董事责任的追究和经营判断的原则

如何公正、合理地追究公司董事在经营中的责任这一问题 ,是公司治理结构中的一项重要内容。本文从美国《示范公司法》、特拉华州的判例以及法学研究所提出《公司治理的诸原理———分析和劝告》三个方面 ,考察和分析美国在董事责任追究中的一个重要判例法理———经营判断原则。从经营判断原则的概念、适用条件以及它的机能等方面加以探讨和研究。     

Revisiting the duty of care of the nonprofit director

The current corporate responsibility environment has prompted interested stakeholders, including legislators and state charity law officials, to more closely evaluate what constitutes the proper exercise of the "duty of care" by the director of a nonprofit corporation. The authors review recent developments affecting duty-of-care obligations and conclude that corporate responsibility and related concepts are likely to require directors to give greater consideration to the exercise of their "oversight" obligations as subsumed within the duty of care. The Article identifies a number of recent instances in which state charity law officials and other third parties have raised issues associated with the proper exercise of directors' oversight obligation, and concludes that directors of nonprofits will require greater counseling on their duty-of-care obligations in order to reduce their liability profile in an increasingly contentious environment.     

虚假陈述中董事对股东责任研究

现代公司对社会生活的影响巨大 ,作为管理者的董事其权力也日益扩张。根据权利义务相一致的原则 ,董事应当承担更多的责任。董事对包括股东在内的第三人的法律责任就是近年来各国公司立法十分关注的问题。其中 ,虚假陈述中的董事对股东责任具有典型意义。只有加强董事对股东责任的研究 ,才能使我国的公司法制臻于完善     

Corporate criminal liability and optimal firm behavior: internal monitoring versus managerial incentives

Legislation addressing corporate criminal liability has been the subject of worldwide debate ever since the financial scandals of the early 2000s. Under current regimes, firms must observe such compliance requirements as internal monitoring mechanisms, the purpose of which is inducing firms to detect the wrongful conduct of their agents. We develop an analytical framework for identifying when, and to what extent, firms may find it beneficial to adopt these regulatory devices. We conclude that more productive firms, those operating in sectors with more market power, and firms whose managers have more opportunities for criminal activity are more likely to prevent wrongful conduct—either through monitoring or the payment of efficiency wages. When the potential returns to illegal activities are high or the firm is large, internal monitoring is probably the optimal strategy of crime prevention; in contrast, smaller firms typically proceed by paying efficiency wages (or ignoring crime). This paper also analyzes the role of the State’s legal capacity as well as the effects of interactions between the structure of reputational losses and the firm’s market power.     

Fly by Night or Face the Music? Premature Dissolution and the Desirability of Extended Liability

Premature dissolution can be a rational corporate response tothe threat of future liability. Although early dissolution iscostly to a firm, liability may be more so. The way in whichliability rules can exacerbate this extreme form of liabilityavoidance is of interest, since "fly-by-night" firms generateparticularly large social costs. In particular, we explore theconsequences of liability that is extended to the business partnersof an insolvent or absent tortfeasor—a relatively commonlegal response when tortfeasors abandon obligations. Extendedliability can be desirable; however, if extended liability isanticipated, business partners themselves may choose to flyby night. We show how the preferred liability rule, includingno liability, depends on the relative costs of premature dissolutionand future obligations. The analysis also sheds light on a setof interrelated legal issues, such as the role of the trustfund doctrine and state dissolution statutes.     

Limited Liability and the Public''s Health

Corporations, through their products and behaviors, exert a strong effect on the well-being of populations. Industries including firearms, motor vehicles, tobacco, and alcohol produce and market products negatively impact public health. All of these industries are composed of corporations, which are legal fictions designed to provide limited exposure to liability, through a variety of mechanisms, for their investors and directors. This means that when actions are taken on behalf of a corporate entity, the individuals responsible generally will not face personal liability for the negative results of those actions. To illustrate this point, this article considers corporate products or practices that have caused harm in varied settings, and analyzes the role that limited liability played in these cases. In addition, the article identifies ways to modify or eliminate some of the principles and practices that accompany limited liability.     

合规视野下的企业刑事责任问题

在企业的刑事归责问题上,西方国家传统上遵循的是以企业员工的行为和主观过错推论企业行为和主观过错的原则。如今,这一归责方式正在受到普遍的质疑和挑战,一种建立在“组织责任”基础上的理论正在兴起,并为企业合规引入企业归责原则确立了理论上的依据。我国刑法所确立的单位犯罪制度,面临着单位犯罪与自然人犯罪“入罪标准不统一”“同罪不同罚”,单位所承担的刑事责任与行政责任难以保持均衡,以及认定单位主观意志较为困难等方面的问题。唯有建立“企业独立意志理论”,将单位视为一种独立的生命有机体,承认其具有实施独立行为和具有独立主观意志的能力,才能走出上述困境,并将企业合规融入单位归责原则之中。     

Noncompetition Clauses: Unreasonable or Efficient?

Generally, legislators and courts look upon noncompetition agreements unfavourably. This paper questions the assumptions underlying the traditional theories on noncompetition clauses and advances two theories that have previously not been found in the legal literature. It is argued that noncompetition clauses are used as a device to self-select employees who desire a long-term contract with the firm. Furthermore, employees agree to these clauses to guarantee that the employer will make specific investments in the employment relationship. The noncompetition agreement protects the creation and distribution of the surplus of the employment relationship. Legal restrictions on noncompetition clauses have the danger of decreasing the ex ante value of the employment relationship. The result will be lower investments and lower wages.     

The Responsibility Gap in Corporate Crime

In many cases of criminality within large corporations, senior management does not commit the operative offense—or conspire or assist in it—but nonetheless bears serious responsibility for the crime. That responsibility can derive from, among other things, management’s role in cultivating corporate culture, in failing to police effectively within the firm, and in accepting lavish compensation for taking the firm’s reins. Criminal law does not include any doctrinal means for transposing that form of responsibility into punishment. Arguments for expanding doctrine—including broadening of the presently narrow “responsible corporate officer” doctrine—so as to authorize such punishment do not fare well under the justificatory demands of criminal law theory. The principal obstacle to such arguments is the large industrial corporation itself, which necessarily entails kinds and degrees of delegation and risk-taking that do not fit well with settled concepts about mens rea and omission liability. Even the most egregious and harmful management failures must be addressed through design and regulation of the corporation rather than imposition of individual criminal liability.     

合规计划的效度之维——逻辑与实证的双重展开

基于对传统企业犯罪预防模式的反思,以及企业责任形式的转变,尤其是文化责任、结构性疏忽的采用,企业合规计划（CorporateComplianceProgram）得以产生并蓬勃发生;对于合规计划的效度问题,实证研究缘于方法论的缺陷,难以达成一致结论;从实证转向逻辑思辨,合规计划对于企业及其职员过失犯罪具有显著作用,而对于故意犯罪,则应区分犯罪主体;对于一般企业职员及中层管理人员的故意犯罪具有一定作用,但对于企业高层职员则难见成效;基于对合规计划及其成效的分析,文章提出选择性借鉴的观点,增加激励机制,严厉刑罚,同时避免合规计划的过度适用引起的诸多问题。     

论董事“善意”规则的演进及其对我国的借鉴意义

从我国公司法的规定来看,勤勉义务和忠实义务不能完全涵盖董事对公司和股东造成损害的不当行为,亟待突破公司法关于董事勤勉义务和忠实义务的框架。在此方面,美国特拉华州公司法中的"善意"规则的演进对我国具有借鉴意义。在特拉华州,确认"善意义务"的独立性有其客观价值,但也存在逻辑困境,故存在巨大争议。我国学者对于引入董事的"善意"规则存在两种截然不同的观点。为应对实践中纷繁复杂的董事责任纠纷,我国应立足于实践需求,通过理论创新,将董事"善意"规则确定为董事信义义务制度的内涵,甚至将"善意义务"定位为独立的董事义务也未尝不可,但暂时不宜将公司合规确立为独立的董事义务。     

职代会的定位与功能重塑

职代会制度是我国颇具特色的一项职工参与制度。随着市场经济体制的建立以及企业治理制度的变革，职代会的地位和作用发生了变化，需要重新审视职代会的正当性。目前，有关职工参与的各种理论从不同角度论证了职代会的正当性，职代会对完善公司治理、加强公司监督、维护公司利益也具有积极作用。我国应通过完善职代会设立规则、职权设置，使传统的职代会与市场经济体制下的现代公司治理机制相契合，让职代会成为职工与企业协商沟通的主要平台，在新的体制环境下发挥协商和监督等功能。     

Companies Making a Killing—New UK Proposals for Corporate Killing

After more than a decade of major public and media outcries for an effective corporate liability regime in relation to workplace deaths the Home Secretary finally confirmed in May 2003, endorsed by the Cabinet in November 2003, that he will prepare a bill during this Parliament Session introducinga new offence of “Corporate Killing”. The call for such an offence as well as individual offences directed at directors and other senior officers arose out of the failures in the current corporate manslaughter law of the UK to convict any middle or large size companies. Specifically, after public disasters such as the capsizing of the Herald of Free Enterprise in 1987 (193 deaths), the Kings Cross Station fire (37 deaths), the Piper Alpha Oil Platform explosion (167 deaths) and a host of recent rail crashes have led to wide public calls to ensure corporations be held responsible for management failings resulting in fatalities. This paper looks briefly at the current law of corporate manslaughter and its failure to deliver the general public's desire for corporate liability as well as the development and evolution of the new proposals.     

Company Liability and Competition Law: Exposure of Company to Risk of Undesirable Behaviour of Directors

In order to protect the objectives of competition policy, companies as undertakings are primarily targeted for the competition law infringements based on the mixed approach of compliance and deterrence theories relying on the view that company directors are incentivised to comply with the rules of competition law by the internal compliance programmes and corporate fines are the consequences of incompliance. This enforcement strategy gives rise to a tension between corporate governance, company law and competition law, as the former two focus on the behaviour of individuals within the corporate structure, while the latter concerns the impact of the company’s behaviour in the market. The question that arises in this tension is whether or to what extent competition law actually considers the way in which the company is run internally while it seeks to promote these primary objectives. This article analyses the deterrent effectiveness of primary enforcement strategy employed in the UK competition law regime and argues that competition law does not tend to localise the source of conduct or particular decisions and does not aim to correct the right wrongdoer. Despite that lack of effectiveness of public enforcement strategy to deter further anti-competitive behaviour has led individual sanctions to be introduced by the Enterprise Act 2002 and the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013 in the UK, companies are still primarily targeted by corporate fines even though directors have intentionally breached the rules of competition law and this strategy is unlikely to deter directors from engaging with undesirable behaviour which exposes the company to risk of liability and loss.

     

Disputes about corporate expression absorption and their legal remedies

Corporate expression is the expression that a company gives to the outside in its capacity as a legal entity. Often referring to resolutions made by shareholder meetings and the board of directors, based on good faith and bound by contractual spirit, a company must be held liable for its expression. Corporate expression absorption refers to the corporate behaviors and situations wherein the majority voting shareholders and directors replace the will of the minority voting shareholders and directors within their own will. Among them, the majority voting shareholders at a shareholders’ meeting (shareholders’ general meeting) are decision-making shareholders, and directors, managers and other senior management staff that decide corporate affairs are called decision-making members. Corporate expression absorption consists of two sorts: absorption by shareholders’ meeting and absorption by the board of directors. Shareholders’ meeting is a company’s authoritative organization; when the voting rights of some shareholders exceed the statutory limit, they will be able to manipulate the expression of shareholders’ meetings and replace the will of other shareholders with that of their own. The expression absorption by the board of directors refers to the practice wherein the majority directors decide on important corporate matters in accordance with the majority rule. Thus, it can be seen that the corporate expression absorption is a double-edged sword, not only capable of uplifting operational efficiency but also likely to help decision-making shareholders achieve personal gains and transfer corporate interests. As for the disputes of corporate expression absorption, the following legal remedies might be adopted: (1) Limit the voting rights of decision-making shareholders. (2) Provide shareholders with veto power over specific events. (3) Ask the chambers of commerce (industry associations) to arbitrate specific events. (4) Preserve the market value of shares held by dissenting directors. (5) Expand cumulative voting; (6) Provide shareholders the right to exit. (7) Legal remedies for corporate deadlock. (8) Shareholders’ derivative lawsuits. __________ Translated from China Law, No. 4, 2005     

公司法人人格否认理论与股东有限责任

一般认为,公司法人人格否认理论是股东有限责任的例外适用和有益补充。本文认为,公司法人人格否认理论是对股东有限责任的根本否定,而股东有限责任作为有限公司制度的基础和支柱,其价值远远高于公司法人人格否认理论。公司人格的滥用问题应通过强化董事责任的方式在合同法和侵权法领域加以解决。     

上市公司定期报告信息披露违法董事责任认定研究

中国证监会对上市公司信息披露违法案件中董事责任的追究,是遏制信息披露违法、促使上市公司规范运作的重要手段。中国证监会对上市公司定期报告披露违法的行政处罚案例的分析和整理表明:中国证监会在对董事行政责任中责任主体的认定、归责原则的确立、具体行为标准的产生和应用等方面,补充和完善了现有法律规定的不足,丰富了我国信息披露制度和上市公司治理规则。     

论我国公司社会责任的制度完善——兼论对欧盟国家公司社会责任实践的借鉴

公司社会责任是指公司对社会、环境和雇员、消费者、临近社区等利益相关者所承担的法律义务与道德义务。欧盟国家对公司社会责任争议不大,其公共政策的方方面面都在积极落实公司社会责任。我国新公司法第五条规定了公司的社会责任,该规定对立法和司法都是有指导意义的。我国应完善公司社会责任的强制性规范、任意性规范与倡导性规范,更要完善公司社会责任的道德建设。     

How Chinese enterprises live in freedom,competition under the rule of law —on the current changes of Corporate Law and Competition Law in China1

China has thoroughly amended its corporate law and hastens to formulate an anti-monopoly law. To rebound then deny the planned economy once adopted, China firmly practices marketization reform. However, common-recognized rules haven t taken shape without sufficient gaming and, lots of quick introduced legislations are only superficial provisions. As the trend of corporate legal system in developed countries, freedom and responsibility are the two contraries but not contradictory directions during the recent reform of China s corporate law. One is deregulation, e.g., introducing one-person company and the transition from approval system to registration system for the establishment of a company; while the other is adding various provisions of responsibility and liability to the Company Law for controlling shareholders, actual controllers, directors, supervisors and top managers. The Anti-Unfair Competition Law of China not only prescribes unfair competition but also counters monopoly. In general, it mainly focuses on anti-monopoly provisions, to popularize the concept and value of free market, making systematic regulations on any kinds of monopoly. This article reviews its background, process, meaning as well as the problems encountered. As there remains somewhat a mystery that China rapidly develops, it may also reflect a fringe of the reason.     

劳动职业伤害的企业社会责任主体分析——以“毒苹果”为例

苹果公司供应商联建科技使用有毒化学原料正己烷导致百名员工中毒的案例引出一个法律难题——间接职业伤害主体的责任问题。本文从"毒苹果"事件提出的法律问题、职业伤害间接责任主体承担企业社会责任的依据,以及间接责任主体承担企业社会责任的途径等方面进行了论述,提出职业伤害间接主体应承担扩大的企业社会责任;间接责任主体承担企业社会责任应从企业自身监督、利益相关者参与治理及政府监管等方面进行。