The political legislation cycle

The economic theory of legislation holds that laws, even when they do not involve financial resources, redistribute property rights. Politicians supply legislation to groups with the highest political return. By the same logic, politicians should supply legislation when doing so has the highest political return. The dynamics of the supply of legislation should follow the pattern suggested by the political business cycle theory. We develop a model of government’s and voters’ behavior where a legislation cycle is the strategy to hold the government (coalition) together. Under certain assumptions, the model predicts that the approbation of laws should be concentrated at the end of the legislature and be positively related to the fragmentation of the government coalition. We test these restrictions on data about the supply of legislation by the Italian Parliament during legislatures from I to XIII (1948 to 2001). The empirical analysis provides strong support to the theory: a legislation cycle occurs when the conditioning phenomena that the model indicates are satisfied.     

The political trend in local government tax setting

Previous fiscal studies have paid little attention to the effects of social interaction on local tax setting. This paper seeks to fill this gap by developing a theoretical model in which politicians belonging to the same party interact with each other in order to draw inferences about ideology. This phenomenon produces a mimic effect which is called the political trend. The results of the analysis show that the political trend gives rise to higher income tax rates and to tax mimicking at the local government level. The framework developed also makes it possible to discriminate between Leviathan-type and welfarist-type politicians. The results show that the former are more sensitive than the latter to changes in the average income tax rate of their peers. Moreover, Leviathan-type politicians are less sensitive than benevolent ones to changes in the central government’s income tax rate.     

Cheap bribes and the corruption ban: A coordination game among rational legislators

Legislators in modern democracies (a) accept bribes that are small compared to the value of the statutes they pass and (b) allow bans against bribery to be enforced. In our model of bribery, rational legislators accept bribes smaller not only than the benefit the briber receives but than the costs the legislators incur in accepting the bribes. Rather than risk this outcome, the legislators may be willing to suppress bribery altogether. The size of legislatures, the quality of voter information, the nature of party organization, and the structure of committees will all influence the frequency and size of bribes.     

Laffer paradox, Leviathan, and political contest

This paper considers a political contest model wherein self-interested politicians seek rents from the public budget, while general voters make political efforts to protest against politicians’ rent seeking directly (for example, through voting in referendums such as the passage of Proposition?13) or indirectly (for example, through donating money to organized groups such as the National Taxpayer Union). We show that the political contest may ironically lead to the Laffer paradox; that is, rent-seeking politicians may intend to set the tax rate higher than the revenue-maximizing rate. For taming Leviathans, political protests may not be as effective as competition among governments.     

A political theory of intergovernmental grants

This paper formulates a political theory of intergovernmental grants. A model of vote-maximizing federal politicians is developed. Grants are assumed to buy the support of state voters and the ‘political capital or resources’ of state politicians and interest groups which can be used to further increase the support of state voters for the federal politician. The model is tested for 49 states. Similarity of party affiliation between federal and state politicians and the size of the Democrat majority in the state legislature increases the per capita dollar amount of grants made to a state. Likewise, increases in both the size of the state bureaucracy and union membership lead to greater grants for a state. Over time, the importance of interest groups (bureaucracy and unions) has increased relative to political groups (state politicians).     

Children's acquisition of political opinions

This paper reports and discusses the results of a survey of English and Welsh schoolchildren aged 11–18, conducted in March–May 2003, covering their attitudes to and knowledge of politics, politicians and political issues. It concentrates in particular on the way these attitudes develop as pupils get older, and also discusses the sources of information on which young people depend, and which may be the key to developing this neglected political ‘market’. It finds that pupils are unenthused by politics, but not ‘apathetic’. Both knowledge and interest increase as pupils grow older; however, negative or cynical attitudes to politicians and to political parties seem to grow at the same time. Yet young people also hold positive attitudes to the electoral process in general, though many do not accept that they will have a ‘duty to vote’ when old enough. The media, though distrusted, is the principal source of information, though it is clear that the family is highly influential; schools seem less influential. Copyright © 2004 Henry Stewart Publications     

Remembering Tony King

Tony King combined scholarship with a real‐world grasp that few could match. This was evident both in his public activities and in his published work. His studies of legislatures and of career politicians changed the way in which issues were viewed and he was skilled at identifying emerging trends before anyone else. He analysed the failings of government, but always as a practical improver. He was a natural communicator in the Bagehot tradition, as evidenced in his writings on the constitution, and he wanted a less adversarial political culture. He showed political scientists that it was possible to combine good scholarship with an ability to communicate.     

Multilevel governance and women's legislative representation

Research shows that electoral systems, gender quotas and a country's socio-economic development affect women's legislative representation (WLR). Less attention is paid to the effects of the rise of regional political arenas and multilevel politics on WLR. Due to less costly and competitive electoral campaigns, women can have easier access to regional legislatures. We argue that this relationship is mitigated by the distribution of competences between the different levels of the political system and that decentralization's effect on WLR at the regional level is dependent on the regions’ political power. To test this, we use an original dataset on WLR in 383 regional parliaments in 19 European countries from 1970 to 2018. Results of the three-level models show that more political authority vested into regions leads to a lower level of WLR in the legislatures of the more politically powerful regions in comparison with not only the regions possessing less authority but also with the national parliament. Possible explanations for this effect, such as the attractiveness of these positions to the mostly male political elite and, consequently, increased costs and competitiveness of electoral campaigns, are suggested.     

Local government consolidations: The impact of political transaction costs

Local government in Norway comprises a large number of small municipalities. Cost efficiency can be improved by consolidating local authorities, and central government has designed a framework to stimulate voluntary mergers. Existing theories suggest that political transaction costs will impede consolidations. (1) Generous grants compensate diseconomies of scale. Central government has promised small municipalities that grant levels will be maintained, but policy promises may not be credible. (2) Property rights to local revenues are nullified when consolidations have been implemented. High-revenue municipalities will therefore go against merger with a poorer neighbor. (3) A consolidated local council may be composed of different political parties, and it may therefore pursue other policies than an existing council. Expected changes in party strength can lead municipalities to oppose a proposed consolidation. (4) Senior politicians are less likely to support mergers, particularly if they come from small polities. We offer an explicit test of these propositions based on data for Norwegian local government. Elected politicians and administrative leaders are more interested in consolidating when efficiency gains are large. Local revenue disparities and to some extent dissimilar party preferences are significant impediments to voluntary mergers. Additionally, smaller municipalities are often prepared to sacrifice some efficiency gain to remain independent polities.     

Reconstruction of the state: Lobbying against political corruption in the Czech Republic

High level of distrust in political elites accompanied with a strong perception of corruption in Czech Republic has led to an increase of several anti‐corruption nongovernmental organisations' activities. About 18 organisations have created in 2013 an open coalition and established a project called “Reconstruction of the State” (Rekonstrukce státu). This project is oriented towards political parties and political elites to lead them to adopt nine anti‐corruption legislative proposals. This paper analyses how the project operates in its formal and informal aspects, which communication means are preferred and how the lobbyists interact with the politicians and political parties. Apart from the analysis of publicly available pieces of information from the project's website and official printed materials, semistructured interviews with activists and field research were performed. It can be seen that Reconstruction of the state has been most successful regarding agenda‐setting, but in the context of the legislative process, it has to face many obstacles either from legislators themselves or competitors with different goals.     

Rent-seeking in natural resource quota allocations

This paper examines the incentives for rent-seeking in the allocation of natural resource quotas to competing user groups by political bodies. The political body has discretion in making the allocation, and competing user groups rent-seek to influence the allocation. We investigate ways in which the governmental body can affect the behavior of the players by setting the ground rules for the competition. A political body can affect an allocatively (Pareto) efficient outcome by choosing an appropriate default (pre rent-seeking) policy. Surprisingly, an allocatively efficient default policy is unlikely to minimize social costs. However, winner-take-all default policies are likely to maximize, not minimize, rent-seeking. A competitive post-allocation market reduces rent-seeking, but is not, either itself or in combination with an efficient default policy, capable of minimizing social costs. However, forcing winners in political redistributions to fully compensate losers both lowers the rent-seeking levels relative to a potential compensation criterion and, when used together with an efficient default policy, is capable of obtaining the first-best solution of an allocatively efficient allocation with zero rent-seeking.     

Too much of a good thing: the ‘problem’ of political communications in a mass media democracy

• Francis Fukuyama asks: ‘… is liberal democracy prey to serious internal contradictions, contradictions so serious that they will eventually undermine it as a political system?’ This paper argues that one of these ‘internal contradictions’ is the political communications process and it can be sufficiently serious to undermine the democratic system—but such an undermining is not inevitable. The problem can be described as follows: Democratic systems require that citizens are kept fully informed by governments (and others) in the interests of transparency and ultimately accountability. Hence, all political communications have, as their final objective, the accountability of politicians at the ballot box. Thus all political communications have what can be described as ‘above’ and ‘below’ the line content. The above‐the‐line is the actual content of the message, the below‐the‐line is the implicit one of ‘think better of me and my colleagues think worse of my opponents’. Consequently, no matter how personally honest and open an individual politician might be, the democratic system requires her or him to be always thinking about securing a successful result at the ballot box. Thus we have the ‘political communications paradox’. Voters want politicians to be honest and accountable but this very demand means that politicians, implicitly, always have to have another agenda in operation when they are communicating with the public, i.e. securing their approval and then their support. As a result the trust which is a fundamental to the workings of a democratic system is constantly being undermined. This has two effects. First, that governments are obliged to make communications, rather than delivery, their real priority and second trust, not just in politicians but in the political system as a whole, tends to wane over time, which in turn endangers the very system it was designed to underpin. But this decline is not inevitable because the system has some in‐built self‐correcting mechanisms These include: the rise of new parties and/or leaders who portray themselves as ‘new’ and ‘untainted’—New Labour, New Conservatives, etc., an almost regular ‘re‐balancing’ of the power relationship that exists between politicians and the civil service, particularly in the communications field, the rise of new forms of communication that seek to by‐pass the institutional roadblocks that are perceived as being the cause of the problems and finally increased attention by journalists and academics to the process of political communications makes it more difficult for politicians to continue with ‘business as usual’ as far as their communication activities are concerned.

Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Do competitive districts get more political attention? Strategic use of geographic representation during campaign and non-campaign periods

MPs are elected as delegates of their electoral district to represent their constituents' interests. Geographical representation is considered a central quality indicator for legislative systems. Yet whether the strategic use of geographic representation is affected by tactical campaign considerations has received less attention. The availability of social media data on a fine-grained level allows us to fill this gap by studying the following question: To what extent do politicians strategically use geographic representation during electoral campaign and non-campaign times? I combine literature comparing campaign and non-campaign periods with studies on strategic incentives for MPs to geographic representation. Empirically, I rely on quantitative text-analytical tools to study German politicians’ tweets from the entire 19th legislative period (2017–2021). My findings have important implications for the geographic representation literature as they imply that MPs use geographic references strategically, especially during campaign periods. Prospective competitive districts receive substantially more political attention already during non-campaign periods, yet further amplified during electoral campaigns.     

What Is It About Politicians?

Why do people dislike politicians and could anything be done about it? Drawing upon survey evidence, it is argued that the twin charge against politicians is that they are engaged in a kind of game and that they are a political class out of touch with real life. These charges are examined and found to have at least some merit. Remedies would involve a change in political behaviour; and measures to widen political recruitment. The consequences of not making such changes will be a further erosion of political trust. Constitutional change is less important in tackling dislike of politicians than alterations in political behaviour.     

Age-related differences when measuring political hypocrisy

This article aims to develop a scale for measuring political hypocrisy (conceptualized as the inconsistency between values publicly expressed by politicians and the behavior they actually demonstrate) and to explore the role of age in voters' perceptions of politicians' hypocrisy, analyzing if citizens belonging to different age groups may identify politicians' hypocrisy with a different detail. Results show that the 19-item scale of political hypocrisy—composed of three dimensions, called “ambiguity,” “slyness,” and “deceit”—has good psychometric properties, and that age-related differences when measuring political hypocrisy do exist (young voters show a greater awareness of the hypocritical behavior held by politicians). Furthermore, results suggest that the perception of political hypocrisy may vary according both to voters' political orientation and voting intention.     

Media and politics in French political science

Abstract. The study of the relationship between media and politics has long been marginal in French political science. The take–off of research has been stimulated by the impact of the Presidential election under the Fifth republic and by the increasing role of television and spin–doctors in this new electoral context. If French studies on political communication converge with international research, they are also characterised by strong peculiarities. The material of case–studies is not campaign–centred, but gives room to various TV programmes, to a wide range of media uses by French politicians. The contribution of historians, the influence of a literary tradition of 'textual' analysis of political speech are important. The publishing of books on this topic also reveals a surprisingly intense participation from spin– doctors, journalists and even politicians. Three main 'schools' are contributing to the dynamics of French research. Linked to the tradition of semiological and literary studies the first one focuses on the study of political discourse in the media. Merging the legacy of English–speaking studies and the French tradition of electoral studies a second one develops an analysis of the campaigning process and of its effects. More recently, a new generation of researchers has widened the object of research to the complex network of relations between politicians, journalists and consultant. Linking successfully the most recent developments or international research and the peculiarities of academic tradition, research on political communication appears as one of the most dynamic areas of French political science.     

The reputational basis of policy success in comparative perspective: Evidence from the education sector in Peru and Bolivia

This article, building on the emerging theoretical corpus of “reputation theory” provides an alternative explanation about how successful policies are obtained in contexts of bureaucratic weakness and volatile politics. The argument is that politicians choose to intervene in delivering successful policies based on how contributable such policies are to construct their political reputations. The findings suggest that in both countries, less tenured politicians face higher incentives to build their reputations, so they choose to deliver better policies to accumulate “successful experiences” as vitae for electoral purposes. Tenured politicians, in turn, opt for inaction or strategic delivery, to preserve their already won political reputations. The present article brings evidence from the education sector of Peru and Bolivia, a sector that has been at the core of these countries' priorities for decades. Through a mixed methods approach involving a panel regression and in-depth interviews, results obtained largely confirm this article's claims.     

State transformation and resource politics: Australia and the regional political economy

Abstract

Although the 1994 Agreed Framework offers a solution to the North Korean nuclear crisis, many problems may prevent its successful implementation. Should the Agreed Framework break down, the United States and South Korea have indicated that they will ask Japan to join them in a trilateral economic sanctions regime.

Japanese participation would include the severance of trade and financial flows, including money sent to North Korea from Japan's ethnic Korean community. In this paper I examine this financial flow, and, finding it a valuable linkage to the North Korean economy, conclude that Japanese participation is vital for a successful sanctions regime against North Korea.

Given this, I examine whether or not Tokyo's cooperation will be forthcoming. Japan would be inclined to participate given that it has a strong interest in eliminating a regional nuclear threat. Furthermore, Japan would also feel pressure from its allies to display diplomatic leadership in the Asia‐Pacific region, as befits a country of its economic importance.

Despite these international reasons for Japanese participation, domestic factors will be likely to prevent Tokyo from joining a sanctions regime: constitutional questions, the possibility of terrorist reprisals, interest in Pyongyang's regime maintenance, concerns for the rights of Japan's ethnic Korean community, and political ties between North Korean and Japanese politicians. I find that these domestic factors will outweigh international pressures for Japanese participation, and thus conclude that in the event of a breakdown in the Agreed Framework, alternatives to a trilateral sanctions strategy against North Korea must be considered.     

Politicians,professionalization and anti-politics: why we want leaders who act like professionals but are paid like amateurs

Why are politicians so unpopular? One common explanation blames a professionalized political class that is increasingly detached from ‘ordinary citizens’. But, there is very little empirical investigation of what it is about the professionalization of politics that engenders distrust. This article uses 12 focus groups and 15 interviews with civil servants from the Australian Public Service—‘insiders’ with first-hand knowledge and experience of the political system—to reflect on political professionalization and its impacts. As a group, civil servants’ views on this question remain largely unexplored yet their proximity to the political process gives them a distinct vantage point from which to reflect on current explanations for rising anti-political sentiment. We find both positive and negative attitudes towards professionalization that destabilize prevailing explanations: on the demand side, civil servants share first-hand experience and knowledge of how the political process works but remain cynical about politicians, whilst on the supply side, they value governing competence more than demographic representation yet still want more ‘amateur’ politicians. Our reflections on these findings highlight contradictory expectations: we want politicians who act like professionals, but who are paid like amateurs.     

The political role of the Japanese media

This article examines the political role of the mass media in contemporary Japan. Journalists, especially newspaper reporters, have long enjoyed privileged access to politicians through a system of kisha (reporters') clubs, a system which allows for a cosy rapport between reporters and their sources, but often works against the public interest. In recent years, however, some television journalists have adopted a more rigorous approach to political stories. Critical programming by television stations such as TV Asahi may have contributed to the end of 38 years of Liberal Democrat Party rule in 1993. Nevertheless, there is insufficient evidence to argue that the Japanese media is now acting as an effective political watchdog. Like the mass media in many other Asian countries, the Japanese media continues to enjoy an ambiguous relationship with holders of political power.