Criminal liability of physicians: an encroachment on the abortion right?

The Supreme Court in 1973 in Roe v. Wade established that decision of first trimester abortion is left to the physician, exercising his best medical judgment, in consultation with the patient. During this period the state may not regulate abortion determination since there is no compelling state interest; therefore a physician performing abortion will be precluded from civil or criminal liability. In second trimester abortion the state has a compelling interest in the health of the mother and may regulate the procedure to protect maternal health; although a previable fetus may be able to survive the abortion, Roe v. Danforth definitively places the woman's right to an abortion above the life of the fetus during the previable stage; therefore the state cannot seek to safeguard the life or health of the fetus during the abortion. Third trimester abortion implies a viable fetus; thus, a compelling state interest in the potential life arises and the state may regulate and proscribe abortion except when necessary for the life and health of the mother. The determination of when viability has been achieved is a matter of judgment resting with the physician who has the choice of techniques and operating procedures which may or may not be fatal to the unborn. It is a question of either termination of pregnancy or destruction of the fetus. In this last case the legal responsibility placed upon the physician is very serious, and involving a risk of civil and criminal liability. Uncertainties as to the boundaries of legal abortion and the threat of criminal liability can only result in a reluctance among physicians to perform second and third trimester abortions, which is against the fundamental right to abortion guaranteed by the Constitution. The Supreme Court will have to elaborate upon the scope of the abortion right, whether it encompasses fetal destruction or only termination of pregnancy, because it directly affects the extent and quality of maternal and fetal care that must be rendered by a physician. If only termination of pregnancy is included the Court must resolve whether the woman's health interests predominate, or whether the physician can be required to enhance fetal survival. Physicians have a right to know the full extent of legal ramifications and implications of legally induced abortion.     

Abortion on demand in a post-Wade context: must the state pay the bills?

The legal issues involved with the application of the United States Supreme Court decisions in Roe v. Wade and Doe v. Bolton (1973) are reveiwed, particularly the question of whether an indigent pregnant woman now has the right to abortion on demand at public expense. The 2 decisions, based on the Fourteenth Amendment, established that a woman, in consultation with her physician, must be free to choose to terminate her pregnancy, at least in the first trimester. State laws are permitted only to regulate abortion procedures in the second trimester and may only regulate or proscribe abortion itself after the fetus becomes viable. The Court did not rule that indigents had a corollary right to the implementation of abortion, and thus free abortions do not appear to be constitutionally required. However, depending on the type of Medicaid coverage in which the individual state is participating, the medically indigent may receive Medicaid benefits for abortions, at least in the first trimester. Since Medicaid is voluntary for the state, it could drop out of the program entirely or the Congress could specifically exclude abortions from Medicaid coverage. Both actions appear unlikely, however, and abortions for medical reasons clearly seem to fall under Medicaid's purpose. Consequently, despite the Wade and Bolton decisions, the right to abortion is limited by the ability of indigents to pay for it. In the light of the serious complications of illegal abortion, it is concluded that legislators should insure the availability of legal abortions. Such a move would not in itself encourage abortions but would properly extend the right to abortion to all citizens.     

Genetic identification of the mummified fetus

During executing some activities by the police, a mummified human fetus was accidentally revealed on a scrap of paper. It came from pregnancy considerably not carried to term, lasting about 2.5 lunar months. Medical examination did not give evidence of mechanical manipulation such as abortion or disintegration. The aim of the study was the genetic identification of the mummified fetus and an answer to the question if an indicated supposed mother was the mother of the fetus. In the study a relevant factor was maternity confirmation by means of statistic calculations.     

Patriarchy,Abortion, and the Criminal System: Policing Female Bodies

This paper argues for a broader consideration of the issue of abortion—one that stresses the centrality of the denial of reproductive rights in the patriarchal policing of women’s bodies and their sexuality. Globally, the estimates of abortion-related deaths in 2014 ranged from 22,500 to 44,000, and countless women are injured or left infertile by seeking illegal abortions. We briefly review international trends regarding abortion politics and then analyze closely women’s access to abortion in two countries: the United States and Bangladesh. Representing two very different contexts of the developed and the developing world, respectively, we contend that abortion services are being constrained by misogynistic politics that deny women control over their bodies. Finally, the paper reviews recent international efforts to establish abortion rights as part of a broader landscape of human rights. Notably, while there are some efforts in the global north to recriminalize both contraception and abortion, these practices have been characterized by a recent United Nation’s report as the deliberate denial of medically available and necessary services and hence a form of “torture.”     

致胎儿死伤的刑法评价

国内关于胎儿性致死伤的讨论,往往忽略中外刑法在是否规定堕胎罪问题上的明显差异性;自愿堕胎可谓一种自伤行为不构成犯罪,计生部门依法强制堕胎因存在违法性阻却事由而不构成犯罪;凡是违背孕妇意愿伤害胎儿(未导致孕妇死亡),致胎儿在母体内死亡的,或者在母体内受到重大伤害但经过治疗而没有留下后遗症的,以及在母体内受到严重伤害留下后遗症以致出生后不久死亡或者形成严重残疾的,都是对母体健康生育机能的侵害,故意为之的构成故意伤害罪,过失为之的构成过失致人重伤罪。     

"Pro-life" absolutes, feminist challenges: the fundamentalist narrative of Irish abortion law 1986-1992

This article asks how Irish abortion law developed to the point of stopping a young pregnant rape victim from travelling abroad to have an abortion in 1992 (Attorney General v.X). The author argues that this case, which ultimately saw the Irish Supreme Court overturn that decision and recognize the young woman's right to abortion, was the last chapter of the fundamentalist narrative of Irish abortion law. The feminist critique of that law needs to consider its particular fundamentalist aspects in order to clarify the obstacles posed to the struggle for Irish women's reproductive freedom. The author argues that a fundamentalist narrative ordered the post-colonial and patriarchal conditions of Irish society so as to call for the legal recognition of an absolute right to life of the "unborn." The Supreme Court's interpretation of the constitutional right to life of the fetus in three cases during the 1980s is evidence that Irish abortion law was constructed through a fundamentalist narrative until that narrative was rejected in the Supreme Court decision in Attorney General v. X.     

The legal status of the fetus: an international review

The article examines the way that courts and legislatures in the United Kingdom, the United States of America, Canada and Australia have answered questions regarding the legal status of a fetus. These questions have arisen in a variety of legal situations: the article deals with succession, criminal, child protection and negligence law. The conclusion offered is that a fetus has a value and an existence that the law should recognise. This does not mean, however, that in all circumstances the law should protect the interests of the fetus. Law-makers will respond differently to claims made on behalf of a fetus, depending on the context. The fetus does not have a uniform value or character in the eyes of the law. The law makes choices as to the situations in which it will take account of actual or threatened antenatal harm.     

Personhood,property rights,and the permissibility of abortion

The purpose of this paper is to argue that the tactic of granting a fetus the legal status of a person will not, contrary to the expectations of opponents of abortion, provide grounds for a general prohibition on abortions. I begin by examining two arguments, one moral (J. J. Thomson's ‘A Defense of Abortion’) and the other legal (D. Regan's ‘Rewriting Roe v. Wade’), which grant the assumption that a fetus is a person and yet argue to the conclusion that abortion is permissible. However, both Thomson and Regan rely on the so-called bad samaritan principle. This principle states that a person has a right to refuse to give aid. Their reliance on this principle creates problems, both in the moral and the legal contexts, since the bad samaritan principle is intended to apply to passive refusals to aid; abortion, however, does not look like any such passive denial of aid, and so it does not seem like the sort of action covered by the bad samaritan principle. In defense of the positions outlined by Thomson and Regan, I argue that the apparent asymmetry between abortion and the usual type of case covered by the bad samaritan principle is only apparent and not a genuine problem for their analyses. I conclude with a defense of the morality of the bad samaritan principle.     

Bracket creep in Australian abortion indications: when did rubella arrive?

This article highlights a common misconception about abortion law that is apparent from reading Harriton v Stephens (2006) 226 CLR 52; namely, that fetal abnormality forms a prima facie case for lawful abortion across Australia. This fallacy stems from the legacy of British law drafted in the aftermath of the thalidomide crisis of the early 1960s, and continues to shape beliefs about Australian abortion law in society and within the judiciary. The article notes the fundamental contradictions between British-style law that provides for abortion on the ground of fetal abnormality and New South Wales case law that provides for lawful abortion in regard to the health and wellbeing of the woman. The author concludes that it is misguided and erroneous to configure abortion law in terms of the fetus inconsistent with the tradition of abortion law, and New South Wales authority.     

Reproductive choices and informed consent: fetal interests, women's identity, and relational autonomy

In this Article, I describe and examine the severe shortcomings in women's autonomy in the context of reproductive choices in the medical arena. The reproductive choices I explore are those choices that involve gestation: abortion, fertility treatments, and interventions during pregnancy. Due to state and medical interests in the fetus, I describe how information conveyed to patients making reproductive choices is biased towards fetal interests, relies on female stereotypes, and is still conveyed with the objective authority of the medical profession. Moreover, reproductive choices implicate women's values and identity interests that reach beyond medical concerns, which are not part of the informed consent doctrine at all. The narrow, individualistic informed consent torts doctrine intended to protect patient autonomy does not do enough in this context to balance bias nor does it mandate discussion of important identity interests and values. Accordingly, I argue that when faced with reproductive choices, women are not provided the balanced and comprehensive information needed to promote their autonomy. In response to the breakdown in patient autonomy I describe, instead of leaving women alone to make choices or regulating in order to protect them from their choices, a broader framework for supporting reproductive choices should be established. In light of the interdependence of woman and fetus, as well as the broader social context shaping these decisions, I argue that a more contextual, relational perspective of autonomy should be the goal of informed consent in the context of reproductive choices. I suggest a number of reforms that aim to optimize patient autonomy from a relational perspective. I suggest a broad, deliberative doctor-patient consultation and legal reforms that create more balance between the pull towards intervention and fetal protection on the one hand, and non-intervention and protection of women's personal identity interests on the other.     

The case of abortion

Abortion as an issue is tried in a courtroom situation. The followi ng questions are dealt with: 1) At what point in the gestation process is the fetus recognized to be a human being and accorded the protection of a human being? and 2) Does a woman have a right to abort her pregnancy? Witnesses present evidence and viewpoints from the following disciplines: law, religion, biology, history, legal history, and medicine. The advocate for abortion focuses on a woman's right to privacy and to control over her own body. The opponent of abortion emph asizes the sacredness of life.     

Abortion in Israel: Community, Rights, and the Context of Compromise

In contrast to American understandings of abortion as a uniquely tragic dilemma, the Israeli abortion issue is a tangential controversy in a larger debate over the relationship between the state's national and democratic identity. The divergent paths of abortion politics in Israel and the United States reflect important differences in underlying religious doctrines, geographical size, feminist ideologies, and the immediacy of other social cleavages. More profoundly, the two abortion stories are the product of distinct understandings of the mutual obligations between citizens and their state and of the relationship between individual and collective rights and duties. While these differences may account for the capacity of Israeli activists on both sides to forge pragmatic compromises, the stability of these policies is uncertain both because of changing Israeli priorities and the import of American conceptions of the abortion dispute.     

British Abortion Law: Speaking from the Past to Govern the Future

This paper analyses the poor alignment of the aging statutory framework and modern understandings of medical best practice in the context of abortion services. With a particular focus on medical abortion, it assesses the significant challenges that the gulf between the two poses for clinicians, service providers, regulators and the courts. Law is said to be at its most effective where there is a shared regulatory community that accepts and endorses the values that underpin it. It is suggested that the example of abortion law provides a marked example of what happens when legal norms once justified by broadly shared moral understandings, concerns for patient safety and requirements of best practice are now either unsupported by or, indeed, sit in opposition to such concerns.     

Cocaine, fetal loss, and the role of the forensic pathologist

Adverse obstetrical outcomes are often associated with maternal cocaine use. These have included intrauterine growth retardation, abruptio placentae, and an increased incidence of spontaneous abortion and pre-term labor. This report details the case of an 18-week-gestation fetus recovered from a sewage treatment plant. A brain specimen was positive for cocaine. With the present epidemic of cocaine abuse, it is important for the forensic pathologist to seek toxicologic evidence of cocaine in all suspicious fetal and neonatal deaths.     

Developmental trends in adolescents' psychological and legal competence to consent to abortion

United States Supreme Court has affirmed the right of states to require parental consent or notice from minors seeking abortion. We examine an underlying presumption that minors are not competent to consent to abortion. Participants (N=75 age 13–21, seeking a pregnancy test at a women's medical clinic) completed an interview that was audiotaped and scored on four cognitive and volitional criteria of legal competence. Competence was compared in three age groups (≤15; 16–17; 18–21) for participants who considered abortion and for those who did not. Adolescents age 16–17 and adolescents ≤15, who considered abortion, appeared as competent as legal adults; only≤15-year-old adolescents who did not consider abortion appeared less competent. Regression analysis was used to identify psychosocial predictors of competence. Results challenge the presumption that minors are not competent. An alternate policy based upon informed consent and empowerment of minors as decision makers is proposed.     

Public support for pro-choice abortion policies in the nation and states: changes and stability after the Roe and Doe decisions

In 1973 the United States Supreme Court ruled that abortion could be had practically on request during the first 3 months of pregnancy. This article discusses whether the decision led to more public support for that position, and where in the U.S. the increase in support has been most drastic. The most recent public opinion polls indicate about 60% public support legalized abortion, while it was only 45% before 1973. Support has also increased even if pregnancy is not judged to be detrimental to the mother's health, or if it is not the result of rape and/or incest, but even if it is simply requested for economic or purely personal reasons. People under 30, with college education, men and Protestants, seem to be the staunchest supporters of abortion on demand. There has also been an increase in the number of Catholics supporting abortion. Support for abortion increased in most states between 1969-1973, particularly in the West and in the Northwest. The fight to deny federal funds for abortion is still raging in Congress; some studies indicate that the religion of the legislators is the most powerful predictor of voting on abortion, and that the decision is a very personal one, and not easily altered by the lobbying of groups on either side.     

The Carhart case and late-term abortions -- what's next in Australia?

A recent case in the United States Supreme Court has indicated a change in course on the issue of abortion rights. In Gonzales v Carhart 127 S Ct 1610 (2007), the Supreme Court, in April 2007, upheld federal legislation banning a particular late-term abortion procedure with no exceptions (even to preserve the mother's life). This column examines the case in the context of recent Australian cases involving abortion issues. It extrapolates from Carhart to consider the potential for the Australian High Court to disrupt access to safe, medically supervised and performed abortion.     

论胎儿在我国未来民法典中的民事主体地位

随着生命科学时代的到来,胎儿及其法律保护将成为21世纪的“时代课题”。胎儿是生命的初始阶段,胎儿生长发育直接关系着人类的生命质量和一国的国民素质。因此,自罗马法以来,各国都相应立法保护胎儿的利益,但在我国法律几乎是一片空白,本文试从民法视角思考胎儿的利益保护问题,认为未来的民事立法应当赋予胎儿民事主体地位。     

Abortion legislation after Webster v. Reproductive Health Services: model statutes and commentaries

The following Article analyzes the United States Supreme Court's examination of abortion rights in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services. The Article then proposes model statutes restricting abortion in light of the Webster decision. The Cumberland Law Review invites and encourages commentary on both sides of the issue.     

"Braxton Hick's" or the birth of a new era? Tracing the development of Ireland's abortion laws in respect of European Court of Human Rights Jurisprudence

In Ireland, Article 40.3.3 degrees of Bunreacht na hEireann (the Irish Constitution) guarantees the right to life of the unborn child and the equal right to life of the mother. Abortion in Ireland is permissible only where there is a real and substantial risk to the mother's own life. Since Ireland became a signatory to the European Convention on Human Rights in 1950,2 there have been concerns that it could result in Ireland being compelled to introduce a right to abortion. This article commences with a review of the extant law on abortion in Ireland, tracing the Constitutional protection afforded to the unborn child. The article will discuss the impact of the European Court of Human Rights' jurisprudence in regard to access to abortion and to information on abortion services in Ireland in an effort to ascertain if it really has resulted in a radical change to Irish abortion laws. As such, it will also be necessary to examine the more recent decisions of the ECtHR such as Tysiac v. Poland, and A, B, and C v. Ireland, to determine both the approach of the ECtHR to access to abortion in general and also to consider if it has resulted in a liberalisation of abortion law in Ireland.