Demanding the Impossible: War,Bargaining, and Honor

This article shows that honor concerns can influence war initiation and termination decisions. When bargaining implicates status or commitments to in-group members, moral nationalists may experience dishonor—and with it emotions like shame and humiliation—when they have to make concessions. These honor costs are different from other costs because they can sometimes be vindicated through costly action. Including these costs in a basic, complete information bargaining model demonstrates that honor concerns can give rise to a “fight, then agree” equilibrium. These influences of honor on war initiation and termination are illustrated with case studies of British decisions in the 1982 Falklands War and French decisions during the 1940 invasion of France.     

Public commitment strategies in intergovernmental negotiations on the EU Constitutional Treaty

We analyze the impact of public commitment strategies as bargaining tools in the negotiations on the EU Constitutional Treaty using a sequential-bargaining model with incomplete information. The analysis suggests selection bias in observable public commitments with respect to the kind of issues that are publicly challenged as well as the kind of governments that will ‘go public’. Public commitments are more likely under high uncertainty over audience costs. Further, the effect of public commitments on the duration and outcome of negotiation is conditional as well. In our empirical analysis, where we analyze the intergovernmental stage of the negotiations on the European Constitutional Treaty, we find strong empirical support for each of our theoretical predictions. Governments were most likely to commit publicly if they represented a domestic constituency that was negative about the EU Constitution and, at the same time, contained many undecided respondents. Moreover, these public commitments were generally quickly accommodated. In contrast, public commitments were less likely to lead to any changes if they were made by governments representing a domestic constituency that was relatively positive about the draft Constitution or negative and decided. In the latter case, however, public statements made bargaining deadlock more likely.

Leopards Can Change Their Spots: When Leaders Take Out of Character Actions

According to audience cost theories, out of character actions by hawkish leaders are likely when such leaders can use their reputations to deflect criticism. This analysis examines the theory of out of character actions, focusing on shifting international conditions and the use of secrecy to allow leaders both to lead public opinion and avoid unwanted scrutiny. The plausibility of this theory is tested in the paradigmatic case for hawkish policy reversal: Richard Nixon’s rapprochement with China in 1971–1972. Examination of four facets of Sino–American relations—the Soviet dimension, conservative opposition to rapprochement, growing domestic support for improved relations, and the secrecy of negotiations—reveal the significance of contextual factors and Nixon’s decisions in explaining improved relations. Leaders can effectively change their type with minimal political repercussions, as long as conditions are favourable and audience costs can be minimised.     

Satisfaction,Alternatives, Investments,and the Microfoundations of Audience Cost Models

In this paper, we suggest that the Investment Model of Commitment, developed in social psychology, offers a solution to an important microfoundational issue in audience cost theory. Audience cost models are useful for thinking about the foreign policy behaviors of democratic and nondemocratic states. However, they often assume that citizens reliably penalize leaders who break their foreign policy promises even though the empirical record suggests this is not always the case. We argue that public commitment to foreign policy assets and relationships is a precondition for the application of audience costs. Using the UN and NATO as case studies, we hypothesize that the commitments people develop to international organizations emerge as a function of (1) their satisfaction with the performance of the organization, (2) the investments in those organizations, and (3) an assessment of the alternatives to these associations. Correlational and experimental tests of the model confirm that the strongest individual-level commitments arise when people are highly satisfied with the performance of specific institutions, believe that much has been invested in support of them, and perceive that the alternatives to particular institutions are poor. Implications for the development of audience cost theory are discussed.     

Avoiding Audience Costs: Domestic Political Accountability and Concessions in Crisis Diplomacy

We challenge the widely accepted proposition that democratic leaders are more accountable than autocratic leaders. We argue that a winning coalition's abilities to monitor and sanction a leader increase as its size decreases. Hence, contrary to conventional wisdom, our theory suggests that autocratic leaders are more accountable than democratic leaders due to the monitoring and sanctioning advantages of smaller coalitions relative to larger coalitions. Many international relations scholars hold that the conventional wisdom explains important variation in leaders’ behavior during crisis bargaining and in the outcomes of international disputes. We evaluate our theory and the conventional perspective by examining rival predictions regarding leaders’ ability to avoid incurring audience costs by conducting crisis negotiations and making concessions outside their coalitions’ view. A reassessment of us-ussr diplomacy during the Cuban Missile Crisis, a favored case of the conventional wisdom, indicates the plausibility of our theory in the context of security crises.     

Intervention Without Leverage: Explaining the Prevalence of Weak Mediators

Existing research on international mediation emphasizes the importance of leverage in altering the combatants' ability to reach a negotiated settlement. Less understood is the role of third parties that do not have access to sources of leverage even though they comprise a substantial amount of mediation efforts. This paper highlights two potential explanations for the prevalence of “weak” mediators. First, a choice of third parties without leverage might be a product of the “supply side” preferences of the international community, in particular, the great powers. Second, the inclusion of third parties without any leverage can result from actors hedging their commitments to the peace process when they suspect with some uncertainty that one side will use third-party involvement insincerely for ends other than peace. Using data from the Managing Intrastate Low Level Conflicts (MILC) project, in conjunction with the PRIO/UPPSALA Armed Conflict data, empirical results using competing risk models confirm both logics. Mediators with weak leverage are more likely when an actor has strong incentives to stall: specifically, when the immediate costs of conflict are high, there is domestic political pressure in the absence of democratic accountability, and relative bargaining power is shifting. The findings also suggest that supply-side dynamics matter. Weak mediators are less likely in the presence of substantial foreign investment and in neighborhoods with strong states, but mediators of all types are more likely in democratic neighborhoods. To further explore the role of insincere motivations, the paper considers the 2002 Ceasefire Agreement (CFA) in Sri Lanka, brokered by Norway.     

Democracy,Deception, and Entry into War

Realists propose that elected leaders that seek war but face a hesitant public may use deception to build public support for war. Leaders may secretly make provocative diplomatic or military moves to push the adversary to attack first, rallying the public behind a war effort seen as defensive, or publicly exaggerate the threat posed by the adversary. This paper develops a liberal institutionalist critique of this theory, positing that elected leaders are deterred from engaging in such deception because democratic political institutions such as political competition, a professionalized military, and the marketplace of ideas increase the likelihood that such moves will be exposed, and once exposed, deceptive politicians will suffer domestic political punishment. The paper examines the thesis that Franklin Roosevelt sought to provoke Germany and Japan to war in 1941, finding little support. It also finds that in general autocratic leaders are more likely than elected leaders to deceive.     

Threats at Home,Threats Abroad: Bargaining and War in the Shadow of Coups and Revolutions

I analyze a two-level game in which a leader bargains over the spoils of international bargaining with a domestic opposition that can threaten her with a coup or revolution. While fighting an international war shrinks the domestic pie, it also alters the distribution of domestic power. This has three main implications. First, if war will undermine the opposition, fighting may be so attractive that leaders demand more for peace than foreign states are willing to give, leading to war. Second, if war will bolster the opposition, leaders accept harsh terms to avoid fighting—strategic selection that has implications for the observed relationship between war and political survival. Finally, prospective shifts in the distribution of domestic power caused by war can reduce the effects of international asymmetric information, though the result may be to increase or decrease the chances of war.     

Grasping the Commercial Institutional Peace

While the commercial institutional peace research program provides empirical evidence that international institutions, especially preferential trade arrangements, help reduce the incidence of militarized inter-state conflict, it fails to delineate clearly how such institutions matter. Building from the logic that low opportunity costs for fighting, private information, and commitment problems constitute important causes of war, this article explores three interrelated causal mechanisms. First, the state leaders' increased expectations about future commerce create an incentive for these actors to consider peaceful bargains as an alternative to costly war. Second, security coordination under the umbrella of a commercial institution provides fuller information about state military capabilities, thus making inter-state bargaining for dispute resolution more efficient. Third, in bringing together high-level state leaders on a regular basis, commercial institutions may create the trust necessary to overcome commitment problems in inter-state bargaining. I explore how these mechanisms have operated within the Gulf Cooperation Council and the Economic Community of West African States.     

The politics of foreign debt in Latin America a study of the debtors’ cartel

This analysis of the foreign debt problem in Latin America shows that this economic burden is onerous and will not be reduced in the short run. The region's political leaders perceived that collective bargaining could increase their bargaining leverage with foreign lenders and could produce more advantageous repayment schedules for most nations. However, despite verbal backing and the economic promise of collective bargaining, a debtors’ cartel failed to materialize. Evaluations of the political dynamics in key nations anticipated creditors. This analysis also shows that the debtors’ cartel failed because collective bargaining did not gain domestic political support. Foreign influence was tangential to the outcome. Given this political climate, the chances for a revival of collective bargaining are very slim.     

Fostering Peace After Civil War: Commitment Problems and Agreement Design

Lasting peace after civil war is difficult to establish. One promising way to ensure durable peace is by carefully designing civil war settlements. We use a single theoretical model to integrate existing work on civil war agreement design and to identify additional agreement provisions that should be particularly successful at bringing about enduring peace. We make use of the bargaining model of war which points to commitment problems as a central explanation for civil war. We argue that two types of provisions should mitigate commitment problems: fear-reducing and cost-increasing provisions. Fear-reducing provisions such as third-party guarantees and power-sharing alleviate the belligerents' concerns about opportunism by the other side. Provisions such as the separation of forces make the resumption of hostilities undesirable by increasing the costs of further fighting. Using newly expanded data on civil war agreements between 1945 and 2005, we demonstrate that cost-increasing provisions indeed reduce the chance of civil war recurrence. We also identify political power-sharing as the most promising fear-reducing provision.     

War, Peace, and the Invisible Hand: Positive Political Externalities of Economic Globalization

Studies of signaling in international relations reveal how punishing bluffing ex post through domestic audience costs or opposition groups facilitates credible ex ante communication among states and reduces the impetus toward war. Global integration of economic markets may also reduce uncertainty by making talk costly ex ante. Autonomous global capital can respond dramatically to political crises. To the degree that globalization forces leaders to choose between pursuing competitive political goals and maintaining economic stability, it reveals the intensity of leaders' preferences, reducing the need for military contests as a method of identifying mutually acceptable bargains. Asymmetric integration can dampen the pacific effects of globalization, but asymmetry does not in itself exacerbate dispute behavior. We present the theory and offer preliminary corroborative tests of implications of the argument on postwar militarized disputes.     

The Interaction Effects of Bargaining Power: The Interplay Between Veto Power,Asymmetric Interdependence,Reputation, and Audience Costs

In international relations, different rationalistic theories have developed to explain negotiators’ behavior and the outcomes of negotiations. The compatibility and interaction effects between the different forms of bargaining power, however, remain unexplored. In this article, I seek to fill this gap by connecting four rationalistic concepts of bargaining power: veto power, asymmetric interdependence, reputation, and audience costs. By showing that domestic veto players are only semiveto players in international politics – because they can veto an improvement but not a deterioration of the status quo – threats based on asymmetric interdependence to disrupt a mutually beneficial cooperative relationship can be connected to veto power; the incompatibility of the factors concerned would otherwise make this impossible. The combination of veto power and asymmetric interdependence, however, raises a theoretical question: Will rational actors ever approve a deterioration of the status quo? Theories of reputation and audience costs can help answer this question. According to these approaches, threatening parties suffer ex post costs when they back down from their own threats. This theoretical analysis sheds new light on how different forms of bargaining power interact with each other and also helps to address some of the theoretical inconsistencies of the original individual concepts. Finally, this analysis suggests some of the weaknesses of empirical studies that have neglected these interaction effects.     

Democracy and the Preparation for War: Does Regime Type Affect States' Anticipation of Casualties?

Immanuel Kant and more recent expositors of the democratic peace thesis suggest that citizens in a republic sanction leaders for resorting to war because, in part, citizens are loath to shed their own blood. This Kantian thesis in turn implies substitution. Just as consumers confronted with price shocks shift consumption to less affected goods rather than simply curtailing consumption, democratic leaders facing retribution for casualties can limit losses, not just by avoiding military contests, but also by substituting capital (ships, tanks, aircraft) for labor (soldiers, sailors, airmen) in the provision of security. A simple consumer choice model shows that citizens' leverage over leaders implies that democracies should consume disproportionately more capital in preparing for—and conducting—defense. Numerous anecdotes assert that democracies do shelter labor with capital, especially during war, but tests of defense-factor allocations on factor endowments, regime-type, and other variables show that defense-factor usage is explained by basic economic theory and not by democracy.     

When Democracies Go to War: Public Debate and the French Decision on War in 1999 and 2003

On what grounds do democratic states wage war? Public opinion is often considered as being of crucial importance in the decision to go to war. This article analyses two debates over war in France. It finds that democracies debate war within a limited range of arguments from which classical reasons for war such as the geostrategic one are absent. However, within the limited range of arguments, public support for decisions to go to war seems to depend significantly on the convergence of all public opinion actors over the interpretation of the crisis situation. The high politics nature of crisis situations gives the political leadership strong leverage in the shaping of thick discourses. The control function of public opinion is then diminished and a de facto prerogative of the government established even though justifications remain restricted to a limited number of arguments. Thick discourses of justification seem to be framed predominantly by arguments of just war.     

Immovable Positions: Public Acknowledgment and Bargaining in Military Basing Negotiations

Why might public acknowledgment of cooperative security negotiations generate bargaining constraints that provoke stalemate? Previous scholarship points to aroused public opinion. Yet in many cases where hard-line bargaining stances develop and talks collapse following public acknowledgment, it is not domestic political pressures that tie leaders’ hands. This article examines instead an international constraint attendant to publicity: opposition by third-party states. I argue that international power position shapes the balance of vulnerability between the negotiating parties to abandonment and entanglement. The act of official acknowledgment can constrain the more vulnerable partner by enabling third-party states to credibly scrutinize its intentions. By threatening strained relations, such scrutiny can create a security dilemma that reduces the weaker partner's bargaining range to a choice between cooperation on its terms and noncooperation. I evaluate this argument by studying foreign military basing negotiations. Statistical analyses and a comparative case study produce strong support for my argument.     

Time Present and Time Past: Rivalry and the Duration of Interstate Wars, 1846-1985

This article sits at the intersection of the rivalry, war duration, and bargaining literatures, suggesting that histories of armed conflict between states increase war duration through their effects on the selectorate and the wartime bargaining process. I argue that the historical relationship between two states plays an integral role in the duration of future conflict. Specifically, historical conflict between states intensifies the preference of national selectorates for military victory and narrows the range of negotiated settlements that leaders might pursue while still maintaining domestic political support. I employ Bennett and Stam's (1996) ex ante data set and Crescenzi and Enterline's (2001) International Interaction Score to provide an empirical test of the ability to generalize appropriately coded historical interaction to the topic of war duration. Contradicting earlier studies, the results of this analysis show that a properly operationalized measure of rivalry has significant and positive effects on war duration.     

A Nash Threat Game of Passing Through Exchange Rate Mechanism II

Following entrance into the European Union, Central Eastern European Countries (CEECs) are expected to join the European Monetary Union (EMU). These countries may incur considerable costs over the course of their passing through the required Exchange Rate Mechanism II (ERM-II). However, with enough bargaining leverage, CEECs may be able to pass some of these costs on to current EMU members. In turn, a CEEC's leverage depends on its ability to wield successful brinkmanship via an exchange-rate policy characterized by a “threaten-thy-neighbor” strategy. A two-stage Nash-threat game captures the essentials of the CEECs' phase of ERM-II pass-through.     

Time for a haircut: political regimes and sovereign debt restructurings

ABSTRACT

Conventional wisdom claims that reputation leads sovereign states to full debt repayment. However, defaults are recurrent, some debtor countries take a lot of time to end them, and some extract costly concessions from investors. This article argues that these differences are largely explained by the political regimes in the borrowing countries. While previous research examines whether democracies make more credible commitments, we analyze how democracies affect bargaining with foreign investors after a default occurs. Democracies, with their institutional checks, electoral uncertainty, greater transparency, and public deliberation, make swift decision-making harder, create incentives to pander and posture, and give leverage to minimize the win set of viable agreements. We test our theory on a comprehensive dataset of debt restructurings with private creditors in the period 1975–2017. The event history analysis indicates that democracies experience longer restructurings and the double-hurdle regression analysis shows that democracies obtain larger creditor losses. Further, there is interesting variation among democracies and autocracies. Our findings suggest that political regimes are crucial to explaining why cooperation fails in international debt markets.     

A theory of democratisation through peace-building

Abstract

This contribution presents a theory of democratisation through peace-building. Peace-building is seen as an interactive process between external peace-builders and domestic elites; whether a post-war state develops into a democracy or not depends to a large extent on the outcome of the bargaining process between domestic elites and peace-builders. It is argued that domestic elites typically face many constraints which make adopting democratic reforms a risky and costly proposition. Also, peace-builders usually have much less leverage over domestic elites than one would expect given their resources and man-power. High adoption costs and low leverage explain the outcome of the interaction between peace-builders and domestic elites often results in a peace which is not democratic. The paper uses an analysis of 19 major peace-building missions for exemplifying the theory.