REFLECTIONS ON THE TRUE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE SCOTT REPORT FOR GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY

The immediate impact of the Scott report was slight because it had no conclusion and led to no ministerial or other resignations. Reasons for this inconclusiveness were examined, including conventions of the judicial process, the difficulty Scott had in defining the offences he was examining, the slipperiness of those offences as constitutional conventions and Scott's lack of grasp of administrative processes.
Yet his report is a mine of information on problems of accountability in the area of government defence sales. It was atypical in that three departments pursuing four policies between them and with another department as policeman had a locus in the process. Given the nearly 100,000 licences being processed at one time, it was a large, complex and fragmented administrative activity which might easily have resulted in more mishaps than it did.
Despite its special features the author argues that it does provide evidence of six areas of difficulty in government accountability which are also of (growing) relevance outside the area Scott surveyed: how one finds who is responsible for policy and policy change; how accountability is secured where confidentiality is justified for national security or other reasons; how one gets operational accountability for executive operations within departments; the accountability of junior to departmental ministers; of junior to more senior civil servants; and of civil servants to ministers.     

The Civil Servant as Legislator: Law Making in British Administration

How are government policy commitments converted into legislation and what happens in the conversion? The role of civil servants in preparing legislation is far more important than is generally assumed. By looking at the work of four recent bill  teams in Britain – teams of civil servants given the task of developing Acts of Parliament – their crucial roles in initiating policies, placing them on the political agenda (even helping secure their place in a party manifesto), developing them, making sure they pass through parliament and enacting them once they have reached the statute books are assessed. The article explores the composition and working methods of bill teams. These teams work with considerable autonomy in developing legislation, but it cannot be assumed that they operate outside ministerial control. Teams see themselves as reflecting the priorities of the government in general and their ministers in particular. Yet ministers typically know relatively little about the law they are bringing in until they receive the submissions and briefings from their officials. Perhaps the biggest danger for democracy is not a civil service putting forward proposals which a minister feels forced to accept, but rather that ministers do not notice or fully appreciate what is being proposed in their name despite having the political authority to change it and a civil service which bends over backwards to consult and accommodate them.     

Suggested Capacities for Minister's Success: An Empirical Approach Based on Saaty's AHP

The roles of ministers are complicated, multiple, and demanding. They need to perform both as a leader of public organization and as a political actor in the Cabinet as appointed by the president or prime minister. This research empirically examines which capacities and types of ministers account for their success. It concludes that a policy capacity is the most desirable ministerial capacity. In addition, this study concludes that a political type minister is the most appropriate ministerial type for ministerial success. However, there is not one best ministerial model, or one required capacity for ministerial success. That is, this study intends to better understand the virtue and the responsibility of ministers.     

THE LOGISTICS OF MINISTERIAL RESHUFFLES

Ministerial reshuffles are complex exercises requiring careful handling. A frequent occurrence in British government, their significance is usually seen in political terms. Prime Ministers attach great importance to maximizing the political advantages to be gained from them. This factor is the chief determinant of their logistics, the principal characteristics of which are secrecy in advance and the speed with which ministerial changes are executed. These features - as much as the frequency of ministerial changes per se - may disrupt the policy process and have serious implications for minister-civil servant power relations. Such problems could be alleviated by giving ministers advance notice of changes of post. The institution of a process of ministerial handovers would strengthen the position of incoming ministers by making them less dependent on their officials, upon whom they rely heavily for initial briefing at present.     

THE IMPACT OF FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ON WHITEHALL

This article examines whether the UK Freedom of Information Act 2000 has changed Whitehall. Based on a two‐year, ESRC‐funded study, it evaluates the impact of FOI on five characteristics of the Whitehall model: the culture of secrecy, ministerial accountability to Parliament, civil service neutrality, the Cabinet system, and effective government. Proponents of FOI hoped that government would be less secretive, more accountable and more effective; critics feared that civil servants would lose their anonymity, and collective Cabinet responsibility would be undermined. Drawing on interviews, media analysis, case law and official documents, the article finds that the impact of FOI is modest at most. It is not powerful enough to do much good or much ill, and the feared ‘chilling effect' on candour and record‐keeping has not materialized. Leaks do more damage than FOI disclosures. But ministers remain apprehensive about the effect of FOI on Cabinet records and discussions.     

Interpreting the World of Political Elites

This paper uses an interpretative approach to analyse the relationship between ministers and officials. It argues that generally, the relationship between ministers and civil servants is harmonious. This can be explained by the fact that both sets of actors tend to draw from the same tradition, the Westminster model. The Westminster model can be understood as the building block from which both ministers and civil servants develop narratives that shape and condition their actions. In the case of ministers, the dominant narrative drawn from the Westminster model is what we refer to as that of 'historical impact'. In the case of civil servants, their dominant narrative, again drawn from the Westminster model is conditioned by the need to provide an account that continually emphasizes how they have acted with 'constitutional propriety'. Generally, these two contrasting narratives do not lead to conflict between ministers and civil servants. However, a serious breakdown in the relationship between ministers and civil servants can occur when either one or both sets of actors draw on a tradition other than the Westminster model, or when they appeal to a different narrative within the Westminster model which shapes their subsequent behaviour and actions.     

‘…I TAKE POLITICAL RESPONSIBILITY!’: THE THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL RELATION BETWEEN MINISTERIAL RESPONSIBILITY AND MINISTERIAL RESIGNATIONS IN GERMANY

How is the doctrine of ministerial responsibility applied in the decisions of German ministers (not) to resign? This question arises from an empirical puzzle as well as from a theoretical contradiction. Despite the prominent principle of ministerial responsibility, empirically, the ‘personal consequences' of ministerial scandals in their area of responsibility, display a large variance. Some ministers resign because of rather trifling affairs, others stay in office in spite of serious scandals. Taking into consideration the delegation relationship between the executive and the parliament, in view of the principal‐agent theory, a minister's resignation due to major political or personal misconduct is to be expected. On the other hand, the actual constitutional configuration of ministerial responsibility casts theoretical doubts on the ministerial loss of office. The quantitative analysis of 133 resignation issues in the years 1949 to 2009 reveals that ministerial responsibility bears no relevance to the decision whether to resign or not. Indeed, when the cause of the resignation issue is directly connected to ministerial responsibility, the probability of a resignation even decreases.     

A DEFENCE OF FREQUENT MINISTERIAL TURNOVER

The frequency with which British ministers are transferred between departments incurs considerable adverse comment. It is generally held to have a prejudicial effect upon government. However, much of the criticism is misdirected and predicated upon questionable assumptions. There are cogent (if rarely voiced) arguments in favour of relatively rapid ministerial turnover. Within departments short-stay ministers are in a stronger position than conventional wisdom allows. At the cabinet level they are less likely to adopt a narrow, departmentally oriented approach at the expense of wider considerations. The party management function of ministerial reshuffles, though much disparaged, plays an essential part in effective government, promoting ministerial vitality and assisting in the achievement of the legislative programme. The preponderance of career politicians in the House of Commons accentuates the pressures for rapid ministerial turnover, the need for which is, paradoxically, further increased by the same party being in office for a prolonged period.     

UK Ministerial Responsibility in 2002: The Tale of Two Resignations

The resignations in 2002 of Stephen Byers and Estelle Morris (UK Secretaries of State for Transport and Education respectively) suggest the need to review the constitutional and political aspects of resignation. In both cases, ministers recognized that they had failed in the oversight or supervision of their departments and thus in the fulfilment of their ministerial role. Their resignations therefore provide evidence of a move away from 'causal responsibility', with its complication of the policy/operations and accountability/responsibility distinctions, towards 'role responsibility'. In so doing, they raise the possibility that what are commonly understood as 'departmental fault' resignations may be more appropriately subsumed within an expanded category of personal fault. The resignations also challenge Finer's thesis on the conditions that need to be meet for a resignation to be forthcoming. In neither instance was the political party out for blood or the prime minister unbending. In both cases the press was relentless, suggesting that the media has become a prime actor in determining resignation, and the minister yielding, a recognition, perhaps, of constitutional principle over political pragmatism.     

POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY AND PERFORMANCE AUDIT: THE CASE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL IN NORWAY

Performance audit is widely used in public administration, but, at present, little empirical evidence exists on its usefulness and contribution to accountability. Based on survey data from 353 civil servants in Norway, this article analyzes the auditees' perceptions of the audit. Performance audit was seen as useful by a majority of the auditees. If auditees agreed to audit criteria and assessments, were allowed to influence the process, had favourable opinions of the reports, and believed that the State Audit Institution contributed to accountability and improvement, then they regarded it as useful. Reports used for accountability purposes were not perceived as less useful. The auditees' administrative level, the use of the report to further interests, and attention from politicians, the media, and the Parliament impacted on the accountability dimension. These results indicate that performance audit can influence civil servants, but the influence is contingent on how the audited civil servants perceive the performance audit.     

The partisan–professional dichotomy revisited: Politicization and decision‐making of senior civil servants

Politicization has an ambivalent reputation among public administration scholars. While considered an effective instrument to safeguard political control over ministerial bureaucracy, partisanship of senior civil servants is likewise associated with patronage and is deemed detrimental to professionalism and meritocracy. To scrutinize this contradiction, the article examines how the party‐political background of senior civil servants influences their decision‐making behaviour. Two theoretically derived conceptions of loyalty are therefore put to the test: responsiveness and responsibility. Effects are captured by using the vignette technique in 40 in‐depth interviews with former senior civil servants from ministerial departments at federal and state level in Germany. The results are surprising in so far as they reveal that politicized senior civil servants act neither more responsively nor less responsibly than their non‐politicized peers. These findings challenge common assumptions and call for a more refined analysis of the conditions under which politicization leads to negative effects.     

The Civil Service Under Stress: The Fall in Civil Service Power and Authority

The failures of governments of both parties in the 1970s had prepared for radical changes in the nature of government under Margaret Thatcher. Among them were that ministers resumed greater power over their civil servants. While various aspects of the relationship between ministers and officials changed and despite the introduction of special advisers, close partnership — the Haldane relationship — was largely retained between them until the end of the 1980s. In the 1990s ministers began to operate less closely with the civil service, largely because they found they had less time for departmental work under the Major and the first Blair administrations. Many of the skills for which civil servants had been trained became less in demand because of the ending of the Cabinet style of government, the reduced importance of ministers appearing before parliament and the greater involvement of spin doctors and media handlers in preparing public documents. However, new skills were required: more rapid accessing of information and more skill in implementation and responsibility for it. The Wilson reforms of 1999 were in large part aimed to remedy these shortcomings. There remains a question whether enough of the Haldane relationship survives for government not to be driven towards greater definition of the rules in which civil servants operate.     

MINISTERIAL ADVISERS,POLITICIZATION AND THE RETREAT FROM WESTMINSTER: THE CASE OF NEW ZEALAND

Political advisers are an established third element in a number of Westminster‐styled jurisdictions, as they are in New Zealand’s institution of executive government. In this paper we report the initial findings of a research project focusing on the role and accountabilities of ministerial advisers in New Zealand. We locate these findings in the context of a growing body of international and comparative research on the role and accountabilities of non civil‐ or public‐service advisers within political executives and comment on the extent to which the findings affirm or refute the view that the ‘third element’ constitutes a threat to the continued application of Westminster principles and practices in New Zealand’s system of government – once described as more Westminster than Westminster. In doing so, we highlight deficiencies in standard conceptions of politicization and argue that there is a need to more clearly differentiate between its procedural and substantive dimensions.     

STRATEGIC LINKS IN A CUT‐THROAT WORLD: RETHINKING THE ROLE AND RELATIONSHIPS OF AUSTRALIAN MINISTERIAL STAFF

Ministerial staff relationships form part of the networks within the core executive. This article uses data from a comprehensive empirical study of Australian ministerial staff to explore advisers' horizontal relationships with each other. It finds that the interactions between Australian ministerial advisers are a key part of their role, are highly valued by ministers and public servants, and are an important element of the cabinet system. The informal links and networks between partisan advisers are underpinned by commonly understood norms of behaviour and a clear power structure. This partisan arena of the core executive has become important to ministers and the collective functioning of government.     

Ministerial Resignations 1945–97

This article reports on data collected on ministerial resignations and non-resignations 1945–1997. It analyses the reasons why ministers resign and patterns that emerge in terms of the types of issues that are more likely to lead to resignation, and variances between different Prime Ministers, parties and over time. It provides the first fully quantified analysis of ministerial resignations in Britain in the post-war period to enhance the impressionistic analyses which have been offered before.     

Re-assessing the Role of Departmental Cabinet Ministers

The study of the core executive has been dominated by discussion of the Prime Ministers and Cabinet with only limited serious treatment paid to ministers. However, ministers and departments are crucial actors in the core executive. This article examines the multiple roles and varying impacts of ministers. More particularly, we initially develop a classification of ministerial roles, which builds upon, but develops, work by Headey, James and Norton. Subsequently, we use this classification to pose two key questions. Which roles do particular ministers stress? In what ways has the balance between these roles changed in the last twenty‐five years?     

RAYNERISM IN PRACTICE: ANATOMY OF A RAYNER SCRUTINY

Rayner scrutinies have become a regular feature of life in government departments. It takes only a few months to conduct a scrutiny but implementation is a far longer process which can absorb much ministerial and official time. This paper describes one of the first Rayner scrutinies — on arrangements for paying social security benefits — from inception to implementation. It relates the scrutiny team's reports to the social security system it was in part reviewing and then traces the way that ministers and officials handled the controversy that the scrutiny team's proposals caused when leaked in an inaccurate form. It concludes by speculating about some wider lessons that might be drawn about the validity of the scrutiny technique; the value of the Rayner label on reviews; the need for independent reviews in bureaucratic organizations; civil service responsiveness to reviews: the political dimension to management issues: public debate and open government considerations, and the indirect consequences of scrutinies.     

Embattled executives: Prime ministerial weakness in East Central Europe

In a period in which “strong” and even “presidential” prime ministers have arguably become more the rule than the exception in the major states of Western Europe, most prime ministers in the new democracies of East Central Europe appear to have been relatively weak figures. This article investigates the reasons for that relative weakness in the ten East Central European countries, which together have had 87 prime ministers in the 16 years since the fall of Communism. It evaluates several possible explanations: party system weakness, the institutional structure, elite recruitment patterns, and policy constraints. It then seeks to explain several notable exceptions to the prime ministerial weakness rule.     

CORE EXECUTIVE STUDIES TWO DECADES ON

The concept of the ‘core executive’ was introduced by Dunleavy and Rhodes in 1990. Two decades on, what is the state of core executive studies? This article argues that the language of the study of central government has been transformed. In addition, there is now a much broader consideration of the central government space, incorporating ministers, civil servants, and so on. Within core executive studies, the resource‐dependency approach has become dominant. Arguably, though, with its insistence on a structural element to power and its focus on prime ministerial predominance, much of this work collapses back into an interpretation that is close to the conclusions of the pre‐1990 debate. Currently, only the interpretive, ethnographic approach proposed by Rhodes and his co‐authors challenges the new orthodoxy. This article suggests that a resolutely positivist account of the core executive would provide a similar challenge and spark a lively and very welcome debate.     

Ministerial responsibility and the Scottish Qualifications Agency

The Scottish Qualifications Agency (SQA) is charged with the task of overseeing school–based qualifications in Scotland. However, for the 2000 exam diet the SQA failed to produce either timely or accurate exam results. The events surrounding this failure, accompanied by the responsible minister's explanation of his own actions and inactions, brought to the fore issues of responsibility and accountability. The unresolved nature of accountability and responsibility within government, particularly in relation to non–departmental public bodies (NDPBs), became apparent as the inquiries into the SQA took evidence. Utilizing the SQA as a powerful example, this article explores the problematic structures of accountability and responsibility that exist between NDPBs and ministers.