Lobbying as a Private Good with Intra-Industry Trade

Intra-industry trade—trade in different varieties of the same product between countries with similar factor endowments—has been an important and surprising feature of the postwar international economy. Economists have explained this trade with models of monopolistic competition, which suggest that intra-industry trade does not have the stark distributional consequences that the more traditional "endowments-based" trade does. I do not dispute that claim here, although I do dispute a political implication drawn from it—that intra-industry trade produces less political action than endowments-based trade. I argue that, because firms involved in intra-industry trade are monopolists, lobbying essentially becomes a private good . If intra-industry trade places costs on firms, they do not have less incentive to take political action to stop it, as the conventional wisdom suggests. I provide evidence for this contention from complaints lodged with the International Trade Commission. The results show that the higher the degree of intra-industry trade the more likely an industry will request protection from the ITC.     

Trade and investment: Introduction to the special issue

This special issue focuses on a variety of political-economy questions on trade and investment and is guided by a shared understanding that trade and investment processes can no longer be studied in isolation from each other. Three articles provide new insights into the study of the design of preferential trade agreements and effects thereof, two of which focus on the politically salient issues of non-trade concerns. A third one investigates which export sectors win from improved market access opportunities, in order words, how gains from trade are distributed. Two articles study the World Trade Organization’s dispute settlement system. One contribution is unpacking the role of the most important and influential firms and investors in affecting US behavior in WTO disputes, a second contribution studies how leadership changes in democracies and autocracies have different effects on dispute behavior. Finally, the special issue includes a new study on how the shadow economies in developing states are affected by the integration into the world economy (trade and investment) and by policy programs of the International Monetary Fund.     

Enduring trade disputes: Disguised protectionism and duration and recurrence of international trade disputes

Why do some WTO trade disputes endure and recur while others do not? States have difficulty resolving trade conflicts when they involve certain types of trade-restrictive domestic regulations. While such regulations vary in their extent of legitimacy—fulfilling non-trade domestic regulatory objectives and availability of less trade-restrictive options—complainant states cannot always distinguish legitimate barriers from illegitimate ones. In such scenarios of disguised protectionism, which I argue is most prevalent with policies involving WTO’s Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) Agreement, disputants confront difficulties concluding their disputes. Disputes last longer and are more likely to recur. I test the argument against a data set of WTO disputes structured in an innovative manner—one that links together related and recurring disputes into single conflicts. Both an event history analysis of conflict duration and a count analysis of conflict recurrence using this data strongly support this argument.     

The impact of leader turnover on the onset and the resolution of WTO disputes

When national leaders are replaced, the incoming leader often represents different interests to those of his predecessor. Such shifts in national priorities affect both the onset of WTO disputes and the resolution of ongoing disputes. In particular, leader turnover increases the likelihood that a nation will be involved in a WTO dispute as either plaintiff or defendant, and, if a dispute is ongoing, then leader change in a defendant state increases the likelihood of significant concessions by the defendant. The impact of leader change on both the initiation and settlement of disputes is greater in non-democratic states than democratic states.     

Intellectual property provisions and support for US trade agreements

Intellectual property rights are a key piece of the expanded trade agenda, and the United States has pushed hard to strengthen protections beyond WTO standards in its trade agreements. While agreement provisions governing intellectual property are commonly thought to be an important driver of corporate preferences over US trade policy, systematic empirical evidence for this proposition, especially in comparison to other determinants of trade policy, is generally lacking. To fill this void, this paper examines variation in reliance on intellectual property across US industries to explain attitudes and lobbying on US trade agreements. The effects of IP provisions on support for US trade agreements are politically substantial, though trade remains the primary determinant of preferences over trade agreements.     

Technology Firms Shape Political Communication: The Work of Microsoft,Facebook, Twitter,and Google With Campaigns During the 2016 U.S. Presidential Cycle

This article offers the first analysis of the role that technology companies, specifically Facebook, Twitter, Microsoft, and Google, play in shaping the political communication of electoral campaigns in the United States. We offer an empirical analysis of the work technology firms do around electoral politics through interviews with staffers at these firms and digital and social media directors of 2016 U.S. presidential primary and general election campaigns, in addition to field observations at the 2016 Democratic National Convention. We find that technology firms are motivated to work in the political space for marketing, advertising revenue, and relationship-building in the service of lobbying efforts. To facilitate this, these firms have developed organizational structures and staffing patterns that accord with the partisan nature of American politics. Furthermore, Facebook, Twitter, and Google go beyond promoting their services and facilitating digital advertising buys, actively shaping campaign communication through their close collaboration with political staffers. We show how representatives at these firms serve as quasi-digital consultants to campaigns, shaping digital strategy, content, and execution. Given this, we argue that political communication scholars need to consider social media firms as more active agents in political processes than previously appreciated in the literature.     

Multinational corporations and regional integration: Some preliminary reflections

In 1970, the worldwide affiliates of mutlinational corporations (MNCs), headquartered in Europe and the USA, numbered 27,300. Inevitably, they have had a significant effect on regional integration—economic, social, and political. Economically, production and marketing patterns of MNCs have tended to aid regional integration in developed regions. However, they have had a limited impact in the Third World.

The presence of MNCs in pluralistic societies will probably further social integration by first fostering a regionally oriented elite; this orientation may then spread to the populace at large. In the Third World, however, MNCs may actually widen the elite‐masses gap.

Social integration also has political overtones, as the socialization process will inevitably enhance attitudinal integration. The more MNC facilities in a region, the more will decision‐making powers and activities tend to be transferred from national units to regional institutions (institutional integration), and the more governments within the region will be urged to make joint policies (policy integration). However, nationalistic feelings and fears of dependence will probably impede regional political integration in the Third World.     

“航行自由”与中美南海博弈（英文）

The South China Sea issue has evolved into a show of force featuring the United States and China. Despite divergent legal interpretations on the navigation regime, China and the US have shown political willingness to keep their dispute under control and enhance maritime cooperation.     

EU–US Trade Disputes about Risk Regulation: The Case of Genetically Modified Organisms

The cultivation of crops increasingly employs genetically modified organisms worldwide. The nature and the probability of side and latent effects of the mass use of genetic engineering are, at present, unforeseeable. A trade-off between risks and benefits is therefore hard to define. The precautionary principle is a globally known though not undisputed approach to handling such uncertainties. Its application is the focus of a World Trade Organisation (WTO) dispute settlement case between the US and the EU about the approval of genetically modified seed in Europe. The competent Panel (Panel in European Communities – Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products, WT/DS291, WT/DS292 and WT/DS293) was scheduled to close the case at the end of 2005. I argue that the dispute is not about the recognition of the precautionary principle in itself, but about different cultural preferences of dealing with risk, leading to disagreement over how the precautionary principle should apply in practice. I suggest that the WTO ought to respect the cultural foundation of risk perception and integrate it into its legal system.     

What Makes Conflict Resolution Possible?

Much of the negotiation literature emphasizes dispute resolution process, seemingly based on the assumption that resolution is indeed possible in a rational environment. The author outlines the history of transformations in social and political thought that have led to this shared assumption. However, the rationality assumption is seriously challenged in the contemporary era by terrorists and others who predicate their actions on a moral certitude that justifies their actions, no matter what the costs. Interveners perhaps should place more emphasis on changing the environment in which disputes occur, so that resolution is at least a possibility.     

The Economic Leverage of International Organizations in Interstate Disputes

Addressing a long-standing debate in international relations scholarship, this study shows that international governmental organizations (IGOs) with high economic leverage over their member states, such as some development banks, substantially lower the risk that political disputes experience the use of military force. Empirical tests covering cases of disputatious claims and international crises since 1946 make use of a new classification of IGOs that have economic leverage and use it toward increasing states’ cost of using force in disputes. When pairs of states are subject to the economic leverage of IGOs, they are substantially less likely to use force. For the understanding and practice of interstate dispute resolution and international conflict more generally, the study suggests a specific linkage between institutionalized economic interdependence and conflict escalation.     

Bringing the Company Back In: A Firm-Level Analysis of Foreign Direct Investment

The industry standard for studying multinational corporations (MNCs) has been to evaluate patterns in aggregate country-level measures of foreign direct investment (FDI). Though certainly related, these data are at best a proxy for the actual commercial and productive activities of multinationals that most political scientists purport to be interested in. Simply put, this is a very indirect way of testing theories about the sociopolitical and economic factors that motivate MNCs’ choice of host countries. This article introduces a new firm-level data set designed to get around this problem by permitting more direct analysis of multinationals’ foreign operations. It then revisits the relationship between regime type and direct investment, finding evidence that MNCs are more likely to establish new subsidiaries in democracies than in nondemocracies. However, further analysis reveals that the strength of this relationship varies by context. Specifically, MNCs rely on regime type as an indicator of political risk when they lack an existing relationship with the host state. In addition, those operating in extractive industries are generally less responsive to political institutions than those operating in manufacturing or services. These results suggest that firm- and sector-specific factors deserve greater consideration than they have been given in the existing literature.     

A Behavioral Model of Dispute Escalation: The Major Powers, 1816–1976

This study combines the empirical evidence drawn from studies of conflict escalation in political science, and the social‐psychological insights concerning human inference and prediction, to develop a dynamic model of dispute escalation. This model makes systematic use of historical data concerning the behavioral unfolding of disputes involving at least one major power to generate probabilistic predictions of the war/no war outcomes of such disputes. Using the Correlates of War Project data on major power disputes in the 1816–1976 period, these predictions are tested against the actual outcomes of the disputes. Overall, the model predicts correctly nearly 94 percent of the cases and compares favorably to several null models against which it is tested. However, while not consistently biased the model's predictions are characterized by considerable instability across various probability ranges. This suggests that the incorporation of more stable factors such as underlying systemic and dyadic attributes may substantially improve the overall performance of the model as well as the stability of its predictions.     

构建大湄公河次区域争端解决机制的思考——以区域贸易争端解决机制模式为鉴

大湄公河次区域经济合作（以下简称GMS）于1992年由亚洲开发银行发起，涉及流域内中国、缅甸、老挝、泰国、柬埔寨和越南等6个国家。对任何贸易体制而言，无论是全球性的多边贸易体制，还是区域性的双边或周边贸易体制，争端解决机制是其贸易规则中必不可少的内容。对GMS来说同样如此。因为，无论GMS贸易自由化规则设计得如何科学合理，若没有一套有效的争端解决机制作为其实施的后盾，6国之间的贸易纠纷就无法得到及时有效的解决，     

Mediating public disputes: A response to the skeptics

Conclusions There are more than 75 well-documented cases of successful dispute resolution in the public sector (and a great many more that are less well-documented). The evidence attesting to the merits of non-adjudicatory approaches to dispute resolution is mounting rapidly.While there are some public disputes that do not lend themselves to informal resolution (i.e., disputes involving fundamental freedoms or rights), many involving conflicting interests and values have proven resolvable in a win-win fashion. The most important preconditions for success have been the presence of a credible nonpartisan facilitator or mediator, parties in an undeniably interdependent situation and pressure created by a decision maker who has promised to act (using traditional decision-making methods) in the absence of a consensus. In short, given these preconditions, there are a number of good reasons to forge ahead with efforts to employ mediation and other forms of dispute resolution on a more regular basis. Lawrence Susskind is Professor of Urban Studies and Planning at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Executive Director of the Program on Negotiation at Harvard Law School, Cambridge, Mass. 02138. Co-author ofResolving Environmental Regulatory Disputes (Cambridge, Mass.: Schenkman, 1984), he has served as a mediator of public disputes at the local, state and federal levels.     

The 2001–2002 Indo-Pakistani Crisis: Exposing the Limits of Coercive Diplomacy

Coercive diplomacy has long been seen as a viable alternative to war by political decision-makers. There is, however, a long line of credible academic and policy critique—stretching back to the Cold War—that asserts the failures of coercion almost always overwhelm its benefits. Our examination of the 2001–2002 Indo-Pakistani crisis supports the overall analytical consensus that coercive methods, under certain circumstances, accomplish little. We discover that India's use of coercive diplomacy was severely hobbled because of Pakistan's possession of nuclear weapons, strong Pakistani conventional forces, and other geopolitical realities that strongly favored Pakistan. Despite careful attempts by Indian elites to apply the principles of “forceful persuasion” to end the crisis on terms favorable to India (the stronger power in the dispute), the Indian strategy failed to accomplish most of its objectives. Our analysis thereby exposes the limits of coercion and compellance for solving chronic territorial and ideological disputes between enduring rivals.     

Lobbying business interests in Russia

Our article examines business lobbying in contemporary Russia within the wider context of lobbying in the decision‐making system overall. It is argued that, although lobbies were an important part of the old Soviet system, the defence of corporate interests was held within ‘natural’ limits by an overriding concern to maintain the established consensus ‐ in the form of a bureaucratic corporatist economy. In the perestroika and post‐perestroika years, however, lobbies themselves took front stage becoming the decisive element in the economy. Easily the most important, in terms of economic strength and political influence, were the various business interest groups, which we have attempted to classify according to their lobbying potential and the channels of influence available to them. The peculiarities of business interest lobbying are also considered, including the as yet unsatisfied quest for political representation, the tendency for management and employees to ‘row together’, the huge potential of uncontrollable lobbying ‘from below’ in the face of growing social tensions and, finally, the disparity between lobbying and other forms of state‐society relations.     

In the Nick of Time: Conflict Management, Mediation Timing, and the Duration of Interstate Disputes

This paper develops a theoretical argument linking time and the timing of conflict management efforts to dispute duration. We test competing hypotheses on conflict data drawn from disputes in the post-1945 period. Our analysis demonstrates that the effects of mediation vary substantially over the course of a dispute. Specifically, we note that mediation has a curvilinear relationship with time and the ending of disputes. Mediation efforts that occur soon after disputes begin have the best chance of reducing expected future dispute duration. Following this initial period, subsequent mediation efforts lead to longer rather than shorter disputes. After a long period, mediation again leads to shorter rather than longer disputes. We also find that there should be consistency in the mediators used to manage a conflict rather than shifting personnel to interject new ideas.     

俄日两国“北方四岛”领土纠纷问题的博弈分析

博弈论和国家利益等相关理论对于研究俄日两国"北方四岛"领土纠纷问题,有较强的解释力。日本不会放弃对"北方四岛"的索要,而俄罗斯也不会轻易归还或部分归还"北方四岛",甚至必要时会加强在"北方四岛"乃至远东地区的军力部署。俄日两国在资本和自然资源方面分别具有不同的比较优势,在博弈模型的纳什均衡中:俄罗斯选择"据守",日本选择"索要,合作"。"北方四岛"问题将会变得长期化。该领土问题的解决,将取决于未来国际政治经济形势,取决于俄日两国彼此之间权力的消长,取决于两国之间的新的博弈均衡。