Efficiency of 'Simple' Liability Rules When Courts Make Erroneous Estimation of the Damage

The literature on liability rules shows that the damage awards under a liability rule affect the efficiency of the rule. One crucial factor that could affect the damage awards and therefore the efficiency characteristics of liability rules is the error made by a court while estimating the harm suffered by the victims. In this paper efficiency property of what we label as 'simple' liability rules when courts make errors in estimation of the damage is studied in a unified framework. The paper provides a characterization of efficient simple liability rules and shows that the biased court errors act to change the efficiency characterization of simple liability rules. A necessary and sufficient condition for a simple liability rule to be efficient in the presence of upper-biased court errors is provided. The analysis is carried out in a quite general framework.     

Proprietary Estoppel and Responsibility for Omissions

The ‘acquiescence’ category of proprietary estoppel is a rare example of responsibility for pure omissions in private law. On liberal‐individualistic theories of ownership, the policy considerations against liability for nondoing are exceptionally powerful in the context of rights over land. Nevertheless, I argue that in proprietary estoppel the law is justified in imposing a duty on the right‐holder to alert a stranger when his actions are based on a mistake. Owners of property rights are under what Honoré termed a ‘special duty’ to contribute to the social good of efficient market for land by publicising their rights. This ‘duty to speak’ is however relatively weak and cannot completely suppress considerations against liability for omission. While liability in the acquiescence category can be justified in principle, the current law, in which owners who failed to correct the mistake of the relying party incur similar liability to owners who actively encouraged the other party to rely, is untenable.     

Strict liability versus negligence when the injurer's activity involves positive externalities

In this paper, I assert that, if the potential injurer’s activity involves externalities unrelated to accidents, the strict liability rule minimizing only the social cost associated with accidents does not induce the social optimum. I also demonstrate that if the externalities are positive, the negligence rule can perform better than the strict liability rule by selecting the due care appropriately, whereas it cannot if the externalities are negative. This argument can be applied to the product liability law. JEL Classification K13     

Moral theories of torts: Their scope and limits: Part I

One approach to legal theory is to provide some sort of rational reconstruction of all or of a large body of the common law. For philosophers of law this has usually meant trying to rationalize a body of law under one or another principle of justice. This paper explores the efforts of the leading tort theorists to provide a moral basis — for the law of torts. The paper is divided into two parts. In the first part I consider and reject the view that tort law is best understood as falling either within the ambit of the principle of retributive justice, a comprehensive theory of moral responsibility, or an ideal of fairness inherent in the idea that one should impose on others only those risks others impose on one. The second part of the paper distinguishes among various conceptions of corrective or compensatory justice and considers arguments — including previous arguments by the author himself — to the effect that tort law is best understood as rooted in principles of corrective justice. This paper argues that although the use of principles of justice may render defensible many (but by no means all) of the claims to repair and to liability recognized in torts, it cannot explain why we have adopted a tort system as the approach to vindicating those claims. Some other principle — probably not one of justice — is needed to explain why it is that the victims claims to repair is satisfied by having his losses shifted to his injurer — rather than through some other means of doing so. The paper concludes that the law of torts cannot be understood — in the sense of being given a rational reconstruction — under any one principle of morality.     

Comparative Vigilance

A growing body of literature suggests that courts and juriesare inclined toward division of liability between two strictlynon-negligent or "vigilant" parties. In this paper, we explorethe economic efficiency of liability rules based on comparativevigilance. We devise rules that are efficient and that rewardvigilance. Commonly used liability rules have discontinuousliability shares. We develop a liability rule, which we callthe "super-symmetric rule," that is both efficient and continuous,that is based on comparative negligence when both parties arenegligent and on comparative vigilance when both parties arevigilant, and that is always responsive to increased care.     

Moral theories of torts: Their scope and limits: Part II

One approach to legal theory is to provide some sort of rational reconstruction of all or of a large body of the common law. For philosophers of law this has usually meant trying to rationalize a body of law under one or another principle of justice. This paper explores the efforts of the leading tort theorists to provide a moral basis - in the sense of rational reconstruction based on alleged moral principles - for the law of torts. The paper is divided into two parts. In the first part I consider and reject the view that tort law is best understood as falling either within the ambit of the principle of retributive justice, a comprehensive theory of moral responsibility, or an ideal of fairness inherent in the idea that one should impose on others only those risks others impose on one. The second part of the paper distinguishes among various conceptions of corrective or compensatory justice and considers arguments — including previous ones by the author himself — to the effect that tort law is best understood as rooted in principles of corrective justice. This paper argues that although the principles of justice may render defensible many (but by no means all) of the claims to repair and to liability recognized in torts, it cannot explain why we have adopted a tort system as the approach to vindicating those claims. Some other principle — probably not one of justice — is needed to explain why it is that the victim's claim to repair is satisfied by having his losses shifted to his injurer — rather than through some other means of doing so. The paper concludes that the law of torts cannot be understood — in the sense of being given a rational reconstruction — under any one principle of morality.     

BOOK REVIEWS

Book reviewed in this article:
Elliott A. Krause, P ower and I llness , Elsevier, New York (1977) 383 pages.
Guldo Calabresi and Philip Bobbltt, TRAGIC CHOICES , W.W. Norton, New York (1978) 252 pages, 3.95 (paper).
David Rorvik, I n H is I mage : T he C loning of a M an
Susan Sontag, I llness as M etaphor     

The development of care technology under liability law

It is well known that strict liability and negligence induce pareto optimal care in a most restrictive model of unilateral accidents. The paper at hand extends this traditional theorem from its static context to an intertemporal setting where tort law induces progress in care technology. This model provides a methodological framework for a general analysis of the dynamic incentives generated by alternative liability rules. One of the many possible extensions of the basic model is to allow for incomplete information. Particularly, we drop the assumption that the authority setting the due care standard under negligence is able to assess technical progress ex ante. It is shown that the dynamic incentives of the negligence rule are distorted compared to strict liability in this modified framework.     

Poetic Justice: Why Sex-Slaves Should be Allowed to Sue Ignorant Clients in Conversion

In this article I argue that clients who purchase commercial sex from forced prostitutes should be strictly liable in tort towards the sex-slaves. Such an approach is both normatively defensible and doctrinally feasible. As I have argued elsewhere, fairness and equality demand that clients compensate sex-slaves even if one refuses to acknowledge that fault is involved in purchasing sex from a prostitute who might be forced. In this article I argue that such strict liability could be grounded in the tort of conversion, and not only (as argued elsewhere) in battery. Since the quintessential experience of sex-slaves is that of being treated as chattels, the appropriate legal response is to allow them to benefit from the strict liability imposed on those who interfere with an owner’s dominion over his property. Accordingly, sex-slaves should be viewed as both subjects and objects. As subjects they can sue clients for the violation of their sexual autonomy manifested by their treatment as objects. This approach is both advantageous to sex-slaves, in the sense it affords them protection that might not otherwise exist, and fair, since the ultimate response to the objectification of sex-slaves by clients should be to afford the former a proprietary-based claim against the latter. I further explain why my approach is not problematic on conceptual grounds, anti-commodification sentiments or feminist concerns with the symbolic message of my solution: that the law treats women as property.     

Inducing corporate compliance: A compound corporate liability regime

Corporate liability regimes have two major social goals: (i) inducing corporations to internalize all social ramifications of their activity; and (ii) inducing corporations to prevent, deter, and report their employee misconduct. The scholarly polemic has shown that none of the liability regimes recognized thus far in the literature efficiently satisfies both social goals. Following a Law and Economics approach, this paper develops an innovative regime that may comprise an optimal corporate liability framework in most settings. The Compound Corporate Liability Regime developed in this paper is a two-layer strict liability regime. Under this regime, corporations that self-report their employee misconduct incur a sanction that is reduced by the variable enforcement costs saved due to their self-reporting. Such a liability framework aligns social and corporations’ interests, and thereby satisfies both social goals of corporate liability regimes.     

试论我国未来民法典中的民事责任制度的体例

传统大陆法系的立法体例是将民事责任规定在债法中,责任与债融为一体,在民法典中并没有单独规定民事责任专章。有的学者认为,民事责任的含义可以分两方面来理解,第一种含义是指某人对他人的权利或者利益不法地加以侵害时,应该受到的民法上的制裁,而这种责任是债务成立的原因;第二种意义是指债务人就其债务而应以其财产为之所承担的担保,这种民事责任是债务成立之后的结果。在很多国家的民事立法中,以有债务即由此种民事责任为原则,所以由此产生的结果就是债务与责任两者经常被混为一谈。然而现代民法将民事责任与债相分离已经是一种不可阻挡的趋势。我国《民法通则》一个显著的特点就是单独就民事责任设立了一章,从而突破了传统大陆法系将民事责任纳入执法的立法体例,可以说,这一设定是我国民事立法的一大特色。本文通过阐述《民法通则》民事责任制度的优点和不足,对之加以扬弃,从而为民法典中民事责任制度的构建提出一点看法。     

公司法人本质属性回归

公司法人有限责任是公司之生命价值所在,而公司法人独立财产则是公司法人有限责任的前提和基础,二者相辅相成,同为公司最根本的属性.在此基础上,应完善相关法律规定,明确公司法人财产的独立性,使公司法人本质属性得以回归,进而促进公司法人制度在我国社会经济发展中发挥更大的作用.     

Intangible heritage: traditional medicine and knowledge governance

Legal context: Although traditional medicine constitutes a component part ofthe identity of the cultural communities concerned, this formof intangible cultural heritage is vulnerable in a globalizingworld where little place is left for the protection of beliefsystems. Key points: While much has been written on traditional knowledge and IPrights, less scholarly attention has focused on the culturaldimension of traditional medicine. Further, no solution hasbeen reached on the best way to ensure its protection. Thiscontribution attempts to establish a linkage between differentsectors of international law, addressing the complex interplaybetween traditional medicine, intended as a special form ofintangible cultural heritage, and international knowledge governance. While the TRIPS Agreement adopts only proprietary approachesto knowledge governance, it has been questioned whether, inthe case of pharmaceuticals, other non-proprietary approacheswould be preferable. Different approaches will be put forwardand the Draft Treaty on Medical Research and Development willbe considered. This would provide a better framework for safeguardingand diffusing traditional medicine. Practical significance: Protecting and promoting traditional medicine may help curingdiseases spread all over the world. Thus, beyond its culturalaspects, the practical importance of traditional medicine liesin its capacity to promote the right to health and human dignity.     

Wikitopia: Balancing intellectual property rights within open source research databases

Wiki “communities” based on the open access ideology allow any visitor to easily add, remove or edit content. However, there are a slew of ethics and policy challenges inherent in their use. Open source software developers are faced with the dilemma of openly sharing their intellectual property and prevent others from claiming proprietary rights from the code they freely shared to the public? Intellectual Property rights licensing, ironically, is the route by which open software developers have chosen to regulate their free code in cyberspace. Open source code is generally free on the surface; but in reality, it comes with obligations which are enforceable by law. Aside from the potential liability for intellectual property infringement, the use of open software raises competition law and tort liability issues. The European Union has developed the European Public License which is written in conformity with the copyright, product liability and consumer protection laws of the 27 member states. The EU Commission has also proposed a new Directive which will extend the principles of consumer protection rules to cover licensing agreements of products like software. This paper will address the various legal issues that may arise in open source community sharing.     

Ownership Rights and the Rites of Ownership

Using condominium owner and landowner narratives about their property, I consider how people answer the question, What does it mean to own something? These property narratives are framed around three sets of social practices, myths, and beliefs which I call rites of identity, rites of settlement, and rites of struggle—the rites of ownership. According to these narratives, ownership requires that the person possessing the property carry out these rites. Their sense of entitlement—ownership rights—is framed by these rites. Following the rites makes one a deserving property owner. Property rights are seen as protectors against arbitrary, unpredictable changes in status that violate these owners, sense that they are entitled to keep what they had worked so hard for and planned for so long. I conclude with a discussion of the value of property narratives for understanding the link between law and culture.     

Property in Body Parts and Products of the Human Body

An intriguing question, which until recently had not been directly explored by the courts, is the extent to which English law recognises body parts and products of the human body as property capable of ownership. Although the common law currently recognises no general property in a dead body (and only limited possessory rights in respect of it), this apparent “no-property rule” provides no justification, it is submitted, for denying proprietary status to parts or products of a living human body. The recent decision of the Court of Appeal in Yearworth v. North Bristol NHS Trust ([2009] EWCA Civ 37) lends strong support to the view that genetic material (as the product of a living human body) is capable of ownership, at least in the context of a claim in the tort of negligence and bailment. This article examines the various issues by reference to both English and Commonwealth authority.

Autonomy and the Rule of Law

Abstract. In this paper I am concerned with the belief that the moral value of the rule of law is based upon some kind of connection between the rule of law and the respect and promotion of personal autonomy. I identify and analyse two possible connections: the rule of law as a sufficient condition for the respect and promotion of personal autonomy, and the rule of law as a necessary condition for personal autonomy. My conclusion is that neither of these two connections grants the moral value of the rule of law.     

物业服务费收缴主体的错位与回归

在众多的物业管理纠纷中,涉及物业服务收费的纠纷又是其中的重点和难点。应当理清其中的基础法律关系,明确物业服务费收缴主体应当是物业服务合同的一方当事人——建筑物区分所有权人组织,而不是物业服务企业,从而使物业服务企业走出困扰其发展的收费困境。     

Plato and the origin of mental health

This essay examines the history of the concept of mental health. Its origin can be traced to Plato, who argued that immorality is to the soul what disease is to the body. The purpose of this argument was to answer those who thought that morality is a set of social conventions, and in that sense, is contrary to nature. Plato responded by turning to those who made a systematic study of nature – the medical writers of his day – and claiming that if proper balance is needed to maintain a healthy body, the same is true of the soul. Thus the natural state of the soul is one in which the various parts agree on which should rule. This does not mean that Plato sought to excuse immoral behavior by treating it as a medical condition, only that he regarded immoral behavior as contrary to nature and thus treatable. Although later attempts to define mental health are not as rigid as Plato's, it is remarkable how many of his insights are still applicable, in particular the claim that morality and mental health, though not identical, are nonetheless linked. A case in point is the experience of wanting something but not liking the fact that you want it. Plato regarded internal conflict of this sort as a paradigm case of psychic dysfunction. I argue that we can regard it as either a moral failing or a mental one.     

Historical Entitlement and the Practice of Bequest: Is There a Moral Right of Bequest?

Entitlement theorists claim that bequest is a moral right. The aim of this essay is to determine whether entitlement theorists can, on their own grounds, consistently defend that claim. I argue that even if there is a moral right to self-appropriated property and to engage in inter vivos transfers, it is a mistake to contend that there exists an equivalent moral right to make a bequest. Taxing or regulating bequest does not violate an individual’s moral rights because, regardless of whether bequest safeguards certain interests, those interests are not the interests of a living, morally inviolable being. Instead, they are the interests of a deceased entity that has lost the ability to track what it values and pursue projects in accord with those values – a quality that by entitlement theorists’ own arguments renders persons morally significant and deserving of rights in the first place.