Equality

“Equality” is a notion about which disagreement arises not simply due to lack of clarity and precision (or intellectual dishonesty and bad faith). Rather, equality is an idea that implies and implicates some form of disagreement as a constitutive possibility of its horizon of discussion. This, in my view, is both a problem and an opportunity. I submit that equality is a plural notion: There are only equalities, practices aimed at removing situated circumstances of inequality and discrimination.     

Dignity and Equality

Inequality remains one of the most challenging issues on theglobal human rights agenda. It is widely recognised that a formalapproach to the assessment of inequality has failed to eliminateentrenched structural social and economic inequality and thata different approach is required in order to tackle the rootsof inequality and achieve substantive equality. In seeking toimplement an approach to equality that addresses the historyof apartheid and the social and economic inequality endemicin South African society, the South African Constitutional Courthas rejected formal equality, and is in the process of developinga substantive interpretation of equality based on the protectionof human dignity. Critics of this approach have argued thatthe concept of human dignity is too indeterminate to providea stable foundation for equality law and that it promotes anexcessively individualistic conception of equality. Focussingon key developments in defining human dignity in German andSouth African constitutional law, this article argues that theconcept of dignity is rooted in a rich tradition which is capableof underpinning an approach to equality which avoids excessiveindividualism and fully recognises the interplay between individualand community needs. A detailed exploration of the equalityjurisprudence of the South African Constitutional Court revealshow the dignity-based approach has been developed in order toprovide a framework within which the actual experience of victimsof discrimination can be explored. It is concluded that thisapproach has the potential to engage with the realities of thewide range of divisions within South African society and theireffects in order to address not only the legacy of apartheidbut also to contribute to the creation of a society in whichevery person is valued equally.     

Backing Away From Equality

Abstract

In his early work in political philosophy, Amartya Sen advanced an interesting and provocative thesis – the egalitarian thesis. This is the claim that every conception of social justice that has received support in recent times is egalitarian. This paper argues that Sen's account of capabilities and his more recent critique of transcendental justice have implications for the truth of the egalitarian thesis. It also discusses how the rejection of the egalitarian thesis bears on the larger, and more general, issue of the overall plausibility of egalitarian conceptions of social justice.     

Anti-Discrimination Rights Without Equality

Anti-discrimination rights are nearly always thought to be justified or explained by equality, although the precise nature of this relationship is rarely considered. In this article I consider the two most plausible relationships, both of which are commonly at least implicitly asserted: that anti-discrimination rights are deontic equal treatment norms, and that anti-discrimination rights are instrumentally aimed at achieving telic equality. I try to show that, as a conceptual matter, anti-discrimination rights are not equal treatment norms: they do not require that all people (perhaps in a certain category) are treated the same. They allow for different treatment, but they prohibit different treatment only on some grounds. Although the suggestion that anti-discrimination rights are instrumentally aimed at telic equality (in some dimension) is conceptually plausible (like all instrumental relationships), it is most unlikely that anti-discrimination rights can be justified on this ground.     

Political Equality by Precedent

This article asks about the justification for the principle of political equality in the sense of equal entitlement to basic rights. A preliminary portion criticizes standard justifications that refer to a property or properties all human beings share; these fail because they are untrue, irrelevant, or question‐begging. The more substantial and constructive portion of the article then argues for a different, indirect mode of justification, based on rebuttals of historical presumptions of inequality and the actual evolution of the idea of equality through partial steps and specific precedents. The justification of political equality is thus connected to the explanation of its emergence.     

平等权原则与宽容——以平等和自由的关系为向度

平等和自由之间是存在张力的,且经常表现为一种矛盾关系。国家强制平等往往通过一定的制度来实现,而这种制度如果不能在自由与平等之间保持某种适度平衡,就会导致来自国家或社会的歧视与缺乏宽容。就平等权原则在世界各国宪法上的规定及其实践而言,虽然不同国家的宪政制度和法治文化传统不同,但都体现了宽容的内在性要求,一如美国的"平等保护原则"和德国的"法律上的平等与禁止恣意原则"。鉴于我国人民代表大会制度下的"立法归类"可能造成的歧视和不宽容,将"法律面前人人平等"单纯理解为平等权或法律适用上的平等原则,都是不甚妥当的,它仍然有进一步诠释的余地。在更为根本的宪法原则层面,宽容理念要求确立社会法治国原则,以对传统法治国原则进行修正,以进一步调和自由与平等之间的内在紧张关系。     

Equality and Marriage in Vico

The subject of this paper is the relationship between marriage and equality in Giambattista Vico. In his writings Vico gives the notion of marriage a unique importance, not framed on any oversized notion of nature or natural law but on the political fight for the right to marry (a quest for full citizenship status). The right to marry is linked with complex dynamics of human equality, and to a notion of human nature shaped by belief‐dependent institutions.     

Political Liberties and Social Equality

This paper examines the link between political liberties and social equality, and contends that the former are constitutive of, i.e. necessary to secure, the latter. Although this constitutive link is often assumed in the literature on political liberties, the reasons why it holds true remain largely unexplored. Three such reasons are examined here. First, political liberties are constitutive of social equality because they bestow political power on their holders, leaving disenfranchised individuals excluded from decisions that are particularly pervasive, coercively enforced, hard to avoid, monopolistic, and final. Second, they are constitutive of social equality due to their positional value, such that those who are denied such liberties are socially downgraded because and to the extent that others enjoy them. Third, they are constitutive of social equality due to their expressive value, in the sense that, by disenfranchising some individuals, the state publicly fails to recognize their equal moral agency. While unpacking these reasons, we address some criticisms of this constitutive link recently raised by Steven Wall and Jason Brennan.     

实质平等和非歧视法

引　言根据对平等和非歧视的一般性理解,拥有平等地位的个人应得到平等的对待。为了在实际中应用这一理念,我们有必要对两个人或两类人进行比较,并得出关于他们之间共同点和不同点的结论。如无正当理由,对地位平等的两个人给予不同的对待就构成了歧视。这种实现平等的方法经常被称做形式平等。形式平等方法在适用于男性和女性时存在不足。首先,形式平等的概念很难应用于无男性参照者的情况,比如有关母性和怀孕的问题。其次,形式平等方法在处理差别待遇的性别中立标准问题时可能没有效果。第三,形式平等方法通常并不足以实现“机会平等”或“…     

Authority, Equality and Democracy

Abstract.  The purpose of this essay is to argue that considerations of fairness play an essential role in the justification of democratic decision procedures. The first part argues that considerations of fairness form part of a practical authority's legitimacy, and that in the political context, those considerations of fairness entail a principle of equal distribution of political power. Subsequently, the article elaborates on the kind of equality which is required in democratic procedures, arguing that different principles of equality should apply to the deliberation and the decision stages of democracy. Finally, the article concludes with a few sketchy remarks on the possible relations between considerations of fairness and soundness of democratic procedures.     

Roemer on Responsibility and Equality

Law and Philosophy -     

Localizing Gender Equality after Conflict

Debates have grown in recent years concerning the realistic utility and application of international human rights law to a local context. Since 2000, the United Nations Security Council has issued eight Women, Peace, and Security resolutions geared toward promoting gender equality measures in conflict prevention during conflict and post-conflict settings. The first of these resolutions, United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325, has been adopted by a number of UN Member States through National Action Plans (NAPs), which provide a framework and roadmap for integrating gender equality measures at the domestic level. Although NAPs were once considered promising, they have largely been unsuccessful.

By examining the implementation challenges facing other gender equality measures and localization programs that seek more effective implementation of the Women, Peace, and Security Resolutions, the following argues that a bottom-up approach rather than a top-down approach must be considered more seriously by international actors supporting implementation and integration of international human rights law, not only for the obvious reason that it emboldens local agency in the adoption process, but also because it is likely to produce outcomes that are meaningful and sustainable for the communities most affected by these provisions.

As such, continued emphasis on change that emanates from the top down in a given country often ignores the reality that gender equality measures in international human rights law are often perceived by governments and civil society actors as a serious disruption to domestic gender norms. Sole reliance on state institutions to deliver these commitments is flawed because it fails to recognize the necessary dialog and contestation among various stakeholders concerning the role of external norms in a local context.     

Sex Equality as Substantive Justice

Books reviewed in this article:
Sandra Fredman, Women and the Law
Aileen McColgan, Just Wages for Women     

Discrimination, Equality and Social Inclusion

Although laws against discrimination have conventionally been justified and articulated according to various conceptions of equality, tensions between different notions of equality undermine the coherence of these explanations. The aim of social inclusion is proposed as part of an alternative justification for discrimination laws. As well as exploring the meaning and implications of the policy of social inclusion for discrimination laws, the extent to which the law already embodies this idea is assessed with particular reference to the scope of anti-discrimination laws, proof of discrimination, justification defences, and positive discrimination. It is concluded that the goal of social inclusion has the potential to provide a vital ingredient in a more coherent, though not uncritical, account of the aims of anti-discrimination legislation.