The dynamite charge

When juries report they are deadlocked, judges may deliver a supplemental instruction known as thedynamite charge which urges jurors to reexamine their views in an effort to reach a unamimous verdict. To examine the impact of this instruction, 72 mock jurors were led to believe they were participating in a controlled deliberation by voting and passing notes. Subjects were randomly assigned to the majority or minority faction of a 3-to-1 split. After the third round of deliberation, half the subjects received the dynamite charge, half did not. Results provided support for the hypothesis that the dynamite charge causes jurors in the minority to feel coerced and to change their votes and encourages those in the majority to exert increasing amounts of social pressure. These findings are discussed for their practical implications, limitations, and directions for further research.We would like to thank Rebecca Buchanan and Craig Gangi for their role as experimenters in a pilot study.     

The effects of death qualification on jurors' predisposition to convict and on the quality of deliberation

This study provides a straightforward test of the proposition that people who are permitted to serve on juries in capital cases (death-qualified jurors) are more likely to convict a defendant than are people who are excluded from serving on capital juries due to their unwillingness to impose the death penalty (excludable jurors). A sample of 288 subjects classified as death-qualified or excludable under theWitherspoon standard watched a 2 1/2-hour videotape of a simulated homicide trial including the judge's instructions, and gave an initial verdict. Death-qualified subjects were significantly more likely than excludable subjects to vote guilty, both on the initial ballot and after an hour's deliberation in 12-person juries. Nine juries were composed entirely of death-qualified subjects (death-qualified juries), while 10 contained from 2 to 4 excludable subjects (mixed juries). On postdeliberation measures, with initial death-penalty attitudes controlled, subjects who had served on the mixed juries were generally more critical of the witnesses, less satisfied with their juries, and better able to remember the evidence than subjects from the death-qualified juries, suggesting that diversity may improve the vigor, thoroughness, and accuracy of the jury's deliberations.     

What does “unwilling” to impose the death penalty mean anyway? another look at excludable jurors

The debate regarding the death qualification of juries usually concerns (a) whether death-qualified jurors have different attitudes and values to excludable jurors, or (b) whether death-qualified juries are more prone to convict. A pivotal question is whether excludable subjects in fact willever impose the death penalty. Subjects were presented with five grisly murder vignettes. Only 40% of excludable subjects refused to consider the death penalty in all of the cases, with the remaining 60% indicating they would consider the death penalty in one or more of the cases. It is argued that the majority of individuals currently being excluded from capital trial juries based on their reservations about the death penalty actually would impose the death penalty for serious enough offenses and that they should therefore be allowed to serve on such juries.     

Doing Justice: Perceptions of Gender Neutrality in the Jury Selection Process

There is a paucity of research on juries in general including the jury selection process. Very little of it examines the effect of gender. This study surveyed 138 potential jurors to determine whether jurors believed they were excluded from jury service due to gender. Additionally the study assessed whether gender affected attitudes about women serving on juries and whether perceptions about women and jury service were associated with general views about the fairness of the justice system. Findings suggest that gender had little effect on jury service or views about women serving on juries, but views about women and their role in jury service was associated with perceptions of general fairness in the system, regardless of the respondent’s gender. These findings point to the need for a more complex understanding of gender when examining the jury selection process.     

The Effect of Jury Deliberations on Jurors' Reasoning Skills

The effect of jury deliberation on jurors' reasoning skill in a murder trial was examined. Specifically, the effect of deliberating on reasoning competence (as defined by Kuhn, Weinstock and Flaton, 1994) was explored. One hundred and four participants viewed a videotaped murder trial and either deliberated in 12-person juries or ruminated on the case individually. Among those assigned to juries, half had their reasoning skill assessed prior to deliberations, while the others were tested after deliberating. Jurors in the individual rumination condition were assessed after they had the opportunity to reflect on the case alone. As hypothesized, post-group-deliberation jurors were more likely to discount both the selected verdict and alternative theories and incorporate judgmental supporting statements than were the other mock jurors. However, the mock jurors did not differ with regard to making statements that supported alternative verdicts or including judgmental statements that discounted their chosen verdict. In terms of Kuhn's reasoning continuum from satisficing (low level) to theory–evidence coordination (high level), there is some evidence that post-group-deliberation jurors may be closer to the high end than predeliberation jurors or post-individual-rumination jurors in some aspects of the task, but not in others.     

Severity of penalty,seriousness of the charge,and mock jurors' verdicts

It has been suggested that jurors in criminal trials are less likely to convict when the penalty is more severe or the charge is more serious. This was explained by Kerr (1975) in terms of a perceived increase in the cost of a Type I error (convicting an innocent person) that resulted in a criterion shift in the amount of evidence jurors required to vote guilty. The previous research found only weak support for the prediction regarding severity but consistent support for the predicted effect of seriousness. However, in the case materials used in these studies, more evidence was legally required to prove guilt on the more serious charges. This article presents studies in which the amount of evidence needed to prove guilt was equated for all charges. Under these circumstances, there was no effect on verdicts of seriousness of charge or severity of penalty and no evidence of a criterion shift due to either variable. There may still be reason to believe that these factors affect real juries, but this belief is not supported by the systematic evidence from mock jury studies.     

Influence of expert testimony regarding eyewitness accuracy on jury decisions

To determine the influence of expert testimony regarding the general unreliability of eyewitnesses, a two-phase study was conducted. In the first phase, 24 community residents served as jurors on four six-person juries. A burglary case was tried in 120 District Court. El Paso, Texas. Two juries heard all the evidence including the expert testimony of a psychologist and the other two heard all of the testimony except that of the psychologist. During the second phase, 24 student jurors constituting four six-person juries viewed a videotape of the trial. Two of these juries saw the entire proceeding from the first phase including the expert testimony and the remaining two saw all but the expert testimony. All juries acquitted the defendant; however, those who heard the expert testimony significantly lowered their judgments of the accuracy and reliability of eyewitness identification as well as its overall importance to the trial. Further, those juries that heard the expert testimony spent a significantly longer time discussing eyewitness identification as well as other relevant evidence. No differences between community residents and college student juries were obtained.The authors wish to thank Judge Brunson Moore, Mr. David Jeans, Mr. Ricky Glenn Smith, Detective James Christianson, D. Steven Cooper, Rachel Hanna, Daniel Torres, and Patricia Tetreault. All of these people participated in the trial and without them this research could not have been conducted. This research was supported by Gift Funds of the Department of Psychology, University of Texas at El Paso.     

Juries Don't Make Legal Decisions! And Other Problems: A Critique of Hastie et al. on Punitive Damages

Hastie, Schkade, and Payne (1998) published a simulation experiment intended to study the performance of jurors and juries regarding verdicts on whether punitive damages should be allowed. They concluded that juries were not very competent and discussed the legal policy implications of this conclusion. I identify a fatal conceptual flaw that renders the study irrelevant to legal policy: The jurors were asked to decide law, a decision that is the responsibility of the trial judge, not the jury. I also identify a number of misstatements and unsupported assertions in the article.     

Passive Observers or Active Participants? Jurors in Civil and Criminal Trials

What was the role played by jurors in civil and criminal trials from the late eighteenth to the late nineteenth century? This article establishes that during this period, juries in Ireland played a relatively active role. It examines individual reports of civil and criminal trials and considers the nature of juror participation during this period, establishing that jurors frequently questioned witnesses, berated counsel, interrupted judges, demanded better treatment and added their own observations to the proceedings. This article compares the nature and level of interaction from different categories of jury – civil and criminal, common and special. It asks why Irish jurors continued to be active participants until late in the nineteenth century, and how the bench and bar received their input. It also suggests that English jurors may have played a more active role during this period than previously thought. Finally, the article considers some possible reasons for the silencing of Irish jurors by the late nineteenth century.     

A Meta-Analysis of the Effects of Jury Size

In a series of opinions in the 1970s, the U.S. Supreme Court concluded that juries smaller than 12 persons would be constitutional if they performed no differently than traditional 12-person juries. In a meta-analysis, we examined the effects of jury size on the criteria the court specified as the basis for making such comparisons. A search for all relevant empirical studies identified 17 that examined differences between 6- and 12-member juries. The total sample for the 17 studies was 2,061 juries involving some 15,000 individual jurors. Among other findings, it appears that larger juries are more likely than smaller juries to contain members of minority groups, deliberate longer, hang more often, and possibly recall trial testimony more accurately.     

A Norms Approach to Jury "Nullification:" Interests, Values, and Scripts

Juries and other lay tribunals are often justified because they leaven the law with community norms. Unfortunately, we do not have a particularly good theory of when and how juries substitute their normative judgments for the law. A first step in developing such a theory is to examine the nature of norms and the way jurors bring normative judgments to their task. In this article I compare and contrast different understandings of norms that currently are in vogue in the social sciences and then use these approaches to develop a more systematic understanding of when juries do and when they do not substitute their normative judgment for that of the law.     

The Effects of Juror Anonymity on Jury Verdicts

This study examined the effects of anonymity on jurors' verdicts and on jurors' feelings of accountability for their jury's verdicts. Twenty four-person anonymous juries and 20 four-person nonanonymous juries rendered individual and group verdicts for three student defendants charged with selling drugs on a school campus. When unanimous guilty verdicts were reached, juries imposed one of five punishments. Finally, jurors completed postdeliberation opinion and accountability questionnaires. As predicted, anonymous juries showed a higher rate of conviction (70%) than did nonanonymous juries (40%) when the evidence against the defendant was strong, supporting the hypothesis that anonymity would have a greater effect for situations in which there was relatively strong evidence of the defendant's guilt. Anonymous juries imposed the harshest punishment (expulsion) significantly more often than did nonanonymous juries. Contrary to predictions from differential self-awareness theory, anonymous juries did not report feeling less accountable than did nonanonymous juries. However, anonymous juries did see the process as significantly more fair than did identifiable juries.     

Studying Perceptions of Juror Influence In Vivo: A Social Relations Analysis

Because of legal constraints and statistical limitations there has been little research on social influence in actual juries. We used Kenny's (1994) social relations model to examine jurors' perceptions of social influence in the jury. After rendering a verdict in criminal or civil court cases, jurors rated how influential each member of the jury had been and provided self-reports of their personality traits. Perceptions of influence in the jury were mostly in the eye of the beholder, with jurors high in Conscientiousness and low in Openness being most likely to report that they were personally influenced by other jurors. There were small but statistically significant levels of consensus in the ratings of how influential the jurors were. To the extent that they did agree, jurors rated extraverted, tall men as most influential.     

Controlling Jury Composition in Nineteenth-Century Ireland

Difficulties in securing convictions in nineteenth-century Ireland led the authorities to resort to various methods of ensuring that petty juries delivered guilty verdicts in cases where this was clearly warranted by the evidence. This article examines some of the ‘stratagems’ put forward by David Johnson and suggests a number of other practices which were used, arguing that many of these mechanisms centred around controlling the composition of trial juries. Examples included altering the property qualifications for jurors, the system of asking jurors to ‘stand by’, and the use of fines to compel attendance. While some of these were the legitimate exercise of established procedures, it will be seen that the Crown on occasion abused or over-used its powers.     

Juries and Viewpoint Representation

To generate high-quality deliberations, juries should be diverse in terms of not only demographics but also viewpoints. Using data from the Survey of Texas Adults (n = 1380), we examine whether existing processes select for individuals who represent the population on a variety of viewpoint characteristics, particularly whether the process of forming juries selects for people who are more independent-minded versus authority-minded. We find, on average, that those who believe in the importance of speaking English, are less compassionate, support Biblical literalism, and express more concern about the community effects of wrongdoing are more likely to have been former jurors than to not have served. Death penalty support is also modestly predictive of jury membership. Non-jurors rate their neighborhoods as cleaner than do former jurors. Results point to composition effects in the summonsing process and to the possibility that some types of people exempt themselves from this civic obligation.     

Lesser-included offenses

The positions taken by prosecutors and defense lawyers on proposed jury instructions on lesser-included offenses provide evidence that juries do not follow the law strictly. This paper develops a simple model of expected utility to predict how jurors make their decisions. The model explains a stylized fact that is inconsistent with the idea that juries always follow the law, namely why prosecutors often object to giving the jury the option of a lesser-included offense. We use the model to evaluate the law concerning jury instructions on primary and lesser-included offenses.     

THE EFFECTS OF SELECTION SYSTEM ON JURY COMPOSITION

The Supreme Court and judicial scholars have argued that the demographic composition of grand and petit juries is important. To the extent that composition is a function of the selection system used, this suggests that the method of selecting grand and petit jurors is important. This article tests the link between selection system and composition by comparing the representation of blacks, Mexican-Americans, and women on grand juries selected by commissioners with the same three classes' representation on grand juries selected at random from the voter registration lists. For these jurisdictions, only female representation is consistently higher under random selection procedures.     

The Legislative Role of Juries

Is it possible that jurors, in the process of evaluating the evidence against a defendant, act to some degree as legislators by assessing the soundness of policies they perceive the criminal law to be supporting? To test the hypothesis that jurors reflect public opinion in making such judgments, the author correlated changes in public opinion on war policy with fluctuations in the proportion of jury trial defendants found guilty of violating selective service laws. It was found that juries convicted those accused of draft evasion at a higher rate when a war was in progress than during peacetime and that during the Korean and Vietnam wars the conviction rate was directly correlated with public approval of American military actions, A breakdown of regional differences showed that the South was somewhat more supportive of the Vietnam War and more prone to convict in selective service cases than the rest of the nation was, but the results of this comparative analysis were inconclusive. Although the correspondence between public opinion and verdict tendencies was far from perfect (perhaps in part because of the skewed composition of juries), the study does sup port the notion that jurors draw on prevailing popular sentiments about laws and the public policies the laws further.     

The representative jury requirement: Jury representativeness and cross sectional participation from the beginning to the end of the jury selection process

The paper specifically addresses the many ways in which the facially neutral procedures actually fail to secure representative jury pools. Although the Sixth Amendment's fair cross‐section requirement forbids systematic discrimination in the creation of the jury venire and panel, it does not guarantee that the criminal jury will in fact reflect an accurate cross‐section of the community. As a result, not only does the Court fail to focus on nonlegally recognized screening mechanisms and factors such as exemptions, excuses, failure to followup jurors, etc., may affect jury representativeness, but also the Court never examined cross‐sectional representation at the entirety of the jury selection processes, except jury panels and final juries.

The first section of this paper presents a brief overview of the constitutional law impacting impartial juries, especially addressing the fair cross‐section doctrine that is the focus of contemporary jury selection procedures. In providing empirical and systematic comparisons of jury participation at each of the distinct jury selection stages encompassing a general population, jury wheels, jury qualified pools, jury eligibles, jury panels, and actual trial jurors, the second section of this paper makes critical analyses of the cumulative effects of screening mechanisms in jury selection. The paper assesses jury compositions by looking at demographic, socio‐economic, and ideological profiles of prospective jurors, illustrating that those jury profiles do not necessarily reflect cross‐sectional representation of the community population at comprehensive stages of the jury selection process. The analytical findings show that unless some deep seated reforms are made to eliminate cumulative effects of selection biases and correct representative imbalances of jury wheels, qualified pools, jury panels, and trial juries, historically underrepresented groups such as racial minorities, the poor, and part‐time employees will continue to be underrepresented on juries, negating the public's shared responsibility for the administration of justice in one of America's most heralded democratic institutions.     

The Rule of Law and Jury Nullification

Jury nullification occurs when a jury renders a verdict based on what it feels the law ought to demand, as opposed to what the law in fact demands. While it is beyond doubt that criminal juries in common law jurisdictions have the ability to so act without fear of legal censure or redress, it remains a highly contentious issue as to whether such juries ought to be informed of this ability. One of the main objections to informing jurors of their purview to nullify is that, in so acting, the rule of law is subverted. Thus, while jurors might have the ability to so act, they ought to be discouraged from doing so. This ability, in other words, must be hidden from them – a subterfuge justified by reference to the rule of law. In this paper I closely examine the rule of law objection and conclude that the conflicts between jury nullification and the rule of law are greatly exaggerated. In fact, in many respects jury nullification promotes the very same ends and goals as does the rule of law. Hence, I conclude, if there is a reason to withhold from the jury any knowledge of jury nullification, such a reason cannot be grounded on considerations of the rule of law.