Beyond “Nonsense on stilts”: Towards conceptual clarity and resolution of conflicting economic rights

Many of the debates concerning the existence of economic rights obfuscate the meaning of the possession of a right to an economic good. In order to provide clarification, several theoretical questions must be probed. This essay explores each of these issues in order to demonstrate that greater conceptual clarity repudiates the arguments against the existence of economic rights. It also seeks to attenuate the vexing problem of necessary and painful tradeoffs between competing rights claims. The final portion of this essay heuristically demonstrates how greater conceptual clarity can aid us in dealing with complex policy issues involving competing rights claims. The phase “Nonsense on stilts” is borrowed from Jeremy Bentham’s refutation pf “Natural” rights. Jeremy Bentham, “Anarchical Fallacies” in Human Rights, ed. A.I.Melden (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 1970), 30–31.     

Human Rights Enjoyment in Theory and Activism

Despite being a seemingly straightforward moral concept (that all humans have certain rights by virtue of their humanity), human rights is a contested concept in theory and practice. Theorists debate (among other things) the meaning of “rights,” the priority of rights, whether collective rights are universal, the foundations of rights, and whether there are universal human rights at all. These debates are of relatively greater interest to theorists; however, a given meaning of “human rights” implies a corresponding theory of change and through that can be an important guide to the practice of human rights activists and their funders. In practice, any organization can describe their work as “rights based.” This article clarifies the practices of human rights activists and their funders that are consistent with a theory of human rights as (1) universal, (2) interdependent across groups and categories of people, (3) indivisible across issue areas and claims, and (4) measured by the enjoyment of rights.     

The ethos of sovereignty: A critical appraisal

Taking as its starting point the commonly held claim about the obscurity of the concept of sovereignty, the article first identifies a fundamental paradox between the classical Westphalian notion of state sovereignty and human rights. In the rhetoric of international politics, attempts to establish the responsibility of states to respect human rights and fundamental freedoms within their jurisdictions are often countered with claims referring to the “sovereign equality” of all states and the subsequent principle of non-intervention. The article suggests that in a more contemporary understanding of sovereignty the responsibility of a state to respect human rights and fundamental freedoms is seen as a constituent ingredient of the state itself. The chapter continues to elaborate how this change has come about. The classical notion of sovereignty is illustrated through a reading of Bodin’s Six Books of the Commonwealth (1576). In Bodin’s world, sovereignty is a constitutive element of the state, and the possibility of a multitude of sovereign entities in a global world logically denying the possibility of any “supra-national” normative framework is still a minor consideration. This possibility is only worked out with the emergence of international law. In both classics such as Emmerich de Vattel’s The Law of Nations (1758) and more contemporary treatises such as Lassa Oppenheim’s International Law (1905), state sovereignty has become conditional to recognition by other sovereign states and a subsequent membership in the “family of nations.” The conditional membership in the “family of nations” involves a contradiction: a sovereign state must act in a “dignified” manner, it must use its sovereignty with “restraint” by respecting the human rights and fundamental freedoms of its citizens, i.e., it must employ its sovereignty in a non-sovereign way. This restriction of sovereignty, addressed as “ethical sovereignty,” becomes a constitutive element in a post-Westphalian state and a central ingredient in the contemporary doctrine of humanitarian intervention. The article further criticizes the various uses (and abuses) of “ethical sovereignty” in the regulation of “failing” and “rogue” states and concludes by identifying its general political dangers. Finally, with reference to Jacques Derrida’s Rogues (2003), the article suggests a more radical reappraisal of the concept of sovereignty. It is a fact that sovereignty is a term used without any well-recognised meaning except that of supreme authority. Under these circumstances those who do not want to interfere in a mere scholastic controversy must cling to the facts of life and the practical, though abnormal and illogical, condition of affairs.¹ —Lassa Oppenheim But to invoke the concept of national sovereignty as in itself a decisional factor is to fall back on a word which has an emotive quality lacking meaningful specific content. It is to substitute pride for reason.² —Eli Lauterpacht     

Are the powers of traditional leaders in South Africa compatible with women’s equal rights?: Three conceptual arguments

This paper is about conflicts of rights, and the particularly difficult challenges that such conflicts present when they entail women’s equality and claims of cultural recognition. South Africa since 1994 has presented a series of challenging—but by no means unique—circumstances many of which entail conflicting claims of rights. The central aim of this paper is, to make sense of the idea that the institution of traditional leadership can be sustained—and indeed given new, more concrete powers—in a democracy; and to explore the implications that this has for women’s equality and equal human rights. This is a particularly pertinent question in the South African context, and I think it is worth reiterating from the outset that there is a distinct impression that women’s equality is always “up for grabs” when other, perhaps more powerful interests, come into play, in a way that would be unacceptable for other aspects of identity, and therefore signifiers of equality. It would be inconceivable, for example, to countenance a claim for a hierarchical racial arrangement in a given community, no matter how deeply culturally entrenched that arrangement was, and regardless of how much support it (ostensibly) had from the community concerned. I think therefore that we are obliged to ask difficult questions about the new legislation on traditional leadership, and to put it under the microscope of political theory in assessing the claim that this is one way of recognizing people’s rights and freedoms in a new democracy. The Traditional Leadership and Governance Framework Act 2003, omits reference to the “powers” of traditional leaders, but rather refers to “functions and roles” which was regarded as something of a victory for women’s rights groups. However, the Commission on Gender Equality (CGE) and others point out that this victory has been all but nullified by the Communal Land Rights Act, 2004, which allocates powers of land administration to traditional councils, which are headed by traditional leaders. In any event, the “functions and roles” that traditional leaders are allocated in terms of the 2003 Act are sufficiently extensive that they may be seen to allocate “power” with the reference to lesser competence appearing to be a mere semantic device for the sake of compromise.     

Capabilities Theory and the Limits of Liberal Justice: On Nussbaum’s Frontiers of Justice

In Frontiers of Justice, Martha Nussbaum applies the “Capabilities Approach,” which she calls “one species of a human rights approach,” to justice issues that have in her view been inadequately addressed in liberal political theory. These issues include rights of the disabled, rights that transcend national borders, and animal rights issues. She demonstrates the weakness of Rawlsianism, contractualism in general, and much of the Kantian tradition in moral philosophy and shows the need to move beyond the limitations of narrow rationalism, nationalism, and speciesism. Nevertheless, Nussbaum fails to elaborate adequately the grounds for her own capabilities position or to face fundamental theoretical questions about the nature and implications of that position.     

What was all the shouting about?: Strategic bargaining and protest at the WTO Third Ministerial Meeting

This article challenges key aspects of theories on norms evolution, transnational advocacy, and social movements. It demonstrates that the “emergence” phase of the “norms life cycle” model (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998) is more internally contested than currently interpreted. It develops two alternatives to the “boomerang” model of transnational advocacy (Keck and Sikkink 1998). It highlights and explains differences—rather than similarities—in the framing strategies of actors involved in globalized protests. It explores the influence of several key “microsociological factors” (Giugni 2002) on the evolution of those stragegies. Empirically the article focuses on the World Trade Organization's Third Ministerial meeting at Seattle in 1999. It analyzes why and how social movement actors framed different interpretations of the human rights at stake in the context of international trade. Framing innovations may have had short-term strategic value at Seattle, but did not lead to a unified understanding of human rights, either among activists themselves or among the government and corporate actors they sought to influence through protest.     

On the Other Side of the Curtain: A Reassessment of Non-Elite Human Rights Experiences and Values in Poland

In this paper, I explore the formation of human rights attitudes among what I call the “silent majority” in the post-communist countries of Central Europe and the former Soviet Union. This is the large, diverse group of people never directly confronted with harsh methods of repression under communism. I argue here that the foundations for conceptualizing human rights are based on the degree and saliency of exposure to rights violations and that, for many citizens of Central and Eastern Europe, life behind the “iron curtain” is associated with relatively fewer rights violations than life after the iron curtain’s fall. Comparative personal experiences will play a key role in explaining how these citizens conceptualize human rights. I test this argument by applying it to the cases of Poland, where I conducted a total of 68 randomly selected non-elite interviews in an effort to probe for key factors defining individuals’ conceptions of human rights.

Politicization as a strategy for recognition and enforcement of human rights in Kenya

Drawing from recent advocacy efforts on the right to education in Kenya, this article argues that linking human rights to local political struggles is a useful way of ensuring their realization. Human rights are legal and moral but their realization is a political project. The form that this project takes will differ from context to context. While paying due regard to the remarkable contribution of international human rights regimes and transnational advocacy of the last fifty years in providing the world with a powerful legal and moral vocabulary of rights, this article suggests that this vocabulary risks losing its edge unless those working in the field of human rights recognize the necessity of local politics. The article examines the activities of the Kenyan human rights movement and its strategic linking of access to basic education with repression of political freedoms. I would like to thank participants at the May 9–10, 2003 “Rights in Africa” conference at North-wester University, Illinois, for their comments on an earlier draft of this paper.     

Political Myth and the Sacred Center of Human Rights: The Universal Declaration and the Narrative of “Inherent Human Dignity”

This paper will explore the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights as an exemplar of political mythmaking, a genre of narrative designed to channel and thereby to quell social anxiety and to orient select groups toward desirable beliefs and practices. One of the Declaration’s most fundamental and forceful elements is its enshrinement of the “inherent dignity” of each member of the human family. Drawing upon contemporary theorizations of mythmaking and sacralization, this article will elucidate the manner in which inherent dignity functions as the central item of sacredness within what we might call the “secular morality” of universal human rights.     

The Logic of Comparative Politics and the Development of Political Science in China

This article attempts to discuss the debate about “indigenizing political science in China” from the logic of comparative politics. The author believes that the phrase “indigenizing political science in China” is misleading at best and destructive to political science development in China at worst. The logic of comparative politics is the same as other comparative social sciences: namely, it is the process of replacing proper names and treating tempo and spatial factors as potential variables contributing to the explanation of political phenomena. As social scientists, we should not be content in using “local Chinese conditions” or “special Chinese cultural factors” to explain political behavior and phenomena in China. Instead, we should decompose the “special Chinese conditions” and “cultural factors” for the deeper meaning of these conditions and factors so that we can conceptualize and elevate these conditions and factors to a theoretical level. In short, the author favors making political science study in China more scientific and argues that the future of political science studies in China lies in replacing the proper name “China” or “Chinese”.     

Adaptive Justice in the Chinese Context: Law versus Commonsense

Under certain circumstances, law may come into conflict with commonsense, which by definition refers to “popular conceptions of right and wrong”, a conflict to which rescue comes a mechanism I conceptualise as “adaptive justice”, as it aims to adapt the law, in balance with other non-positive, but equally universal rules, to the circumstances at hand. It follows two propositions: (1) When law encounters or engenders difficulty during its legislation, application or interpretation, certain non-positive, universal rules will have to be introduced in order to make flexible the rigidity of written law; (2) the solution is an adaptive application of legal rules, rather than adherence to a literal reading of legal texts. In the context of the libertarian-communitarian debate on justice, this notion of adaptive justice may offer us a new angle, as it has an in-built focus on “methodological relationalism”, which by definition uses interpersonal relationship as the basic unit of analysis to decode human behaviour and values.     

The possibility of secular human rights: Alan gewirth and the principle of generic consistency

This article explores Alan Gewirth’s argument for a secular foundation for the idea 2 of human rights as a possible response to Michael J. Perry’s claim “that the idea of 3 human rights is…ineliminably religious.” I examine Gewirth’s reasoning for constructing 3 a theory, namely that existing theories are fundamentally flawed and leave the idea of human rights without a logically consistent foundation, before considering in detail his claims for the Principle of Generic Consistency (PGC). Having looked at his critique of numerous other theories, as well as at his own argument about human action grounding basic rights to freedom and well-being, I then offer a critique of Gewirth’s PGC. Ultimately my conclusion is that Gewrith's 3 theory relies too heavily on the notions, first that we have a meta-desire not to contradict ourselves and, second, that we are unable to find persuasive justifications for our behavior that might allow us to avoid self-contradiction. If one is not troubled by charges of self-contradiction or, as is more often the case, one does not recognize that one’s victim is as much a human being as oneself, Gewirth’s theory 5 V 3 will not seem particularly persuasive. *** DIRECT SUPPORT *** A28BB025 00003     

Europe at the Fin de Siècle

In 1968 he was a prominent spokesman for noncommunist intellectuals, and he later became a founding member and leader of the human and civil rights movement “Charter 77.” The danger of totalitarianism has been his constant theme.     

The Physical Basis of Voluntary Trade

The article discusses the conditions under which can we say that people enter the economic system voluntarily. “The Need for an Exit Option” briefly explains the philosophical argument that voluntary interaction requires an exit option—a reasonable alternative to participation in the projects of others. “The Treatment of Effective Forced Labor in Economic and Political Theory” considers the treatment of effectively forced interaction in economic and political theory. “Human Need” discusses theories of human need to determine the capabilities a person requires to have an acceptable exit option. “Capability in Cash, Kind, or Raw Resources” considers what form access to that level of capability should take—in cash, kind, or raw resources, concluding that a basic income guarantee is the most effective method to ensure an exit option in a modern, industrial economy.     

The global promotion of gender equality—A propaganda approach

This paper proposes a new way of measuring progress in international politics, an approach that focuses on the symbolic and ideological work of international organizations. Although such a strategy is not entirely new to the study of International Relations, it has not been a common, accessible way of assessing how well international organizations work to effect change. The more famous methods have been legalistic—investigations of how international organizations have created new international law in the issue-areas under investigation¹—and bureaucratic—studies of how international organizations create machinery to deal with the problems². But in a world where domestic and international discourse is more mediated than ever before by television, radio, the Internet, newspapers, and other means of mass communication, the argument here is that propaganda is a third arena that must be taken into account when exploring the work of international organizations. The international organization in question here is the United Nations, and the issue-area examined is gender equality, a topic that is also variously described as “women's rights,” “women's issues”, or the “women's movement”. The paper explains first why the topic of the UN and women's rights is important, I then examine the propaganda role of the UN in the struggle for gender equality, and the paper concludes with a critical analysis of the UN's propaganda work in relation to this issue.     

Unilateral jurisdiction: Universal jurisdiction <Emphasis Type="Italic">à l’Américaine</Emphasis> in the age of post-realist power

Conclusion The United States is using the theme of rights to build its unilateralism. In order to transform this unilateralism into a convincing universalism, it needs to reinforce its “soft power,” appeal to its partners and convince them of the necessity of its initiatives. Aggressive or offensive rights and crude unilateral military interventions are dangerous per se; they might also endanger American power in the long run. Culturally, this challenge is rooted in America’s origins and in its enthusiastic desire to reform the world. In that respect, the shaping of a so-called “world community,” America is challenging continental Europe and its hierarchical universal power rooted in Catholic verticality. On the contrary, the U.S. conception of power is based on a horizontal dynamic, inspired by the structure of the reformation movement. American coercive rights are defying a universal powerless law; Luther is certainly taking its revenge against Rome. Indeed, as for now, America’s universal competence turns out to be more effective than the ICC. However, if the United States does not take into account its own aspirations to define universal norms, it will be more and more difficult for the United States to justify the necessity of its military decisions. any step back to crude realism could be a fatal regression. It will be a mistake for the pursuit of America’s own interests; it would also most probably endanger the stability of the international system, as it would foster rivalries and hostile reactions.     

Human-provided waters for desert wildlife: what is the problem?

Conflict persists in southwestern deserts of the United States over management of human-constructed devices to provide wildlife with water. We appraised decision processes in this case relative to the goal of human dignity and by the standards of civility and common interest outcomes. Our analysis suggested that conflict was scientized, rooted in worldviews, and aggravated by use of inflammatory symbols such as “wilderness” and “bighorn sheep.” Contested problem definitions, framed as matters of science, advanced factional interests largely by allocating the burden of proof and failing to disclose private concerns about well-being, affection, respect, skill and power. Decision processes were shaped by precepts of scientific management, and thus largely failed to foster civility, common ground, and a focus on common interests, and instead tended to exacerbate deprivations of dignity and respect. If the status quo continues, we foresee further erosion of human dignity because there are likely to be increases in system stressors, such as climate change and human population growth. The prognosis would be more hopeful if alternatives were adopted that entailed authoritative, equitable, and collaborative public decision-making processes that took into consideration national-level common interests such as the U.S. Endangered Species Act.     

Towards a Study of Human Rights Practitioners

The expansion of human rights provisions has produced an increasing number of human rights practitioners and delineated human rights as a field of its own. Questions of who is practicing human rights and how they practice it have become important. This paper considers the question of human rights practice and the agency of practitioners, arguing that practice should not be conceived as the application of philosophy, but instead approached from a sociological point of view. Whatever the structuring effect of political institutions, human rights is being defined more expansively by practitioners. The weakness of international institutions and the interpretive scope of human rights discourse produce significant opportunity for practitioners to interpret the meaning of human rights. Our exploratory interviews of a small sample of practitioners reveal widely varying histories, in which they interpret their own work as “human rights” practice in differing ways. Practitioners who in the past thought of themselves differently, now identify as human rights activists. They are also becoming more professional, but concerned about professionalization. Their self-interpretations reflect these concerns and also respond to the necessities of career events. Through the conscious and unconscious aspects of their practice, practitioners exercise considerable agency in adapting human rights discourse to their own concerns while also being critical of it.