Political parties in Ghana: agents of democracy?

Political parties are generally thought of as agents of democracy that fulfil a range of functions, such as policy formulation, interest aggregation and articulation, social integration, and elite recruitment. However, given the weakness of many African parties, are they able to contribute positively to democracy? This article seeks to answer this question by using Ghana – one of Africa's most successful democracies – as a case study. It is found that parties in Ghana are comparatively strong and do indeed mobilise large numbers of voters. They even expose a degree of ideological competition and have successfully adapted their strategies to the local context. On the other hand, they expose serious weaknesses in the field of social integration and interest representation. Against this background it is argued that even in procedurally well-functioning democracies like Ghana, political parties can be instruments of elite competition that contribute to the exclusion of the poor from decision-making.     

Guinea‐Bissau's rocky path to peace and democracy

Nepad has helped to world to focus on Africa's challenges and potential successes rather than the negatives.     

Public councils in Kazakhstan: a case of emergent participative democracy?

As Kazakhstan aims to become one of the top 30 developed countries by 2050, it is increasingly turning to ways which will improve its governance, one of which is greater participation by its citizens in the decision-making processes of state agencies. A new initiative aimed at doing just that, the establishment of public councils, received legal backing in January 2016. The aim of public councils is to ‘strengthen democracy and the quality and responsiveness of public polices’ through the ‘public expression of matters of concern to Kazakh citizens’. This article offers a formative evaluation of the role performed by public councils and questions the extent to which they have achieved this aim. It draws on primary data from public officials, non-governmental organizations, ministries, and non-participant observation of public councils in Kazakhstan. It finds limited evidence of their effectiveness to date.     

Towards understanding Botswana and South Africa’s ambivalence to liberal democracy

ABSTRACT

Despite their recognised democratic successes, Botswana and South Africa have had ambivalent experiences with liberal democracy. It is contended that they fall somewhere in-between what scholars refer to as electoral and liberal democracies; dominant party systems within Carothers’ ‘gray zone’. Two explanations are offered. The first relates to the underlying political culture of the ruling elite: the liberal democratic values of the founders and early elites of both the African National Congress (ANC) and the Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) were never fully embedded; instead, their political cultures were influenced by traditions and ideologies with illiberal values. The second explanation focuses on a key feature of a liberal democracy – restraining of power, namely through encouraging an autonomous civil society and limiting executive access to the state. It is argued that for fear of losing their dominant positions, the ANC and the BDP resist restraints on their access to state power.     

Elite patronage over party democracy – high politics in Sri Lanka following independence

When Sri Lanka became independent in February 1948 it lacked a well-established party system and instead relied upon patronage and elite social relationships. Though it had a long pre-independence history of constitutional development and evolving democracy, party politics was not deep-rooted and political power continued to be wielded by an elite that had an almost feudal relationship with the masses. The convention based Westminster model Sri Lanka adopted engendered a local system that relied more on relationships than rules. Political parties and institutions were often unable to check and balance the Executive's conduct of power. Sri Lanka's elite operated British institutions in an anachronistic eighteenth-century manner such as in having a patronage-based Cabinet dominated by its prime ministerial leader/patron rather than by collegial attitudes or values. The weakness of party institutionalisation and the ambiguity in the constitutional arrangements laid the foundations for future political conflict and marginalisation of segments of society. The continuity of affairs of state from the colonial era and the known and reassuring leadership of D.S. Senanayake and his ‘Uncle-Nephew Party’ masked the democratic tensions and institutional fragility within the Sri Lankan state that would come to the fore violently only years after what was then seen as a model transfer of power.     

Indonesia and the “conflictual consensus”: a discursive perspective on Indonesian democracy

In this essay we propose an alternative approach to assessing the state of democracy in Indonesia. We focus not on institutional indicators (as is usually the case) but on manifestations of political discourses in the public sphere. In applying post-Marxist political theory through the work of Slavoj ?i?ek and Chantal Mouffe, we argue that democracy’s main defining feature is that it allows antagonistic discourses about alternative policies to coexist, yet still manages to coalesce around a minimal consensus on how these discursive conflicts are to be dealt with in a fair way. Applying this approach to democracy analysis to Indonesia, we suggest that the major obstacles to democratic practice do not emerge from institutional problems, but from an overbearing political discourse that imposes broad consensus and harmony on most political issues. Political discourse in Indonesia is generally structured around “Islam” and “the people.” These themes provide a basis for a political consensus that conceals economic and social contradictions and reveals considerable depoliticization in Indonesian democratic practice.     

Mauritania, August 2005: Justice and democracy, or just another coup?

A military coup abruptly ended Ould Taya’s authoritarianregime in Mauritania, one of the longest-running regimes inWest Africa. The bloodless coup broke a dangerous politicalimpasse and stopped what seemed to be a slide towards breakdownand violence. Using the democratization literature, this articleexplains its root causes and evaluates the prospects for theestablishment of a genuine democracy after two decades of arepressive military and then quasi-military regime. It arguesthat several variables combined to seal the regime’s fate.These are essentially the deeply flawed, tribally based, make-believedemocracy, Ould Taya’s own troubled personality, and finally,the security apparatus’s withdrawal of its backing. Thearticle also argues that the new military junta’s firstdecisions appear encouraging enough but that its determinationto keep a tight control over the transition process and avoidthe fundamental aspects of Mauritania’s malaise may jeopardizegenuine long-term democratization. ^1. Julius O. Ihonvbere, ‘A balance sheet of Africa’stransition to democratic governance’, in John Mbaku andJulius O. Ihonvbere (eds), The Transition to Democratic Governancein Africa (Praeger, Westport, CT, 2003), p. 51. ^2. On Mali, see Zeric K. Smith, ‘Mali’s decade of democracy’,Journal of Democracy 12, 3 (2001), pp. 73–9; for the Ivorianexperiment under General Guéï, see Boubacar N’Diaye,‘Not a miracle after all ... Côte d’Ivoire’sdownfall: flawed civil-military relations and missed opportunities’,Scientia Militaria 33, 1 (2005), pp. 89–118. ^3. Alfred Stepan, ‘Paths toward redemocratisation: theoreticaland comparative considerations’, in Guillermo O’Donnell,Philippe C. Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead (eds), Transitionsfrom Authoritarian Rule (The Johns Hopkins University Press,Baltimore, MD, 1988), pp. 64–84. ^4. One of the very few Anglophone specialists on Mauritania, AnthonyPazzanita, thought that the prospects for democracy for Mauritaniaafter 1992 were ‘bright’, but apparently never revisitedthe issue. See Anthony Pazzanita, ‘The origin and evolutionof Mauritania’s second republic’, Journal of ModernAfrican Studies 34, 4 (1996), pp. 575–96. ^5. For an authoritative discussion of the subject, see PhilippeMarchesin, Tribus, ethnies et pouvoir en Mauritanie (Khartala,Paris, 1992). ^6. See Abdel Wedoud Ould Cheikh, ‘Des voix dans le désert:sur les élections de l’ère pluraliste’,Politique Africaine 55 (1994), pp. 31–9. ^7. There are no official statistics on the ethno-cultural make-upof the country. At independence, it was assumed that the Beydane(including the Haratines) made up 75 percent of the population.However, in the late 1970s, the government kept under seal theresults of the national census, prompting allegations that thiswas done to conceal the demographic shift in favour of blacks,who have a higher birth rate. Unspoken quotas seem to stilluse 75:25 percent of Beydane and Negro-Mauritanians, respectively.However, there is a growing consensus that the general breakdowngiven here, although a rough estimate, is closest to the demographicreality of Mauritania today. ^8. ‘El Hor’ means freeman. It is a semi-recognizedpolitical movement set up by the Haratine elites to fight themanifestations and legacy of slavery. SOS-Esclaves is (untilrecently non-recognized) a human rights organization set upto monitor the issue of slavery and assist slaves to attainfreedom. ^9. See Human Rights Watch/Africa, Mauritania’s Campaign ofTerror: State sponsored repression of black Africans (HumanRights Watch, New York, 1994); Janet Fleishman, ‘Ethniccleansing’, Africa Report 39 (1994), p. 45. ^10. The chairman of the junta has publicly stated that the fearof a complete breakdown of the state is what prompted the militaryto act. As I argue, other less lofty considerations, such aspersonal survival, cannot be discounted. ^11. The International Crisis Group, in particular, issued a reportthat exposed Ould Taya’s attempts to delegitimize thelegal opposition, including moderate Islamists, by assimilatingthem to fundamentalist terrorists, warning that the whole schemecould very well backfire. See International Crisis Group, L’Islamismeen Afrique du nord IV: Contestation islamiste en Mauritanie:Menace ou bouc émissaire? (Rapport Moyen-Orient/Afriquedu Nord No. 41, Brussels, 2005). ^12. After his November 2003 electoral victory, which the US governmentmust have known to be fraudulent, he received a glowing messageof congratulations from President Bush. This support to oneof the most repressive regimes in West Africa was bitterly resentedby many democratic activists. Initially, the Bush administrationwas the only government to demand the return of Ould Taya topower, who was called, in the early hours of the coup, by theUS ambassador in Nouakchott, as the US State Department dailybriefings of 4 August 2005 indicate. ^13. The chairman of the military council made this statement threedays after the coup when he addressed the assembled leadersof political parties. For the text of the statement, see http://ufpweb.org/transition/ce385/interv/alloc_eli.htm,4 December 2006. ^14. Author’s interviews with Mohamed Vall Ould Oumere, editorialdirector of La Tribune, Nouackchott, May 2004. ^15. Mahamadou Sy, L’enfer d’inal (L’Harmattan,Paris, 2000). ^16. The best-known members of this financial and political network:Ahmed Ould Taya (Ould Taya’s brother), Abdallahi OuldNoueguet, Sejad Ould Abeidna (both Smasside), Mohamed Ould Bouamattou(an Oulad Bousbaa), and Abdou Ould Maham (an Idewaali). ^17. See Africa Research Bulletin (15 November 1987), p. 8674. ^18. See Philippe Marchesin, ‘Origine et évolution despartis et groupes politiques’, Politique Africaine 55(1994), p. 27. ^19. Stepan, ‘Paths’, p. 76. ^20. See ‘Petit coup d’Etat entre amis’, La Lettredu Continent (Paris), 25 August 2005. ^21. Boubacar N’Diaye, ‘Mauritania’s stalled democratisation’,Journal of Democracy 12, 3 (2001), p. 93. ^22. Peter Da Costa, ‘Democracy in doubt’, Africa Report37, 3 (1992), p. 60. ^23. Boubacar N’Diaye, Abdoulaye Saine, and Matturin Houngnikpo,‘Not Yet Democracy’: West Africa’s slow farewellto authoritarianism (Carolina Academic Press, Durham, NC, 2005),pp. 107–37. ^24. Cedric Jourde, ‘"The President is coming to visit!" Dramasand the hijack of democratisation in the Islamic Republic ofMauritania’, Comparative Politics 38 (2005), pp. 421–40. ^25. Boubacar N’Diaye, ‘The effect of Mauritania’s"human rights deficit": the case against "to forgive and forget"’,African Journal of Policy Studies 8, 1 (2002), pp. 17–35. ^26. N’Diaye et al., ‘Not Yet’, p. 193. ^27. The coup leaders made a point to signal the transitory natureof military regime and their willingness to usher in a politicalsystem that was completely different from the one they overthrew.See ‘Nouakchott calm, but new "colonels’ regime"faces outside political pressure’ (http://journals.aol.com/mfg917/Lilithharp17/entries/2378,5 April 2006). ^28. Marina Ottaway, Democracy Challenged: The rise of semi-authoritarianism(Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, DC,2003), pp. 3–27. Up to August 2005, Mauritania seemedto fit approximately Ottaway’s ’semi-authoritarianismof decay’ category, pp. 21–3. ^29. William Case, ‘New uncertainties for an old pseudo-democracy’,Comparative Politics 37, 1 (2004), pp. 83–104. ^30. N’Diaye et al., ‘Not Yet’, pp. 122–6. ^31. Robert Jackson and Carl Rosberg, Personal Rule in Black Africa:Prince, autocrat, prophet, tyrant (University of CaliforniaPress, Berkeley, 1982). ^32. Jennifer Widner, ‘Two leadership styles and patterns ofpolitical liberalisation’, African Studies Review 37,1 (1994), pp. 151–74; Larry Diamond, ‘Beyond authoritarianism:strategies for democratisation’, in Brad Roberts (ed.),The New Democracies, Global Change and U.S. Policy (MIT Press,Cambridge, MA, 1995); also Juan J. Linz, ‘Crisis, breakdownand re-equilibration’, in Juan Linz and A. Stepan (eds),The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes (Johns Hopkins UniversityPress, Baltimore, MD, 1978), pp. 4–5. ^33. Mohamed Nassirou Athie, ‘Il y a onze ans, le 16 mars’,Al Beyane 14 (1996), p. 8. ^34. Since the 1978 coup, there has been a proliferation of Arabnationalist groups in the Mauritanian army. See Anthony Pazzanita,‘Mauritania’s foreign policy: in search of protection’,Journal of Modern African Studies 30, 3 (1992), pp. 288–300.For example, the military council’s No. 2, Mohamed OuldAbdel Aziz, is said to be one of the leaders of the Nasseristmovement, a pan-Arab nationalist group. ^35. See for example, Mohamed Fall Ould Oumère, ‘Ilévite le face à face’, Al Beyane 5 (1992),p. 1. ^36. Habib Ould Mahfoudh, ‘La tension’, Al Beyane 6 (1992)(Supplement), p. 2. ^37. Ibid, p. 1; see also François Soudan, ‘MaaouiyaOuld Taya: "Le Sénégal nous veut du mal"’,Jeune Afrique 1513 (1990), pp. 34–7. ^38. Pierre-Robert Baudel, ‘La Mauritanie dans l’ordreinternational’, Politique Africaine 55 (1994), pp. 11–19. ^39. Peace and Security Council of the African Union, 37th meeting,‘Report of the Chairperson of the commission on the situationin the Islamic Republic of Mauritania’ (African Union,Addis Ababa, 8 September 2005), p. 7. ^40. Ibid, p. 10. ^41. N‘Diaye, ‘Not a miracle’, p. 105. ^42. Stepan, ‘Paths’, pp. 77–8. ^43. See Amnesty International, ‘Mauritania: a future freeof slavery?’, 17 November 2002 (http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/engAFR380032002!Open,17 August 2005). ^44. World Bank, World Development Indicators, 2005 (The World Bank,Washington, DC, 2005), p. 23. ^45. According to the same World Bank report (Ibid, p. 73), in 2000,the top 10 percent of Mauritanians enjoyed nearly 30 percentof national ‘income or consumption’, whereas thelowest 30 percent share less than 9 percent. ^46. Moussa Diop, ‘Quand Ely se fâche, les fauteuilstremblent!’, L’éveil-hebdo 613 (2005), pp.1, 3. ^47. The IMF statement is available at http://www.imf.org/external/country/mrt/index.htm,10 January 2005. ^48. See Nicole Ball and Kayode Fayemi (eds), Security Sector Governancein Africa: A handbook (Centre for Democracy and Development,Lagos, 2004). ^49. For a population of less than three million, Mauritania hasnearly twice the number of men in the security forces as eitherMali or Senegal. The population of each of these states is atleast three times that of Mauritania. See International Institutefor Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2002–2003(International Strategic Studies, London, 2002), pp. 207–11. ^50. Guillermo O’Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter, Transitionsfrom Authoritarian Rule: Tentative conclusions about uncertaindemocracies (The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore,MD, 1989), p. 66. ^51. The UN Office for West Africa has finally identified this situationas a major cause of coups and instability in the sub-region.The author has collaborated in the drafting of a report to callattention to this issue and how to address it. ^52. Peace and Security Council of the African Union, 37th meeting,‘Report of the Chairperson’, pp. 10–11.     

Al-Wefaq and the February 14 uprising: Islam,nationalism and democracy – the Shici-Bahraini discourse

Al-Wefaq's complex nature led to ambiguity over the relationship between religion and politics and over the balance between Islamic ecumenism and sectarianism. While the Shi^ci uprising presented a national and democratic agenda, questions remain over the party's full commitment to democracy and its loyalty to the national framework in the current regional turmoil with the empowerment of Shi^cis and disintegration of nation-states. There could be a discrepancy between the declared aims of an oppositional movement and its actions once it assumes power. The problematic legacy of minority–majority relations in Bahrain, the country's political culture and the difficult example of post-2003 Iraq, are further barriers to advancing full democracy. If the Shi^ci majority gains power the party may become less democratic and more sectarian. Yet, it will also have much to lose given Bahrain's strategic alliance with the US and its position as a financial services hub in the region.     

Undermining Western democracy promotion in Central Asia: China’s countervailing influences,powers and impact

This article examines whether and to what extent China’s involvement in Central Asian countries undermines the democracy promotion efforts of the European Union and the United States. Findings confirm that China does indeed challenge Western efforts, but in an indirect way. First, Chinese provision of substantial and unconditional financial assistance makes Western politically conditioned aid appear both ungenerous and an infringement of sovereignty. Second, the Shanghai Co-operation Organisation, inclusive of China’s leadership role, creates an institutional means through which the (semi-)authoritarianism of member states is legitimized and challenges Western emphasis on democracy and human rights. Finally, by the power of its own example, China demonstrates that democracy is not a prerequisite for prosperity, the rule of law and social well-being.     

South Africa and Eastern Europe: The challenge of multi‐ethnic societies in transition to democracy

This article explores similarities between the South African transition and the advent of liberal‐democratic government in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. Challenges these societies have in common are the accommodation of ethnic and racial diversity and whether democracy can protect minorities. The article surveys the process of constitution‐making among the states of Eastern Europe, examining their efforts to reconcile sectional ethnic/cultural rights and universal human rights. These provisions are compared with the mechanisms employed in South Africa's interim constitution with this purpose. In conclusion, it is argued that successful multiethnic democracies develop where some of a number of identifiable characteristics are present.     

Egypt’s 2011–2012 parliamentary elections: Voting for religious vs. secular democracy?

This study investigates whether individuals’ attitudes towards democracy and secular politics have any influence on voting behaviour in Egypt. Based on data from survey conducted immediately after the Egyptian parliamentary elections in January 2012, this study finds that Egyptians’ attitudes towards democratic governance were quite negative around the parliamentary elections, yet Egyptians still endorsed democracy as the ideal political system for their country. However, empirical findings suggest that support for democracy has a limited impact on electoral results. On the other hand, the main division in Egyptian society around the first free and fair parliamentary elections was the religious–secular cleavage. As people support secular politics more, they become significantly less likely to vote for Islamist parties. These results illustrate that preferences in regard to the type of the democracy – either a liberal and secular or a religious democracy – were the main determinant of the historic 2012 elections in Egypt.     

A fissure in ‘unanimous democracy’: parliamentary contestations over property rights on land in early Republican Turkey

The parliamentary politics of Turkey's one-party regime (1925–1946) has been described as a ‘unanimous democracy’, particularly on account of the absence of a voting opposition. Many scholars consider the Law for Providing Land to Farmers of 1945 as the first instance of parliamentary opposition in the one-party legislature. The current article challenges this widespread view and argues that property rights on land tended to provoke backlashes even before 1945. It examines the making of the deportation, land distribution and settlement laws of the 1920s and 1930s, all of which sanctioned intervention into property relations on land in the form of the expropriation of landowners. Going beyond an exclusive focus on voting patterns, this article traces parliamentary resistance by examining how government bills changed as they proceeded through both the reviewing committees and the general assembly. It links the birth of a full-fledged parliamentary opposition in 1945 to the previous waves of discontent and shows that property rights on land was a constant fissure in the early Republic's unanimous democracy.     

Elective affinity or comprehensive contradiction? Reflections on capitalism and democracy in the time of finance-dominated accumulation and austerity states

The often-asserted relation of formal adequacy or elective affinity between capitalism and democracy is historically contingent on both sides of the relation. First, it holds for what Weber called “formally rational capitalism” – which is the form that Marx had previously investigated in Das Kapital – rather than others, such as traditional commercial capitalism or politically oriented capitalism. Second, it holds only to the extent that “the comprehensive contradiction” identified by Marx at the heart of the democratic constitution can be resolved: the contradiction between a universal franchise that potentially gives subaltern classes control over legislative and executive powers and a constitution that protects property rights favourable to capital. Building upon Poulantzas, it is then argued that these conditions are being undermined by the rise of new forms of political capitalism, especially finance-dominated accumulation, that are facilitated in turn by the consolidation of both neoliberalism and “authoritarian statism”. This involves the intensification of “exceptional” elements in a formally democratic shell, and the emergence of a permanent state of austerity. The article concludes with comments on the limits of finance-dominated accumulation and the austerity state.     

Deliberative democracy and the politics of traditional leadership in South Africa: A case of despotic domination or democratic deliberation?

A heated debate developed in South Africa as to the meaning of ‘deliberative democracy’. This debate is fanned by the claims of ‘traditional leaders’ that their ways of village-level deliberation and consensus-oriented decision-making are not only a superior process for the African continent as it evolves from pre-colonial tradition, but that it represents a form of democracy that is more authentic than the Western version. Proponents suggest that traditional ways of deliberation are making a come-back because imported Western models of democracy that focus on the state and state institutions miss the fact that in African societies state institutions are often seen as illegitimate or simply absent from people's daily lives. In other words, traditional leadership structures are more appropriate to African contexts than their Western rivals. Critics suggest that traditional leaders, far from being authentic democrats, are power-hungry patriarchs and authoritarians attempting to both re-invent their political, social and economic power (frequently acquired under colonial and apartheid rule) and re-assert their control over local-level resources at the expense of the larger community. In this view, the concept of deliberative democracy is being misused as a legitimating device for a politics of patriarchy and hierarchy, which is the opposite of the meaning of the term in the European and US sense. This article attempts to contextualise this debate and show how the efforts by traditional leaders to capture an intermediary position between rural populations and the state is fraught with conflicts and contradictions when it comes to forming a democratic state and society in post-apartheid South Africa.     

Forward to democracy or back to authoritarianism? The attitudinal bases of mass support for the Russian election protests of 2011–2012

Two UK-based political scientists present the results of an original survey they conducted in Russia soon after the presidential elections of 2012. The survey examines the interaction between mass attitudes toward the causal triggers of protest during the 2011–2012 electoral cycle and underlying political attitudes regarding the preferred alternatives to a hybrid regime (both more democratic and more authoritarian). They find that supporters of the protests were not stronger advocates of a democratic transition; on the contrary, they were more likely to support authoritarian leadership and ethno-nationalism. This finding leads to a discussion of whether one of the major constraints on elite-mass mobilization in Russia is the authoritarian direction such mobilization might entail.     

Kenya's political ‘transition’ through the eyes of its ‘foot soldiers’ for democracy and human rights (1997–2012)

This is a study of young human rights activists who provide a unique window on Kenya's recent and turbulent political history (1997–2012). The period includes the end of authoritarian rule and election of a ‘reform’ government in 2002 that expanded some human rights but abused others. Based on archival materials and periodic, multiple interviews by the author with key youth activists, the findings make three contributions to the study of human rights and democracy. First, it identifies the often overlooked role of secondary level activists in a human rights/democracy social movement, the so-called ‘foot soldiers’. Second, it explores the failure of Kenya to consolidate its democracy and quell police violence, including the assassination of two human rights investigators, an event which sent a chill through the activist community. Third, by tracing the trajectory of some ‘foot soldiers’ during this period, the study confirms a theory of a cycle of social movement activism but suggests modifications.     

The concept of democracy: moments,meanings and images in the “long term” (a proposed rethinking of conceptual history in the Ibero-American world)

ABSTRACT

In recent years there has been a notable increase in the practice of conceptual history in the Ibero-American world. There has been a particular focus on the use of fundamental concepts previous and subsequent to the Independences (1750–1850). This work is a proposal to broaden the temporal framework of analysis, until the Second World War at least. It also suggests the introduction of three central aspects: incorporation of images as a complement to texts in the analysis of concepts; identification of the historical moments at which there occurs a change in the dominant semantic of each concept; and consideration of the Ibero-American sphere, not in isolation but in interaction with the global world. To illustrate this new approach, we provide a case study related to a paradigmatic key concept of modernity: Democracy.     

Congresses versus caudillos: the untold history of democracy in Latin America,with special emphasis on New Granada (Colombia), 1830–60. A new research agenda

SUMMARY

Since their origins, congresses played significant roles in the emerging states of Latin America following independence from Spain. Yet their protagonism has been overshadowed by the so-called caudillos, the strongmen who seem to have dominated the politics of the region during most of the nineteenth century. This article argues that congresses were central political actors in Latin America during the century and it does so by examining their various functions. Congresses served to form governments, to define the legislative agenda and to limit the power of the executive. Congress was the institution around which political parties and their leaders were formed, while the practices of representative government developed.