Quangos与澳门政府自治机构：兼与香港比较

在西方国家除了政府部门架构以外，而同样提供公共服务的其它所有组织类别，都普遍被通称为“quangos”（quasi-autonomous nongovernmental organizations），即半自主非官方机构。据文菲尔（Sandra Van Thiel），quangos是“被赋予执行一个或多个公共政策为其主要任务的一些组织，它们由公帑支持但运作上与政府保持距离，且与部长或主管部门并无上下层级关系”。自治机构的建制在澳门回归前已存在，乃前宗主国葡萄牙由本土引入，是quangos的一种。本文将从其法律地位主要是独立法人组织、内部管理架构、人员组成、经费来源、职权及监察几个大的范畴详细分析这些自治机构，并与香港类似组织作出比较。     

Reforming Credit Reform

The Federal Credit Reform Act (FCRA) improved the treatment of credit in the federal budget, but failed to make the budget cost of credit and noncredit programs fully comparable. Inconsistencies and downwardly biased credit costs arise from the restriction under FCRA that cash flows be discounted at Treasury rates, and from the omission of certain administrative costs. We describe the shortcomings of FCRA and policy distortions that may occur, and propose modifications to the Act that would more closely align budget costs of credit and noncredit programs.     

进一步改善公共服务的改革方向

本文基于OECD各成员国所制定的并实施的成功的公共服务创新措施和实践战略,提出了一个有关公共服务改革管理的框架.在明确了公共服务面临的来自内部和外部的严峻挑战的基础上,指出了进一步改善公共服务的改革方向.     

Reforming Central Banking STEPHEN KIRCHNER

This book is about which monetary institutions and monetary regimes are most likely to promote: price stability. As such it is a welcome addition to the literature on this much debated question, especially because it provides such a lucid account of Kirchner's side of the debate. The questions he explores are important because central banks have become much more significant in recent times. Indeed, momentous changes in political economy, especially in the last decade in the wake of global and domestic financial deregulation, have propelled monetary policy and central banks to a new prominence.     

Reforming Social Security and Medicare

Books reviewed:
Sheila Burke, Eric Kingson and Uwe Reinhardt, (eds.) Social Security and Medicare, Individual versus Collective Risk and Responsibility     

Reforming the Conventions Regarding Parliamentary Scrutiny of Ministerial Actions

Parliamentary scrutiny of government ministers is limited by the convention that one house of parliament cannot compel a member of the other house to appear before it. This convention limits the Senate's capacity to examine ministers who are members of the House of Representatives. It has its origins in UK parliamentary practice, and is given alleged legal force in Australia by virtue of section 49 of Australia's constitution. That section effectively says that Australia's current parliamentary powers, privileges and immunities are those of the UK House of Commons in 1901.
However analysis of UK practice prior to the twentieth century reveals a surprising picture. Far from protecting members of one house from the other house's inquiries, it would seem that invitations issued by one chamber to a member of the other were never refused, an element of 'custom and practice' now conveniently overlooked. Furthermore, the purpose of the powers had nothing to do with protecting ministers. On the contrary, their origins He in a desire to ensure the strength of parliamentary accountability. If modern Australian practice is to be true to historical House of Commons practice, consideration should be given to ensuring that each chamber does have guaranteed access to ministers of the other house.     

Reforming the Expenditure Budget Process: The Canadian Experience

During the past twenty years the government of Canada has introduced three distinct approaches to managing its expenditure budget. The approaches were all introduced with considerable fanfare and also with the promise that they would enable the government to finally get a firm handle on its expenditure budget.
This paper looks at the three approaches and outlines their most important features. The paper also presents the reasons that led to the downfall of both the Program Planning Budgeting System (PPBS) and the Policy and Expenditure Management System (PEMS). The paper goes on to argue that the recently introduced approach—labeled the Expenditure Review Committee (ERC)—is also unlikely to meet expectations. It also provides an historical context for understanding why each particular approach was adopted.     

Foreign policy by commission: Reforming the intelligence community

Can presidential commissions serve as a source of significant policy innovation in the area of intelligence analysis? This study shows that intelligence commission recommendations present a decidedly mixed bag. We cannot speak of a linear movement toward improving the quality or management of intelligence analysis in which one problem is solved and attention then is turned to the next. Yet presidential commissions looking into intelligence analysis cannot be mere symbolic window dressing. Many of their recommendations have been listened to. It would be more accurate to see them as having in each instance narrowed the range of policy choices receiving serious consideration as means of improving the intelligence product.