We do negotiate with terrorists: navigating liberal and illiberal norms in peace mediation

The normative framework in mediation processes is growing. Mediators are increasingly expected by their mandate-givers to incorporate liberal norms such as inclusivity into their overall strategy. However, in the wake of the terrorist attacks that took place on 11 September 2001, and the policy shifts that accompanied the “Global War on Terror”, mediators find themselves simultaneously pressured to design mediation processes actively excluding armed groups proscribed as terrorists and consequently incorporating this illiberal norm of “exclusivity”, barring proscribed groups’ access to negotiations. This article asks what consequences this development has on the normative agency of mediators, based on if and how they incorporate proscribed armed groups into their mediation strategies. It argues that the dichotomy between liberal and illiberal norms has important consequences on a mediator’s normative agency. First, the dichotomy constrains mediators to a single normative standard, rendering only liberal and illiberal views possible. Second, the assumption that liberal norms are “good” and illiberal norms are “bad” engenders a double dichotomy that greatly constrains a mediator’s normative agency. Third, these constraints on a mediator engender new mediation practices such as outsourcing and risk-sharing in an attempt to salvage normative agency. The article contributes to scholarship on norms, terrorism and mediation through providing a more nuanced view of normative parameters in mediation practice.     

On evaluating mediators

Conclusion Evaluating mediators is a complex process, but not an impossible one. While no single solution is likely to be found, a set of options is emerging. Any new refinement, admittedly, brings with it new difficulties, and the options laid out here are themselves complex to administer. An adroit program management may be able to put together relatively quickly a workable, efficient, and fair approach to evaluation that is tailored to its own circumstances. But most likely, the process of developing evaluation tools will require sustained effort, justified partly by recognition that only trial and error will eventually produce a result keyed to the program's, the parties', and the mediators' diverse needs.Nevertheless, it should be apparent that avoidance of the problems is no longer an acceptable strategy. In an era when rational standards for judging the elements of mediators' effectiveness are becoming more refined, and when mediation itself is becoming an increasingly common option for resolving all kinds of disputes, retaining public confidence in any program will demand that the program devote time and effort to evaluating and strengthening its most important resources. Christopher Honeyman has played a variety of dispute resolution roles including mediator, arbitrator, and administrative law judge in cases involving labor and environmental issues, for the State of Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission (P.O. Box 7870, Madison, Wis. 53707-7870) and for other programs.An earlier version of this article was presented under the title Problems in Evaluating Mediators, at the North American Conference on Peacemaking and Conflict Resolution, Montreal, Quebec, March, 1989.Christina Sickles Merchant, Byron Yaffe, Stephen Goldberg, Jeanne Brett and Martha Askins offered detailed and helpful critiques of earlier drafts of this work. I am particularly grateful to the mediators of Maine's Court Mediation Service and to its directors, Jane Orbeton and the late Lincoln Clark, for their willingness to take the risks of applying an untried theory and their help in developing it. And once again, my colleagues at the Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission provided numerous and significant comments and criticisms which have corrected my thinking on a number of points. However, the opinions expressed here are the author's, and do not necessarily reflect the policy of the WERC.     

A useful tool for evaluating potential mediators

Conclusion Overall, the guidelines published by NIDR are a useful set of standards that should become a valuable reference tool for those responsible for evaluating and selecting mediators. Each institution that is involved in this process will find the guidelines useful as they develop their own criteria. George H. Friedman is vice president for case administration of the American Arbitration Association, 140 West 51st St., New York, N.Y. 10020.Allan D. Silberman is vice president for education and training with the AAA.The authors are grateful for the input on this brief commentary received from their AAA colleagues Thomas R. Colosi, vice president for national affairs, and Robert E. Meade, vice president for program development.     

Knowing When to Salute

Due to a strong “Can Do” spirit and a well-engrained, albeit simplistic, notion of civilian control over the military, senior military leaders are disinclined to publicly share their disagreement with emerging national security policy. Many senior officers mistakenly believe that there are no alternatives other than just silently executing, resigning, or retiring when confronted with bad policy formulation. There are, however, options available to senior uniformed leaders when confronted with policy formulation that they, in their professional opinion, believe is flawed. Depending on the degree to which the civilian authorities are receptive to military advice and the magnitude of the threat to national security involved in the policy, senior military leaders can choose among many alternatives to widen the policy debate.     

猪繁殖与呼吸综合征病毒侵入介体的研究进展

为探究猪繁殖与呼吸综合征病毒(PRRSV)侵入宿主细胞的途径,介绍了PRRSV的细胞嗜性和其侵入的介体(硫酸乙酰肝素、唾液酸黏附素和CD163等),以及它在病毒侵入宿主细胞时所表现的生物学功能,提出了PRRSV入侵猪肺泡巨噬细胞的一般途径。     

Secrecy and Self-Interest: When Mediators Act Deceitfully

3rd party intervention in interstate conflict is a common strategy for mitigating conflict and obtaining a final agreement. However, not all mediations are successful, leading to the development of a rich literature on the mechanisms which decrease the probability of failure in a 3rd-party intervention. Within this literature, some studies examine how a mediator’ behavior and incentives affect the result of the mediation. Virtually all these studies assume that the mediator is virtuous such that peace is the most desired outcome of a conflict for her. However, this study challenges this assumption and contends that a mediator can gain benefit from the conflict between disputants. If this benefit is adequately large to overcome the benefits of peace, then the mediator has enough incentive not to conduct the mediation toward a peaceful outcome. We develop a signaling game model to study this issue formally and test the proposed hypothesis empirically.     

叶利钦:执政行为与政治思维

叶利钦的执政生涯经历两次转变 :第一次是脱离夺权时期奉行的平民主义路线和“分权”思维 ,转向加强权力的总统制 ;第二次是转向与“金融寡头”密切结合的“寡头政治”。同时 ,他先后抛弃了为稳定其政权做出过重要贡献的切尔诺梅尔金和普里马科夫。从叶利钦的执政行为中可以看到其政治思维有 7个基本点 ,即 :1 .反共主义 ,2 .西方式制度原则 ,3 .激进经济变革 ,4.培育私有者阶层 ,5.亲西方 ,6.大权独揽 ,7.路线和权力的继承性。叶利钦政治思维的根本问题 ,是新制度法统建设与民族发展和居民生活利益之间发生了矛盾。他以新制度法统建设为目的 ,这导致目标错位 ,变成了为法统建设而建设 ,从而背离了民族发展和居民生活利益的终极目标。     

When Do Ideologies Produce Alliances?

Recent research suggests a conditional relationship between states' domestic regimes or ideologies and their alliances. I argue that the likelihood that alliances will form along ideological lines increases with the fear among at least two governments of ideology I that they are threatened by transnational rival ideology J . Understanding the power of demonstration effects—that when J advances in one country it gains credibility in others— I -governments will have an incentive to enter an international agreement to oppose J domestically. Such domestic-security agreements will exacerbate the security dilemma, raising fears among J -governments that I -governments are forming a bloc directed at J and J -governments. J -governments will tend to respond by increasing cooperation among themselves, inducing corresponding fears among I -governments; the coalescing I - and J -blocs will tend to spiral into alliances. I - or J -governments wishing to avoid ideologically based alliances may signal an absence of rollback intentions through various means. I demonstrate this process of alliance formation with a lengthy case study of alliance formation in the Holy Roman Empire in the sixteenth century.     

When Humanitarianism Matters: Liberalism and the Termination of Strategic Commitments

For all of the recent advances in the study of humanitarian norms in international relations, the prevailing sentiment remains that human rights are subordinate to other interests, especially strategic, in great power foreign policy making. This article seeks to lay the foundation to qualify this extant pessimism. It does so through a study of strategic commitments. Focusing specifically on security assistance in Latin America during the Cold War, this study assesses when and how humanitarian norms are most likely to lead democratic states to terminate these types of pledges. In so doing, it contributes to the growing literature on democratic commitments, furthers our understanding of non-governmental organization influence on international politics, and, most importantly, lays the theoretical basis for better assessing the extent to which humanitarian norms frame relationships between democracies and strategic partners.