Towards a positive theory of political rhetoric: Why do politicians lie?

This paper presents a model in which politicians can increase the probability of election by making exaggerated claims about the benefits of their own platform — referred to as positive campaigning — and by exaggerating the undesirable characteristics of their rival — i.e., negative campaigning. Such lies may be detected at some point in the future and thus result in a costly loss in reputation. Thus the politician must tradeoff immediate benefits against potential future costs. Of course this problem is similar to any commercial endeavor — a car maker, for example, is tempted to claim that his car is better and the competition's is worse than it is. But it is shown that the lack of transferable property rights to political office makes lying more likely in political markets. It is also shown that there is a natural tendency for politicians to engage in more negative campaigning.     

Shirking and political support in the U.S. Senate, 1964–1984

Several empirical studies have suggested that legislators engage in a surprisingly large degree of on-the-job consumption, or ideological behavior. These findings cast doubt on the hypothesis that legislators can be modelled as though they seek to maximize political support. This paper attempts to determine whether commonly used proxies for ideology in fact represent behavior to which voters are averse. The results show that legislators who engage in more of this behavior lose general-election support without generally receiving compensating increases in partyprimary support. A corollary to this result is that voters punish shirking legislators significantly.     

When citizen deliberation enters real politics: how politicians and stakeholders envision the place of a deliberative mini-public in political decision-making

Policy Sciences - In the wake of the increasing use of deliberative citizen assemblies in the public sphere, this article studies how traditional policy actors receive a mini-public as...     

Working, Shirking, and Sabotage

Books reviewed:
John Brehm and Scott Gates, Working, Shirking, and Sabotage: Bureaucratic Response to a Democratic Public .     

Do politicians’ preferences correspond to those of the voters? An investigation of political representation

This paper investigates political representation by exploring the relationship between citizens' preferences and the preferences of their elected representatives. Using Swedish survey data, the empirical analysis shows that voters and politicians have significantly different preferences for local welfare services, implying that voters do not elect representatives with the same preferences as their own. The results show that when comparing a politician of a certain age, gender, educational level and marital status, with a voter with identical characteristics, the politician still has preferences for a significantly higher level of spending on the locally provided services. Hence, our results indicate that the representation of different socio-economic groups does not necessarily lead to a larger degree of representation of these groups' agendas. Moreover, we find the observed difference to be largest for the least salient expenditure item. We do, however, not find any evidence for differences in preferences between the two groups being associated with a decline in trust for politicians among voters.     

Judging politicians: The role of political attentiveness in shaping how people evaluate the ethical behaviour of their leaders

Political theorists have developed well‐defined normative understandings of what constitutes ethical political conduct. Based on democratic theory as well as the demands of practical politics, these understandings prescribe certain types of behaviour and proscribe other types. However, it is unclear to what extent this normative framework has resonance for ordinary citizens. This article demonstrates that attention to politics tends to increase the resonance of this normative framework. The analysis identifies three norms about the holding of public office that are expected to structure citizens' ethical judgments: the avoidance of conflicts of interest; conformity with the law or institutional rules; and the maximisation of the public good. The article assesses the importance of these norms in structuring judgments by means of an experiment embedded in a population survey conducted in Great Britain. The analysis finds that informational cues pertaining to conflict‐of‐interest avoidance only condition responses among the attentive, while information pertaining to law conformity has far wider resonance. This finding has implications for approaches to political ethics focusing on normative considerations that appear to have low salience for much of the general public.     

Political Shirking,Opponent Quality,and Electoral Support

Several recent papers in the public choice literaturesuggest that legislators shirk, or vote in a mannercontrary to constituent interest. This paper exploresthe relationship between senatorial shirking andelectoral consequences. I model political shirking,opponent quality and election outcomes assimultaneous, and find significant evidence of arelationship between shirking over the senatorial termand electoral outcomes. However, I find that voterspunish recent shirking much more than they punishearly-term shirking, and that senators apparently actconsistently with this relationship.     

Representation, Voluntary Retirement, and Shirking in the Last Term

There is disagreement over whether or not representatives shirk.Previous studies, however, have used raw interest group scores thatdo not allow for accurate comparisons over time. I take advantageof recently published indexed ADA scores by Groseclose, Levitt, andSnyder (1999) that adjust for temporal differences to test forshirking. I compare results from adjusted ADA scores to Poole andRosenthal's Nominate scores. With a simple, straightforward test ofdyadic representation, I provide additional evidence that shirkingexists among voluntarily retiring members of Congress.     

Shirking in the Contemporary Congress: A Reappraisal

Michael H. Crespin Department of Political Science, Michigan State University, 303 S. Kedzie Hall, East Lansing, MI 48824 e-mail: e-mail: crespinm{at}msu.edu Jeffery A. Jenkins Department of Political Science, Northwestern University, 601 University Place, Evanston, IL 60208 e-mail: e-mail: j-jenkins3{at}northwestern.edu Ryan J. Vander Wielen Department of Political Science, Washington University in St. Louis, Campus Box 1027, One Brookings Drive, St. Louis, MO 63130 e-mail: e-mail: rjvander{at}artsci.wustl.edu This paper replicates the findings that appeared in the article"Severing the Electoral Connection: Shirking in the ContemporaryCongress," published in the American Journal of Political Science(44:316–325), in which Lawrence Rothenberg and MitchellSanders incorporated a new research design and, contrary toall previous studies, found evidence of ideological shirkingin the U.S. House of Representatives. We investigate the robustnessof their results by reestimating their model with Congress-specificfixed effects and find that their results no longer hold.     

Motivation of politicians and long-term policies

We analyze the motivation of politicians in democracies when long-term policies are socially desirable. Politicians receive utility from holding office and from the success of their projects. We refer to the two extreme types of politicians as “populists” and “policy success-seekers”. One result is that inefficiencies in the political process are smaller when a politician is of the populist type. When politicians offer incentive contracts, the problem of inefficient decision-making may be solved. The amount of money necessary to induce the incumbent to undertake the socially optimal project decreases with the degree of populism he displays.     

A comparison of prospective and retrospective voting with heterogeneous politicians

A long-standing empirical literature has been concerned with determining whether voters vote “prospectively or “retrospectively.” Despite this interest, little is known about the consequences of one voting regime versus another. This study addresses this deficiency. We find that voter welfare can be greatly affected by the candidate selection technique employed by voters. Among other findings, we show that “electing the best candidate” does not always maximize voter welfare. Furthermore, “myopic” voting is sometimes superior to “farsighted” voting. These findings have implications for interpretations of empirical studies of voter behavior.     

Labour market risks and political preferences: The case of temporary employment

The political economy literature has gathered compelling evidence that labour market risks shape political preferences. Accordingly, insecurity fuels support for redistribution and left parties. This article analyses this argument for temporary workers, a so far neglected risk category which has increased dramatically in the past two decades. Temporary workers also have been in the focus of recent insider‐outsider debates. Some authors in this line of research have argued that temporary work leads to political disenchantment – for example, non‐instrumental responses such as vote abstention or protest voting. This contradicts risk‐based explanations of political preferences. The article discusses both theoretical perspectives and derives conflicting hypotheses for the empirical analysis of temporary workers' policy and party preferences. The review reveals considerable ambiguity regarding the questions which parties temporary workers can be expected to support and what the underlying motives for party choice are. Synthesising arguments from both perspectives, the article proposes an alternative argument according to which temporary workers are expected to support the ‘new’ left – that is, green and other left‐libertarian parties. It is argued that this party family combines redistributive policies with outsider‐friendly policy design. Using individual‐level data from the European Social Survey for 15 European countries, the article supports this argument by showing that temporary, compared to permanent, workers exhibit higher demand for redistribution and stronger support for the new left. Neither the risk‐based nor the insider‐outsider explanations receive full support. In particular, no signs of political disenchantment of temporary workers can be found. Thus, the findings challenge central claims of the insider‐outsider literature.     

Corruption monitoring and the supply of politicians in China

Monitoring institutions are usually perceived as efficient instruments for improving governance. This article evaluates the link between corruption monitoring and the supply of politicians in nondemocracies. Using China as a case, I show that corruption monitoring pushes capable young elites away from seeking government positions. This effect may be driven by two possible mechanisms: economic returns and career prospects. Specifically, corruption investigations may reduce the expected economic returns for government officials, undermining capable young elite’ willingness and efforts to become government officials. In addition, corruption investigations may indicate that there are potential uncertainties and risks involved when taking on a political career, which reduce capable young elites’ desire to pursue a political career. The empirical analysis confirms these two mechanisms and provides unique evidence for the unintended negative impact of corruption monitoring institutions.     

The political market for real income redistribution through choice of the weights in COLAs

This paper studies alternative cost-of-living indexes derived from the generalized Fechner-Thurstone (GFT) utility form, their use in contracts for cost-of-living adjustments (COLAs), and the resulting effect of choice of index on the distribution of real income. The indexes and their distributional effects are compared to the officially reported Consumer Price Index (CPI) and a CPI computed from the same data set used to compute the GFT indexes. It is found that the choice of index used in adjustment clauses in contracts has an impact on the distribution of real income of the group. As an example, the U.S. federal government schedule of wages and salaries is adjusted from 1981 through 1984 by all of the indexes reported here. Use of alternative indexes illuminates the normative assumptions regarding the relative importance of different income strata (among other things) implicit in any public practice of pegging COLAs to a single form of price index.We wish to thank Mason Gerety and Kathy Hayes for helpful criticisms of the first drafts of this paper.     

The environments of U.S. R&D laboratories: political and market influences

R&D laboratories in the United States have during the past decade undergone much structural and environmental change. Much of this change has been in response to public policy initiatives and changing markets. One result of the changing environments of R&D laboratories is that traditional sector-based (government, industry, university) classification of laboratories tells us little about their structure and behavior. This study based on survey data derived from 966 U.S. R&D laboratories, develops an environmental input taxonomy, based not on sector but on the mix of political and market influence on laboratories. This taxonomy is examined in connection with three central policy issues: amount of cooperative research, red tape and bureaucratization, and laboratory output. Traditonal sector classification accounts well for red tape, but the environmental input taxonomy provides additional insights into laboratories' scientific and technical output and cooperative research.     

Being unequal and seeing inequality: Explaining the political significance of social inequality in new market democracies

Market economies inevitably generate social inequalities, of which the new democracies of Central and East European (CEE) societies have seen dramatic – though widely diverging – levels of growth. Do CEE citizens believe that inequality is excessive and, if so, why? And what is the connection between perceptions of social inequality and citizens' views of new markets and democracy? These questions are addressed using new data from mass surveys conducted in 2007 in 12 post‐communist CEE states. Surprisingly weak links are found between social inequality perceptions and national‐level measures of inequality as well economic, social and political conditions. Perceptions of social inequality are mainly driven by individual‐level assessments of market and democratic performance, but not by market or democratic ideals.     

International trade policy: Benevolent dictators and optimizing politicians

The claim that sophisticated non-operational efficiency-based arguments for intervention facilitate obfuscatory policy-induced income transfers will meet, in some quarters, the counterclaim that this is an overly cynical interpretation of politicians' policy motives. Rent-seeking can likewise be argued to be an overly cynical conception. The theory of rent-seeking would impute self-interest motives to the offer of payment for a cup of coffee.The different perceptions of policy motives are particularly evident when the debate turns to the existence of politically allocated rents. The beneficiaries of politically allocated rents have an interest in denying the existence of rents that have been allocated via the discretionary political process, and in claiming that observed transfers reflect socially warranted considerations.