On the Argument of Infinite Regress in Proving Self-awareness

In PV 3.440ab and 473cd–474ab, Dharmakīrti raises the argument of infinite regress (anavasthiti) twice. The argument originates from the same argument stated by Dignāga in his Pramā?asamuccaya 1.12ab1, in which the fault of infinite regress is called ani??hā. In Pramā?asamuccayav?tti 1.12b2, Dignāga presents another type of argument of infinite regress (anavasthā) driven by memory, which is elucidated by Dharmakīrtian commentators. The arguments were criticized by Kumārila Bha??a and Bha??a Jayanta and even more intensively so by two modern scholars, Jonardon Ganeri and Birgit Kellner. In this paper, I first examine the source of the arguments—Pramā?asamuccayav?tti 1.12 and its translation, based on which I provide my interpretation of the two models of arguments of infinite regress. I then offer my response, according to Dharmakīrti and his commentators, to Ganeri’s and Kellner’s critiques. By doing so, I attempt to identify the essence of these arguments is and find out to what extent one can defend the infinite regress argument in Dignāga’s and Dharmakīrti’s theory.     

Organizational Justice Comes of Age: Review of the <Emphasis Type="Italic">Oxford Handbook of Justice in the Workplace</Emphasis> Edited by Russell Cropanzano and Maureen Ambrose

The subfield of organizational justice has entered young adulthood. Its scientific achievements from conception to contemporary applications are represented in The Oxford Handbook of Justice in the Workplace, edited by Russell Cropanzano and Maureen Ambrose. The Handbook highlights advances in the field’s theoretical foundations, measurements, and applications. This Handbook follows a decade on the heels of its predecessor, Handbook of Organizational Justice, edited by Jerald Greenberg and Jason Colquitt. In 2005 the justice field was dominated by developmental debates over esoteric definitions of various facets of organizational justice, whereas the present Handbook reflects construct refinement, orientation to detail, and theoretical nuance that comes with maturation. This timely release therefore offers a fitting opportunity to reflect on key trends over the last 10 years and to consider the future of organizational justice research. This collection of comprehensive chapters meticulously compiled by the luminaries of organizational justice shows that organizational justice is still young, developing, and full of potential to influence the world.     

Doing Green,Critical Criminology with an Auto-Ethnographic,Feminist Approach

In this article, I employ an auto-ethnographic methodology as a point of departure in order to explore my path into research on the legal and illegal trade in wild animals which, over the years, has consisted of interviews with experts and enforcement agencies in Brazil, Colombia and Norway including offenders (in Norway), and analysis of verdicts, interrogation reports, and custom seizure reports from Norway. I argue that research not only may, but should be value-driven and that a researcher’s personal biography can (1) provide additional insight into a research area; (2) serve to create rapport with informants; and (3) forge an important foundation for the formulation of research questions and the analysis of empirical data. Values also provide a platform for the choice of theoretical framework that is applied and which enhance and further knowledge within the field—in this case, perspectives of harm and justice, particularly species justice and eco-justice. The article calls for a stronger interdisciplinary approach in green criminology—one that includes feminist care ethics, philosophy and compassionate conservation perspectives, and which offers a more radical critique of human exploitation of ‘wildlife’ specifically and other animals more generally.     

Of Normal Human Sympathies and Clear Consciences: Comments on Hyman Gross’s <Emphasis Type="Italic">Crime and Punishment: A Concise Moral Critique</Emphasis>

Contemporary criminal justice systems are extraordinarily unfair. Focusing on Hyman Gross’s Crimes and Punishment: A Concise Moral Critique, however, I identify ways in which scholarly criticisms of these criminal justice systems tend to miss their target. In particular, I argue against the assumption that in order to criticize these criminal justice systems we need to cast doubt on the very practice of blaming people and on the notion of desert, or that we need to reject wholesale retributive rationales for punishment. Quite the contrary: an important reason why contemporary criminal justice systems are unfair is that they punish many people undeservedly.     

The Positionless Middle Way: Weak Philosophical Deflationism in Madhyamaka

In this paper, I explore the connections between meta-ontological and meta-philosophical issues in two of Nāgārjuna’s primary works, the Mūlamadhyamakārikā and the Vigrahavyāvartanī. I argue for an interpretative framework that places Nāgārjuna’s Madhyamaka as a meta- and ultimately non-philosophical evaluation of philosophy. The paper’s primary argument is that an interpretative framework which makes explicit the meta-ontological and meta-philosophical links in Nāgārjuna’s thought is both viable and informative. Following Nāgārjuna, I start my analysis by looking at the positions that exist within the ontological debate and show that the Mādhyamika should be understood as an ontological deflationist who aims to discredit ontological questions altogether. I argue, however, that the Mādhyamika does not wish to engage in meta-ontological debates either and that Nāgārjuna’s ontological deflationist arguments necessarily lead to a position of philosophical deflationism: the rejection of all philosophical and meta-philosophical debates. Further on, I provide a sketch of denegation, the language operator in Madhyamaka that allows Nāgārjuna to make seemingly philosophical claims while not having the commitments that traditional philosophical claims do. I conclude with a defense of my interpretation of Madhyamaka as weak philosophical deflationism compared to other deflationist construals, an explicit discussion of the ways in which my understanding differs from contemporary western interpretations that prima facie resemble weak philosophical deflationism, and an identification of weak philosophical deflationism with dequitism, a variant of quetism.     

Growing up Sexist: Challenges to Rawlsian Stability

John Rawls pinpoints stability as the driving force behind many of the changes to justice as fairness from A Theory of Justice to Political Liberalism. Current debates about Rawlsian stability have centered on the possibility of maintaining one’s allegiance to the principles of justice while largely ignoring how citizens acquire a sense of justice. However, evaluating the account of stability in political liberalism requires attention to the impact of reasonable pluralism on both of these issues. I will argue that the first question of Rawlsian stability – how a child acquires a sense of justice – remains unanswered in Political Liberalism. This fact has been overlooked by Rawls, his defenders, and his critics. The failure to attend to the ways reasonable pluralism undermines Rawls’s own story about a child’s moral development ultimately threatens Rawls’s account of stability in political liberalism – or so I will argue. Despite all of the changes Rawls makes to justice as fairness in order to resolve the stability challenge, Political Liberalism fails to deliver the robust stability Rawls seeks.     

Reply to Critics

This article responds to the four contributors to the book symposium on Conscience and Conviction: The Case for Civil Disobedience. Those four contributors are Thomas Hill Jr, David Lefkowitz, William Smith, and Daniel Weinstock. Hill examines the concepts of conviction and conscience (Chapters 1 and 2); Smith discusses conviction and then analyses the right to civil disobedience and my humanistic arguments for it (Chapter 4); Weinstock explores democratic challenges for civil disobedience (Chapter 5); and Lefkowitz assesses the merits of a legal demands-of-conviction excuse for civil disobedience (Chapter 5). This ‘Reply to Critics’ addresses them in turn.     

Fictions of Restorative Justice,Vincent Geeraets

In this paper, I argue that scholars such as John Braithwaite and Lode Walgrave rely on fictions when presenting their utopian vision of restorative justice. Three claims in particular are shown to be fictitious. Proponents of restorative justice maintain, first, that the offender and the victim voluntarily attend the restorative conference. Second, that the restorative conference enables the offender and the victim to take on active responsibility. Third, that the reparatory tasks on which the parties agree should not be understood in terms of the intentional infliction of harm. These fictions, so I argue, are not merely a mistake, but instead serve an important function: the various parties need to believe that they adequately capture the reality of the restorative conference as they are more likely to acquiesce if they believe the fictions to be true. I conclude that the fictions are the driving force within the restorative endeavour.     

On the Value of Constitutions and Judicial Review

In his thought-provoking book, Why Law Matters, Alon Harel defends two key claims: one ontological, the other axiological. First, he argues that constitutions and judicial review are necessary constituents of a just society. Second, he suggests that these institutions are not only means to the realization of worthy ends, but also non-instrumentally valuable. I agree with Harel that constitutions and judicial review have more than instrumental value, but I am not persuaded by his arguments in support of this conclusion. I argue that Harel’s ontological claim is unsustainable, and that his axiological claim needs revision. Regarding the former, I show that constitutions and judicial review are only contingent constituents of a just society. Regarding the latter, I contest Harel’s specific account of the value of constitutions and judicial review. Harel grounds the non-instrumental value of constitutions in freedom as non-domination but, upon scrutiny, it emerges that their non-instrumental value lies elsewhere. Further, Harel holds that the non-instrumental value of judicial review stems from its embodying a right to a fair hearing. I argue that this right has non-instrumental value only under a particular set of circumstances. I thus conclude, contrary to Harel, that the non-instrumental value of judicial review is contingent on those circumstances obtaining.     

Recalling an Unfair Experience Reduces Adolescents’ Dishonest Behavioral Intentions: The Mediating Role of Justice Sensitivity

Injustice experiences are likely to have a strong impact on—adolescents' life. However, individuals differ in how they perceive and respond to injustice depending on their justice sensitivity. Whereas several studies analyzed the relationships between justice sensitivity and antisocial behaviors in adult samples, little is known about this relationship among adolescents. The aim of the present experimental study is to expand knowledge on the antecedents and effects of justice sensitivity from the Victim (i.e., JS-Victim) and Others (i.e., JS-Observer, Perpetrator, and Beneficiary) perspective, particularly with regard to its relationship to willingness to act in dishonest behavioral intentions (e.g., stealing money or objects from classmates, teachers, or strangers). The study involved 369 Italian students (52% males; M _age = 16.64, SD = 1.78). We examined the role of justice sensitivity in the relationship between the recall of unfair, fair, or neutral episodes, and the consequent willingness to perform dishonest behaviors. Results demonstrate that recalling unfair (vs. fair or neutral) episodes leads to an increase in JS-Others, which in turn decreased willingness to behave dishonestly. Conversely, JS-Victim did not mediate the relationship between the recall of unfair episodes and intentions to behave dishonestly. The present findings suggest that during adolescence JS-Others might act as a protective factor against dishonest behaviors.     

Drug Treatment Policy in the Criminal Justice System: A Scoping Literature Review

This scoping review sought to map the emerging evidence on use of harm minimization drug treatment programs in criminal justice settings. A search of various data bases including Cochrane Database of Systematic Reviews Medline, ProQuest, SAGE Premier, Scopus, Taylor & Francis Online, and Web of Science yielded eight studies that met inclusion criteria. The available evidence suggests increasing adoption of harm minimization policy oriented programs by countries around the world. Specific programs adopted include needle and syringe exchange, methadone maintenance, buprenorphine maintenance and treatment in lieu of incarceration. Each of these programs has evidence to support their effectiveness in relation to individual harm reduction, disease reduction, increase treatment retention and reduced criminality. This article considers implications of the adoption of harm minimization policies by criminal justice systems.     

Exploring Justitia Through Éowyn and Niobe: On Gender,Race and the Legal

The image of Lady Justice, a white woman, sometimes appearing with her eyes veiled and other times unveiled, at times bearing scales and/or a sword in her hands, still is a common and popular feature of legal culture in many parts of the world. This is an image of justice that is found everywhere, from courthouses to cartoons. However, one may ask: “Who is this woman?”; Is she really a worthy representative of justice?; Or even a commendable representative of women? Thus, in this article, it is proposed to question the image of Lady Justice and the interpretations that have been associated with it, as well as the standards of conduct required of, and imposed upon, women both inside and outside the legal profession. The article will consider a range of arguments related to such questions, particularly on the issues of gender and race, by using two female characters: Éowyn (from Tolkien’s The Lord of the Rings) and Niobe (from the Wachowskis’s The Matrix). The two characters are women who have some significance in both plots. Through them, I will establish some similarities and differences with Justitia, namely the need to be disguised as men or embrace male attitudes (a similar process concerning women in the legal profession, for example); the use of weapons (specifically, the sword, and, hence, the necessary analysis of women as law breakers, in contradiction to the image of Justitia); and finally some key issues relating to the representation of women of colour.     

Some Remarks on the Genesis of Central Yogācāra-Vijñānavāda Concepts

The present paper is a kind of selective summary of my book The Genesis of Yogācāra-Vijñānavāda (2014). [1.–2.] It deals with questions of origin and early development of three basic concepts of this school, viz., the ‘idealist’ thesis that the whole world is mind only (cittamātra) or manifestation only (vijñaptimātra), the assumption of a subliminal layer of the mind (ālayavijñāna), and the analysis of phenomena in terms of the “Three Natures” (svabhāvatraya). [3.] It has been asserted (H. Buescher) that these three basic concepts are logically inseparable and therefore must have been introduced conjointly. [4.] Still, from Vasubandhu onward treatises have been written in which only one of the three concepts is advocated or demonstrated to be indispensable, without any reference to the other two being made. Likewise, in most of the earlier Yogācāra treatises, the three concepts occur in different sections or contexts, or are even entirely absent, as vijñaptimātra in the Yogācārabhūmi (except for the Sa?dhinirmocanasūtra quotation) and ālayavijñāna in the Mahāyānasūtrāla?kāra and Madhyāntavibhāga. [5.] It is therefore probable that the three concepts were introduced separately and for different reasons. [5.1.] As regards the concept of the “Three Natures”, I very hypothetically suggest that it was stimulated by the Tattvārthapa?ala of the Bodhisatvabhūmi. [5.2.1.] In the case of ālayavijñāna, I still think that my hypothesis that the concept (term + idea) originated from a problem emerging in connection with the “attainment of cessation” (nirodhasamāpatti) holds good and has not been conclusively refuted, but I admit that Prof. Yamabe?s hypothesis is a serious alternative. [5.2.2.] An important point is that in the Yogācārabhūmi we come across two fundamentally different concepts of ālayavijñāna, the starting point for the change being, probably, the fifth chapter of the Sa?dhinirmocanasūtra. [5.3.] As for ‘idealism’, we may have to distinguish two strands, which, however, tend to merge. [5.3.1.] The earlier one uses the concept cittamātra and emerges as early as in the Pratyutpanna-buddha-sa?mukhāvasthita-samādhi-sūtra in connection with an interpretation of visions of the Buddha Amitāyus. [5.3.2.] The later strand introduces the concept vijñaptimātra and seems to have originated in the eighth chapter of the Sa?dhinirmocanasūtra in connection with a reflection on the images perceived in insight meditation. [5.3.3.] In texts like the Mahāyānasūtrāla?kāra, concepts from other Mahāyānasūtra strands (like abhūtaparikalpa) become prominent in this connection, and it is only in the Mahāyānasa?graha that the use of vijñaptimātra is finally established.     

Quality of Will,Private Blame and Conversation: Reply to Driver,Shoemaker, and Vargas

In this paper, I defend my book Conversation and Responsibility (Oxford University Press, 2012) in response to three critics: Julia Driver, David Shoemaker, and Manuel Vargas. Driver raises questions about my account of private blame. Shoemaker finds problems with my account of quality of will. And Vargas questions the conversational nature of my account.     

Balancing Between Human Rights Assumptions and Actual Fundamental Human Rights Safeguards in Building an Area of Freedom,Security and Justice: a Cosmopolitan Perspective

Rhetoric often claims that the European Union (EU), in issues related to Justice and Home Affairs, has to be united in its diversity. As such, the asylum and judicial systems of the Member States are initially perceived as equally good. By applying the cosmopolitan theory on two fields of interstate cooperation, asylum and judicial cooperation in criminal matters, the article explores how cosmopolitan the EU is in these fields, with a specific focus on material detention conditions. For cosmopolitanism to work, it has to be grounded in commonly shared norms, which enable the EU to regulate its dealings with the otherness of the Member States. The crucial role of the European Court of Human Rights and the Court of Justice of the European Union in placing boundaries on the equal goodness of the Member States’ asylum and judicial systems is analysed. This judicial reality in which cosmopolitan norms are established and protected is discussed, together with the political realities dominating policy debates in order to build an Area of Freedom, Security and Justice.     

Transgression and Standard Theories: Contributions Toward Penal Abolition

In this paper I propose a transgression theory and a standard theory toward penal abolition. I argue that given the ubiquity of “crime” in human relationships, to speak of “criminal behavior” as deviant nullifies the concept deviance (abnormal, out of the ordinary, etc.). After demonstrating that empirically the opposite is the case, I argue for a transgression theory (that most human beings regularly act in ways that transgress the norms and laws they establish) and propose a standard theory (that human beings are both maintainers and transgressors of the social orders they establish). My paper challenges the foundational language (constructions) of “criminal justice” logic that ignore the continuity of the past in the present (white supremacy, neocolonialism, racial capitalism, and gendering enslavement), and that fortify discourse and practice from recognizing, eliminating and standing accountable by rectifying centuries of white privilege, heteronormativity, and the oppression of nonwhite bodies.     

Kant with Freud: Derrida’s Analysis of the Ancient Dream of Self-Punishment

During his 2000–2001 seminar on the death penalty, Jacques Derrida argues that Kant is the most ‘rigorous’ philosophical proponent of the death penalty and, thus, the thinker who poses the most serious objections to the kind of philosophical abolitionism that Derrida is trying to develop in his seminar. For Kant, the death penalty is the logical result of the fundamental principle of criminal law, namely, talionic law or the right of retaliation as a principle of pure, disinterested reason. In this paper, I demonstrate how Derrida attempts to undermine Kant’s defence of the death penalty by demonstrating both its internal contradictions (the tenuous distinction between poena forensis, that is, punishment by a court, and poena naturalis, natural punishment) and its strange affinities with the law of primitive peoples (as understood by Freud in Totem and Taboo). I argue that Derrida’s repeated returns throughout the seminar to Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals suggest that Kant’s seemingly rational defence of the death penalty is ultimately motivated by interests that belie the supposed disinterestedness of modern law and by a notion of natural justice that at once subtends and subverts all criminal law.     

‘My Eyes Were Open’: Awakened Maternal Identity and Leaving Violent Relationships for the Infant/Children

A qualitative secondary analysis explored stories of mothers (n = 49) who left violent relationships (VRs) through a lens of maternal identity. Constant comparative method identified a theory of Awakened Maternal Identity (AMI) and Leaving VR for the Infant/Children. Mothers described how the VR diminished their maternal identity (DMI). Partners controlled the VR though unrealistic infant care expectations, criticisms of infant care, harsh parenting, and control over mothering decisions. DMI lowered the mother’s capacity to provide emotionally nurturing infant care. Over time, mothers experienced AMI- as their ‘eyes were opened’ they experienced a stronger sense of mothering responsibility, focused more on the infants and children, and eventually prioritized their relationship with the infants and children over the partner. AMI seemed a turning point that led to leaving the VR for the infants/children. Recommendations offered for professionals to foster AMI as potential means to initiate the leaving VRs.     

Dignāga,Kumārila and Dharmakīrti on the Potential Problem of pramāṇa and phala Having Different Objects

Following Dharmakīrti’s interpretation, PS I 9ab has been understood as stating a view common to both Sautrāntikas and Yogācāras, i.e. a view that self-awareness (svasa?vitti) is the result (phala) of a means of valid cognition (pramā?a). It has also been understood that Dignāga (in I 8cd and I 9) accepts two different views attributed to Sautrāntikas with regard to pramā?aphala: in PS(V) ad I 8cd he regards the cognition of an external object (arthādhigati) as the result; in PS(V) ad I 9ab–cd he alternatively presents another view that self-awareness is the result. Dignāga’s text, however, does not support these interpretations. Rather it contradicts them. In fact Dignāga (in I 8cd and I 9cd) presupposes a single view, and not two, attributed to Sautrāntikas, a view that the cognition of an external object (arthādhigati) is the result. In I 9ab (svasa?vitti? phala? vātra) he is presenting an alternative view that is attributed only to Yogācāras, i.e. a view that is not common to Sautrāntikas. Althogh the Sautrāntika sākāravāda essentially has an internal structure, Dignāga presupposes that an external object can be regarded as the object of cognition because it is similar to the (essentially internal) image of object. He assumes that the objects of pramā?a and phala, both being external objects, are identical. Criticizing Dignāga’s claim that bāhyārthajñāna (not svasa?vitti) is the phala, Kumārila (?V pratyak?a 79cd) points out that there is a serious gap between the objects of pramā?a and phala. Consequently Dharmakīrti has to admit that even in the Sautrāntika view an external object is not directly cognized (PV III 348b: arthātmā na d??yate) and instead proposes as the second view of Sautrāntikas that svasa?vitti (and not bāhyārthajñāna) is the phala. At the same time he reinterprets Dignāga and defends from Kumārila’s criticism by introducing the two different levels. When investigating the real nature (PV III 350c: svabhāvacintāyām), i.e. in the paramārtha level, svasa?vitti is the phala, whereas in the upacāra level, bāhyārthajñāna or bāhyārthani?caya is the phala. Thus, Dharmakīrti avoids Kumārila’s criticism of Dignāga. Kumārila triggers Dharmakīrti’s new introduction of the second view of Santrāntikas that svasa?vitti is the phala.     

Reply to Five Critics of <Emphasis Type="Italic">Why Tolerate Religion?</Emphasis>

This is my contribution to a symposium on my book Why Tolerate Religion? (Princeton, 2013), in which I respond to essays by François Boucher (Montreal) and Cécile Laborde (University College London), Frederick Schauer (Virginia), Corey Brettschneider (Brown), and Peter Jones (Newcastle). I clarify and revise my view of the sense in which some religious beliefs are “insulated from reasons and evidence” in response to the criticisms of Boucher and Laborde (2015), but take issue with other aspects of their critique. I defend most of my original argument against utilitarian and egalitarian objections from, respectively, Schauer and Brettschneider. I also discuss and defend the “No Exemptions” approach to conscientious objection to neutral laws of general applicability against a variety of objections, arguing, in particular, that my view is probably not very different from that of Jones.