The Duty to Protect the Victim – Or the Duty to Suffer Punishment?

This paper addresses The Ends of Harm by Victor Tadros. In it, I attempted to explore some of the implications of Tadros’s theory of punishment, particularly those following from the uneasy relationship between punishment of the offender (D) and D’s duty to protect the victim (V) from future harm. Among my concerns were: the apparent underinclusiveness of Tadros’s theory of punishment; the vague and unpredictable scope of D’s liabilities; the taking away by the state of V’s right to be protected; and the lack of inherent limitations on the appropriate forms and amounts of punishment. I also questioned the true meaning of the duty incurred by D as a result of D’s wrongdoing and suggested that protection of Vs from future harm may not be as essential to Tadros’s justification of punishment as he has argued.     

How to control interception-does the UK strike the right balance?

This Article critically analyses the regime for intercepting the content of communications under the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 in the light of the recent ruling by the European Court of Human Rights in Kennedy v the UK. It looks at the safeguards for privacy protection provided such as the requirement for a warrant and the roles of the Investigatory Powers Tribunal and the Interception of Communications Commissioner and whether these safeguards are compliant with Article 8 of the European Convention of Human Rights.     

Sienkiewicz v Greif (UK) Ltd and Willmore v Knowsley Metropolitan Borough Council: A Material Contribution to Uncertainty?

In the conjoined cases of Sienkiewicz and Willmore, the Supreme Court decided that the exceptional Fairchild approach to the proof of causation in negligence applied where a mesothelioma victim had been negligently exposed to asbestos by one defendant at a level well below unavoidable environmental asbestos exposure. The negligent exposures in both cases materially increased the risk of mesothelioma thereby satisfying the Fairchild test. Whilst reasserting the primacy of the common law as governing the rules of causation in mesothelioma cases, the Supreme Court failed to clarify the scope of the Fairchild exception. Moreover, in an extensive obiter discussion of epidemiological evidence, the Supreme Court has raised more questions than it has answered relating to the role, if any, of scientific evidence in the law of toxic torts.     

The Stock Market to the Rescue? Carbon Disclosure and the Future of Securities-Related Climate Change Litigation

This article considers the role that securities litigation can play in forcing public companies to disclose climate change risks to their investors and potential shareholders. Such disclosure can prove to be a strong incentive for companies to manage their greenhouse gas emissions and climate change exposure better. Securities regulators in North America have, for the most part, resisted efforts effectively to enforce obligations by companies to disclose climate change risks. This led to a recent action by the Office of the Attorney-General in New York, which exemplifies the role that litigation can play in this area. Investors themselves may soon bring their own actions against companies over their carbon disclosure, the basis for which is already provided in securities legislation.     

Self-Reported Intentions to Offend: All Talk and No Action?

To study criminal decision making, researchers commonly present hypothetical offending scenarios to participants and record their self-reported intentions to offend (SRIO). These SRIO scores are treated as an indicator of participants?? predisposition to commit the act described in the scenario. Drawing from the field of clinical measurement, the current study examines the diagnostic accuracy of SRIO scores by comparing participants?? intentions to acquire illegal music files from a designated distributor to their actual attempts to acquire such files. Approximately 7% of participants who read about a (bogus) music piracy opportunity reported strong??and at times definitive??intentions to seek out the illegal files. However, in actuality, no one in the study engaged in this behavior. Clinimetric indicators suggest that SRIO scores are better at predicting abstention from crime than actual criminal participation.     

Incitement to Religious Hatred: All Talk and No Substance?

The Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006 has a frenetic history. It is the culmination of six attempts in Parliament in the last twelve years to make incitement to religious hatred unlawful. ¹ 1 Lord Lester proposed two amendments to the Criminal Justice and Public Order Bill, June 1994 and the (Lord) Bishop of Oxford moved an amendment in July 1994. Lord Avebury introduced a Religious Offences Bill in 2001. The government has tried three times: in the Anti‐Terrorism, Crime and Security Bill in 2001; in the Serious Organised Crime and Police Bill, introduced in November 2004 and (successfully) in the Racial and Religious Hatred Bill, introduced June 2005.
Each attempt has met with intense criticism. But now that the legislation is here, what may it achieve?     

Has the cocaine epidemic arrived in the UK?

National surveys of the UK drug situation in 2000 found that cocaine was the most frequently seized Class A drug, with 25-40 tonnes of cocaine being smuggled into the UK each year. In the light of these findings, an audit of the analytical monitoring for cocaine abuse has been performed covering the period from 1996 to 2002. It was found that there has been a consistent upward trend in the percentage of requests found to be positive for cocaine over this 7-year study period, rising from 9.7% in 1996 to 22% in 2002. This data would suggest that the use of cocaine has increased dramatically over the past few years, indicating that the arrival of the "cocaine epidemic" has now started to become a reality in the UK.     

Must the Surgeon Take the Pill? Negligence Duty in the Context of Cognitive Enhancement

Recently, attention has turned to the possibility of enhancing human cognitive abilities via pharmacological interventions. Known as ‘cognitive enhancers’, these drugs can alter human mental capacities, and in some cases can effect significant improvements. One prime example is modafinil, a drug used to treat narcolepsy, which can help combat decreases in wakefulness and cognitive capacity that arise due to fatigue in otherwise healthy individuals. In this paper, we respond to calls in the philosophical and ethical literature that surgeons and other medical professionals should be morally obliged to take cognitively enhancing drugs. We examine whether surgeons who make fatigue‐related errors during patient care might be considered legally obliged to enhance themselves. We focus on liability for a failure to medicate, and conclude that it is highly unlikely that surgeons will be legally obliged to address their fatigue through the use of cognitive enhancing drugs.     

No Harm No Foul? Objectivism and the Law of Attempts

Law and Philosophy -     

Can Strict Criminal Liability for Responsible Corporate Officers be Justified by the Duty to Use Extraordinary Care?

The responsible corporate officer (RCO) doctrine is, as a formal matter, an instance of strict criminal liability: the government need not prove the defendant’s mens rea in order to obtain a conviction, and the defendant may not escape conviction by proving lack of mens rea. Formal strict liability is sometimes consistent with retributive principles, especially when the strict liability pertains to the grading of an offense. But is strict liability consistent with retributive principles when it pertains, not to grading, but to whether the defendant has crossed the threshold from noncriminal to criminal conduct? In this essay, I review the two most plausible arguments supporting an affirmative answer in the context of the RCO doctrine. First, perhaps this doctrine reflects a rule-like form of negligence, akin to a rule that prohibits selling alcohol to a minor. Second, perhaps this doctrine expresses a duty to use extraordinary care to prevent a harm. Neither argument is persuasive. The first argument, although valid in some circumstances, fails to explain and justify the RCO doctrine. The second argument, a duty to use extraordinary care, is also inadequate. If “extraordinary care” simply means a flexibly applied negligence standard that considers the burdens and benefits of taking a precaution, it is problematic in premising criminal liability on ordinary negligence. If instead it refers to a higher duty or standard of care, it has many possible forms, such as requiring only a very slight deviation from a permissible or justifiable standard of conduct, placing a “thumb” on the scale of the Learned Hand test, identifying an epistemic standard more demanding than a reasonable person test, or recognizing a standard that is insensitive to individual capacities. However, some of these variations present a gratuitous or incoherent understanding of “negligence,” and none of them sufficiently explain and justify the RCO doctrine.     

Interviewing to Detect Deception: When to Disclose the Evidence?

Research shows that there are few objective cues to deception. However, it may be possible to create such cues by strategic interviewing techniques. Strategic Use of Evidence (SUE) is one such technique. The basic premise of the SUE technique is that liars and truth tellers employ different counter-interrogation strategies, and that the evidence against the suspect can be used to exploit these differences in strategies. This study examined the effect of the timing of evidence disclosure (early vs. late vs. gradual) on verbal cues to deception. We predicted that late disclosure would be most effective in differentiating between liars and truth-tellers, and that cues to deception in the gradual disclosure condition would progressively disappear due to the suspects’ realization that evidence against them exists. That is, we expected that liars in the gradual presentation condition would become more consistent with the evidence over time. A sample of 86 undergraduate students went through a mock-terrorism paradigm (half innocent, half guilty), and were subsequently interviewed using one of three disclosure strategies: early, gradual, and late disclosure. We measured statement-evidence inconsistencies as cues to deception . Results supported our predictions in that cues to deception were most pronounced in the late disclosure condition. Contrary to our expectations, the results suggested that presenting the evidence gradually may put innocent suspects at a higher risk of misclassification as they seem to adopt a strategy that is more similar to guilty suspects.