Constraints, states, and wars

Abstract. The rational choice assumption is already disputable at the individual level of decisionmaking. At the level of collective decision-making unitary rational action is an unrealistic assumption. It neglects the transitivity of collective preferences issue, the logic of collective action and freeriding, the agency problem, and the human tendency to agree with each other irrespective of the facts. While unitary rational action is rejected as a basis for theorizing on international relations and war, the idea of decision-making under constraints seems as valid in the interstate context as in economics. The most important constraints on national security decision-making are the anarchical character of the international system and the corresponding need for self-help, the security and the territorial delimitation dilemmas, the presence or absence of plausible blueprints for victory, and the presence or absence of domestic constraints on bellicosity. A simple explanatory model of war built on these ideas is suggested and tested with dyadic data for the 1962–1980 period. In addition, there is some discussion of why collective security is doomed to fail, and why hegemony rather than balance improve the prospects of peace.     

Different goods, different effects: exploring the effects of generalized social trust in large-N collective action

Does generalized social trust help solve large-N collective action problems? This paper argues so, offering a novel explanation for the relationship: People tend to cooperate if they expect others to be cooperating, which implies that people holding generalized social trust more readily cooperate in large-N dilemmas because they expect that most people will cooperate. The paper tests the explanation in a rigorous design. The analyses show a positive, robust effect of generalized social trust on public good provision, but no effect is found in a joint product situation. This supports the hypothesis, indicating that trust specifically enhances cooperation in collective action dilemmas.     

Counterterrorism strategies in the lab

We conduct experiments to test the collective action dilemmas associated with defensive and proactive counterterror strategies. Defensive policies are associated with creating public ??bads' (e.g., a commons) whereas proactive policies are akin to the voluntary provision of public goods. When combined, the inefficiency of collective action is exacerbated, resulting in a situation known as a Prisoner??s Dilemma squared (PD²). Deterministic versus probabilistic equivalent versions of the associated externalities are compared within a laboratory setting. Experimental results reveal that the collective action problem associated with counterterror strategies is deepened in uncertain environments, and is indeed a robust regularity that is not easily overcome; as individuals gain more experience, they become even more self-interested.     

Defending the Articles of Conferation: A Response to Sobel

A fundamental mystery of the Articles of Confederation is why the statescontributed sizeable resources to the confederation government when theywere allegedly caught in a collective action problem. In a recent article,Russel Sobel denies the collective action problem and suggests that ourresearch on the incentive structure of the confederation contradicts theevidence. This note clarifies both of our arguments, introduces the typeof evidence that would determine whether national public goods weresub-optimally supplied, and explains why states contributed in a mannerthat is consistent with the evidence and with a deficient institutionaldesign.     

Uber Über regulation? Regulatory change following the emergence of new technologies in the taxi market

Can emerging technologies transform not only markets, but also foster new regulatory change mechanisms? In the context of prevailing theories of regulatory change, this article explores the extent to which an interest‐based explanation can account for the regulatory responses toward emerging Transportation Network Companies (TNCs). Based on a primary cross‐city analysis of the 40 largest cities in the United States, the study found that although the existence of ex ante interest groups indeed somewhat limited the extent of ex post regulatory acceptance of TNCs, regulators seemed to prefer the newcomers over existing incumbents and approved TNCs in 77.5 percent of the examined cities, rarely pursuing harsh enforcement even when TNCs operated illegally. The research attempts to explain this intriguing phenomenon by extending the interest‐based approach to account for the key role played by “technological regulatory entrepreneurs.” The entrepreneurs bridged collective action barriers by becoming the central agent that managed, and reaped the benefits of, the collective action, by lowering the organizational costs and by disseminating information effectively and turning consumers into political campaigners, thus successfully promoting regulatory change.     

European Cooperation on Future Crises: Toward a Public Good?

As crises grow more transnational in origin and effect, managing them effectively will require international cooperation. This article explores the dilemmas inherent to producing common crisis management capacities across national governments. Drawing on the literature related to "international public goods," the article builds an approach for understanding these dilemmas through the lens of collective action and the perverse incentives associated therein. The article applies this approach to cooperation in Europe on an issue that typifies the transnational crisis—the spread of communicable disease—and highlights obstacles to European Union ambitions to build a robust system for disease surveillance and control. Having isolated the obstacles, the article then identifies solutions to facilitate cooperation toward more effectively producing the good in question.     

The narrative structure of policy analysis

This paper holds that the prior development of clear external criteria or principles is not always a useful avenue to the resolution of policy dilemmas, and that external criteria are sometimes as likely to emerge from proposed resolutions to policy issues as they are to govern those resolutions. In the absence of external criteria, stories meeting certain characteristics (truth, richness, consistency, congruency, and unity) can integrate necessary considerations, explain the development of current dilemmas, and point the way to resolutions. Not all policy analyses need to be in the narrative form-some analyses appropriately make tenseless arguments for particular principles. However, these principles invariably allow for many possible actions, and only a narrative can explain which particular course of action is desirable and why.     

Self‐Organizing Policy Networks: Risk,Partner Selection,and Cooperation in Estuaries

Policy actors seek network contacts to improve individual payoffs in the institutional collective action dilemmas endemic to fragmented policy arenas. The risk hypothesis argues that actors seek bridging relationships (well‐connected, popular partners that maximize their access to information) when cooperation involves low risks, but seek bonding relationships (transitive, reciprocal relationships that maximize credibility) when risks of defection increase. We test this hypothesis in newly developing policy arenas expected to favor relationships that resolve low‐risk dilemmas. A stochastic actor‐based model for network evolution estimated with survey data from 1999 and 2001 in 10 U.S. estuaries finds that actors do tend to select popular actors as partners, which presumably creates a centralized bridging structure capable of efficient information transmission for coordinating policies even without any government mandate. Actors also seek reciprocal bonding relationships supportive of small joint projects and quickly learn whether or not to trust their partners.     

Courage,regulatory responsibility,and the challenge of higher‐order reflexivity

Contemporary regulators must respond to ever‐increasing societal demands in various domains. Regulators must cope with these demands under conditions of extreme epistemic scarcity and ideological divide. This leaves regulators perplexed about what action they should take. Regulatory praxis offers two primary responses to this moral and epistemic dilemma: technical canonization and reflexive regulation. While these two approaches represent contrary regulatory philosophies, they suffer from two common blind spots: (a) disregard of the critical role of discretionary judgment in regulatory action; and (b) disregard of the dilemma of higher‐order reflexivity. The article explores the idea of higher‐order reflexivity in the regulatory context. This exploration renders visible the abysses that are faced by regulators as they attempt to resolve regulatory dilemmas through a cognizant and introspective process. The article argues that the Socratic concept of courage and the idea of forward‐looking responsibility provide a plausible framework for thinking about the challenge of regulatory judgment. It concludes with a discussion of the legal and institutional mechanisms that could both facilitate and put to scrutiny the realization of this ideal (but noting also several features of the contemporary regulatory system which constitute potential barriers).     

The private stake in public goods: overcoming the illogic of collective action

Conclusion According to the Logic of Collective Action, most actions in the service of common interests are either not logical or not collective. In a large group, the argument goes, individual action counts for so little in the realization of common interests that it makes no sense for a person to consider group interests when choosing a course of personal conduct. Only private interests are decisive. Their fulfillment, at least, depends in a substantial way on one's own behavior. Individual actions designed to achieve private advantage are therefore rational. Actions aimed at collective goods are a waste of time and effort. Occasionally, of course, a person acting on the basis of private interests may inadvertently provide some collective good from which many other people derive benefit. This is what happens in the case of the Greek shipping tycoon. But it occurs only because one person's private good fortuitously coincides with the collective good of a larger group. From the tycoon's perspective, there are no collective interests at stake in the sponsorship of an opera broadcast, only his own private interests. Nor does his decision to underwrite a broadcast take account of the other people who will listen to it. His action is a solitary one designed to serve a private interest, and it is perfectly consistent with Olson's argument concerning the illogic of collective action, because it is not grounded in collective interest and is not a case of collective behavior. Olson's theory permits people to share collective interests but not to act upon them voluntarily. The only acknowledged exception occurs in the case of very small groups, where each member's contribution to the common good represents such a large share of the total that any person's default becomes noticeable to others and may lead them to reduce or cancel their own contributions. In this instance, at least, one person's actions can make a perceptible difference for the chance of realizing collective interests, and it is therefore sensible for each person to consider these collective interests (and one another's conduct) when deciding whether or not to support group efforts. Outside of small groups, however, Olson finds no circumstances in which voluntary collective action is rational. But in fact the conditions that make collective action rational are broader than this and perhaps more fundamental to Olson's theory. They are inherent in the very ‘collectiveness’ of collective goods - their status as social or group artifacts. In the absence of a group, there can be no such thing as a collective good. But in the absence of mutual awareness and interdependence, it becomes extremely difficult to conceive of a social group. The assumption that group members are uninfluenced by one another's contributions to a collective good is no mere theoretical simplification. It may be a logical impossibility. Being a member of a group, even a very large one, implies at the very least that one's own conduct takes place against a background of group behavior. Olson's assumptions do not acknowledge this minimal connection between individual and group behavior, and they inhibit recognition of the elementary social processes that explain why slovenly conduct attracts special attention on clean streets, or why the initial violations of group norms are more momentous than later violations. It may be argued, of course, that the groups of Olson's theory are not functioning social groups with a collective existence, but only categories or classes of people who happen to share a collective interest. The logic of collective action is intended precisely to show why these ‘potential’ groups are prevented from converting themselves into organized social groups whose members act in a coordinated way. In such latent groups, perhaps, members are unaware of one another, and Olson's assumption that they are uninfluenced by one another's conduct becomes a reasonable one. Another implication, however, is that Olson's theory is subject to unacknowledged restrictions. The logic of the free ride is for potential groups. It may not hold for actual ones. The distinction is exemplified, in the case of public sanitation, by the difference between what is rational on a clean street and what is rational on a dirty one. The logic of the free ride does not make sense for the members of an ongoing group that is already operating to produce collective goods such as public order or public sanitation. While this represents a notable limitation upon the scope of Olson's theory, it apparently leaves the logic of collective action undisturbed where potential or latent groups are concerned. But suppose that a member of an unmobilized group wants her colleagues to contribute to the support of a collective good that she particularly values. Her problem is to create a situation in which such contributions make sense to her fellow members. As we have already seen in the case of the neighborhood street-sweeper, one possible solution is to provide the collective good herself. If it has the appropriate characteristics, its very existence may induce other members of the latent group to contribute to its maintenance. This is not one of those cases in which one person's private interest fortuitously coincides with the collective interest of a larger group. The neighborhood street-sweeper is acting on behalf of an interest that she is conscious of sharing with her neighbors. Her aim is to arouse collective action in support of that interest. She does not expect to pay for public cleanliness all by herself, or to enjoy its benefits all by herself. Her role bears a general resemblance to the one that some analysts have defined for the political entrepreneur who seeks to profit personally by supplying a collective good to the members of a large group (Frohlich, Oppenheimer, and Young 1971). Like the neighborhood street-sweeper, the entrepreneur finds it advantageous to confer a collective benefit on others. But the similarity does not extend to the nature of the advantage or the manner in which it is secured. The entrepreneur induces people to contribute toward the cost of a collective good by creating an organizational apparatus through which group members can pool their resources. The existence of this collection mechanism can also strengthen individual members' confidence that their colleagues' contributions are forthcoming. What the entrepreneur gains is private profit - the difference between the actual cost of a collective good and the total amount that group members are prepared to pay for it. By contrast, the neighborhood street-sweeper induces support for a collective good, not by facilitating contributions, but by increasing the costs that come from the failure to contribute. As a result of her efforts, she gains a clean street whose benefits (and costs) she shares with her fellow residents. She takes her profit in the form of collective betterment rather than private gain, and her conduct, along with the behavior of her neighbors, demonstrates that effective selfinterest can extend beyond private interest. Self-interest can also give rise to continuing cooperative relationships. The street-sweeper, acting in her own interest, brings into being a cooperative enterprise in which she and her fellow residents jointly contribute to the production of a collective good. Cooperation in this case does not come about through negotiation or exchange among equal parties. It can be the work of a single actor who contributes the lion's share of the resources needed to establish a collective good, in the expectation that its existence will induce others to join in maintaining it. The tactic is commonplace as a means of eliciting voluntary collective action, and it operates on a scale far larger than the street or the neighborhood. Government, paradoxically, probably relies on it more than most institutions With its superior power and resources, it may be society's most frequent originator of voluntary collective action. Its policies, imposed through coercion and financed by compulsory taxation, generate a penumbra of cooperation without which coercion might become ineffectual. By providing certain collective goods, government authorities can move citizens to make voluntary contributions to the maintenance of these goods. The stark dichotomy between private voluntary action and public coercion - one of the mainstays of American political rhetoric - may be as misleading as the identification of self-interest with selfishness. There is more at stake here than the voluntary production of collective goods. Continuing cooperative behavior can have other results as well. Once group members begin to expect cooperation from one another, norms of cooperation and fairness are likely to develop. Axelrod (1986) has suggested that modes of conduct which have favorable outcomes for the people who pursue them tend to evolve into group norms. Public-spirited action that serves self-interest could therefore engender a principled attachment to the common good, undermining the assumption of self-interestedness that gives the logic of collective action its bite. Laboratory studies of cooperative behavior have already demonstrated that experimental subjects have far less regard for narrow self-interest than rational choice theory requires (Dawes 1980). In one extended series of collective action experiments, however, Marwell and Ames (1981) found a single group of subjects who approximated the self-interested free-riders of Olson's theory. They were graduate students in economics.     

Ethnic Networks

Active research on a wide range of political contexts centers on ethnicity's role in collective action. Many theories posit that information flows more easily in ethnically homogeneous areas, facilitating collective action, because social networks among coethnics are denser. Although this characterization is ubiquitous, little empirical work assesses it. Through a novel field experiment in a matched pair of villages in rural Uganda, this article directly examines word‐of‐mouth information spread and its relationship to ethnic diversity and networks. As expected, information spread more widely in the homogeneous village. However, unexpectedly, the more diverse village's network is significantly denser. Using unusually detailed network data, we offer an explanation for why network density may hamper information dissemination in heterogeneous areas, showing why even slight hesitation to share information with people from other groups can have large aggregate effects.     

Testing for environmental racism: Prejudice,profits, political power?

Economic theories offer many explanations for why exposure to environmental risks may vary by race: pure discrimination by polluters or politicians in siting decisions; differences in willingness to pay for environmental amenities linked to income or education levels; and variations in the propensity of communities to engage in collective action to oppose the location of potential polluters. This article tests these hypotheses by focusing on the capacity decisions of commercial hazardous waste facilities. Zip code neighborhoods targeted for capacity expansion in plans for 1987–1992 by commercial hazardous waste facilities had an average non white population of 25 percent, versus 18 percent for those areas without net expansion. Differences in the probability that residents will raise a firm's expected location costs by engaging in collective action to oppose capacity siting offer the best explanation for which neighborhoods are selected for capacity expansions.     

The Limits and Opportunities of Networks: Municipalities and Canadian Climate Change Policy

Research on climate change policy and politics has become increasingly focused on the actions and influence of subnational governments. In North America, this attention has been particularly focused on why subnational governments have taken action in the absence of national leadership, what effect action might have on future national climate policy, and whether the collective action of networks of municipal governments are reshaping and challenging the character of national and global climate governance. This paper examines Canadian municipal climate in light of the absence of a comprehensive and effective climate national strategy. The paper considers various reasons why local governments in Canada have not been central players in national plans, and why their actions have not been more influential nationally. The paper argues that the potential influence of Canadian municipalities on national climate policy is weak, given the loose nature of the network and the long-held structural view that municipalities are not significant units of political analysis in national political and policy debates. The paper concludes by considering the constraints and opportunities of subnational climate networks and municipal network analysis.     

The Politics of Vulnerability: Constructing Local Performance Regimes for Homeland Security

Paradoxically, the greater the national security threats, the more important the role of local policy in the United States. In this article we examine homeland security initiatives—particularly the tension between risk and vulnerability—and the governance dilemmas they pose for local communities. In contrast to the usual emphasis on coordination and capacity, we argue for conceptualizing local imperatives attendant to homeland security as collective action problems requiring the construction of local performance regimes. Performance regimes must engage three challenges: (1) to enlist diverse stakeholders around a collective local security goal despite varying perceptions of its immediacy; (2) to persuade participants to sustain their involvement in the face of competing demands, and (3) to create a durable coalition around performance goals necessary for reducing local vulnerability. Using these analytic categories casts local homeland security issues in strategic terms; it also encourages comparisons of local governance arrangements to respond to risk and vulnerability.     

Crowding out Citizenship

The currently accepted theory of collective action presumes that individuals are helplessly trapped in social dilemmas. This has led to a form of policy analysis that presumes external authorities must solve all collective-action problems. The presumed universal need for externally implemented incentives is based, however, on a single model of rational behavior. This model has been shown to be an inadequate foundation to explain extensive empirical findings from the field and the experimental laboratory related to nonmarket settings. Thus, it is necessary to adopt a broader theory of human behavior that posits multiple types of individuals – including rational egoists as well as conditional cooperators – and examines how the contexts of collective action affect the mix of individuals involved. I will briefly review the empirical evidence related to intrinsic motivations and how external incentives may crowd out or crowd in behaviors that are based on intrinsic preferences. I then discuss the delicate problem of designing institutions that enhance citizenship rather than crowding it out. The penchant for neat, orderly hierarchical systems needs to be replaced with a recognition that complex, polycentric systems are needed to cope effectively with complex problems of modern life and to give all citizens a more effective role in the governance of democratic societies.     

The Europeanisation of conflict: Reflections from a social movement perspective

If Europe is becoming a polity, then regular patterns of social and political conflict ‐ both institutional and non‐institutional ‐ will emerge between citizen groups and decision‐making authorities. Although we are beginning to have a substantial body of research on institutionalised interest group interaction at the European level, we know much less about non‐institutionalised forms of contentious collective action that have European policies as their targets. Using social movement theory, several varieties of such collective action can be identified. Based on the theory of political opportunity structure, it is shown why one of these forms ‐ actions intended to bring national states’ power to bear against European policies — appears to have a rich and turbulent future.     

Coordinating intermediaries: The prospects and limitations of professional associations in decentralized regulation

A key question in understanding regulation through independent intermediaries is the extent to which intermediary actions are either coordinated, thereby supporting consistency in regulatory application, or uncoordinated, leading to monitoring and enforcement disparities. This paper examines professional associations as one mechanism by which policy action may be coordinated in decentralized arrangements. Professional associations provide means and venues for members to interact, offer training and education that develops shared understanding of policy directives, are collective representation bodies for professional members, and may play an important role in establishing and enforcing collective standards for appropriate behavior. We examine these functions in the decentralized administration of United States organic food certification, focusing on two relevant professional associations – the Accredited Certifiers Association and the International Organic Inspectors Association. Drawing on multiple methods, including interviews and survey data, our findings indicate that professional organic certification associations provide valuable education and training, disseminate information, and facilitate knowledge sharing among administrative entities and with regulatory authorities. We conclude with a discussion of the prospects and limitations of professional associations for third‐party regulation, and how accounting for professional association functions can improve our understanding of regulatory intermediary coordination and conduct.     

A social-ecological approach to voluntary environmental initiatives: the case of nature-based tourism

This paper addresses the role of voluntary environmental initiatives by the tourism industry to alleviate social dilemmas for the management of natural resources. The objective is to explore whether previous findings on the determinants of voluntary action in the management of common-pool resources (CPR) also apply to a sector, such as tourism, where non-extractive uses are dominant. The paper applies the social-ecological systems framework recently developed by Ostrom (Science, 325, 419–422, 2009) to analyze qualitative data from meta-analyses of successful voluntary environmental initiatives in tourism. Results show that the determinants of voluntary action in tourism are partially consistent with previous research on CPR, finding relevant the presence of leadership, norms of behavior among members of the voluntary initiatives, shared mental modes, salience of the resource for users, and substantial productivity of the resource system in the likelihood of self-organization. However, other variables that have been shown to be relevant in non-tourism CPR situations are not supported by this analysis, such as: most variables regarding the ecological system (its size, predictability, and the mobility of its derived resource units) as well as the number of users and supportive collective choice rules that enable users to craft and enforce some of their own rules. The implications of this partial mismatch in findings are not straightforward. The paper presents a set of research questions that open a path for further research.     

Politics and the organization of collective action: The case of Nigeria, 1960–1975

The case of Nigeria provides support for an organizational conception of collective action. Such a conception rests on the notion that collective events—riots, demonstrations, strikes, marches, and violent confrontations—are the accompanying manifestations of routine politics and are instigated by many of the same organizations that sponsor nonviolent, ordinary political and economic activity. It is argued that collective action is organized action; its vehicles are mainly preexisting organizations that determine the location and timing of collective action, select the forms of contention, articulate the issues, and choose the targets of collective protest. It is further argued that insofar as a society's organizational base determines the shape of collective action, then political policies that affect the society's organizational composition will have a corresponding effect on the shape of collective action. That is, policies of organizational repression and facilitation will decrease or increase associated forms of collective action.