The Impact of Information Technology Development on the Legal Concept A Particular Examination on the Legal concept of 'Signatures'

This paper intends to explore the impact of Information technology(IT) development on the legal concept of ‘signatures’.To what extent and in which way does it impact on the legalconcept of ‘signatures’? This paper attempts toexamine this issue from an international and comparative perspective.It was found that IT development has different levels of impacton the legal concept of ‘signatures’ in differentjurisdictions. In the Common Law system such as the UK and theUS, it does not change the legal concept of ‘signatures’.However, it does put the legal concept on such an importantposition. On the contrary, IT development changes the legalconcept of ‘signatures’ in the Civil Law systemsuch as Germany and China.     

Lord of Your Domain, But Master of None: The Need to Harmonize and Recalibrate the Domain Name Regime of Ownership and Control

The world has seen three waves of property. The first hark backcenturies and relate to ‘real and personal property’such as land and chattel, also known as immovable and movableproperty. The second gained recognition around the nineteenthcentury and relates to propertization of the ‘laboursof the mind’ or ‘intellectual property’. Thethird wave came within a much shorter period and starting togain recognition and it is what is known as ‘virtual property’.The law and policy-makers have had to surmount not only a steeplearning curve but also in some cases a foundation that is wroughtwith mistakes when it comes to the treatment that should begiven to virtual property. The Domain Name System (DNS) is thebest example of a form of virtual property that has given riseto challenges in law making and administration. The ‘landgrab’ of domain names in the World Wide Web (WWW) havegiven rise to a virtual tsunami of registrations and this hasled to the subsequent erection of levees in the form of a challengeregime. This paper will identify and consider the problems thatthe DNS is facing and suggest the changes that have to be madeto it in order for it to withstand the forces of what will bean increasingly rising sea of domain names on the WWW. This paper will begin with a look at the fissures in the seabedof the DNS by comparing how the management and policies relatingto domain name registration and challenge have shifted and divergedin different jurisdictions as well as by examining the inadequaciesof the original registration regime (ICANN) and challenge policy(UDRP). After identifying the problem, suggestions will be madeto resolve them in the best possible way, which require a revisitof the stakeholder and policy interests in the Internet andthe ownership and control of domain names that essentially functionas an important gateway to the WWW in order to rebalance theseinterests in an attempt to achieve greatest equilibrium. Amendmentswill be proposed to both the registration and challenge regimesas well as to the structure and hierarchy of domain name administrationwhich should be a globally coordinated effort just as the DNSis a common entryway to the global property that is the WWW.     

Justifying Age Discrimination

The characteristics of age discrimination as provided for inthe Employment Equality (Age) Discrimination Regulations setit apart from existing anti-discrimination schemes. The ambitof the Regulations is limited to the employment field. Withinthis area, the legislation does not simply seek to identifya characteristic of a specific minority group and then removethat factor from the decision-making process. Instead, workingfrom a quality common to all (age), the Regulations seek onlyto prevent reliance on it for purposes that are ‘illegitimate’or if the consequences of doing so are ‘disproportionate’.This is necessary: first because the Regulations do not seekmerely to protect discrete age groups, and in practice the interestsof persons of different age may well be in conflict; secondlybecause many decision-making criteria that appear objectiveare in substance, age-related. In order to sort ‘bad’discrimination from ‘good’ discrimination a notionof substantive equality must exist. The Regulations themselvesgive little indication of what equality should mean. There isno existing consensus from which the answer can be drawn, andthe rationales that have underpinned previous anti-discriminationlegislation are not easily transposed to age discrimination.The practical application of the justification defence containedin Regulation 3 will shape the substantive meaning of equalityin this area. This article seeks to identify what the properapproach should be to the provisions of Regulation 3, and suggeststhat this should be derived from considerations of transparentdecision-making, and the need to respect the dignity of theindividual.     

Shadows in Paradise - Exploring Non-Refoulement as an Open Concept

The principle of non-refoulement contains a paradox. While stateshave committed to respecting the principle by joining the 1951Refugee Convention and key human rights conventions, its contentis not established in international law. In other words, stateshave committed to a principle the content of which is indeterminate.Since no common definition exists, in practice, national andinternational bodies have extensive powers of discretion togive content to the terms ‘persecution’, ‘torture’,‘degrading’ or ‘cruel’ treatment. Thepurpose of this article is to explore non-refoulement as anopen and ambiguous concept. Acknowledgement of the indeterminacyis important, as open concepts never remain such in practicebut are always issued with content or interpreted. This approachcalls for a further question: how do interpretations come aboutand what kind of factors influence them? The conclusion of thearticle is that different national and international actorspromote their own ‘correct’ interpretations of thiskeystone of refugee protection.     

The Personal Nature of Individual Criminal Responsibility and the ICC Statute

By affirming criminal responsibility of the individual, theICC Statute recognizes a distinction from the internationalresponsibility of states, which is the basis of modern internationalcriminal law. The importance of the principle is evident notonly in the breadth and analytical nature of the provision dealingwith it, i.e. Article 25 of the Statute, but by its being placedin the part of the Statute devoted to the ‘General Principlesof Criminal Law’. After an introductory considerationof the context of the Article and of its general implications,this article analyses the contents of the regulation and thetype of responsibility outlined in it. The principle that emergescould be called the ‘personal nature’ of internationalcriminal responsibility. Although the general principles setout in the ICC Statute are rather rudimentary in comparisonwith what is to be found in the ‘General Part’ ofmost national criminal laws, the principle of personal responsibilityemerging from the Statute is nevertheless in the best traditionsof criminal law. It serves both as the foundation and as thelimitation of international criminal responsibility, so helpingto ensure that modern international criminal law is not a toolfor oppression but rather an instrument of justice.     

Overcoming the challenges posted by technology to traditional copyright law: from Betamax to Grokster

Legal context: Dual use technology, or technology which can be used for bothinfringing and non-infringing uses, raises interesting issuesin the area of copyright law. This note analyses inter aliathe two US Supreme Court decisions on dual use technology, separatedby a gap of over 20 years—Sony v Universal Studios (1984)and MGM v Grokster (2005). Key points: Sony lays down the famous ‘Betamax’ defence—ifthe technology is ‘capable of substantial non-infringinguses’, then it cannot be challenged as infringing. Thistest had stood the test of time, and it is only recently inGrokster that there arose an occasion to reconsider its application.The Court in Grokster, borrowing from the jurisprudence developedin Patent law, recognized a novel test of liability—basedon the active ‘inducement’ to infringe. The flawin Grokster is that despite its attempt to develop new standardsfor a digital age, the ruling leaves areas of uncertainty. Practical significance: Dual use technology has become ubiquitous in this age—fromthe iPod to YouTube to P2P software, all are capable of beingused in lawful as well as unlawful ways. Legal pronouncementshave the potential to impact not just the development of law,but also innovation in technology. Some believe that the ‘brightline’ of Sony has been muddled thereby threatening technologicalinnovation. Others, me included, believe that Sony is inapplicablein the face of new technology, and hail the decision in Groksteras a positive step forward in what it actually decides. However,in what it does not decide, Grokster still represents a lostopportunity by the Court to clear up the muddled waters.     

Legal Originality

In legal academia it is highly controversial how to ‘beoriginal’ in legal research. This article will try tomaintain an attitude of tolerance in not promoting or discreditingone particular methodology. Instead, it will identify four differentways of ‘being original’. Perhaps the most commonapproach is to deal with ‘micro-legal questions’.Many legal academics also pursue research in ‘macro-legalquestions’. Less common but growing is the importanceof ‘scientific legal research’ and research in ‘non-legaltopics’.     

The spy who came in from the cold

Some words occur to us in pairs, often to the extent that wefind it difficult to hear the one without recalling the other.Thus ‘Romeo’ suggests ‘Juliet’; ‘Anthony’invokes ‘Cleopatra’; ‘Héloïse’follows ‘Abélard’ and so on. Many furtherexamples exist, particularly in the case of lovers. In intellectual property circles the concepts of ‘author’and ‘royalties’ are also closely linked—buttheir relationship is strained. While the author's love forroyalties is sincere and undiminished     

Law's Legitimacy and 'Democracy-Plus'

Is it the case that the law, in order to be fully legitimate,must not only be adopted in a procedurally correct way but mustalso comply with certain substantive values? In the first partof the article I prepare the ground for the discussion of legitimacyof democratic laws by considering the relationship between law’slegitimacy, its justification and the obligation to obey thelaw. If legitimacy of law is seen as based on the law beingjustified (as in Raz’s ‘service conception’),our duty to obey it does not follow automatically: it must bebased on some additional arguments. Raz’s conception oflegitimate authority does not presuppose, as many critics claim,any unduly deferential attitude towards authorities. Disconnectionof the law’s legitimacy from the absolute duty to obeyit leads to the second part of the article which consists ina critical scrutiny of the claim that the democratically adoptedlaw is legitimate only insofar as it expresses the right moralvalues. This claim is shown to be, under one interpretation(‘motivational’), nearly meaningless or, under anotherinterpretation (‘constitutional’), too strong tosurvive the pressure from moral pluralism. While we cannot hopefor a design of ‘pure procedural democracy’ (byanalogy to Rawlsian ‘pure procedural justice’),democratic procedures express the values which animate the adoptionof a democratic system in the first place.     

International Law and Detention of US Asylum Seekers: Contrasting Matter of D-J- with the United Nations Refugee Convention

US refugee law reflects an ever-increasing conception that theapplication of international standards would constitute an unacceptablerisk to national security. CSR Article 31(2)’s requirementthat refugees ‘shall not’ be detained unless ‘necessary’appears among the chief casualties of such suspicions. US jurisprudenceremains strikingly devoid of reference to Article 31, and 2003’sMatter of D-J- is a prime example. D-J- was an administrativedecision in which the US Attorney General held that nationalsecurity required all US asylum seekers who successfully arrivevia boat must be subject to mandatory detention throughout thecourse of removal proceedings. Despite US accession to the Protocol,Article 31(2) was not mentioned. This article explores what might have happened to D-J- if theRefugee Convention had indeed been applied to his case. Utilizingthe international methodology for treaty interpretation, itapplies Article 31(2) to various aspects of the Attorney General'sdecision. Part 2 argues that under the Supreme Court's CharmingBetsy rule, statutory discretion to detain must be interpretedconsistently with US international obligations. Part 3 concludesthat Article 31(2) of the Refugee Convention grants asylum seekersa right to release whenever their detention is not ‘necessary’.Part 4 proposes a three-part ‘pyramid’ approachto explain the elemental phases of the decision to detain anasylum seeker and examines necessity at each stage. Finally,Part 5 discusses Article 31(2)’s implications regardingevidence and proportion. The premise throughout is that, hadit been applied, the Refugee Convention could have protectedthe interests of both D-J- and ‘national security’.     

Market Fundamentalisms: Business Ethics at the Altar of Human Rights

In this article the author explores what he terms ‘anemergent trade-related, market-friendly paradigm of human rights’,in contrast to the paradigm of human rights enshrined in theUniversal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). It focuses ona reassertion of the UDHR paradigm in relation to corporategovernance and business conduct, looking specifically at theProposed Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporationsand Other Business Enterprises with regard to Human Rights (‘Norms’).The article examines, in this respect, five central themes:the intertextuality of the Norms; the ‘network’conception of trade and business conduct; ways of categorisinghuman rights obligations; duties regarding implementation ofthe Norms; and, finally, related ethical theory concerns.     

From the Contract of Employment to the Personal Work Nexus

This article describes the author’s plans for and designof his research project upon the Personal Work Contracts inEuropean Comparative Law; it seeks consultation with the readershipabout those plans and that design; and it develops two linkedaspects of the theoretical infrastructure for that project,namely the analysis of the ‘family of personal work contracts’and the analysis of the ‘personal work nexus’. Theanalysis in terms of the ‘family of personal work contracts’asserts the validity and utility of the wide and inclusive notionof the ‘personal work contract’ as a central organisingcategory for individual employment law and of a multi-dimensionalway of viewing and understanding this category as a family ofcontracts within which the contract of employment is of courseimportant but is not an over-dominant paradigm. The analysisin terms of the ‘personal work nexus’ argues thatthe contracts within this ‘family of personal work contracts’may be better understood if they are placed in the explanatoryframework of the ‘personal work nexus’, which isa concept of a yet looser and more comprehensive set of legallinks or connections within which personal work relations maybe cast. Ways are suggested in which these analyses may contributeto the better meeting of the regulatory needs of personal workrelations and in which those analyses might be refined and testedby means of a European comparative methodology.     

Dutch Courts' Universal Jurisdiction over Violations of Common Article 3 qua War Crimes

On 14 October 2005, The Hague District Court sentenced two Afghanasylum seekers for their role and participation in the tortureof civilians during the Afghan War of 1978–1992. The Courtheld in both cases that it had ‘universal jurisdiction’over violations of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventionsand that the accused were guilty of ‘torment’ (‘foltering’)and torture as a war crime (‘marteling’). The jurisdictionalbasis relied upon by the Court and the Court's legal reasoningin both cases is open to criticism.     

The Paradigm of the War on Crime: Legitimating Inhuman Treatment?

Since 11 September 2001, a new paradigm has developed in criminallaw. Parallel to the idea of the ‘war on terror’,a paradigm based around ‘war on crime’ has emerged.Inevitably, however, a paradigm of war leads to abandoning scientificapproaches based on a legal-moral vision (crime, guilt and punishment)in favour of a merely pragmatic vision, which associates nationalsecurity with social defence. Based on an unclear concept ofdangerousness, presumed by simple membership in a group labelled‘enemy’, the goal is to neutralize, or even eliminate,the criminal/deviant. When combined with a denial of internationalprotections, deconstructing national criminal law thus runsthe risk of pushing a black hole through the rule of law. Manyhave criticized such a paradigm; however, the author pointsout that the paradigm of the war on crime (and more generallythe war on terror), provided that it respects internationallaw, can be useful, because it shows the need to overcome thebinary opposition between war and peace, as well as betweenwar crimes and ordinary crimes. Nonetheless, it must be clearthat this paradigm can only be one of transition. To overcomethe war–peace dichotomy in a global community and to reconstructthe relationship between terrorism and torture, neither a ‘warcrimes’ nor a ‘war on crime’ paradigm is trulysufficient. Only through the amplification of a paradigm of‘crime against humanity’ (itself unstable and evolvingbut free from the war metaphor) can we reconstruct humanityas a value and make it the cornerstone of any legal system.     

All the best things come to those who wait

‘A book may be good for nothing; or there may be onlyone thing in it worth knowing; are we to read it all through?’(Samuel Johnson) This section is dedicated to the review of ideas, articles,books, films and other media. It will include replies (and rejoinders)to articles, the evaluation of new ideas or proposals, and reviewsof books and articles both directly and indirectly related tointellectual property law. In 1966, Professor Benjamin Kaplan gave the Carpentier Lecturesat Columbia University. His subject was copyright law and eachof his three lectures examined a different aspect of that subject.The first looked at the ‘First Three Hundred and FiftyYears’, the second at ‘Plagiarism Reexamined’,and the final at ‘Proposals and Prospects’. Theselectures were     

Gaining confidence in the law of confidence

Legal context. The recent case of EPI v Symphony has left theUK law of confidentiality in an uncertain state: the extentto which recipients of confidential information may be permittedto ‘use’ mixtures of such information with publiclyavailable material remains unclear. The Court of Appeal in EPIfelt that it was hard to reconcile the principle that any claimin confidence must fail if the material in question is in thepublic domain with the ‘springboard’ doctrine; butis the distinction illusory? Key points. Issues raised in this case include considerationof what precisely is ‘use’ of confidential information,when mixed with public information, and whether a confider shoulddo more than rely on confidentiality obligations to protectthe fruits of his/her disclosures. This article asks how confidentialityobligations may be aligned with the control of statutory intellectualproperty rights. It considers whether the Court of Appeal inMarkem v Zipher has confused the issue and speculates as tohow far the general law of contract can assist the confider. Practical significance. Finally, this article discusses whichlegal tools will best assist the confider seeking to protectits intellectual property.     

Equity and Conscience

This article argues that the peculiarly ‘common law tradition’separation of common law and equity had at its origins a principledbasis in the concept of ‘conscience’. But ‘conscience’here did not mean primarily either the modern lay idea, or the‘conscience’ of Christopher St German's exposition.Rather, it referred to the judge's, and the defendant's, privateknowledge of facts which could not be proved at common law becauseof medieval common law conceptions of documentary evidence andof trial by jury. The concept of a jurisdiction peculiarly concernedwith this issue allowed the ‘English bill’ procedureto be held back to a limited subject area rather than—asin Scotland and the Netherlands—overwhelming the old legalsystem. By the later 17th century, however, the concept of consciencehad lost its specific content, leaving behind the problem, stillwith us, of justifying the separation of ‘equity’.     

From Benchmarking to Final Status? Kosovo and The Problem of an International Administration's Open-Ended Mandate

This contribution examines certain inherent shortcomings ofan ‘open-ended’ institution-building operation forwhich the future status of the entity in statu nascendi remainsundecided. It first addresses the policy of conditionality throughwhich Kosovo’s international administration attempts tomeasure the performance of local institutions against imported‘standards’. The external representation functionof an international administration acting on behalf of a non-stateterritorial entity, as an agent of necessity, is then analysed,considering recent and little-known developments and suggestingthat UNMIK’s practice supports the argument that ‘internationalized’territories possess limited legal personality. Turning ‘inward’to a sphere of domestic governance, the contribution highlightssome of the problems encountered with regard to the privatizationof public assets in Kosovo. Here, it argues that UNMIK is awkwardlycaught between the pursuit of both the interests of the territoryunder its administration and the collective interest of theorganized international community – two sets of interestswhich can collide head-on. The article concludes by suggestingthat an international territorial agent should not, as a rule,attempt to mediate a solution, but endeavour to represent theterritory in good faith.

‘You gave us freedom, but not a future’.¹

     

Disagreement over 'relevant sector' when determining prior art under the Community design right

This case concerns assessment of the relevant product sectorto determine what constitutes prior art when examining whethera design, having previously been ‘made available to thepublic’, would not qualify for protection as a Communityregistered design for lack of novelty.