Why Do Peace Negotiations Succeed or Fail? Legal Commitment,Transparency, and Inclusion during Peace Negotiations in Colombia (2012–2016) and Turkey (2012–2015)

This article examines the ways in which the negotiation framework—i.e., the legal guarantees, information management mechanism, and degree of inclusivity in peace negotiations—shapes the likelihood of concluding a peace agreement. Codifying the peace negotiations in law, publicizing information about the content of negotiations, and including mediators and civil society actors in peace talks is likely to increase a government's short‐term costs. However, doing so alleviates the adversaries' information asymmetry and commitment problems, sets guidelines to insure the process against exogenous shocks, and increases the number of actors taking part in conflict management. Comparing the recent peace negotiations to end intrastate wars in Colombia and Turkey, this article argues that a legalized, public, and inclusive framework made a peace agreement possible in Colombia, while the lack of such a framework caused Turkey's peace talks to fail.     

Endgame at the Kennedy round: A case study of multilateral economic diplomacy

During the details stage of multilateral economic talks, agreements are usually negotiated using a combination of two methods - compromise on individual issues and tit-for-tat exchanges. This article identifies the circumstances in which the the US, EEC and British delegations employed these traditional diplomatic techniques, and assesses the effectiveness of these techniques in forging agreement in the details stage of the Kennedy Round, Providing a detailed account of these talks, the article demonstrates that the negotiating techniques of the American delegation were far more flexible than those of the European and British delegations and that this flexibility was vital to the successful completion of the talks. The article concludes that differences in negotiating technique are best explained by a combination of two factors - the contrasting decision making structures of each negotiating team and the international political context of the negotiations.     

Endgame at the Kennedy round: A case study of multilateral economic diplomacy

During the details stage of multilateral economic talks, agreements are usually negotiated using a combination of two methods ‐ compromise on individual issues and tit‐for‐tat exchanges. This article identifies the circumstances in which the the US, EEC and British delegations employed these traditional diplomatic techniques, and assesses the effectiveness of these techniques in forging agreement in the details stage of the Kennedy Round, Providing a detailed account of these talks, the article demonstrates that the negotiating techniques of the American delegation were far more flexible than those of the European and British delegations and that this flexibility was vital to the successful completion of the talks. The article concludes that differences in negotiating technique are best explained by a combination of two factors ‐ the contrasting decision making structures of each negotiating team and the international political context of the negotiations.     

Immovable Positions: Public Acknowledgment and Bargaining in Military Basing Negotiations

Why might public acknowledgment of cooperative security negotiations generate bargaining constraints that provoke stalemate? Previous scholarship points to aroused public opinion. Yet in many cases where hard-line bargaining stances develop and talks collapse following public acknowledgment, it is not domestic political pressures that tie leaders’ hands. This article examines instead an international constraint attendant to publicity: opposition by third-party states. I argue that international power position shapes the balance of vulnerability between the negotiating parties to abandonment and entanglement. The act of official acknowledgment can constrain the more vulnerable partner by enabling third-party states to credibly scrutinize its intentions. By threatening strained relations, such scrutiny can create a security dilemma that reduces the weaker partner's bargaining range to a choice between cooperation on its terms and noncooperation. I evaluate this argument by studying foreign military basing negotiations. Statistical analyses and a comparative case study produce strong support for my argument.     

Uncertainty, risk, and trust: The Swedish—German general staff negotiations of 1910

Despite a protracted and well-established policy of neutrality, in 1910, Sweden decided to enter into negotiations with Germany concerning military collaboration in case of a Russian attack against Germany and Sweden. This article argues that behind the Swedish decision to enter into the talks was Swedish trust towards Germany to the effect that Germany would not exploit the talks for its own interests. The article discusses the phenomenon of inter-state trust in terms of risk and uncertainty, and analyzes the Swedish decision process leading to the general staff negotiations.     

Uncertainty,risk, and trust: The Swedish—German general staff negotiations of 1910

Despite a protracted and well‐established policy of neutrality, in 1910, Sweden decided to enter into negotiations with Germany concerning military collaboration in case of a Russian attack against Germany and Sweden. This article argues that behind the Swedish decision to enter into the talks was Swedish trust towards Germany to the effect that Germany would not exploit the talks for its own interests. The article discusses the phenomenon of inter‐state trust in terms of risk and uncertainty, and analyzes the Swedish decision process leading to the general staff negotiations.     

Studying small states in international security affairs: a quantitative analysis

Todays’ international security architecture composed of international security treaties and international security norms has been established and formalized by negotiations. Owing to the great importance of international security negotiations for international security practices, this paper sheds light on negotiation activities. A study of 100 different international security negotiations shows that states vary considerably with respect to their negotiation activity. Some countries voice positions very often, while others remain completely silent. This is puzzling, as active negotiation participation is an expression of state sovereignty and a means to influence the shape of the international security architecture. The article distinguishes between capacity and incentives as driving forces of state activity in international security negotiations. The analysis reveals that, next to political and financial capacities, states that place high priority on military matters are more active, while smaller and poorer states are more likely to shelter under the security umbrella of larger counterparts.     

Negotiators as Mediators: The Case of 1987–1995 Korea–United States Bilateral Trade Negotiations

Despite their widely recognized benefits, integrative approaches to negotiation have seldom been effectively used in interorganizational negotiations. This study analyzes the 1987–1995 Korea–United States Trade Negotiations, identifying elements in those talks that could have moved the negotiations in a more integrative direction. The role of building relationships — especially between key negotiators — is examined. Informal negotiations between the key negotiators from both sides were crucial in building such relationships, which helped both sides create solutions for mutual gains. This process was realized, inter alia, by the dual role that the key negotiators took on as negotiators and as mediators.     

The Dilemma of Nuclear Disarmament: The Case of North Korea

ABSTRACT

The Hanoi summit between the US and North Korea failed not because of North Korea’s brinkmanship strategy or its miscalculation of the US position on the denuclearisation talks, but because of a fundamental issue: a dilemma of how much to yield in giving up its military capabilities to expedite the lifting of sanctions. The leadership in Pyongyang has concerns about the ‘deliverability’ of its promises to its domestic audience to ensure deterrence capabilities and economic recovery. The two-level game model explains why both sides keep minimising the range of options for the negotiations, increasing the risk that the talks will break down.     

A Review of: “Rebecca Knuth. Burning Books and Leveling Libraries. Extremist Violence and Cultural Destruction.”

In the 1970s, Western European countries were hit hard by terrorism, especially by international terrorism that crossed borders easily and allowed terrorists of different origins to carry out attacks against both governments and people. Consequently, the necessity of fighting this menace also extended to international organisations. This article looks at how the Council of Europe dealt with the issue, and assesses the negotiations that led to the Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism from the German perspective. West Germany was very interested in establishing a sounder international legal framework against terrorism and thought that the Council of Europe would be able to make an important contribution by abolishing the political offence exception that had so far been a core feature of most extradition treaties. This clause allowed political criminals to escape punishment by fleeing to a country that would deny extradition to a different country on the grounds of the political nature of the act committed by the person in question. The article gives an account and analysis of the complex negotiations that finally resulted in the adoption of the Convention in 1977, as well as of the problems encountered and compromises reached during these negotiations.     

Parliamentary assertion and deep integration: the European parliament in the CETA and TTIP negotiations1

Abstract

Scholars have long viewed parliamentarians as parochial actors having little interest, or incentive to engage, in international diplomacy. Yet, parliaments have recently taken on a very active role in various international negotiations. This article explores the role of the European Parliament (EP) in the European Union (EU)–Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) and the EU–United States Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) negotiations. Drawing on classic institutionalist insights, it develops the concept of parliamentary assertion and explores its usefulness through a combination of comparative and process-tracing analyses. The conclusions are threefold: (1) the EP has asserted its power in international trade matters beyond the simple power of consent; (2) the EP’s search for legitimacy in the EU polity is driving this phenomenon; and (3) this phenomenon is significant beyond the current CETA and TTIP negotiations.     

日美贸易摩擦中三大谈判机制的对比研究

"市场导向的个别领域谈判"、"日美结构性障碍协议"、"日美经济框架对话"是战后日美双方缓解贸易摩擦的三大谈判机制。对三大谈判机制及其各自内部子议题的对比研究发现,贸易谈判中外压强度和谈判有效性之间并不存在对称关系。在这些谈判机制中,美国对日外压与日本国内的内压之间形成了动态的双层博弈。内压的结构与价值诉求、利益指向是分析贸易谈判的重要变量。     

Salvaging the Trans-Pacific Partnership: building blocks for regional and multilateral trade opening?

The high hopes that the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) would open up trade across the Pacific were dashed by the decision of the new US Government under President Trump to withdraw from the agreement in January 2017. Despite being controversial, the TPP had been recognized as an agreement that substantially updates and extends international trade rules responding to new technological developments and economic realities. It was thus lauded by some as the first true twenty-first century trade agreement. The United States’ withdrawal from TPP gives the agreement an uncertain future. Yet, we argue in this paper that some achievements of the TPP might not be lost. The TPP offers important lessons for other ambitious regional trade deals both in terms of process and content. Furthermore, several chapters of the TPP can become blueprints for ongoing and upcoming negotiations at the multilateral level. A one-to-one transposition of TPP provisions into the multilateral trade agreement is unlikely, yet certain provisions could serve as valuable inspiration for future multilateral trade talks.     

New Insights into Coalition Negotiations—The Case of German Government Formation

Research on coalition negotiations after general elections in parliamentary systems usually focuses on the parties’ utility maximization as corporate actors. However, the most recent process of government formation after the German general election in 2017 followed a different type of logic and led to an outcome unlike that of other coalition negotiations. Regarding policy seeking, office seeking, and vote seeking, the outcomes of both the exploratory talks between Christlich Demokratische Union (CDU)/Christlich-Soziale Union (CSU), Freie Demokratische Partei, and the Greens and the negotiations between CDU/CSU and Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands are at least partly irrational from a cost–benefit analysis. This article examines the formation of Germany’s government in 2017–2018 and reveals the paradoxical outcomes of each phase of the negotiations. Empirical data to underpin the argument stem from interviews with negotiators and statements of direct participants in the formation of the coalition. Instead of the parties’ utility maximization, negotiations were largely dominated by intraparty conflicts, in which individual interests and personal trust rather than partisan unitary programs were most relevant to the negotiation process and outcome. Our work answers the question of why the grand coalition was unexpectedly renewed in the end—contrary to what might be predicted based on established theories of coalition building. The observations and conclusions set forth are of general interest not only for future coalition negotiations in Germany but also for other European parliamentary democracies facing increasing party fragmentation. Most importantly, the analysis yields insights into negotiations undertaken in the absence of rationalist behavior.     

From Tremors to Talks: Do Natural Disasters Produce Ripe Moments for Resolving Separatist Conflicts?

This article suggests that natural disasters can produce a ripe moment for conflict resolution because governments faced with the demand for effective disaster relief have incentives to offer concessions to separatist challengers. An analysis of the prevalence of new negotiations, ceasefires, and peace agreements during 12-month periods before and after natural disasters for separatist dyads 1990–2004 reveal some support for this proposition. Natural disasters increase the likelihood that parties will initiate talks or agree to ceasefires but have less effect on the signing of peace agreements. In line with the proposed mechanism, these results are particularly strong in democracies and following more severe disasters where the need to provide relief is most acute.     

国际法视角下的六方会谈

缔造和平的过程是一个不断迁就和适应不同的目标及其轻重缓急次序的过程。和平解决国际争端也需要选择适当的方式、遵循法的规范、发挥高超的谈判技巧、提出创造性的方案、保持良好的谈判势头。六方会谈旨在调停美朝冲突、推动多边会谈、遵循协商原则来和平解决朝核危机。它法理上的作用和其政治上的作用一样,都是国际争端解决的关键,都是需要不断探讨和研究的课题。     

How NGOs Use Their Facilitative Negotiating Power and Bargaining Assets To Affect International Environmental Negotiations1

This article argues that NGOs can “tip the balance” in favor of particular outcomes at international environmental negotiations by leveraging a combination of facilitative negotiating power and discreet bargaining assets. It uses the international climate change negotiations to illustrate how NGOs employ their facilitative power and bargaining assets, which stem from NGOs’ transnational character, ability to increase the transparency of negotiations, and claims to legitimacy.     

How NGOs Use Their Facilitative Negotiating Power and Bargaining Assets To Affect International Environmental Negotiations1

This article argues that NGOs can “tip the balance” in favor of particular outcomes at international environmental negotiations by leveraging a combination of facilitative negotiating power and discreet bargaining assets. It uses the international climate change negotiations to illustrate how NGOs employ their facilitative power and bargaining assets, which stem from NGOs' transnational character, ability to increase the transparency of negotiations, and claims to legitimacy.     

Why “Conservative,” Not Liberal,Internationalism?

There is no broad literature defining conservative internationalism as there is for liberal internationalism and realism. Yet conservative internationalism differs from liberal internationalism and realism in four important ways. First, it seeks a world of limited government or separate sovereign nations not big international institutions. Second, it believes that national security is a function of ideological differences not just relative power or diplomatic misunderstandings. The democratic peace is a much safer world for America than the balance of power or United Nations. Third, it recognizes the need to use force during negotiations, not just after negotiations fail, because authoritarian states will not take negotiations seriously if they can achieve their objectives outside negotiations. And fourth, it advances democracy conservatively by prioritizing regions where strong democracies exist nearby (today Ukraine and Korea) and by using military leverage to reach timely compromises that weaken authoritarian states.