农村信用社人力资源管理探讨

本文分析了当前农村信用社人力资源现状，并从农村信用社人力资源管理现状分析当前农村信用社人力资源存在问题的原因。在此基础上，有针对性地提出农村信用社人力资源管理对策。     

REGULATION AND THE THEORY OF AGENCY1

The major arguments of this paper are that there is a need for an integrating framework for the study of regulation, including the design of regulatory institutions, and that the theory of agency may provide such a framework. The paper provides a brief overview of this approach. The theory of agency is a general theory of social relationships of “acting for” that is now under development in several disciplines, particularly economics and accounting. Regulation is seen as a generic relation observed widely in social behavior, and as a particular type of agency relationship. The problems of agency relations–e.g., the problems of principals in controlling agents and of agents in acting according to the principals' desires–have their counterparts in regulation.     

Loyalty and competence in public agencies

Competent public agencies are associated with better economic outcomes. Beyond competence, political leaders need to secure the loyalty of their agencies. Unfortunately, several theories predict a tradeoff between these two valued features. This paper finds that recruitment into agencies is meritocratic where (1) agency officials have poor outside options, (2) careers in agencies are long-lasting, and (3) agency loyalty is important. Moreover, agency competence is lower when (4) loyalty is important but the time horizon is short, and (5) outside opportunities improve but the time horizon is long. This evidence fits best with a theory of loyalty as non-contractible behavior.     

The Federal Antideficiency Act at 150—Where Do We Stand?

The Antideficiency Act of 1870 codified Congress's power of the purse to curb unauthorized agency spending. Is it still working? This paper analyzes all violations of the Act over 12 years by agency and type, causes and consequences, and how violations were detected. The number of violations has trended down slightly. While agency preventive controls have failed, detective controls are working. Employees and agencies are comfortable self‐reporting violations, which are neither pervasive nor material. The risk of violations increases during fiscal year transitions and periods of change. The Act remains effective at stopping unauthorized and overspending, but does not address wasteful spending.     

Relational representation: an agency-based approach to global justice

This paper argues that Amartya Sen’s comparative approach to justice requires a politics that is attentive to the agency of the other. Rethinking representation as a relational, rather than a sovereign, concept captures the relationship between agency and justice that is emerging in global politics today. It is increasingly common that non-governmental actors engage with communities through practices of trust and responsibility without appeal to political authority. Relational representation helps clarify the dynamics of these relationships and provides a way to think about their purpose. That purpose is to effect changes that ameliorate suffering and injustice, working to re-present the represented persons as more capable persons, more free to use their agency.     

The congressional foundations of agency performance

When Congress delegates a policy mandate to a regulatory agency, Congress acts as a principal, choosing the institutional arrangements, or the ‘rules of the game’ for agency decision making. Individuals in the agency, acting as agents, take the rules of the game as given and do the best they can within these institutional arrangements. In this paper we develop a simple model that relates the congressional choice of institutional arrangements to two underlying environmental factors — uncertainty and conflict. We suggest that uncertainty and conflict of interest lead Congress, in delegating, to prescribe a greater scope of permissable regulatory activity, a wider array of regulatory instruments, and more confining regulatory procedures. Increased scope and stronger instruments tend to broaden the overall discretionary authority of the agency, while more confining procedures tend to narrow it. We conjecture that with increased uncertainty or conflict the narrowing tendency more than offsets the broadening tendency, for a net decrease in the agency's overall discretionary authority. Lastly, we argue that the performance of a regulatory agency in fulfilling its mandate is determined in large measure by the foundations Congress constructs for the implementation of delegated authority.     

Contested Engagements: Youth and the Politics of Citizenship

In this paper, a framework is presented for exploring how youth perform their citizenship through political engagements. The framework provides a way to explore the agency of youthful citizens as imagined by different agents and the ways that youth understand their performances as citizenship. Using interviews with university students and administrators at six universities in Manchester and Glasgow, a distinction is highlighted between agency and the performance of political acts in the production of citizenship, and the implications of this distinction for the development of autonomous citizens.     

Border formations: security and subjectivity at the border

This paper offers a normative argument for reconfiguring borders that rests on a critique of intersecting logics bearing on security, incorporation, agency, subjectivity, encounter, and citizenship. Especially important to my critique is the mutually reinforcing relationship between border security and prevalent assimilationist and integrationist forms of incorporation associated with the dominant single-citizenship model. I offer instead an alternative framing of incorporation I call enfoldment, which is anchored in the contingent and negotiated agency and subjectivity of mobile persons and a multiversal understanding of societies. As I argue, one avenue for opening the possibilities of migrant agency and subjectivity is via what I term ‘mediated passage’. It entails shielding migrants and travellers from the direct control of movement by states at borders, allowing for passage across borders mediated by civil society organizations possessing independent power and authority.     

Do Legislatures Matter in Budgetary Reform?

A recurring problem in the implementation of budgetary reforms at the state level is whether and how to engage legislatures in the effort. This paper posits that legislatures are critical for effective implementation and that different legislative institutional arrangements may have differential effects on both legislative and agency implementation. Drawing on a multistate survey, the analysis shows that higher levels of legislative responsibility for budgeting as well as legislative engagement in oversight of performance information are significantly associated with increased use of performance measures in making budgetary decisions both at the legislative and agency levels.     

Political values in independent agencies

Despite that independent agencies are typically justified in terms of technical efficiency, they inevitably have to make political judgments. How can political reasoning be legitimate in such institutions? This paper starts by investigating the merits of two prominent models. The “avoidance model” asks agency reasoning to stick to empirical facts and as far as possible stay clear of political values. By contrast, the “specification model” recognizes the need for constructive normative work, but confines it to the refinement of given statutes. This paper challenges both models and defends a third alternative. The “public reason model” requires agencies to ground their value judgments in a publicly accessible framework of reasoning, which is here interpreted as their overarching mandate. The paper argues that agency mandates should be conceived as distinct domains of reasoning, and it delineates three institutional virtues that enable agencies to track this domain.     

The Importance of Subjective Data for Public Agency Performance Evaluation

Evaluating public agency performance has typically been based on objective measurements. However, some researchers contend that evaluation is not complete without considering client perceptions of agency performance. This study supports combining subjective client perceptions with objective data in the evaluation process. Survey results and internal performance data are examined for a state agency charged with investigating citizen disputes with utility companies. Regression analyses show that the factors that most influence the client’s satisfaction with agency performance are the client’s perception of how long it took to resolve the dispute, based on survey results, and whether the case was decided in the client’s favor, from the agency’s internal records. The “real” resolution time recorded in the agency’s information system was not significant. These results indicate that subjective data provide valuable information for evaluating agency performance.     

Optimal Central Banker Contracts and Common Agency

This paper considers the contracting approach to centralbanking in a simple common agency model. We suggest thatcentral banker contracts that do not consider the possibilityof more than one principal existing are incomplete contracts.Such incomplete contracts can be a poor form ofmonetary policy delegation under common agency. We develop amodel with two principals – society (government) and ageneric interest group, whose objective conflicts withsociety’s ex ante preferences by incorporating an inflationarybias. We determine when the government-offered orinterest-group-offered contract dominates the central banker’sdecision. The results largely depend on whether theinterest-group-offered contract is written in terms of outputor inflation.     

The “baby steps” in mainstreaming sustainable public procurement in Ghana: A “double‐agency” perspective

The emerging literature on public procurement policy suggests that public procurement may be leveraged to advance several public policy agenda. Hence, many countries have reformed their public procurement process towards social and environmental outcomes termed sustainable public procurement. These reforms have often been launched in response to international initiatives such as the global 10‐year framework for action on sustainable consumption and production by the Johannesburg implementation plan in 2002 and the Sustainable Development Goals. Yet, empirical evidence on the drivers and benefits of SPP in developing countries is still scarce. This gap is addressed with a qualitative case study of six public sector institutions in Ghana. On the basis of elite interviews, this paper highlights barriers to mainstreaming SPP in Ghana's public sector. We further advance the scanty principal–agency literature by establishing a double‐agency relationship in the context of SPP, which depicts limited agency cases where principals lack the capacity to defend their own interests.     

Hiding in plain sight – using signals to detect terrorists

This paper studies the interaction between a governmental security agency, as the Transportation Security Agency, or the Immigration and Naturalization Service, and a terrorist organization, like Al Qaeda. The governmental agency wants to stop the terrorists, but first must infer whether a visa applicant or an airline passenger is a terrorist on the basis of some observable signal. The terrorist organization's objective is to get past security to commit murder and mayhem. We derive the equilibrium strategy for this signaling model, and evaluate specific anti-terrorist policies, as the creation of the new Homeland Security Agency and increased airport security screening.     

Reflections on Iranian revolution of 1979: rise of subjectivity and citizenship

Iranian revolution of 1979 seems to be one of the most enigmatic events of the twentieth century. This paper attempts to shed light on this enigma by reflecting on the social processes that have been at work in Iran since early twentieth century. Beginning in that era, Iran embarked upon a process of modernization that involved the creation of a complex consisting of modern military, bureaucracy, and educational systems. This complex was instrumental in creating a rudimentary form of agency among different classes and strata in Iran which gradually engendered the potential for revolutionary action among large segments of society. Yet this rudimentary form of agency – what in the paper is referred to as ‘inchoate agentification’ – was only up to the level of revolutionary ethos, lacking the capacity to create fully democratic institutions. As a result of the mass participation in the revolution and the total war with Iraq that lasted for eight years, the process of agentification in Iran entered a new phase in which increasing number of people seem to have developed a more mature form of agency and subjectivity – in fact inter-subjectivity – that could explain the demand for rights and freedoms of citizenship in that country as is manifested in the Green Movement since 2009.     

Federal Agency Budget Officers: Who Needs Them?

This article examines the role of federal agency budget officers and their responsibilities from the author's own perspective and experience. The article suggests that it is inadequate to standardize the role of an agency budget oficer other than that used by the agency head to determine if he or she is satisfied with the budget processes in the agency.     

Searching for contracting patterns over time: Do prime contractor and subcontractor relations follow similar patterns for professional services provision?

This paper compares over a 12‐year period (1) patterns of contracting between a state transportation agency and its prime contractors providing engineering design services with (2) patterns between these prime contractors and their subcontractors. We find evidence of different contracting patterns at each level that emerge over time and coexist in the same contracting context. While patterns at the agency–prime level are characterized by repeated contracts, patterns at the prime–sub level indicate fewer repeats and more contractor turnover. Implications for outsourcing practice and theory are discussed. © 2011 by the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management.     

Against agency: a positional critique

Abstract

This paper uses the changing historical and theoretical frames within which management pay and investor claims are considered to provide a critique of the functionalist approach of agency and to develop an alternative, positional explanation of rewards. The first part of the paper draws on the contrast between the pre-1940 critique of the rentier and the post-1980 discursive construction of the shareholder to raise important contemporary questions about position and reward. The second part develops the idea of positional rewards to challenge agency assumptions by arguing that both giant firm managers and the less visible, though larger, group of intermediaries use their position to skim value. In contrast, the experience of position is more mixed for shareholders, who are generally passive value surfers. The final section of the paper argues that a renewed emphasis on position will enable a problem shift from value creation to value capture.     

Agency Termination in the UK: What Explains the ‘Bonfire of the Quangos’?

In October 2010, the UK’s Coalition Government announced a radical reduction in the number of public bodies in the UK. This research tests the impact of three factors identified in the termination literature as affecting agency survival: political turnover, age and agency type. The research found that advisory Non-Departmental Public Bodies were five times more likely to have been identified for abolition or merger than other agency types. The research also found that agency age was a factor, but that political turnover was not significant.     

Ministers as double agents? The delegation process between cabinet and ministers

Abstract. Delegation from cabinet to ministers is complicated because the cabinet consists of the same ministers that are supposed to act as its agents. In the extreme case ministers are completely autonomous within their portfolio. This paper argues that the resulting potential for agency loss is limited, but not negated, by both hierarchy and collective decision–making in cabinet, or by establishing direct delegation relationships between legislative committees or political parties and ministers, bypassing the government. Appointments to ministerial office are the prevailing exception to ministerial autonomy. To the extent that ministerial preferences are not stable and exogenous, screening before appointments is an ineffective control, and ministerial identification with departmental interests is the most probable source of agency loss.