Experience and the distribution of portfolio payoffs in the European Commission

Abstract.  This article tests four theories of portfolio distribution within the European Commission and assesses whether experience plays a role in the process of allocating policy responsibilities. The share of portfolios that each Member State is assigned, through its Commissioners, is strongly related to its resources and voting power, as predicted by the proportionality norm and bargaining theory, respectively. Additionally, Member States with Commissioners that have experience in the relevant portfolios are assigned shares that are significantly above what one may expect from these two theories. For half of the portfolios, Commissioners have moderate views along the dimension of the policy they manage, but appointed Commissioners also have significantly more experience in both supranational portfolios and similar national portfolios than the median Commissioner. The difference in experience in supranational and, more weakly, national portfolios significantly accounts for the difference in preference between the appointed and the median Commissioner. Finally, salience matters as well. Left/right leaning Commissioners are significantly more likely to be assigned portfolios with a left-wing/right-wing ideological profile, but this strong relation disappears for Commissioners with above average experience in the Commission, in the relevant supranational portfolios or in national governments.     

The organization of influence on the EC's common agriculturalpolicy: A network approach

The common agricultural policy of the EC with its market regulations is decided at EC level by a multilevel system of government, in which the Commission and the parliamentary parties of the European Parliament play the supranational role and the national ministries of agriculture act as parts of the intergovernmental system of the Council of Ministers. National interest groups have thereby three major access routes to the EC system, first through their national governments, or second indirectly, transmitted by their European peak organizations, or third directly to the supranational EC actors. The network approach is applied to study empirically the densities of access through these various routes. The links between actors in the agricultural policy domain are conceptualized as links for the exchange of resources, the most important resource of a policy domain being the final control of policy decisions. The political actors of the governance system originally hold full control of this valuable resource which they exchange for influence resources possessed by the interest groups, as public support or expert knowledge. Empirically, answers to the network questions depend on the type of resource and the viewpoint of the interviewed actors. An index is developed which indicates the resource flows between actors and the distribution of equilibrium control of policy decisions. It is shown that the national ministers of agriculture depend very much on the support and expertise of their national farmers' lobby, whereas the Commission relies more on contacts within the political sector itself. Multilevel systems need a lot of political coordination, so that the political actors within such systems, especially at the supranational level, seem to deal first of all with each other and not so much with the demand side of politics, compared to the national ministers of agriculture.     

The organization of influence on the EC's common agricultural policy: A network approach

Abstract The common agricultural policy of the EC with its market regulations is decided at EC level by a multilevel system of government, in which the Commission and the parliamentary parties of the European Parliament play the supranational role and the national ministries of agriculture act as parts of the intergovernmental system of the Council of Ministers. National interest groups have thereby three major access routes to the EC system, first through their national governments, or second indirectly, transmitted by their European peak organizations, or third directly to the supranational EC actors. The network approach is applied to study empirically the densities of access through these various routes. The links between actors in the agricultural policy domain are conceptualized as links for the exchange of resources, the most important resource of a policy domain being the final control of policy decisions. The political actors of the governance system originally hold full control of this valuable resource which they exchange for influence resources possessed by the interest groups, as public support or expert knowledge. Empirically, answers to the network questions depend on the type of resource and the viewpoint of the interviewed actors. An index is developed which indicates the resource flows between actors and the distribution of equilibrium control of policy decisions. It is shown that the national ministers of agriculture depend very much on the support and expertise of their national farmers' lobby, whereas the Commission relies more on contacts within the political sector itself. Multilevel systems need a lot of political coordination, so that the political actors within such systems, especially at the supranational level, seem to deal first of all with each other and not so much with the demand side of politics, compared to the national ministers of agriculture.     

Much ado about money and how to spend it! Analysing 40 years of annulment cases against the European Union Commission

This article analyses four decades of annulment cases against the European Commission brought before the European Court of Justice by dissatisfied Member States. Annulment cases are interpreted as incidents of a struggle between Member State governments and the Commission about policy decisions. Studying annulment cases for the first time in comparative perspective, three important patterns of variation are identified: with respect to the evolution of annulment cases over time, as regards the Member States as plaintiffs and in view of policy fields. Subsequently the data are interpreted on the basis of structure, agency and policy field specific explanatory mechanisms. Leaving the aggregate level, the two policy areas that account for more than 80 per cent of annulments are analysed: EU agriculture and competition policy. In the vast majority of cases, the dominant rationale behind annulments is not national objections to the supranational exercise of delegated powers per se or in specific policies (as most structural theories would expect) but to the way the Commission uses these competences to restrict how national governments may allocate European or national funding.     

The European Politics of Book Pricing

Scholars are increasingly concerned with the phenomenon by which successive policy areas in Europe become 'communitarised' - by which we mean that the sector's governance increasingly takes place at the supranational level. As was the case for the environment or the telecommunications sector, no formal competence on book policy, and more generally on cultural policy, appeared in the original treaty, and hence I seek to explain why and how the communitarisation of the policy debate on book prices took place. On the one hand, the European Court of Justice and the Commission, which benefited from the complicity of subnational private actors, were making use of their judicial and regulatory powers in order to liberalise the book sector. On the other hand, member states which felt that their policy traditions were challenged by European intervention tried to shift the decision-making process back to an intergovernmental mode in an attempt to impose an alternative policy solution, treating books as a special product. The main argument that is put forward in this article is that once the locus of the decision-making process had shifted de facto towards the EU level, the diversity of actors' preferences, decision rules and the nature of the status quo made it impossible for the tenants of dirigiste solutions to impose their policy preferences.     

Political leadership and European integration: The case of Jacques Delors

European Community politics created new opportunities for political leadership. Leadership of the integration process was provided first and foremost by national political leaders, with the EC's supranational institution — the Commission — playing a supporting role. Jacques Delors was the first Commission president (1985–1995) significantly to redefine his role, and consequently to create a model for European, supranational political leadership. Analysing Jacques Delors’ discourse provides us with a methodological tool for understanding how he politicised the leadership role of the Commission, and to what effect.     

The Politics of Crisis Management: Public Leadership Under Pressure by Arjen Boin,Paul 't Hart,Eric Stern,and Bengt Sundelius

ABSTRACT

The article addresses two principal questions: how public management reforms develop in a context of high government turnover, and how, under these circumstances, features of the specific area of public management policy affect the dynamics of the reform and in particular its “technical feasibility.” The research questions are addressed through the case study of the Italian administrative context between 1992 and 2007, a period marked by tumultuous government turnovers. The article presents reforms in two policy areas of public management: civil service reform and innovation, over a three-period time span covering 15 years. The brief duration of political leadership represents a threat to the approval and implementation of policy interventions irrespective of the political salience of the issue and the need for legal enactment. Therefore, the success of a public management reform process in an unstable political context characterized by frequent government turnovers depends on meeting certain conditions for successful policy entrepreneurship: the a priori expertise of policy entrepreneurs, their ability to repackage the issue, keep a community of practice alive, and maneuver the dynamics of the legal process. However, implementation, being a less visible phase, suffers from greater discontinuity as “maintenance activities” necessary for the success of reform are disregarded. Thus, the consideration of the temporal dimension of the policy cycle and the area-specific effects on public management reform dynamics exerted by diverse levels of political salience and legal enactment represent the main contributions of this work to the theories on public management policy change.     

Agency Escape: Decentralization or Dominance of the European Commission in the Modernization of Competition Policy?

The "modernization" reforms of European antitrust are summarized and interpreted. The article uses principal–agent analysis enhanced by socio-institutional insights. The reforms in policy implementation are of historic importance. While they appear to promise decentralization to national competition authorities, more sophisticated analysis points to an increase in the centralized power of the Commission. The novel instrument of a supranational European Competition Network creates a redesigned relationship between the Commission and the member states that carries high risks of incoherence. Modernization driven by a legal epistemic community carries a less obvious risk that increased power of competition policy will unduly reinforce liberal market disciplines through a juridification of the European competition regime.     

Getting a Seat at the Table: Capital,Capture and Expert Groups in the European Union

European Commission expert groups provide powerful platforms from which interest organisations can steer the EU consultation process and weigh in on policy outcomes. Commission decision-makers and bureaucrats rely heavily on expert groups to provide expert policy advice on highly technical issues in the early stages of the policymaking process. Interest organisations provide this advice in order to have their voices heard at the EU level. But whose interests are being represented in these expert groups? Which types of interest organisations, in other words, get a seat at the table and why? This article, using data on over 800 expert groups and nearly 3,000 interest organisations, argues that expert group membership is largely a function of superior resources, EU-level interests and existing institutionalised ties to decision-makers. Far from simply addressing the Commission’s need for expertise, expert group membership is more a story of capital and capture.     

European Union Institutions and French Political Careers

This article examines one aspect of the relationship between European Union institutions and the French political field: politicians' careers. What is the value of positions in the Commission and the European Parliament for French politicians in terms of career mobility? This study shows that the value of the Commission as a source of domestic political capital has risen since the 1950s, whereas the value of the European Parliament has remained relatively low. The position of Commissioner is now comparable to a ministerial-level position. Membership in the European Parliament has remained secondary to a national political career. Yet, as a result of the European Parliament's peripheral position in the French political field, new social groups, linking the regions to the European institutions or forming cross-partisan interest groups, have been created. Evidence shows that if the European Union institutions present an alternative type of political capital to national political capital, political careers and ambitions are still formed in national terms. National mechanisms for the formation of groups having a vested interest in the relative autonomy of supranational political institutions have not developed sufficiently. This inadequacy might be the single most important reason for the democratic deficit in the European Union. We are not in business at all; we are in politics. (Former President of the EC Commission Walter Hallstein, quoted in Swann 1990, vii)     

Is There an Alternative to 'Schengenland'?

The process of 'Schengenizing' the law on immigration and asylum matters and the tensions generated by the intergovernmental pattern of cooperation, in the context of the European Union, have had negative effects upon the principles underpinning the European polities and the identities of their citizens and residents. A principled, enlightened and non-restrictive Union immigration policy would have to be based on the questioning of states 'right' to exclude aliens and on an alternative way of thinking about immigration. This entails 'constitutionalization' of immigration in the European Union and the creation of partnership arrangements among political units in supranational, national and subnational environments.     

Ethics Experts as an Instrument of Technocratic Governance: Evidence from EU Medical Biotechnology Policy

This article challenges the assumption that ethics committees introduce democratic control in policy areas where scientific expertise and ethical concerns collide. The claim is that politicians or bureaucrats are likely to resort to the use of ethical expertise when they face a specific type of dilemma: the impossibility, on the one hand, of yielding a consensus on controversial value‐based issues via the democratic route and the need, on the other, to legitimize controversial policy choices in these areas. The article examines this dynamic with regard to the European Union's medical biotechnology policy, a contested policy domain where ethical specialists are awarded expert status. The article finds that establishing ethical experts as a new category of expertise alongside scientific experts actually bolsters the technocratic domain in areas where it is contested, thus reinforcing the authority of experts and bureaucrats in the policy process, rather than democratic control.     

The political economy of centralization and the European Community

Since 1972, the share of central government expenditure in total public expenditure has continued to increase in most industrial countries. In an international cross-section analysis, it has a significant positive effect on the share of government spending in GDP. The actors who have an interest in centralization are analyzed. The dynamics of centralization are attributed to a response asymmetry and two thresholds. “Popitz' law” of the attraction of the larger budget is tested with respect to the EC Commission: high-ranking politicians come mainly from the smaller member states. The voters' attitudes toward European unification are analyzed in a pooled regression. Ten years hence, 80% of our economic legislation, and perhaps even our fiscal and social legislation as well, will be of Community origin (Jacques Delors, Debates of the European Parliament, 6 July, 1988, No. 2-367/140).     

Channelling Protest in Illiberal Regimes: The Cuban Case since the Fall of the Berlin Wall

Abstract

As part of the strategy for better governance, the European Commission has taken steps towards improved consultation and dialogue on European Union (EU) policy with interested parties. Opening up the policy process and getting interest groups involved are considered important for the democratic legitimacy of EU policy making. This article examines the public Internet consultation on the Commission proposal for a new European chemicals policy, the so-called REACH system. Being one of the most consulted issues in EU history, the chemicals policy review is considered as a critical test for the participatory mechanisms provided by the European Communities. By analysing more than 6000 contributions to the consultation, it is demonstrated that it invited broad participation, although industry was considerably better represented than NGOs and other civil society associations. Moreover, an overwhelming majority of participants were national actors from the largest member states rather than transnational actors. It is concluded that online consultations can invite broad participation in EU policy shaping but it is unlikely to bring about equal participation from different group of actors. Therefore it raises concern when measured against standards of democratic governance.     

Building organizational reputation in the European regulatory state: An analysis of EU agencies' communications

Organizational‐reputation literature has advanced our understanding about the U.S. regulatory state and its agencies. However, we lack contributions on what a reputational account can add to our knowledge about the European regulatory state, the strategic behavior of supranational agencies, and their endeavors to legitimize themselves in a multilevel political system. We know little of how reputation‐management strategies vary across EU agencies and why. The study offers the very first mapping of organizational‐reputation‐management patterns across all EU agencies, as well as the first empirical assessment on how reputational considerations guide supranational agencies' legitimation strategies. The results indicate that EU agencies facing higher reputational threats revert to their avowed raison d'être (i.e., technical conduct). We find that regulatory agencies utilize a more diverse set of reputational strategies by emphasizing the technical, procedural, and moral reputations more than nonregulatory agencies, whereas social‐policy agencies foster their technical reputation more than economic‐policy agencies.     

Economic knowledge and the scientization of policy advice

The growing role of economic expertise in contemporary policy-making has received increasing scholarly attention. Yet, so far, this discussion has only been tenuously linked to relevant debates in public policy and administration, such as the work on policy advisory systems. The article attempts to bridge this gap by examining the changing reliance on academic economic knowledge within policy advisory bodies. It does so by analysing appointments and citation patterns in Norwegian advisory commissions in economic policy over the last 45 years. The analysis shows a marked increase in the number of academic economists appointed to commissions and in citations to economic literature. Moreover, it reveals an orientation towards the most prestigious outlets of the international economics discipline. This development can be interpreted as a scientization of policy advice in the economic field, that is, a growing reliance on academic expertise for analysis and arguments about public policy.     

Agenda-setting under pressure: Does domestic politics influence the European Commission?

The European Union (EU) has become increasingly visible and contested over the past decades. Several studies have shown that domestic pressure has made the EU's ‘electorally connected’ institutions more responsive. Yet, we still know little about how politicisation has affected the Union's non-majoritarian institutions. We address this question by focusing on agenda-setting and ask whether and how domestic politics influences the prioritisation of legislative proposals by the European Commission. We argue that the Commission, as both a policy-seeker and a survival-driven bureaucracy, will respond to domestic issue salience and Euroscepticism, at party, mass and electoral level, through targeted performance and through aggregate restraint. Building on new data on the prioritisation of legislative proposals under the ordinary legislative procedure (1999–2019), our analysis shows that the Commission's choice to prioritise is responsive to the salience of policy issues for Europe's citizens. By contrast, our evidence suggests that governing parties’ issue salience does not drive, and Euroscepticism does not constrain, the Commission's priority-setting. Our findings contribute to the literature on multilevel politics, shedding new light on the strategic responses of non-majoritarian institutions to the domestic politicisation of ‘Europe’.     

The Public Salience of Foreign and Security Policy in Britain,Germany and France

The salience of foreign affairs to general publics is an important but often neglected parameter for the role of public opinion in foreign and security policy. This article explores the determinants of foreign affairs' public salience and probes into the respective patterns in Germany, Britain and France. Building on the theory of news values, the article proposes to distinguish between issue-specific and country-specific influences on the public salience of foreign and security policy. The data suggest that broad international crises on the scale of 9/11 or the Iraq war go along with distinct cross-national peaks in the salience of foreign affairs to general publics. At the same time, the effects of constant issue logics are refracted by country-specific factors: most notably, the latter account for the much higher overall salience of foreign affairs to the British public than to the German and French publics since late 2002.     

The European Commission and fiscal governance reform: a strategic actor?

The intensification of the financial and economic crisis in Europe has added a new impetus to the debate over the possibilities for securing supranational fiscal integration within the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). Since the literature on the European Union’s response to the crisis is dominated by the study of intergovernmental politics, this article considers the previously neglected role of the Commission. A framing analysis of the Commission’s crisis discourse is operationalised here, which is supplemented by interviews with senior officials located in the Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs (DG ECFIN) during key phases of the crisis. It is found that a supranational reform agenda was never internalised by the Commission. Instead, the Commission acted strategically by framing the crisis around intergovernmental fiscal discipline. These findings suggest that, in line with the ‘new intergovernmentalist’ thesis, supranational institutions themselves may not be as ‘hard-wired’ towards supranationalism as is often assumed.     

The first supranational policy in the European Union: Competition policy

Abstract. Competition policy has become a salient issue in the last decade. The purpose of this article is to widen discussion amongst political scientists of an issue that has been dominated by the disciplines of economics and law. The concept of a competition policy is the foundation stone of the entire European Union. It lies at the very heart of efforts to establish a common market and within the EU competition policy arena the decision making powers have laid firmly with the supranational institutions. This article provides an overview of the issue; it traces the constitutive foundations of policy and discusses the functions of the core EU competition policy actors. It is primarily concerned with the European Commission, in particular, DGIV. The paper accounts for DGIV's metamorphosis in the 1980s and the myriad of problems now confronting its procedures and efficiency in the 1990s. Whether these defects can be resolved will ultimately determine the fate of DGIV. Arguments for institutional reform are raging through the European institutions and DGIV provides no exception. The paper concludes with a discussion on the plausibility of the creation of an independent European Competition Office, modelled on the role of the German Federal Cartel Office.