to the creation of oversight, especially during collective bargaining. Minority demands for police reform, on the other hand, can lend support for its implementation, especially after a highly publicized case of misconduct between the police and minority citizens. Using a retrospective approach, this study examined the extent to which these opposing forces influenced the existence of oversight. Findings suggest that departments that engage in collective bargaining were no more likely to use an oversight agency than departments that did not engage in collective bargaining. Cities with large percentages of African Americans, however, were more likely to have an existing oversight agency.     

Congressional Oversight Hearings and Policy Control

Oversight hearings should be an important congressional tool for controlling recalcitrant agencies, but it is not clear that this should always be equally true. The logic of principal‐agent models of legislative policy control implies that oversight might sometimes, but not always, be superfluous to said control. Here, I reintroduce oversight hearings to theories of policy control and argue that congressional committees conduct oversight hearings primarily as a response to the extent to which agencies have different policy preferences from them and as a function of their capacity to conduct hearings cheaply. I test these hypotheses using committee hearings data (Policy Agendas Project) from both the U.S. House of Representatives and the Senate from 1947 to 2006 and provide support for theoretical arguments about the institutional nature of legislative policymaking strategies and ultimately help clarify the role of oversight in legislative‐executive relations.     

Work activity of persons working as members of advisory committees established under the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA). Final rule

We are revising our disability regulations under titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act to establish a new, special rule that affects individuals who are receiving payments or providing services as members or consultants of a committee, board, commission, council or similar group established under the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA). Under this special rule, we will not count any earnings an individual is receiving from serving as a member or consultant of a FACA advisory committee when we determine if the individual is engaging in substantial gainful activity under titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act (the Act). In addition, we will not evaluate any of the services the individual is providing as a member or consultant of the FACA advisory committee when determining if the individual has engaged in substantial gainful activity under titles II and XVI of the Act. Based on our experience with FACA advisory committees and the frequency and level of activity required by these committees, we believe that performance of activity on these committees does not demonstrate the ability to perform substantial gainful activity. We believe this to be consistent with Congress's view, as it has recognized in creating the Ticket to Work advisory committee, for example, that current disability beneficiaries should be considered for membership. This also will encourage individuals with disabilities to serve on FACA advisory committees, thereby providing the benefit of their unique perspective on policies and programs to the Federal Government.     

The Regulation of Xenotransplantation in the United Kingdom After UKXIRA: Legal and Ethical Issues

Xenotransplantation - the transfer of living tissue between species - has long been heralded as a potential solution to the severe organ shortage crisis experienced by the United Kingdom and other 'developed' nations. However, the significant risks which accompany this biotechnology led the United Kingdom to adopt a cautious approach to its regulation, with the establishment of a non-departmental public body - UKXIRA - to oversee the development of this technology on a national basis. In December 2006 UKXIRA was quietly disbanded and replaced with revised guidance, which entrusts the regulation of xenotransplantation largely to research ethics committees. In this article we seek to problematize this new regulatory framework, arguing that specialist expertise and national oversight are necessary components of an adequate regulatory framework for a biotechnology which poses new orders of risk, challenges the adequacy of traditional understandings of autonomy and consent, and raises significant animal welfare concerns. We argue for a more considered and holistic approach, based on adequate consultation, to regulating biotechnological developments in the United Kingdom.     

Legal Reasoning and the Separation of Powers: A State-Level Analysis of Disputes Involving Federal Funds Appropriations*

This article investigates the influence of judicial decisions on state legislative oversight of federal funds. A systematic analysis of judicial decisions is undertaken in an effort to reveal (a) the extent to which such activity on the part of legislatures is permitted or denied by courts, and (b) the nature of legal reasoning that determines differential outcomes. The analysis reveals, among other things, that there are two divergent paths of law: one upholding the legislative prerogative to exercise the power of the purse, and the other upholding the executive function of governors to act as custodians and executors of federal funds and programs. The delegation of legislative powers to interim committees is likewise investigated.     

Rethinking UK Parliamentary Adaptation in EU Affairs: Devolution and Europeanisation

How national parliaments adapt to the European Union is an important debate. However, scholars often overlook the regional aspect. This is particularly so for the UK where, despite devolution since 1999, scholarship remains largely devolution-blind. It is assumed that evaluating UK parliamentary adaptation only requires assessing the work of Westminster committees. This article takes a first step towards rectifying this oversight through reconceptualising UK–EU parliamentary engagement as multi-territory, not state-centric. This is demonstrated by comparing the social construction of practices in Scotland, Wales and at Westminster since 1999. Acknowledging devolution, however, does not just require comparing practices. Additionally, the paper asks how the ideas of devolution have been taken up by actors, potentially transforming the meaning of UK engagement for them. This necessitates new approaches drawn from interpretivist and constructivist institutionalist theories. Ultimately, therefore, the paper goes further than arguing for devolution-aware research to promoting change more generally in how parliamentary adaptation is theorised.     

Party Effects in State Legislative Committees

Legislative scholars have theorized about the role of committees and whether they are, or are not, tools of the majority party. We look to the states to gain more empirical leverage on this question, using a regression discontinuity approach and novel data from all state committees between 1996 and 2014. We estimate that majority‐party status produces an 8.5 percentage point bonus in committee seats and a substantial ideological shift in the direction of the majority party. Additionally, we leverage a surprisingly frequent, but as if random occurrence in state legislatures—tied chambers—to identify majority‐party effects, finding similar support for partisan committees. We also examine whether the extent of committee partisanship is conditional on party polarization or legislative professionalism, but we find that it is not. Our results demonstrate that parties create nonrepresentative committees across legislatures to pursue their outlying policy preferences.     

Uncertainty and the Prevalence of Committee Outliers

Political scientists often suppose that the informational model of legislative organization predicts an absence of committee outliers. In fact, the model predicts that committee outliers will be more common when the floor is more uncertain than its committees. Data limitations have largely prevented testing this uncertainty‐outlier prediction, until now. For this article, I investigated whether or not the informational model correctly predicts under what scenarios outliers will be more frequent. As predicted, more uncertainty is associated with more committee outliers in U.S. state legislatures. Legislatures in which the floor is less informed than the committees are more likely to have committee outliers.     

Circumventing Legislative Committees: The US Senate

Committees have been established to improve legislation and make expert recommendations. However, many bills do not appear in committees, and how they reach the Senate floor varies in style and strategy. We develop and test expectations for when, as well as how, bills bypass Senate committee proceedings. The procedures legislators use to circumvent committees and what makes committee bypassing more probable are explored. The findings clearly demonstrate that bills introduced by ideologically extreme minority-party members are more likely to bypass committees. We also show a clear shift in the procedural choices senators make as the Senate becomes increasingly polarized. This article highlights the procedural choices members make, how these choices produce differing outcomes, and suggests evidence of positive agenda power for individual minority-party senators.     

条条与块块关系下的法院院长产生

条块关系是不同于西方学术典范的解释中国现象的中国叙事框架。在中国政治语境中,较之中央地方关系更重要的是条条与块块关系。在地方法院院长产生的问题上,作为块块的上级党委和本级党委与拟任职法院的上级法院之间,对人选各有不同支配关系。在武装夺权年代确立的"块块为主,条块结合"的地方治理机制,在市场经济条件下获得新的政治考量意义。     

Post-legislative scrutiny in the UK Parliament: adding value

ABSTRACT

Legislatures appoint committees for different purposes. Both Houses of the UK Parliament separate legislative committees from non-legislative, or select, committees. Each is unusual in that it utilises select committees to engage in post-legislative scrutiny. We examine why each engages in this type of scrutiny, given competing demands for limited resources. Distributive and informational theories are utilised to explain the difference between the two chambers, identifying why the form of asymmetrical bicameralism to be found in the United Kingdom facilitates scrutiny that would otherwise not be undertaken. The genesis and impact of post-legislative scrutiny committees are considered, with a focus on the House of Lords and why the use of such committees plays to the strengths of the House.     

Committee Outliers in State Legislatures

In this paper, we extend recent work exploring the prevalence of outlying committees in American state legislatures. Using an expanded sample of 45 states and measures of legislator preferences generated by a single, federated group, we find that most legislative committees are representative of the parent chambers from which their members are selected. Furthermore, we test multivariate models designed to account for theoretically relevant patterns in variations in outlier percentages among control and noncontrol committees. The fact that our models are such poor predictors of nonrepresentative committees speaks to the idiosyncratic nature of the relatively small percentage of outlying committees in the states. This conclusion, in turn, provides further support for the proposition that representative committees are simply rational.     

Federal Employees Health Benefits Program: limitation on physician charges and FEHB program payments--OPM. Interim regulation with request for comments

The Office of Personnel Management (OPM) is issuing an interim regulation that amends current Federal Employee Health Benefits (FEHB) Program regulations to require that the charges and FEHB fee-for-service plans' benefit payments for certain physician services furnished to retired enrolled individuals do not exceed the limits on charges and payments established under the Medicare fee schedule for physician services. The regulation authorizes the FEHB plans, under the oversight of OPM, to notify the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS) of a Medicare participating hospital, physician or supplier who knowingly and willfully fails to accept, on a repeated basis, the Medicare rate as payment in full from an FEHB plan. The regulation also authorizes the FEHB plans, under the oversight of OPM, to notify the Secretary of HHS of a Medicare nonparticipating physician or supplier who knowingly and willfully charges, on a repeated basis, more than the Medicare limiting charge amount (115 percent of the Medicare Nonparticipating Physician Fee Schedule amount).     

Oversight of HMRC soft law: lessons from the Ombudsman

An investigation of the role which the Ombudsman plays in tax law, on which comparatively little has been written, reveals that the body makes an important and distinct contribution. There is now almost universal acceptance that tax law is overly complex and indeterminate. If the primary law offers few answers to the taxpayer, then HMRC’s role as administrator of the system becomes apparent. Soft law elaborating upon how HMRC will apply the primary law to a given class of taxpayers is rendered indispensable. In practice however, HMRC soft law has often been found to be deficient. Analysis of the current oversight arrangements for HMRC soft law immediately reveals the genesis of these issues. Select committees exercise Parliamentary control, whilst an independent body performs external audits. These entities however only incommensurately examine the soft law. Into this void steps the Parliamentary and Health Service Ombudsman, a body which has ‘carved for itself a distinctive niche’ in the public law framework. The paper accordingly seeks to elaborate upon the important role that the Ombudsman plays in scrutinising HMRC soft law and the lessons which can be derived from this analysis.     

Regulation of Firearm Dealers in the United States: An Analysis of State Law and Opportunities for Improvement

Firearms were associated with 30, 136 deaths in the United States in 2003. Most guns are initially sold to the public through a network of retail dealers. Licensed firearm dealers are an important source of guns for criminals and gun traffickers. Just one percent of licensed dealers were responsible for more than half of all guns traced to crime. Federal law makes it difficult for ATF to inspect and revoke the licenses of problem gun dealers. State licensing systems, however, are a greatly under-explored opportunity for firearm dealer oversight. We identify and categorize these state systems to identify opportunities for interventions to prevent problem dealers from supplying guns to criminals, juveniles, or gun traffickers. Just seventeen states license gun dealers. Twenty-three states permit routine inspections of dealers but only two mandate that those inspections occur on a regular basis. Twenty-six states impose record-keeping requirements for gun sales. Only thirteen states require some form of store security measures to minimize firearm theft. We conclude with recommendations for a comprehensive system of state licensing and oversight of gun dealers. Our findings can be useful for the coalition of more than fifty U.S. mayors that recently announced it would work together to combat illegal gun trafficking.     

AI research and data protection: Can the same rules apply for commercial and academic research under the GDPR?

The paper examines how the EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) is applied to the development of AI products and services, drawing attention to the differences between academic and commercial research. The GDPR aims to encourage innovation by providing several exemptions from its strict rules for scientific research. Still, the GDPR defines scientific research in a broad manner, which includes academic and commercial research. However, corporations conducting commercial research might not have in place a similar level of ethical and institutional safeguards as academic researchers. Furthermore, corporate secrecy and opaque algorithms in AI research might pose barriers to oversight. The aim of this paper is to stress the limits of the GDPR research exemption and to find the proper balance between privacy and innovation. The paper argues that commercial AI research should not benefit from the GDPR research exemption unless there is a public interest and has similar safeguards to academic research, such as review by research ethics committees. Since the GDPR provides this broad exemption, it is crucial to clarify the limits and requirements of scientific research, before the application of AI drastically transforms this field.     

Conclusion: prospects for analysing committees in comparative perspective

ABSTRACT

While theories of committees in the U.S. Congress can continue to play a central role in the still-growing comparative study of committees, they require careful, frequent modification. Moreover, more fruitful study of committees may require a wider framework, recognising more fully that committees are institutions embedded in wider social structures.     

Legislative Efficiency and Political Inclusiveness: The Effect of Procedures on Interest Group Mobilization in the European Parliament

This paper contributes to discussions surrounding interest group representation in the European Parliament. Drawing from conceptualizations of legitimacy, and theoretical work on information-access we argue that different procedures bestow a different type of authority to parliamentary committees affecting their legitimacy orientation, in turn impacting the balance between private and public interests mobilised. We assess a population of 10,000 accredited lobbyists, and the procedural output across the 7th legislature’s committees (2009–2014). Our analysis indicates that committees with a higher ratio of Ordinary Legislative Procedures to Own Initiative Reports see greater private interest mobilisation. Conversely, in committees where the procedures’ ratios are inverse we observe greater public interest mobilisation. Theoretically, we provide a novel approach for framing the committee’s nature from a procedural perspective, bridging discussions on interest group mobilisation and the democratic deficit. Empirically, the results overturn the premise of business dominance across the institution’s committees through a unique dataset.