Securing the Only Game in Town: The EU's Political Conditionality and Democratic Consolidation in Post-Soviet Latvia

The state of democracy in post-communist Europe has been subject to some debate in recent years; but it needs to take account of longer-term trends. The focus here is on how far the EU's political conditionality has contributed to democratic consolidation using an in-depth case study of post-Soviet Latvia. The record of the impacts of conditionality up to EU entry is examined and then attention turns to whether post-accession tendencies have demonstrated any significant changes after the end of Brussels' monitoring. Using a comparative framework, this article shows that the outcome after four years of EU membership is mixed with both positive and negative results. It is concluded that there is no automatic locking-in effect of European integration; and that conditionality assists democratic consolidation more in structural than in attitudinal or behavioural terms.     

Is Mexican democracy consolidated?

In the wake of Mexico's electoral watershed of 2 July 2000, many scholars are willing to classify the country as an electoral democracy, yet debate persists over whether Mexican democracy is consolidated. This article seeks to advance this debate by clarifying the meaning of the term democratic ‘consolidation’ and how it should be operationalised. It argues that the concept should refer exclusively to a regime with a low probability of democratic breakdown. This avoids the conceptual confusion created by viewing consolidation as any change that improves the quality of democracy. In terms of measuring consolidation, it maintains the importance of placing greater weight on the proximate cause of regime instability, anti‐democratic behaviour, and discounting more remote causes of democratic breakdown, including economic performance, institution building, and attitudinal support. Based on this understanding, the article explains why Mexican democracy is fully consolidated.     

Democracy, Law, and Comparative Politics

This article offers a revision of democratic theory in light of the experience of recently democratized countries, located outside of the northwestern quadrant of the world. First, various definitions of democracy that claim to follow Schumpeter and are usually considered to be “minimalist” or “processualist” are critically examined. Building upon but clarifying these conceptual efforts, a realistic and restricted, but not minimalist, definition of a democratic regime is proposed. Thereafter, this article argues that democracy should be analyzed not only at the level of the political regime but also in relation to the state—especially the state qua legal system—and to certain aspects of the overall social context. The main underlying theme that runs through this article is the concept of agency, especially as it is expressed in the legal system of existing democracies. I dedicate this article to my daughter Julia, for the metonymy and much love Guillermo O'Donnell is the Helen Kellogg Professor of Government at the University of Notre Dame. He has written many books and articles on authoritarianism, political transitions, democratization, and democratic theory. His latest book,Counterpoints, was published in 1998 by the University of Notre Dame Press. O'Donnell is a Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. I presented previous versions of this paper and received useful comments at seminars held in April and May 1999 at the University of North Carolina; Cornell University; Berlin's Wissenschaftszentrum; the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Atlanta, August 1999; and in September 1999 at the Kellogg Institute. I also appreciate the comments and criticisms received from Michael Brie, Maxwell Cameron, Jorgen Elklit, Robert Fishman, Ernesto Garzón Valdés, Jonathan Hartlyn, Osvaldo Iazzetta, Gabriela Ippolito-O'Donnell, Iván Jaksić, Oscar Landi, Hans-Joachim Lauth, Steven Levitsky, Juan Linz, Scott Mainwaring, Juan M. Abal Medina, Martha Merritt, Peter Moody, Gerardo Munck, Luis Pásara, Timothy Power, Adam Przeworski, Héctor Schamis, Sidney Tarrow. Charles Tilly, Ashutosh Varshney, and Ruth Zimmerling. I am particularly grateful for the careful revision and editing undertaken by Gerardo Munck and Ruth Collier for the present issue ofSCID.     

Unlikely candidates for democracy: The role of structural context in democratic consolidation

Many contributors to the new literature on democratic consolidation overemphasize the role of political leadership, strategic choices about basic institutional arrangements or economic policy, and other contingent process variables. Their focus on political crafting has encounraged an undue optimism about the possibility of consolidating democracies in unfavorable structural contexts. This article critiques the current literature and asserts the primary importance of structural context in democratic consolidation. The powerful influence of structural context is illustrated by using just two structural variables, economic development level and prior authoritarian regime type, to indicate a group of thirty-eight countries in which democracy has failed to consolidate during the third wave of democratization (1974-present) and is very unlikely to do so in the near or medium-term future. Men make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please; they do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circumstances directly found, given and transmitted from the past. J. Mark Ruhl is Gleen and Mary Todd Professor of Political Science and Chair of the Department of Political Science at Dickinson College in Carlisle, PA. He has written extensively on Latin American politics and has specialized in the cases of Colombia and Honduras. Recent publications by Professor Ruhl includeParty Politics and Elections in Latin America (Westview, 1989), coauthored with R.H. McDonald of Syracuse University, and “Redefining Civil-Military Relations in Honduras”Journal of Intermerican Studies and World Affairs (Spring 1996).     

Democratization through European integration: The case of minority rights in the Czech Republic and Romania

While scholars have tended to focus on domestic factors as most critical to the consolidation of democracy, the post-communist European Union (EU) candidate states have exhibited a unique confluence of domestic and foreign policies, due to their objective of EU membership. This article assesses and compares the impact of the EU on policy making in two diverse candidate states in their first decade of transition, focusing on minority rights protection as a fundamental requirement of both EU membership and a stable democracy. I find that the EU has played a principal role in the reform process and democratic consolidation of candidate states, even in the controversial field of minority rights. The degree and nature of the EU’s impact, however, has depended in part on the activism of the particular minority, EU interest and pressure, EU Member States’ own domestic policies, and the persistence of racism in society. Dr. Melanie H. Ram is a research associate at the Institute for European, Russian and Eurasian Studies at George Washington University and Senior Program Officer for the Japan International Cooperation Agency USA Office. She has written extensively on European Union enlargement and democratic consolidation and reform in Central and Southeastern Europe, and is the author most recently of “Harmonizing Laws with the European Union: The Case of Intellectual Property Rights in the Czech Republic” inNorms and Nannies: The Impact of European Organizations on Central and East European States (2002). Earlier versions of this article were presented at the American Political Science Association Annual Meeting, 30 August–2 September 2001, San Francisco, CA and at “Voice or Exit: Comparative Perspectives on Ethnic Minorities in Twentieth Century Europe,” Humboldt University, Berlin, 14–16 June 2001.     

Taxation data as indicators of state-society relations: Possibilities and pitfalls in cross-national research

Cross-national research on taxation is a growth industry in political science. This article discusses key conceptual and measurement issues raised by such studies. First, it highlights the ways in which taxation has been studied as a rich and varied concept, including as a component of the state-building process, as a collective action problem, and/or as a problem of distributive justice. Second, the article identifies the central tradeoffs associated with the construction of taxation indicators used to measure such ideas. It discusses considerations such as which forms of revenue should be included and which should not, whether and how to standardize taxation measures, and how no fine-tune measures through a clear specification of units, universes, and measurement calibration. These choices have important implications for the “scoring” of countries, and for making valid inferences about the relationship between states and societies. Evan S. Lieberman is a Robert Wood Johnson Scholar at Yale University and will begin and appointment as assistant professor in the Department of Politics at Princeton University in September 2002. His interests include comparative politics, research methods, and economic and social policy. I would like to thank Christopher Achen, David Collier, Marc Morjé Howard, Lucan Way, members of the Robert Wood Johnson Policy Scholars Seminar at Yale University, three anonymous reviewers, and the editors atStudies in Comparative International Development for their valuable comments and suggestions.     

Institutions for high-quality growth: What they are and how to acquire them

This article opens with a discussion of the types of institutions that allow markets to perform adequately. While we can identify in broad terms what these are, there is no unique mapping between markets and the non-market institutions that underpin them. The paper emphasizes the importance of “local knowledge”, and argues that a strategy of institution building must not over-emphasize best-practice “blueprints” at the expense of experimentation. Participatory political systems are the most effective ones for processing and aggregating local knowledge. Democracy is a meta-institution for building good institutions. A range of evidence indicates that participatory democracies enable higher-quality growth. Sakenn pe prie dan sa fason (Everyone can pray as he likes.) —Mauritian folk wisdom This paper was originally prepared for the International Monetary Fund’s Conference on Second-Generation Reforms, Washington, DC, November 8–9, 1999. I thank Ruth Collier, Steve Fish, Mohsin Khan, Saleh Nsouli, conference participants, and an anonymous referee for helpful comments. Dani Rodrik is professor of international political economy at the John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University. He is also the research coordinator for the Group of 24 (G-24), a research associate of the National Bureau of Economic Research, and a research fellow of the Centre for Economic Policy Research (London). He serves as an advisory committee member of the Institute for International Economics, senior advisor of the Overseas Development Council, and advisory committee member of the Economic Research Forum for the Arab Countries, Iran and Turkey. Professor Rodrik’s recent research is concerned with the consequences of international economic integration, the role of conflict-management institutions in determining economic performance, and the political economy of policy reform.     

Postcommunist divergence: A comparative analysis of the transition to capitalism in Poland and Russia

This article critiques the dominant neoliberal transition paradigm. The implementation of neoliberal reforms in the postcommunist world has fostered the creation of two different types of capitalism. Rather than enabling a transition to Western European-style capitalism, these reforms have produced divergence within the postcommunist world. This article uses comparative firm-level case studies from Russia and Poland to construct a “neoclassical” sociological alternative to neoliberal theory that can explain this divergence. In this account, intra-dominant class structure (the pattern of alliances between the Party bureaucracy, the technocracy, and humanistic intellectuals) at the time of the transition produces different “paths to capitalism,” or policy regimes, which, in turn, have different effects on the ability of firms to restructure. In Russia, this creates a system of “patrimonial capitalism” that will produce long-term economic stagnation. In Poland, a variety of modern rational capitalism emerges. This latter system is distinguished by its very high levels of dependence on capital imports in comparison to the advanced capitalist countries. As a result, this type of economy will be quite vulnerable to economic shocks. Lawrence King is an assistant professor of sociology at Yale University. His book includeThe Basic Features of Postcommunist Capitalism in Eastern Europe (2001) andAssessing New Class Theory (with Ivan Szelenyi, forthcoming). He is currently working on a book entitledPostcommunist Capitalisms. I am grateful for a Yale Junior Faculty Research Fellowship, and the support of the Yale Center for Comparative Research, the Social Science Research Fund at Yale, and the Yale Center for International and Area Studies. I would also like to thank Aleksandra Sznajder and Evgenia Gvozdeva for their invaluable research assistance, and Ivan Szelenyi, Andrew Schrank, Hannah Brueckner, Alison Pollet, and the editors and anonymous reviewers atStudies in Comparative International Development for their comments and suggestions.     

Multi-party elections in the Arab world: Institutional engineering and oppositional strategies

Recent moves toward multi-party competition for elected legislatures in numerous Arab countries constitute a significant departure from earlier practices there, and create the basis for democratic activists to gradually chip away at persistent authoritarian rule. This article explores the institutional mechanisms by which incumbent authoritarian executives seek to engineer these elections. It documents examples of rulers changing electoral systems to ensure compliant legislatures, and demonstrates the prevalent use of winner-takes-all electoral systems, which generally work to the regimes’ advantage. I then review various strategies of opposition forces—boycotts, non-competition agreements, election monitoring, and struggles over election rules—and the dilemmas that these entail. Surmounting differences in terms of ideologies, as well as short-term political goals and prospects, is a central challenge. The future should see greater electoral participation among opposition activists, along with cleaner elections. As vote coercion and ballot box stuffing is restricted by opposition pressures, electoral institutions will take on greater importance, and struggles for proportional representation are likely to increase. Marsha Pripstein Posusney is associate professor of Political Science at Bryant College and an adjunct associate professor of International Relations (Research) at the Watson Institute for International Studies at Brown University. Her first book,Labor and the State in Egypt: Workers, Unions, and Economic Restructuring (Co-lumbia University Press, 1997) was co-winner of the 1998 Albert Hourani prize, awarded annually by the Middle East Studies Association for outstanding original scholarly work on the Middle East. She is currently completing work on a co-edited volume,Privatization and Labor: Responses and Consequences in Global Perspective (Edward Elgar Publishing, Forthcoming). Earlier versions of this article were presented at Middle East Studies seminars at Harvard and columbia Universities in April, 1998, and at a Brown University Political Science Dept. seminar in April, 1999. In addition to the feedback at these events, I would like to acknowledge helpful comments on earlier versions from Miguel Glatzer, Iliya Harik, John Kerr, Ann Lesch, Vickie Langohr, Rob Richie, Wendy Schiller, Jillian Schwedler, Joe Stork, Greg White, and especially Ellen Lust-Okar and four anonymous reviewers. I am also grateful for the research assistance of Myrna Atalla, Daria Viviano, Laurent Fauque, and Colleen Anderson. The article draws on presentations and discussion at the conference on “Controlled Contestation and Opposition Strategies: Multi-Party Elections in the Arab World”, Brown University, October 2–3, 1998. Sponsored by the Watson Institute for International Studies at Brown in cooperation with the Center for Middle Eastern Studies as Harvard, it brought together ten democratic activists from seven different Arab countries. It is referenced here (to save space) as the “Brown elections conference.”     

Moderate Islam and secularist opposition in Turkey: implications for the world,Muslims and secular democracy

Developing an argument based in theories of democratic consolidation and religious competition, and discussing the reasons for the secularist opposition to the government, this article analyses how government by a party rooted in moderate Islamism may affect Turkey's peculiar secular democracy, development and external relations and how Muslims in the world relate to modernization and democracy. Arguing that secularism in advanced democracies may be a product of democracy as much as it is the other way around, the article maintains that democratic consolidation may secure further consolidation of Turkish secularism and sustainable moderation of Turkish political Islam. Besides democratic Islamic – conservative actors and other factors, democratic consolidation requires strong democratic – secularist political parties so that secularist and moderate Islamist civilian actors check and balance each other. Otherwise, middle class value divisions and mistrust in areas like education and social regulation may jeopardise democratisation and economic modernisation and continuing reconciliation of Islamism with secular democracy and modernity.     

Luring,learning, and lobbying: The limits to capital mobility in the Dominican Republic

While Third World governments are advised and expected to establish their export processing zones (EPZs) near low-cost labor markets and modern transportation centers, the Dominican Republic’s oldest and most successful zones are located in the country’s relatively remote, high-cost interior. In this article I use qualitative and quantitative data: first, to explain the seemingly irrational EPZ location decision; second, to account for the seemingly paradoxical success of the country’s relatively high-cost secondary city EPZs; and third, to explore the puzzle’s implications for debates on industrial location, globalization, and the political economy of development policy. Andrew Schrank is an assistant professor of sociology at Yale University. He is currently completing a book on export diversification in the Dominican Republic. He is also collaborating on projects on the software industry in Mexico and a study of intellectual property rights in cross-national perspective. I would like to thank Stephen Bunker, Lawrence King, Marcus Kurtz, Denis O’Hearn, Kenneth Shadlen, members of the University of Chicago’s “Organizations and State-Building” workshop, participants in the Social Science Research Council’s “Rethinking Social Science Research on the Developing World” conference, and SCID’s reviewers for helpful comments. The research was undertaken with the assistance of the Institute of International Education.     

Scaling Down: The Subnational Comparative Method

Subnational units of analysis play an increasingly important role in comparative politics. Although many recent studies of topics such as ethnic conflict, economic policy reform, and democratization rely on comparisons across subnational political units, insufficient attention has been devoted to the methodological issues that arise in the comparative analysis of these units. To help fill this gap, this article explores how subnational comparisons can expand and strengthen the methodological repertoire available to social science researchers. First, because a focus on subnational units is an important tool for increasing the number of observations and for making controlled comparisons, it helps mitigate some of the characteristic limitations of a small-N research design. Second, a focus on subnational units strengthens the capacity of comparativists to accurately code cases and thus make valid causal inferences. Finally, subnational comparisons better equip researchers to handle the spatially uneven nature of major processes of political and economic transformation. Richard Snyder is assistant professor of political science at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. He is the author ofPolitics after Neoliberalism (2001). His articles on regime change and the political economy of development have appeared inWorld Politics, Comparative Politics, Journal of Democracy, andBritish Journal of Political Science. I appreciate helpful comments on this material from Nancy Bermeo, Dexter Boniface, David Collier, John Gerring, Edward Gibson, Robert Kaufman, Juan Linz, James Mahoney, Kelly McMann, Gerardo Munck, Peter Nardulli, David Samuels, Judith Tendler, and two anonymous reviewers. I also benefited greatly from the insightful comments on an earlier draft provided by the participants in the conference on “Regimes and Political Change in Latin America,” held at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign in August 1999.     

Monetary mismanagement and inadvertent democratization in technocratic Mexico

Conclusion The interplay between political and economic reform in Mexico has atken a path not fully predicted by neomodernization theorists or their critics. The Mexican events during these last few years demostrate that economic growth and market reform are not necessarily correlated neatly with the advance of democratic practices, During the Salinas and Zadillo administartions, political opening was not the “ultimate consequence of economic opening” as two analysts of Mexican economics and politics argued several years ago.⁵⁶ It was not the case that an expansion of individual initiative and greater economic choice accompanying market opening led to the accelaration of democratic reforms in Mexico. Rather, limited democratic reforms were offered as the price of public asquiescence to the economic pain associated with Mexico’s recent cycle of economic crisis and reform. The gradual expansion of democracy in Mexico was not the consequence of market reforms but instead was the mechanism enabled the implementation of these reforms. Earlier versions of this paper were presented at Southern Methodist University conference on the Economic and Political Challenges of Market Reform in Latin America, Dallas, TX, October 1997 and the XXI International Congress of the Latin American Studies Association, Chicago, IL, 24–26 September 1998. The author would like to thank the participants of the SMU conference and Philip Oxhom for their comments.     

Understanding contentious collective action by Chinese laid-off workers: The importance of regional political economy

Episodes of contentious collective action involving laid-off workers have erupted throughout China in recent years. With few exceptions, studies of Chinese laid-off workers’ contention have attempted to generalize from field research in very few⦓r even single⤜ocalities. This limitation has led to several debates that can frequently be addressed by examining differences in political economy among China’s industrial regions. Based on 19 months of fieldwork and over 100 in-depth interviews with workers, managers, and officials in nine Chinese cities, this article offers a systematic, sub-national comparative analysis of laid-off workers’ contention. The article also addresses broader issues in the analysis of social movements and contentious politics, a field that has too often failed to take such regional differences into account. William Hurst is a Ph.D. candidate in political science at the University of California, Berkeley, where he is completing a dissertation on the politics of China’s state-sector lay-offs. His previous publications include “Analysis in Limbo: Contemporary Chinese Politics Amid the Maturation of Reform” (with Lowell Dittmer;Issues & Studies, December 2002/March 2003), and China’s Contentious Pensioners” (with Kevin O’Brien;The China Quarterly, June 2002). This article benefited from the assistance of many Chinese friends and colleagues in Beijing, Benxi, Chongqing, Datong, Harbin, Luoyang, Shanghai, Shenyang, and Zhengzhou. Kiren Chaudhry, Calvin Chen, Ruth B. Collier, Kenneth Foster, Mark W. Frazier, Douglas Fuller, Mary E. Gallagher, thomas B. Gold, Kun-chin Lin, Chung-in Moon, Kevin O’Brien, Dorothy Solinger, Jaeyoun Won, as well as Judy Gruber and all the participants in her Spring 2003 seminar, and two anonymous reviewers offered extremely helpful comments. For their generous financial support during various stages of my research and writing, I wish to thank: the Fulbright Institute of International Education Program, the National Security Education Program, the Yanjing Institute at Harvard University, the University of Hawaii, Beijing University, the Lewis Mumford Center for Comparative Urban and Regional Research at SUNY-Albany, the University, of California Institute for Labor and Employment, as well as the Graduate Division, the Institute for International Studies, the Institute for East Asian Studies, and the Center for Chinese Studies at the University of California-Berkeley.     

Party size and policy outcomes: An empirical analysis of taxation in democracies

Taxation varies widely among democracies. Yet scholars disagree whether differences in political institutions help produce the variation. This article identifies topdown and bottom-up mechanisms by which political institutions are thought to influence taxation. It then combines political and economic data on more than 50 democracies to evaluate the impact of political institutions on government revenues. Cross-sectional and pooled time series analyses that include controls for economic conditions and partisan ideologies of governments confirm an indirect impact of these institutions: there is a curvilinear relationship between the size of political parties in a democracy and the tax revenues collected. Yet the effect of party size on policy outcomes is limited to a subset of democracies. The article opens new paths for research on the roles of electoral, constitutional, legislative, and party institutions in democratic policy making around the world. Andrew C. Gould is associate professor of government at the University of Notre Dame, where he is a Fellow of the Kellogg Institute for International Studies and of the Nanovic Institute for European Studies. He recently publishedOrigins of Liberal Dominance: State, Church, and Party in Nineteenth Century Europe and the article “Conflicting Imperatives and Concept Formation,” which appeared inThe Review of Politics. For their suggestions and/or data, I thank José Antonio Cheibub, Sven Steinmo, Duane Swank, Daniel Verdier, and Michael Wallerstein. For their comments, I am grateful to Carles Boix, Delia Boylan, Lloyd Gruber, Fran Hagopian, Peter Hall, Mark Hallerberg, Gretchen Helmke, Scott Mainwaring, Paul Mueller, Dennis Quinn, Ashutosh Varshney, and two anonymous reviewers. Peter Baker and Tom Lundberg provided insights and skilled research assistance. This work was supported in part by a grant from the Faculty Research Program, University of Notre Dame. A prior version of this article was presented at the 2000 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association. The errors that remain are my own.     

Democratisation in Indonesia: From Transition to Consolidation

Abstract

Despite many pessimistic expectations, the democratisation process in Indonesia has been progressing steadily over the past decade. The Indonesian political elite has crafted and stabilised a political transition mainly characterised by frequent, free and fair elections, peaceful rotations of power, effective elected officials and separation of powers, inclusive suffrage, freedom of expression, independence of the media and associational autonomy. In other words, within one decade, Indonesia has developed the main attributes of a democratic country, according to most theories of procedural democracy. However, the extent to which Indonesian democracy has been consolidated and institutionalised is another issue, which requires close examination and assessment. Does the Indonesian democracy fulfil or approximate the criteria stipulated by theorists of democratic consolidation? This article investigates the extent to which Indonesia has managed to advance its democratic transition and evaluates the prospects and challenges of democratic consolidation. In general, the article asserts that despite the persistence of a number of shortcomings, the steady progress of the Indonesian democratisation process and the consistent commitment of the principal political actors to the democratic rules of the game will likely lead to more institutionalised, policy-driven party politics and a gradual democratic consolidation in the foreseeable future.     

The Emperor’s new clothes: Labor reform and social democratization in Chile

This article analyzes the relationship between political and social democratization in recent democratic transitions by illustrating how the two processes were at odds in the case of labor reform in Chile (1990–2001). Labor reform served simultaneously to consolidate political democracy and slow down the momentum of social democratization. It was a tool for signalling policy change to legitimate the democratic regime, but at the same time leaving the liberal economy intact. The Chilean case calls into question the thesis of a natural progression from political to social rights prevalent in democratic theory, and allows us to generalize about the way marketization places limits on democratic deepening. The article first discusses what would be appropriate criteria of social democratization considering contemporary labor issues and labor relations in Chile. It then investigates the political process of labor reform. Ongoing legal debates through the 1990s show the extent of path dependence set in motion by the timid nature of the first social reforms in Chile’s new demoncracy and their muting effect on citizenship. Louise Haagh obtained her doctorate from the University of Oxford (St. Antony’s College) in 1998, and for the next three years held a British Academy Postdoctoral Research Fellowship at the College. In 2001 she began a lectureship at the University of York.     

Unrequited Moderation: Credible Commitments and State Repression in Egypt

In strategic accounts of democratization, credible commitments by the opposition shape whether incumbents will relinquish power. Revisiting Kalyvas’s study of Algeria and Belgium, this article introduces evidence from Egypt that shows the structural readiness of incumbents remains as consequential as commitment credibility. During the period 1990–2008 the credibility of democratic commitments by the Egyptian opposition improved along the lines identified by Kalyvas. Unlike its Algerian counterpart, the Islamic movement in Egypt was able to “silence the radicals” and, after 1998, emit a non-dissonant message of electoral participation without militia violence. This improvement in commitment credibility was not reciprocated by Egyptian elites, who enjoyed western support and a sturdy repressive apparatus. Similar factors obstructed the Algerian opposition and they indicate a more disciplined, less dissonant Islamic party would have been unlikely to effect a democratic transition. Transitions are most likely when a credibly committed opposition faces an elite ready to rotate power. The second factor helps explain the success of the Catholic party in Belgium and the failure of comparable Islamic movements in North Africa.     

Cultural and economic prerequisites of democracy: Reassessing recent evidence

The purpose of this article is to reassess two influential theories of democratic development: the theory of democratic culture and the theory of economic development. The leading predecessors in each domain—Ronald Inglehart and Adam Przeworski—are the prime targets of analysis. We take issue with recent evidence presented by these authors on three grounds: the evidence (1) confuses “basic” criteria of democracy with possible “quality” criteria (Inglehart); (2) conceptualizes democracy in dichotomous rather than continuous terms (Przeworski); and (3) fails to account for endogeneity and contingent effects (Inglehart). In correcting for these shortcomings, we present striking results. In the case of democratic culture, the theory lacks support; neither overt support for democracy nor “self-expression values” affect democratic development. In the case of economic development, earlier findings must be refined. Although the largest impact of modernization is found among more democratized countries, we also find an effect among “semi-democracies.” Axel Hadenius is professor of political science at Uppsala University in Sweden. He is the author ofDemocracy and Development (Cambridge University Press, 1992) andInstitutions and Democratic Citizenship (Oxford University Press, 2001). Jan Teorell is associated professor of political science at Uppsala University. His articles on intra-party democracy, social capital, and political participation appear in international journals.