Legislative Oversight in the Ukrainian Rada: Assessing the Effectiveness of Parliamentary Committees

This study analyses factors associated with the perceived effectiveness of committee oversight in the Ukrainian Rada. Based on two waves of original survey data, it attempts to discern whether Ukrainian MPs view the committee oversight process primarily as an extension of partisan politics, a forum for constituency representation and resource distribution, or a politically independent process of information acquisition and regulation. The findings of the analysis suggest that partisan political considerations do not play a significant role in shaping MP attitudes towards committee oversight. Rather, deputy evaluations of the oversight process are influenced mainly by distributional and informational factors, suggesting that committee oversight is one area in which legislative institutionalisation appears to be taking root in post-communist Ukraine.     

Searching for the Electoral Connection: Parliamentary Party Switching In the Ukrainian Rada, 1998–2002

Studies of legislative behavior almost universally begin with the assumption that legislators desire reelection. For scholars who study the Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada, this assumption is perhaps tenuous, given the weaknesses of political parties and the significant party switching. Yet an analysis of party switching between 1998 and 2002 using a new method that controls for selection bias demonstrates that, although turnover among parties was high, this turnover followed an electoral logic: deputies changed parties, in part, to secure reelection. Thus, the electoral connection, assumed in so much of the legislative behavior literature, existed even in the chaotic Rada.     

Electoral Influences on Legislative Behavior in Mixed‐Member Systems: Evidence from Ukraine's Verkhovna Rada

Abstract: This article addresses how mixed‐member systems that combine proportional representation (PR) and single‐member districts (SMD) into a single election can influence legislators' voting behavior. Scholars have generally extended standard expectations of behavior to mixed‐member systems by assuming that legislators occupying PR seats in mixed‐member parliaments should be more cohesive than those occupying SMD seats. I argue that controlling for seat type alone does not take into account the interaction between PR and SMD in mixed‐member systems. Using voting data from Ukraine's Verkhovna Rada, I show that controlling for dual candidacy and the “safety” of the deputy's district or list position increases our understanding of the factors motivating legislative cohesion.     

Electoral Institutions and Legislative Particularism

How do electoral institutions affect legislative behavior? Though a large body of theoretical scholarship posits a negative relationship between multimember districting and the provision of particularistic goods, empirical scholarship has found little evidence in support of this expectation. Using data on the provision of US post offices from 1876 to 1896, a period during which many states elected congressional representatives from at‐large districts, and a differences‐in‐differences approach, I find that counties represented by at‐large representatives received approximately 8% fewer post offices. The results have important implications for studying how electoral institutions affect incentives for legislative behavior.     

The Electoral Connection and Legislative Committees

This article examines whether the career needs of legislators – to be re-elected or to move on to another political post – allow us to explain the rules governing committee structures and the committee assignments individual legislators obtain. It uses the institutional variations provided by Argentina, Costa Rica, and Venezuela to test hypotheses about committee assignments and committee assignment mechanisms. It finds that incentives created by candidate selection procedures and electoral rules show some relationship to committee assignments, but with a good deal of variation across national cases and individual careers.     

Parties and Electoral Performance in the Market for Political Consultants

We investigate whether the hiring relationships of candidates and political consulting firms better resembles the predictions of the “adversarial” or “allied” models of consultant‐party interaction. We find that the highest‐quality consultants are not allocated to the most competitive races, consultant‐candidate relationships persist even as candidates' electoral prospects change, and firms who work for challengers face a higher risk of market exit than firms working for incumbents. The market focuses entirely on win‐loss records and ignores the information on consultant performance available in candidates' vote shares. These findings depict a market driven by individual candidate, rather than aggregate party, goals.     

Political Parties and the Representativeness Of Legislative Committees

What role do parties play in determining which interests committees represent? In this article, I compare committee organization and representativeness in Nebraska's nonpartisan legislature with those in the partisan senates of Kansas and Iowa. I demonstrate that when parties do not organize legislative conflict, committees are less representative of the full chamber. I argue, however, that committee representativeness does not necessarily result from parties actively working to create representative committees. Rather, when legislative conflict has a definitive partisan structure and the committees are always controlled by the majority party, representative committees will result as a simple by‐product of the partisan structure and organization.     

Electoral Institutions,the Personal Vote,and Legislative Organization

What is the relationship between electoral institutions and the internal organization of legislatures? Existing research on the U.S. Congress suggests that electoral incentives shaped by the candidate‐centered nature of congressional elections explain the emergence of strong committees in that legislature. Exploring the issue from a comparative perspective, it is argued that the impact of ballot structure on committee system structure is dependent on how legislators cultivate personal votes. Committees will be stronger when legislators supply fiscal legislative particularism (pork), but weaker when legislators cultivate support by delivering extra‐legislative constituency service. Statistical analysis, combining original data on committee design in 39 democratic legislatures with measures of ballot structure and mechanism to cultivate a personal vote (MCPV), confirms the expectation.     

How Parties Create Electoral Democracy,Chapter 2

Parties neither cease to exist nor cease to compete for office when the general election is over. Instead, a new round of competition begins, with legislators as voters and party leaders as candidates. The offices at stake are what we call “mega‐seats.” We consider the selection of three different types of mega‐seats—cabinet portfolios, seats on directing boards, and permanent committee chairs—in 57 democratic assemblies. If winning parties select the rules by which mega‐seats are chosen and those rules affect which parties can attain mega‐seats (one important payoff of “winning”), then parties and rules should coevolve in the long run. We find two main patterns relating to legislative party systems and a country's length of experience with democratic governance.     

香港特区立法会选举制度探析

香港立法会由什么样的议员组成,是香港选举制度发展一个重大问题,不仅关系到香港的政治生态,而且关系到香港社会稳定与经济的发展。香港选举制度的发展应遵循循序渐进、均衡参与的原则。功能组别的存在本身具有合理性,功能组别选举也是香港选举制度发展特色之一,在香港民主制度的发展中发挥了重要的作用。但是也应当看到功能组别选举中的一些不合理因素,也需要进一步改革,为了保持社会的稳定性及政改的便利性。较为理想的路径选择是分阶段推动功能组别的改革,使之与香港社会民主制度的发展相适应。     

Legislative Behavior in Romania: The Effect of the 2008 Romanian Electoral Reform

This article analyzes the impact of electoral rules on legislators’ rate of vote defection from their party position in legislatures while accounting for how party‐leadership strength mediates this impact. To this end it looks at the effect of the 2008 Romanian electoral reform. The reform shifted the electoral system from a closed‐list proportional representation to one in which all candidates run in single‐member districts. The analysis finds that because party leaders have maintained their leverage intact, the impact of the reform was minimal, with legislators being more likely to defect in less important votes only, in which party leaders allow defection. Also, after the reform legislators are more likely to use other means to impress their voters, such as legislative initiation and cabinet questioning. These forms of behavior are more accepted by party leaders.     

Electoral Reform and Changes in Legislative Behavior: Adoption of the Secret Ballot in Congressional Elections

There is widespread agreement that the Australian ballot fundamentally altered the American electoral system. One common approach to test the effects of ballot reform is to examine legislators elected under the party and secret ballot. An alternative research design, which we adopt here, compares changes in the behavior of legislators who were elected under both ballot types. We use this approach to investigate whether ballot reform directly influenced legislators' decisions to seek renomination and their behavior within the institution. Our results raise a number of important implications for understanding the effects of electoral reform on political behavior.     

我国通讯监听诉讼规则之建构

通讯监听诉讼规则对惩罚犯罪和保障基本人权具有双重价值。首先概述西方主要法制发达国家相关立法状况,接着对我国相关立法缺陷进行分析,并就如何建构我国通讯监听诉讼规则提出立法建议。     

The Effect of the Electoral Calendar on Politicians' Selection into Legislative Cohorts and Legislative Behavior in Argentina, 1983–2007

How do electoral opportunities affect politicians' career strategies? Do politicians behave strategically in response to the opportunities provided by the electoral calendar? We argue that in a legislature that combines nonstatic ambition with a staggered electoral calendar, different kinds of politicians will have dissimilar preferences towards running in concurrent or midterm elections. More specifically, politicians with no previous executive experience should strategically run in midterm legislative elections in order to increase their visibility among voters, while more experienced politicians should opt for concurrent elections. We support these claims with data from the Argentine Chamber of Deputies between 1983 and 2007.     

Electoral Rules and Party Switching: How Legislators Prioritize Their Goals

Stemming from ambition theory, a vast body of studies has demonstrated how politicians' pursuits of different goals can explain their behaviors. Among other goals, politicians strive for re‐election or to attain a better office. However, little is known about the way politicians prioritize these goals. This article uses the phenomenon of legislative party switching to address this void and examines how hierarchy between goals determines legislator strategies. The study exploits the 2008 Romanian electoral reform, which rendered the electoral system more candidate centered. Drawing on data from more than 3,900 individual‐level observations over the period from 1996 to 2012, this article shows how vote incentives alter the trade‐offs between re‐election and office motivations. The findings suggest that politicians will pursue office goals only if the goal of re‐election is to be achieved.     

Ukrainian Orthodoxy and the Ukrainian Project

The author analyzes the evolution of inter-Church and Church-state relations in post-Soviet Ukraine in the context of Ukrainian nation building and Russian-Ukrainian relations.     

The Role of Party: The Legislative Consequences of Partisan Electoral Competition

We examine the proposition that incentives for legislative organization can be explained by the nature of electoral competition. We argue that legislators in environments where parties are competitive for majority status are most likely to have delegated power to their leadership to constrain individualistic behavior within their party, which will in turn increase the spatial predictability of individual voting patterns. Using roll‐call votes and district‐level electoral data from the U.S. state legislatures, we show empirically that increased statewide interparty competition corresponds to more predictable voting behavior overall, while legislators from competitive districts and those in the minority party have less predictable behavior.     

Size,Power, and Electoral Systems: Exogenous Determinants of Legislative Procedural Choice

I tested hypotheses about the relationship between exogenous institutions and legislative procedural choice using a unique cross‐sectional approach and a dataset gleaned from 55 legislative bodies from around the world. I focused on three entrenched characteristics of legislative bodies that we have theoretical reason to think will shape procedures: size, the relative power of the chamber, and the method by which its members are selected. Relatively small and powerful bodies generally have decentralized procedures. To a lesser extent, we can say the same of chambers that have electoral systems that incentivize the personal vote.     

非法证据排除规则的理论分析和立法完善

非法证据排除规则的建立和健全是我国刑事诉讼法律制度逐步走向完善的标志。《关于办理刑事案件排除非法证据若干问题的规定》和《刑事诉讼法修正案草案》对非法证据排除规则做了系统规定,但是这两部法律文件中的相关规定还有待完善,我们有必要对这两部法律文件中关于非法证据排除规则的相关规定存在的缺陷和不足进行剖析,并提出《刑事诉讼法修正案草案》的完善意见。     

论商法通则的立法定位及其逻辑展开

立法定位既是商法通则立法的基点和逻辑起点,亦是指导商法通则司法适用的线索和指南。从商法通则和《民法总则》的关系、自身属性、适用对象三方面考虑,商法通则应当是“补充法”“权利法”和“裁判法”。制定商法通则不是对民法典“民商合一”立法体制的否定,恰恰是对民法典的必要“补充”和有益“完善”;商法通则的内容设计应当以商事权利为主轴和核心;其规范逻辑结构与构成要素应当符合构成要件—法律后果之要求,以便于法适用和司法裁判。在三者关系上,“补充法”和“裁判法”的商法通则是从“外部”关系进行考虑的;“权利法”是从商法通则“内部”属性来认识的;“权利法”和“补充法”的商法通则是从“静态”视角看待的,“裁判法”是从“动态”适用视角考虑的。