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1.
Concerns over affective polarization in Western democracies are growing. But which broader political distinctions are also affective demarcations? As inter-party cooperation is the rule in multi-party democracies, explaining affective polarization beyond partisan divisions is crucial. I argue that demarcations between political camps deepen affective polarization, and country-level factors influence the relevance of these affective divides. Based on survey data from 23 Western democracies (1996–2019), I demonstrate that affect is most polarized between Left and Right camps, and between the Radical Right and other camps. Further, these divides are dynamic and depend on different country-level outcomes. The Left/Right divide disappears when Left and Right parties govern together, while the Radical Right divide is fortified with Radical Right electoral success. These findings highlight that affective polarization’s group foundations extend beyond partisanship, and that affective polarization could even act as a defence mechanism against radical challengers. 相似文献
2.
Affective polarization captures the extent to which citizens feel sympathy towards partisan in-groups and antagonism towards partisan out-groups. This is comparatively easy to assess in two-party systems, but capturing the pattern of affect towards multiple parties is more complex in multiparty systems. This article first discusses these challenges and then presents different ways of measuring individual-level affective polarization using like-dislike scores, a widespread measure of party sympathy. Using data for 51 countries and 166 elections from five modules of the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems, I then show that affective polarization adds to existing concepts as a way of understanding political participation and democratic orientations. Studying affective polarization outside the US could therefore have important consequences for our understanding of citizen perceptions of politics as well as citizen behaviour, but we need the appropriate measures to do so. 相似文献
3.
We investigate the degree of affective polarization in presidential election years toward the two major parties and their nominees. Notwithstanding studies which show that individuating information about an out-group member can generate a person-positivity bias, we demonstrate a person-negativity bias directed at out-party candidates at least for some. We motivate and test two hypotheses: first, we expect more sophisticated partisans to display a greater difference in their feelings towards specific candidates compared to evaluations of the parties themselves; second, we anticipate sophisticated partisans will exhibit a person-negativity bias toward out-party candidates and a person-positivity bias toward in-party candidates. The results accentuate the conditional nature of the person-positivity bias and shed light on how political sophistication is linked to affective polarization. 相似文献
4.
This study explores whether, in societies around the world, affective polarization – or animosity between citizens based on their political allegiance – is stronger if political divisions align with non-political ones. Such ‘social sorting’ has earlier been established to foster affective polarization in the United States. In this study, I argue that the underlying mechanism travels across the globe. I then present two complementary studies which confirm this hypothesis. First, I employ CSES data to predict the level of affective polarization by social sorting at 119 elections in 40 countries, showing that greater alignment of partisan divisions with non-political divisions in a society (along the lines of income, education, religion and region) is associated with stronger dislike towards political outgroups. Second, using Dutch panel data, I show that individuals who fit the socio-demographic ‘profile’ of their party better tend to be more affectively polarized. This has important implications for our understanding of affective polarization. 相似文献
5.
Research has suggested that affective polarization (AP)—the extent to which partisans view each other as a disliked out-group—has increased, especially in two-party political systems such as in the US. The understanding of AP in multiparty systems remains limited. We study AP in Finland, characterized by a strong multiparty system and a low level of ideological polarization, between 2007 and 2019. We find that AP has increased, driven mainly by voters evaluating their least favorite party more negatively. We also propose an approach that goes beyond earlier literature, which has mostly used a single aggregate metric to measure AP. Using latent profile analysis, we find that voters are grouped into blocs that view some parties positively and others negatively. This suggests that the complex dynamics of AP in multiparty democracies involve relationships between not just individual parties but between what we call affective blocs that span across party lines. 相似文献
6.
In this article we analyze the effects of election salience on affective polarization. Campaigns and elections epitomize the moment of maximum political conflict, information spread, mobilization, and activation of political identities and predispositions. We therefore expect that affective polarization will be higher just after an election has taken place. By the same token, as elections lose salience, affective polarization will diminish. We analyze this question using CSES data from 99 post-electoral surveys conducted in 42 countries between 1996 and 2016. Our identification strategy exploits variation in the timing of survey interviews with respect to the election day as an exogenous measure of election salience. The empirical findings indicate that as elections lose salience affective polarization declines. The article further contributes to the debate on the origins of affective polarization by exploring two mechanisms that may account for this relationship: changes in ideological polarization and in the intensity of party identification. Both are relevant mediators, with ideological polarization seemingly playing a more important role. 相似文献
7.
We explore how partisan affect shapes citizens' views of party ideology and political competition. We argue that voters' affective ties to parties (both positive and negative) lead them to perceive the ideological positions of those parties as more extreme. Further, when voters are \"affectively polarized,\" i.e., they strongly like some parties and dislike others, they are more likely to view politics as high stakes competition, where ideological polarization is rampant, participation is crucial, and electoral outcomes are highly consequential. Using cross-national survey data covering 43 elections in 34 countries, we show that partisan affect indeed impacts perceptions of party ideology and that affective polarization alters beliefs about the nature of political competition. 相似文献
8.
In multiparty contexts, we know that affective polarization tends to cluster in ideological blocs, although the factors driving this process are still quite unexplored. In this paper, we contribute to filling this gap in the literature by exploring the capacity of ideological identity vis-à-vis issue-based ideology to polarize sentiments towards party voters into two opposing left-right blocs. Specifically, we provide empirical evidence that affective attachments to ideological labels increase the affective distance between ideological blocs to a greater extent than issue extremity and issue consistency. These bipolarizing effects of ideological identity persist even when the identity is inconsistent with issue-based ideology. Additionally, we show that bipolar affective polarization exerts little reverse influence on ideological identity. We support these arguments using an original survey from the TRI-POL project carried out in five multiparty systems: Argentina, Chile, Italy, Portugal and Spain. 相似文献
9.
This contribution evaluates the mediating role of different political contexts and levels of democratic consolidation on the effect of party system polarization on ideological vote and discusses how this relationship enhances democratic representativeness. The influence of party system polarization on ideological voting is analyzed in two areas: the voters' competence in identifying parties' ideological positions; and the voters’ tendency to vote for the most ideologically proximate party, which is one of the key features of the spatial theories of voting. Using data from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) from 1996 to 2019 and multilevel modelling techniques, the paper compares how those features vary across different types of countries, particularly older and newer democracies, and different regions of the world. 相似文献
10.
Julianna Sandell Pacheco 《Political Behavior》2008,30(4):415-436
Adolescence is an important time for political development. Researchers have concentrated on the family as the sole socializing
agent of youths; however, as Campbell, Gimpel, and others have shown, political contexts also matter for young citizens. Using
the National Education Longitudinal Study of 1988, the Record of American Democracy, and election outcomes data, I find that
adolescents who resided in politically competitive locales or states have higher turnout years later compared to those who
lived in uncompetitive contexts. These effects are not mediated by the home political environment and act through political
socialization. This research adds to a growing literature on the influence of political contexts on political behavior and
is the first to explore how political competition during adolescence influences voter turnout in young adulthood.
相似文献
Julianna Sandell PachecoEmail: |
11.
2004年10月,中共中央国务院发出《关于进一步加强和改进思想政治教育的意见》,强调指出,大学生是十分宝贵的人才资源,是民族的希望,是祖国的未来。加强和改进大学生思想政治教育,提高他们的思想政冶素质,探索大学生思想政治教育的方法,把他们培养成中国特色社会主义事业的建设者和接班人,加快推进社会主义现代化的宏伟目标,确保中国特色社会主义事业兴旺发达,具有重大而深远的战略意义。 相似文献
12.
思想政治教育是促进高校学生全面发展的重要途径。在当代,随着中国社会转型期的到来,高校学生思想政治教育所处的环境发生了很大的变化,其中,有机遇也有挑战。直面高校学生思想政治教育中的困境、剖析背后的原因并在原有基础上实现超越,对于增进高校学生思想政治教育发展,增强高校学生思想政治教育的针对性、实效性有重大意义。 相似文献
13.
Scott D. McClurg 《Political Behavior》2006,28(4):349-366
Despite scholarly interest in determining how exposure to disagreeable political ideas influences political participation, existing research supports few firm conclusions. This paper argues that these varied findings stem from an implicit model of contextual influence that fails to account for the indirect effect of aggregate social contexts. A model of contextual influence is outlined which implies that the neighborhood partisan context moderates the effect of political disagreement in social networks on campaign participation. The evidence shows that network disagreement demobilizes people who are the political minority in their neighborhood, but has no influence on people in the majority. When viewed together, these findings indicate that a person’s relationship to the broader political environment sets distinctive network processes in motion.
相似文献
Scott D. McClurgEmail: Phone: +1-618-453-3191 |
14.
Oliver Heath 《Political Behavior》2007,29(4):493-516
Turnout decline in Britain is greater than it first appears since changes in the social composition of the electorate have
had a positive impact on turnout. This paper finds that whereas a weakening in the strength of party identification is associated
with the long-term decline, the political context influences short-term variation. Partisan dealignment is also changing the
dynamics of the determinants of turnout. Since non-identifiers are more strongly influenced by the political context than
strong identifiers, and there are now more non-identifiers than previously, the political context is becoming a more important
factor in determining whether people vote or not.
相似文献
Oliver HeathEmail: |
15.
Since the UK's vote to leave the European Union, there has been considerable debate about whether voters (particularly Leave voters) were well-informed prior to making their decisions. We gave a 15-item EU knowledge quiz to a large, nationally representative sample of the British population via an online survey. Our quiz included nine ‘ideologically neutral’ items, as well as six items that we deemed more ‘ideologically convenient’ for one side or the other. Overall, there was no average difference between Leave voters and Remain voters (either before or after controlling for covariates), despite the fact that Remain voters scored slightly higher on a short test of probability reasoning. In addition, both Leave and Remain voters were more likely to answer correctly on items that were ‘ideologically convenient’ for them. Consistent with the previous literature, older age, male gender, higher education, and stronger political interest were all significant predictors of EU knowledge. Interestingly however, these variables only predicted knowledge on the nine ‘ideologically neutral’ items; their associations with knowledge on the six ‘ideologically convenient’ items were generally weak and non-significant. 相似文献
16.
Affective polarization, or antipathy between the supporters of opposing political camps, is documented to be on the rise in the United States and elsewhere. At the same time, there are limits to our understanding of this phenomenon in multiparty contexts. How do citizens draw the line between 'ingroups' and 'outgroups' in fragmented contexts with multiple parties? Answering this question has been hampered by a relative lack of data on citizens' views towards compatriots with opposing political views outside the US. This study is based on original data collection, measuring citizens’ evaluations of various political and non-political outgroups among a population-representative sample of 1071 Dutch citizens. These data allow to study the extent and configuration of affective polarization in the highly fragmented context of the Netherlands. The analysis shows that respondents do distinguish between parties and partisans. They report more dislike towards political outgroups than towards almost all non-political outgroups. Rather than disliking all out-partisans equally, evaluations grow gradually colder as ideological distance towards a group increases. Affective polarization is especially strong between those who disagree on cultural issues, and between those who support and oppose the populist radical right. The article discusses how these findings enhance our understanding of affective polarization in multiparty systems. 相似文献
17.
Recent comparative electoral research shows that both ideological and competence voting are influenced by the degree of party system polarization. However, while the former association is uncontroversial, investigations on the latter have led to contradicting results. This study takes one step back, arguing that polarization rather affects how voters perceive party ideological positioning and competence. Building on literature linking elite polarization to mass partisanship, the study argues that party identification is a strong moderator of party evaluations in polarized elections. Hypotheses are tested with multilevel logit models on a pooled data set of European Election Studies from 1994 to 2009. Results show that partisans are more likely to view their preferred party as the most competent and ideologically close when the environment is polarized, while there is no such effect for non-partisans. 相似文献
18.
案例教学是医学院校思想政治理论课(以下简称"思政"课)教学的一种现代教育理念的有效教学方法,它能有效提高"思政"课的针对性、实效性和吸引力。在教学活动中"思政"课教师应结合医学生特点,精选案例、巧设问题。通过医学生思考、讨论和交流,教师引导、讲述和评论等方式,来提高其学习"思政"课的兴趣和教学效果。 相似文献
19.
Part of the growing literature on valence politics interprets the electoral impact of party competence perceptions as resulting from consensus over ideological positions in contemporary societies. The relationship between valence politics and consensus, however, is usually based on either disputable theoretical assumptions or on single-country analyses. In this paper I empirically test the assumptions linking valence politics and policy consensus in a comparative perspective across 21 political systems. The results show no evidence that valence is associated with consensus, and some evidence that the electoral effect of valence is correlated with certain forms of policy dispersion, such as ideological party polarisation. The implication that perceptions of party competence are significantly informed by spatial-based considerations is discussed. 相似文献
20.
A substantive portion of the electorate declares in pre-electoral surveys that they are undecided. However, little has been done in trying to understand who these voters are and how they finally decide their vote. In this article, we try to advance the literature by disentangling the circumstances under which voters are more likely to be undecided. While the traditional approach to the study of electoral indecision has been to characterize which individual traits make voters more likely to be undecided, this article provides consistent evidence showing that key elements of the political context may also affect electoral indecision. Using long-term harmonized data from Spanish pre-electoral surveys over 30 years, we find that voting indecision is influenced by two different types of contextual factors. First, there are some political contexts that reduce voters' cognitive costs when deciding their vote, i.e. the level of electoral competitiveness and the number of parties competing in the elections. Second, there are other political contexts that increase voters' social or expressive costs, i.e. the level of government popularity, since costs of expressing preference for the party in government increases when its public image is undermined. 相似文献