Shared Waters—shared Responsibility. Application of the Principles of Fairness for Burden Sharing in the Mediterranean

The paper addresses the issue of burden sharing within the context of the Barcelona Convention for the protection of the Mediterranean. The initial premise is that the perceived fairness of burden sharing rules is an important factor in the success of multilateral environmental agreements. We review briefly the basic ideas behind the fairness and equity debate in global environmental affairs before we apply a number of widely accepted equity rules in the case of Mediterranean marine protection. We derive arithmetic examples to illustrate the application of the rules and compare them in terms of their political attractiveness, cost-effectiveness and practical feasibility. It is shown that the simple rule of egalitarian justice scores high on all aspects.     

Increasing Participation and Compliance in International Climate Change Agreements

Scientific and economic consensus points to the need for a credible and cost-effective approach to address the threat of global climate change, but the Kyoto Protocol to the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change appears incapable of inducing significant participation and compliance. We assess the Protocol and alternative policy architectures, with particular attention to their respective abilities to induce participation and compliance. We find that those approaches that offer cost-effective mitigation are unlikely to induce significant participation and compliance, while those approaches that are likely to enjoy a reasonably high level of implementation by sovereign states are sorely lacking in terms of their anticipated cost effectiveness. The feasible set of policy architectures is thus limited to second-best alternatives.     

Implications of EU Enlargement on the EU Greenhouse Gas 'Bubble' and Internal Burden Sharing

Currently, the EU-15 forms the only 'bubble' under the Kyoto Protocol and has negotiated an internal burden sharing. A strategic EU climate policy should include accession countries. Thus, even in the case of early ratification of the Kyoto Protocol by 2002, it would be sensible to form a bubble with all countries that are certain to be EU members during the commitment period 2008–2012. Of course due to Art. 4.4 of the Protocol the EU-15 has to stick to its own bubble. However, nothing prevents it from forming an implicit bubble including all first wave countries by inducing them to form a bubble on their own and transfer the surplus to the EU-15. Similarly, second wave countries should form a bubble of their own to co-ordinate JI and permit transfers to the EU. This would reduce the gap between business-as-usual and the target by about 50%. If ratification is delayed to a point where it is clear which second wave countries will be members by 2008, the bubble should be extended by those countries. When in 2005 target negotiations start for the second commitment period, the EU should negotiate a bubble consisting of all states being certain to be members by 2013.     

Applying Fairness Principles in Climate Change Nuisance Litigation

The tort of public nuisance has been used in two recent climate change cases, Connecticut v. American Electric Power Co. and Comer v. Murphy Oil, USA, to single out a handful of American companies with deep pockets and hold those companies liable for global climate change. This article examines why these suits contravene judicially established procedural and substantive safeguards—including “but for” causation, proximate causation, remediability, and liability allocation—that are meant to ensure that when the judicial system holds a defendant liable, it is fundamentally fair to the defendant to do so.     

‘US, China and the Economics of Climate Negotiations’

Despite the entry into force of the Kyoto Protocol, the US decision not to comply with its Kyoto commitments seems to drastically undermine the effectiveness of the Protocol in controlling GHG emissions. Therefore, it is important to explore whether there are economic incentives that might help the US to modify its current decision and move to a more environmentally effective climate policy. For example, can an increased participation of developing countries induce the US to effectively participate in the effort to reduce GHG emissions? Is a single emission trading market the appropriate policy framework to increase the signatories of the Kyoto Protocol? This paper addresses the above questions by analysing whether the participation of China in the cooperative effort to control GHG emissions can provide adequate incentives for the US to re-join the Kyoto process and eventually ratify the Kyoto Protocol. This paper analyses three different climate regimes in which China could be involved and assesses the economic incentives for the major world countries and regions to participate in these three regimes. The main conclusion is that the participation of the US in a climate regime is not likely, at least in the short run. The US is more likely to adopt unilateral policies than to join the present Kyoto coalition (even when it includes China). However, a two bloc regime would become the most preferred option if both China and the US, for some political or environmental reasons, decide to cooperate on GHG emission control. If the US decides to cooperate, the climate regime that provides the highest economic incentives to the cooperating countries is the one in which China and the US cooperate bilaterally, with the Annex B_?US countries remaining within the Kyoto framework.     

效率与公平——严格责任在刑法领域运用中所体现的两种不同价值

严格责任是存在于英美法系国家的一项重要的刑法制度。它强调举证责任的转移,即检察官只需对犯罪行为的存在以及犯罪行为与被告的关系进行证明,而被告是否具有犯意的证明则交由被告进行。严格责任主要适用于侵犯公共福利犯罪。它是现代社会追求效率的产物,但其公平性却时常受到指责。     

Fairness in Bargaining

This paper uses historical and contemporary philosophical discussions of fairness to present a structural approach to the definition of fairness. After establishing a set of standards (not a specific definition), we assess the impact of fairness in negotiations and bargaining. Our analysis concludes that truly fair behavior is absent in bargaining and negotiations. Instead, behaviors that have been called just can also be characterized as self-interested. Our review suggests that the term fairness has been used rather loosely, as a convenient label or as a more palatable alternative to self-interested explanations for an individual's choices. For reasons of both parsimony and accuracy, we recommend that the self-interest of the actors be carefully considered before calling their bargaining behavior fair.     

Affect and Fairness in Economics

A strained relationship exists between mainstream economics and ethics. Over the last decade, behavioral economists have strongly argued for the importance of fairness in motivating behavior, based on substantial experimental evidence. Two main approaches to the modeling of fairness have been proposed: the outcome-based inequity aversion approach, and the intention-based reciprocity approach. Both approaches have been quite successful in explaining the experimental evidence. Nonetheless, this paper questions the role that is assigned to fairness in these models and the way fairness is incorporated, using recent experimental findings concerning emotions and fairness perceptions. The analysis supports the view that feelings are important for justice, also from a policy perspective, and pleads for closer attention being paid to the functioning of emotional brain systems.

中国在国际气候谈判中面临的新挑战及其应对

德班平台建立后,国际气候谈判由“双轨制”变为单轨,发达国家和发展中国家自此将在一个共同的平台上就未来国际气候机制展开谈判,过去相对稳定的国际气候谈判格局发生演变.在这种情况下,中国面临着发展中国家身份的集体认同的变化,以及中国所一贯坚持的“共同但有区别的责任”原则的重新解读,这些变化将给中国的身份定位及国家利益带来影响.因此,中国一方面要把握在未来国际气候机制制定中的话语权,积极参与全球气候治理体系的改革与建构,使其适应中国国内中长期发展目标;另一方面也要承担相应的减排责任,做负责任的大国,为全球气候治理贡献力量.     

论刑事诉讼中实体公正与程序公正之关系

程序公正近年来在我国法学理论界引起很大争论与探讨,就刑事诉讼中实体公正与程序公正之关系,各种观点百家争鸣,而该问题不仅为诉讼理论问题,且关系到诉讼中人权保障、诉讼模式等一系列实质内容,但有些提法抛开法律文化背景与法制现状,一味强调程序优先或过分坚持实体优先,有失偏颇。     

合作与牵制:气候变化的国际法律机制及其应对

全球气候变化问题是当前的热点话题,各国在参与实施《联合国气候变化框架公约》及《东京议定书》中都在积极寻求制高点。因此在全球气候变化的控制和实施方面,国际社会体现出合作与牵制两种表现,牵制是在谈判中的牵制,谈判是相互牵制的谈判,这两种表现中,合作是目的,牵制是手段。发展中国家要在2012年之前做好充分准备具有一定的挑战性,需要处理好合作与牵制的关系,我国面临的问题具有一定的独特性,处理好控制全球气候变化方面的合作与牵制的关系,积极应对全球气候变化问题。     

病毒共享的国际法思考

从条约解释角度而言,病毒材料构成国家主权管辖范围内的“遗传资源”或“自然资源”,但其获取是否应遵循“事先知情同意”原则尚存在争议。国际专利体制激励基于病毒材料的医药研发,并不直接导致生物剽窃或医药可及性难题,但问题在于没有规定病毒材料的所有权和获取条件,故存在保护上的不对称性。从本质上说,病毒共享之争体现国际法上分配正义的缺失,故无法破解全球公共卫生难题,促进发展中国家履行健康权。为此,《国际卫生条例》需进一步明确健康权的国际责任,构建公平的“材料转移”机制。我国既要推动国际法上分配正义的实现和相关制度的非倾覆性变革,也可结合自身国情和优势发挥更大的建设性作用。     

Will International Investment Rules Obstruct Climate Protection Policies? An Examination of the Clean Development Mechanism

Rules governing the global environment and the international economy are currently decided in separate arenas. Yet, environmental agreements can have strong economic implications, particularly with the growing use of market mechanisms. Economic liberalization rules, meanwhile, may limit the effectiveness of environmental agreements. This paper assesses the potential interaction between one important market-based environmental mechanism – the Clean Development Mechanism of the Kyoto Protocol on climate change – and the framework of international investment law.     

论非均衡经济制度下税法的公平与效率

我国的非均衡经济制度创造了举世瞩目的经济奇迹,这得益于社会转轨时期两种经济模式并存,其制度资源新旧交替的溢出,令"效率优先,兼顾公平"的基本原则左右逢源;然而,贫富失衡的社会必须内生衡平的法律机理予以回应,作为转移支付实现社会财富公平分享的税法,其调节功能的非均衡构造和回应只有在特定的本土制度资源的基础上对症下药,以税负的实质性公平原则契合现实的不平衡状态,方能达到共富和谐的理想目标。     

民事诉讼中的举证责任

本文考察了举证责任的基础概念、一般理论及目前我国民事诉讼制度对这些概念理论的接受状况或程度,在此基础上展示举证责任倒置和减轻在我国民事立法上及司法实务运作中的种种形态。本文不强调定义的精确和理论的新颖,而着力于尽可能紧扣我国民事审判实务的具体场境,去尝试系统地整理相关的基础知识。     

气候变化的国际法之秩序价值初探

价值理念贯穿于法律运行的整个过程 ,并对法律运行起着相应的指导作用。气候变化的国际立法活动 ,也必然受到相关价值理念的指导。在气候变化问题日益严峻的挑战面前 ,气候变化的国际法应当执著地追求秩序价值。而要真正实现秩序价值 ,就必须及早将气候变化的国际法所向往和追求的秩序价值外化为具体的、有效的应对气候变化问题的措施、手段和行动     

试论司法的一般规律及中国独具的司法规律

司法规律是人类司法活动所内含的必然趋势和特征,它具有独立性、公正性、公开性、效率性和终局性等特征。受政治体制、文化传统、经济制度、社会发展阶段及司法官素质等多种因素的制约和影响,我国司法制度具有自己的鲜明特色。我国司法除了应遵循人类文明法治社会共有的司法规律外,还必须遵循坚持社会主义法治理念、坚持“三个至上”、接受人大监督、司法机关相互制约以及服从和服务于大局等中国独具的司法规律。     

中国语境下的刑事证明责任理论

坚持和实践客观真实与法律真实相结合的中国特色诉讼真实观,离不开与其相适应的证明责任理论和制度的支持。在中国语境下,刑事证明责任包括公安司法机关的证明职责和控辩双方的举证责任。坚持法院承担证明职责,就要坚持法院拥有一定范围内的调查证据职权。举证责任包括推进责任和结果责任。在刑事诉讼中有必要在制度上明确结果责任的例外、辩护方承担一定的推进责任、非法证据排除规则中举证责任的分配。