法国大革命前期的三权分立

权力分立并通过权力制衡达到政治自由是法国思想家孟德斯鸠明确提出的资产阶级国家制度的基本原则,但卢梭极度轻蔑赋予国家各组成部分独立权力以相互制约的均衡理论.这种观念上的冲突,在法国大革命时期的前两部宪法中表现得十分鲜明.从实际情况看,法国大革命时期的权力分立有自己的特色:议会至高无上并发展为相当程度的专制,行政权过于弱化而无法与立法权抗衡,司法权根本没有独立地位.因此可以说,法国人基本上没有按照孟德斯鸠的思路去制约权力.     

Political Communication and the Unexpected Outcome of the 2002 French Presidential Elections

ABSTRACT

The results of the first round of the 2002 French presidential election were a profound shock. Prime Minister Jospin did not make it to the final round run-off, beaten as he was by the far right candidate Jean-Marie Le Pen who claimed second place. This article argues that use (and misuse) of modern campaigning methods proved decisive to this outcome. Paradoxically, Jospin's overtly professional approach actually hindered him. His flawed strategy failed to target crucial voters, and assorted tactical decisions compounded this error. Nor did the media coverage and distorted public opinion polls help a beleaguered Jospin candidacy. In this election the cautious would be the main beneficiaries.     

Moderation and Dissent. The French Presidential Elections of 1995

The results of the Presidential elections of April-May 1995 confirm that there are currently two parallel trends in French politics. On the one hand the mainstream left and mainstream right are increasingly contesting the middle ground, and a majority of voters accept this. On the other hand, a substantial minority of the electorate is keen to protest against the inability of any of the major parties to remedy France's socio-economic ills, and therefore votes for the marginal parties, the parties of dissension and protest.     

Donors,Primary Elections,and Polarization in the United States

I examine the influence of partisan donors on the district-level ideological polarization of congressional candidates in the United States. I use data from 2002–10 U.S. House elections, which provide for the placement of major party primary winners on the same ideological dimension as their primary, general election, and partisan donor constituencies. Using this unique data set, I find strong evidence that the influence of donors in nominating contests is a source of polarization in the United States. House nominees are more responsive to their donor constituencies than either their primary or general electorates. I also find some evidence that the lack of general election competition affects nominee extremity. In safer districts, Democratic incumbents appear more responsive to donors. However, Republican donors seem to demand proximity regardless of district competitiveness. Overall, the polarizing effects of donor constituencies dominate any moderating effects, resulting in ideologically extreme nominees and, ultimately, members of Congress.     

反拨雅各宾主义的阐释定向:法国大革命以及马克思主义的后续形式

法国大革命产生的"革命"概念规范着现代政治叙事已达两个世纪.而大革命的遗产在各种密织如布料般错综复杂的联系和阐释中呈现了不同的面向.就所凸显的问题而言,无论是将它与历史学相关联.还是与政治的神学相并论,抑或与历史唯物主义相结合,对大革命起源和遗产的花样繁多的篡改总被归咎为一种简单化的马克思主义.而在这个确定了的阐释路向上,我们清楚地看到了卡尔·施米特、弗朗索瓦·傅勒等人明确勾联法国大革命与专制主义的当代形式的理路:除传统的资源以外,他们利用马克思来反对马克思主义.其核心的理解方案是:将世俗的宗教崇拜信仰或雅各宾主义的革命史学的方式归并到马克思主义身上,并由此导致革命政治解释中的人民主权的正当性危机,导致民主理论走到逻辑的尽头.可以看到,大革命和20世纪的马克思主义在作为现代性的某种深刻的政治激情方面被领会为同一性质的论证是由此发源的.     

Valence,Elections, and Legislative Institutions

To the degree that voters care about competence, expertise, and other valence characteristics of their representatives and political parties care about winning elections, parties have an incentive to signal that their legislators have such characteristics. We construct a model of parties, motivated by both reelection and by policy, that attempt to signal individual incumbents' valences to voters through the assignment of these members to positions of authority. The model illustrates how electorally motivated party leaders will have an incentive to promote less competent incumbents than they would if voters did not make inferences from promotion decisions. We derive the model's empirical implications and test them with original data on the careers of Chilean senators serving between 1998 and 2013. In support of the model's insights, we find that promotion to a leadership position is an effective signal to voters only if the promoted incumbent has extreme views relative to the party.