Citizen political knowledge and accountability: Survey evidence on devolution in Kenya

Devolution complicates citizens’ ability to assign responsibility for the provision of public goods and services to different tiers of government. Misattribution of responsibility limits the effectiveness of electoral accountability in the nested principal–agent relationships comprising voters, politicians, and bureaucrats. This raises two important questions. First, how do citizens learn about the functions of different tiers of government under devolution? Second, how do levels of political knowledge condition citizens’ evaluations of subnational governments? Using cross‐sectional and panel survey data from Kenya (2014–2018), this article shows that voters accumulate knowledge through exposure to government services, and that gender and partisanship mediate knowledge accumulation. In addition, exposed citizens are more likely to give positive evaluations of subnational politicians, despite the fact that such exposure may reveal subnational governments’ low capacity, ineffectiveness, and governance gaps. These findings advance our understanding of the dynamics of political accountability under devolution.     

The Practice and Theory of US Statebuilding

Abstract

The United States has employed three models of statebuilding over the last century, each animated by a different political theory. Statebuilding 1.0, developed and used from the late 1890s through the end of the Cold War, emphasized building loyal and politically stable subordinate states. Privileging American geopolitical and economic interests over those of local populations, the model was premised on the theory of realpolitik. Statebuilding 2.0 arose under and, in many ways, came to characterize attempts by the United States to construct a New World Order after 1990. The key shift was from seeking loyalty to building legitimate states. Under this model, the United States attempted to build broad-based popular support for nascent states by creating democratic institutions and spearheading economic reforms. In this ‘end of history’ moment, liberalism reigned triumphant in statebuilding practice and theory. Statebuilding 3.0 is now being ‘field-tested’ in Iraq and Afghanistan. This new model seeks to build legitimacy for new states by providing security and essential public services to their populations. It rests on social contract theory, and its core tenet that legitimacy follows from providing effectively for the basic needs of citizens. Successive sections summarize the practice of statebuilding under each model and discuss its implicit political theory. A critique of each model then flows naturally into the practice and logic of the next. The conclusion outlines why a statebuilding 3.1 is necessary, and what such a strategy might entail.     

IN IT FOR THE LONG HAUL? POST‐CONFLICT STATEBUILDING,PEACEBUILDING, AND THE GOOD GOVERNANCE AGENDA IN TIMOR‐LESTE

Statebuilding after conflict often entails liberal peacebuilding measures. The end of the UN mission in post‐conflict Timor‐Leste in December 2012 provides a unique opportunity to investigate statebuilding in practice. The liberal peacebuilding agenda has met with stiff academic resistance—mainly from the critical theorist camp—and is questioned as an appropriate measure of …statebuilding success. We deploy instead the good governance (GG) agenda as a hybrid local‐liberal guide. Drawing on field work, interviews, and secondary documents, we investigate what we see as four key, intertwined and overlapping aspects of GG: state capacity including the establishment of a state bureaucracy, participation and the engagement of civil society, institution building and rule of law, and corruption control and transparency. We note GG provides a useful policy heuristic, while abstract “one‐size‐fits‐all” liberal peacebuilding models, which avoid the complexities of machinery of government issues, the time taken to develop institutions, and historical and contextual environments of countries, are likely to face severe problems. New states may be dependent on external forces to maintain monopoly of violence. The reversibility and uncertainty of statebuilding and the decades‐long commitment needed by international agencies are noted. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Political Partisanship and Welfare Service Privatization: Ideological Attitudes among Local Politicians in Sweden

This article ties in with a growing international literature examining the link between party politics and welfare service privatization in modern welfare states. In recent decades, a central aspect of policy change in Sweden is that private actors have come to produce publicly financed welfare services on a more regular basis. This overall privatization trend is furthermore characterized by substantial geographical variation across Sweden's 290 municipalities. The ideological attitudes of local politicians have been recognized as particularly important for understanding this development. This article examines the extent to which local politicians’ ideological attitudes regarding welfare service privatization are best explained with a partisan approach emphasizing between‐party polarization as opposed to a critical perspective that points to the proclaimed significance of ideological consensus between left and right parties in certain municipal contexts. Using multilevel modelling and survey data collected from elected politicians in municipal governments, the empirical findings show substantial differences in attitudes between Conservatives and Social Democrats, irrespective of municipal characteristics – most notably the degree of welfare service privatization. Hence, the results strongly indicate that the partisan approach is much more fruitful compared to the consensus approach as a general explanation for local politicians’ attitudes towards welfare service privatization in Sweden. Accordingly, a conclusion is that comparisons at the subnational level within countries are important as a complement to country‐comparative studies when attempting to understand the link between political partisanship and welfare service privatization in modern welfare states.     

International Transitional Administrations and the Politics of Authority Building

This article critically examines authority-building practices of international transitional administrations (ITAs) engaged in statebuilding, and evaluates authority building as a framework for understanding the practices of statebuilding operations. It argues that war-torn states rarely lack actors claiming authority, but that these claims are often competing and mutually exclusive, and frequently not widely recognized. Building authority, therefore, requires ITAs to choose between different actors, recognizing the authority claims of some and withholding recognition from others, seeking ways to strengthen their ability to justify their authority claims vis-à-vis domestic and international audiences. Through authority-building practices, external actors directly become part of the political competition and dynamics of war-affected societies. The discussion of authority building by ITAs proceeds in three steps. The first section outlines the concept of political authority, in particular in the context of fragile states and of ITAs, and discusses relevant methodological issues. The second section then examines three distinct aspects of authority building by ITAs: claiming and justifying their own authority, recognizing and validating the authority claims of local actors, and strengthening the capacity of local actors to justify their authority claims. The final section concludes the paper with some reflections on political authority and authority building.     

A political theory of intergovernmental grants

This paper formulates a political theory of intergovernmental grants. A model of vote-maximizing federal politicians is developed. Grants are assumed to buy the support of state voters and the ‘political capital or resources’ of state politicians and interest groups which can be used to further increase the support of state voters for the federal politician. The model is tested for 49 states. Similarity of party affiliation between federal and state politicians and the size of the Democrat majority in the state legislature increases the per capita dollar amount of grants made to a state. Likewise, increases in both the size of the state bureaucracy and union membership lead to greater grants for a state. Over time, the importance of interest groups (bureaucracy and unions) has increased relative to political groups (state politicians).     

Prominent Role Models: High‐Profile Female Politicians and the Emergence of Women as Candidates for Public Office

Can prominent female politicians inspire other women to enter politics? A woman occupying a high‐profile office directly impacts women's substantive representation through her policy actions. Here, we consider whether these female leaders also facilitate a mobilization effect by motivating other women to run for office. We posit that prominent women in politics serve as role models for other women interested in political careers, causing an increase in female candidates. We test this theory with data from the American states, which exhibit considerable variation in the sex of state legislative candidates and the high‐profile offices of governor and U.S. senator. Using a weighting method and data spanning 1978–2012, we demonstrate that high‐profile women exert substantively large positive effects on female candidates. We conclude that women in major offices are crucial for women's representation. Beyond their direct policy impact, they amplify women's political voice by motivating more women to enter politics.     

Learning to Love Democracy: Electoral Accountability and the Success of Democracy

This article explains why dissatisfaction with the performance of individual politicians in new democracies often turns into disillusionment with democracy as a political system. The demands on elections as an instrument of political accountability are much greater in new than established democracies: politicians have yet to form reputations, a condition that facilitates the entry into politics of undesirable candidates who view this period as their “one‐time opportunity to get rich.” After a repeatedly disappointing government performance, voters may rationally conclude that “all politicians are crooks” and stop discriminating among them, to which all politicians rationally respond by “acting like crooks,” even if most may be willing to perform well in office if given appropriate incentives. Such an expectation‐driven failure of accountability, which I call the “trap of pessimistic expectations,” may precipitate the breakdown of democracy. Once politicians establish reputations for good performance, however, these act as barriers to the entry into politics of low‐quality politicians. The resulting improvement in government performance reinforces voters’ belief that democracy can deliver accountability, a process that I associate with democratic consolidation. These arguments provide theoretical microfoundations for several prominent empirical associations between the economic performance of new democracies, public attitudes toward democracy, and democratic stability.     

Fault Lines: The Effects of Bureaucratic Power on Electoral Accountability

This article introduces a new explanation for why citizens may fail to vote based on government performance. We argue that when politicians have limited capacity to control bureaucrats, citizens will not know whether government performance is a good signal of the incumbent's quality. We develop a selection model of elections in which policy is jointly determined by a politician and a bureaucrat. When politicians have incomplete power over policy, elections perform worse at separating good and bad types of incumbents. We test the theory's predictions using survey experiments conducted with nearly 9,000 citizens and local officials in Uganda. We find that citizens and officials allocate more responsibility to politicians when they are perceived as having more power relative to bureaucrats. The allocation of responsibility has electoral consequences: When respondents believe that bureaucrats are responsible for performance, they are less likely to expect that government performance will affect incumbent vote share.     

Voters AS A Hard Budget Constraint: On the Determination of Intergovernmental Grants

Recent empirical literature has shown that the determination of intergovernmental grants is highly influenced by the political bargaining power of the recipient states. In these models federal politicians are assumed to buy the support of state voters, state politicians and state interest groups by providing grants. In this paper we provide evidence that the fiscal referendum reduces the reliance of states on matching grants received from the central government and thus the possibility of interest groups and state bureaucrats to obtain more grants. If referendums are available, voters serve as a hard budget constraint.     

Too much of a good thing: the ‘problem’ of political communications in a mass media democracy

• Francis Fukuyama asks: ‘… is liberal democracy prey to serious internal contradictions, contradictions so serious that they will eventually undermine it as a political system?’ This paper argues that one of these ‘internal contradictions’ is the political communications process and it can be sufficiently serious to undermine the democratic system—but such an undermining is not inevitable. The problem can be described as follows: Democratic systems require that citizens are kept fully informed by governments (and others) in the interests of transparency and ultimately accountability. Hence, all political communications have, as their final objective, the accountability of politicians at the ballot box. Thus all political communications have what can be described as ‘above’ and ‘below’ the line content. The above‐the‐line is the actual content of the message, the below‐the‐line is the implicit one of ‘think better of me and my colleagues think worse of my opponents’. Consequently, no matter how personally honest and open an individual politician might be, the democratic system requires her or him to be always thinking about securing a successful result at the ballot box. Thus we have the ‘political communications paradox’. Voters want politicians to be honest and accountable but this very demand means that politicians, implicitly, always have to have another agenda in operation when they are communicating with the public, i.e. securing their approval and then their support. As a result the trust which is a fundamental to the workings of a democratic system is constantly being undermined. This has two effects. First, that governments are obliged to make communications, rather than delivery, their real priority and second trust, not just in politicians but in the political system as a whole, tends to wane over time, which in turn endangers the very system it was designed to underpin. But this decline is not inevitable because the system has some in‐built self‐correcting mechanisms These include: the rise of new parties and/or leaders who portray themselves as ‘new’ and ‘untainted’—New Labour, New Conservatives, etc., an almost regular ‘re‐balancing’ of the power relationship that exists between politicians and the civil service, particularly in the communications field, the rise of new forms of communication that seek to by‐pass the institutional roadblocks that are perceived as being the cause of the problems and finally increased attention by journalists and academics to the process of political communications makes it more difficult for politicians to continue with ‘business as usual’ as far as their communication activities are concerned.

Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

How Political Stability Shapes Administrative Performance: The Italian Case

During the last decade in many European Union countries it has clearly emerged that states with weak administrative capacity at the subnational level are more likely to have serious problems with the mismanagement of Structural Funds, or even with accessing them. As a result, some member states such as Italy have embarked upon a programme of institutional and administrative reforms aimed at increasing their administrative capacity. However, retrospective data shows that even though some regions have implemented all the required reforms, their performance has remained unchanged. Along with administrative requirements, are political conditions as such to guarantee that administrative capacity can produce the desired effects? What happens if we do not have political stability that allows for continuity and coherence in administrative actions? Political stability is a controversial variable and theories within the literature present ambiguous results. Some authors strongly claim that stability hinders performance because it fosters the practice of clientelism and the entrenchment of distributional coalitions. In contrast, I aim to explore whether and why, in some cases, stability is actually a variable that accounts for better and improved administrative performance.     

Does Decentralization Improve Perceptions of Accountability? Attitudinal Evidence from Colombia

Decentralization is argued to create incentives for local and regional politicians to be more responsive and accountable to their constituents, but few studies have directly tested this claim. We use survey data from Colombia to examine individual‐level evaluations of the degree to which decentralization prompts citizens to view department government as more accountable. We estimate the effect of administrative, fiscal, and political decentralization, controlling for participation, political knowledge, confidence in government, education, and income on perceptions of accountability. Our results indicate that administrative and fiscal decentralization improve perceptions of accountability, while political decentralization does not.     

Intergovernmental Political Competition in American Federalism

Many policies in the United States are jointly determined by federal and state actions. In the game theoretic model offered here, politicians in both the state and national governments seek credit for providing goods desired by the public and avoid blame for the taxes necessary to provide the goods. In line with Peterson's (1995) theory of functional federalism, the level of government that is better able to supply particular goods and services tends to take the lead in their provision, even to the extent of fully crowding out much less efficient governments. However, under a broad set of circumstances, both state and national politicians seek credit via public spending, and their joint provision leads to a relative "oversupply" of public goods and services, and thus to "overtaxation." Under joint provision, states vary in their responses to changing federal spending patterns based both on the causes of the national changes and on state characteristics .     

Conservatism between theory and practice: The case of migration to Europe

This article explores the neglected relationship between conservatism as political theory and conservatism as political practice using the example of recent immigration to Europe. A cursory glance at how European politicians have responded to migration challenges suggests that they roughly divide into an open‐arm, leftist ‘liberal’ camp and a right‐wing ‘conservative’ one. The situation, however, is more complex. This article engages with the resources of conservative theory to argue that there are many distinct conservative theoretical positions for any one policy point. Using contemporary migration patterns as a case study, the findings suggest that Conservative parties have not borrowed much from conservative theory in its variety of incarnations. In fact, conservative theory can buttress a course of action that is generous toward migrants and at odds with the claims of right‐wing populist movements. While certain strands of conservatism imagine a homogenous people, there are others that are no less pro‐pluralism than liberal theories, and sometimes more so.     

Antipodean Statebuilding: The Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands and Australian Intervention in the South Pacific

Abstract

This essay analyses Australian-led statebuilding efforts in Solomon Islands, through the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI). RAMSI has often been offered as a successful example of statebuilding worthy of international consideration. Here, some of the limitations of the RAMSI mission and its progress in rebuilding the ‘failed’ South Pacific state will be carefully assessed. Despite significant short-term statebuilding successes in restoring security and stabilizing the economy, RAMSI faces long-term challenges centred on the complex politics of political community-building. As an example of ‘best practice’ statebuilding, RAMSI highlights the complexities involved with the two-level game of international intervention: the (conflicting) challenge of reconciling the need to respect sovereign sensitivities with the need to undertake robust political engagement.     

Unprincipled Principals: Co-opted Bureaucrats and Corruption in Ghana

In theory, granting politicians tools to oversee bureaucrats can reduce administrative malfeasance. In contrast, I argue that the political control of bureaucrats can increase corruption when politicians need money to fund election campaigns and face limited institutional constraints. In such contexts, politicians can leverage their discretionary powers to incentivize bureaucrats to extract rents from the state on politicians' behalf. Using data from an original survey of bureaucrats (N = 864) across 80 randomly sampled local governments in Ghana, I show that bureaucrats are more likely to facilitate politicians' corrupt behavior when politicians are perceived to be empowered with higher levels of discretionary control. Using qualitative data and a list experiment to demonstrate the mechanism, I show that politicians enact corruption by threatening to transfer noncompliant officers. My findings provide new evidence on the sources of public administrative deficiencies in developing countries and qualify the presumption that greater political oversight improves governance.     

External Actors,State‐Building,and Service Provision in Areas of Limited Statehood: Introduction

This article introduces the themes and arguments of the special issue. While virtually all polities enjoy uncontested international legal sovereignty, there are wide variations in statehood, that is, the monopoly over the means of violence and the ability of the state to make and implement policies. Areas of limited statehood are not, however, ungoverned spaces where anarchy and chaos prevail. The provision of collective goods and services is possible even under extremely adverse conditions of fragile or failed statehood. We specify the conditions under which external efforts at state‐building and service provision by state and nonstate actors can achieve their goals. We focus on the extent to which external actors enhance the capacity (statehood) of authority structures in weak states, or directly contribute to the provision of collective goods and services, such as public health, clean environment, social security, and infrastructure. We argue that three factors determine success: legitimacy, task complexity, and institutionalization, including the provision of adequate resources.     

Between the Letter and the Spirit: International Statebuilding Subversion Tactics in Burundi

This article explores the appropriation dynamics of international statebuilding in Burundi, with a focus on the period from 2010 to 2015. If international statebuilding is most commonly presented (and debated) as practices leaning towards the achievement of a liberal democracy, this article argues that it can also be used towards undemocratic ends. The central claim is the following: the (most) recent authoritarian trend observed in Burundi’s main political force in government, the National Council for the Defence of Democracy – Forces for the Defence of Democracy (CNDD-FDD), did not only occur against international statebuilding but also through its appropriation and, more specifically, through self-reinforcing subversion tactics of appropriation. The article conceptualizes these tactics, examines the factors of emergence and conditions of existence, and presents the main expressions along three major editorial lines of international statebuilding: pluralist democracy, vibrant civil society and respect of the rule of law.     

The causes of legal rents extraction: evidence from Spanish municipalities

This paper analyzes the causes of legal political rent extraction by using a direct measure of it, namely, local top politicians’ wages. In particular, we investigate whether local politicians’ incentives to extract rents by setting their own wages are influenced by the degree of political competition and voter information. We use a sample of the largest Spanish municipalities over the years 2008–2010. The results indicate that weaker political competition and lesser voter information are related to more rent extraction. In an additional analysis, we show that higher wages do not ensure better financial management. These findings confirm that when politicians can set their own salaries, higher wages do not mean better management, but they are just political rents.