Repetitive Military Challenges and Recurrent International Conflicts, 1918–1994

This article seeks to shed light on the problem of recurrent international conflicts. It does so by investigating the relative frequency of a particular class of such conflicts, those in which the challenger in a given conflict is the challenger in the next conflict involving the same two countries. I demonstrate that these "repetitive military challenges" constitute a significant majority of several types of recurrent conflicts. I also develop a Cox proportional hazards model of the risk that, after a given conflict, the defender is re-challenged by the original challenger, a conflict that is usually but not always a repetitive challenge. This analysis finds that a range of systemic, dyadic, and national conditions contribute to the risk of re-challenges. One key finding is that after low-severity conflicts, democratic defenders are at a greater risk than are nondemocratic defenders to be the victims of re-challenges.     

Chinese Choices: A Poliheuristic Analysis of Foreign Policy Crises, 1950–1996

This paper uses the Poliheuristic Theory (PH), developed by Mintz, which incorporates both psychological and rational choice components in a synthesis of these previously isolated approaches, to explain decision making in Chinese foreign policy crises. China is an interesting initial case for this project for two reasons. One is its importance as a permanent member of the UN Security Council and rising superpower. The other is China's reputation as a nearly unique "black box"—an especially challenging case—with regard to decision making in foreign policy crises. Taken from the authoritative compilation of the International Crisis Behavior (ICB) Project, the nine cases (with available data) in which China is a crisis actor span the period from 1950 to 1996. A comparative analysis of Chinese decision making in times of crisis is used to test hypotheses derived from the PH. The hypotheses focus on how decisions are anticipated to occur over two stages. Principal expectations are that the non compensatory rule, which places priority on political considerations, will determine viable alternatives at the first stage, while choices more in line with expected value maximization or lexicographic ordering will characterize the second stage.     

The Domestic Determinants of Foreign Policy Behavior in Middle Eastern Enduring Rivals, 1948–1998

Rivalry-related issues tend to dominate the foreign policy agenda of states in enduring rivalries. Thus, the enduring rivalry research program provides an important framework for foreign policy analysis. This paper probes the domestic elements of strategic interaction in the three main Middle Eastern rivalries: Israel–Egypt, Israel–Jordan, and Israel–Syria. The empirical tests probe whether the number of parties represented in Israel's cabinet and Arab and Israeli domestic unrest impact the propensity for these rivals to employ hostility against each other. We specify vector autoregression (VAR) models and negative binomial event count models with monthly levels of hostility as the dependent variables for the period 1948–1998. The results provide interesting foreign policy implications regarding the impact of Israeli domestic political structures on conflict dynamics in the Middle East. There is no evidence that the foreign policy behavior of Arab states becomes risk averse when Israeli leaders might need an external scapegoat. These findings are discussed in the context of other research on enduring rivalries and strategic interaction.     

Opposites Do Not Attract: The Impact of Domestic Institutions, Power, and Prior Commitments on Alignment Choices

States that choose to involve themselves in an ongoing dispute do so by choosing to align with or against one of the original disputants. What factors lead states to prefer to help one side over the other? We consider the effect of the disputants' power, political and economic institutional similarities between each disputant and the aligning state, and formal alliance commitments between each disputant and the aligning state on these alignment choices. We evaluate these expectations empirically by examining the alignment choices of states that joined with one side or another in a Militarized Interstate Dispute during the period of 1816 to 1986. The results indicate that regardless of regime type, institutional similarities matter to the aligning state's decision. We also find that power concerns matter only to autocracies; democracies do not seem to base their alignment choices on the power of the sides in the dispute. Finally, the evidence indicates that the alignment choices of democracies cannot be anticipated by their prior alliance commitments, although the alignment choices of autocracies can. These results suggest interesting implications for research on the democratic peace, the determinants of threat in the international system, and the impact of selection effects. The consistent empirical evidence that institutional similarity affects alignment decisions also increases our confidence that future investigations of institutional similarity generally, rather than an exclusive focus on joint democracy, will prove fruitful.     

Rashomon in Jerusalem: Mapping the Israeli Negotiators' Positions on the Israeli–Palestinian Peace Process, 1993–2001

To understand the complexities and dilemmas of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict this paper maps the divergent Israeli positions along the route of the "Oslo" peace process of 1993–2001, including the negotiations at Camp David (July 2000), and Taba (January 2001). This paper is based upon a qualitative content analysis of 20 in-depth interviews conducted in 2002 and 2003 at the Leonard Davis Institute for International Relations at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem with a broad range of Israeli negotiators, including senior politicians, foreign ministry officials, senior military officers, former members of the security services, and political aides. This paper tackles the question of how Israelis who were directly involved in the peace process now evaluate it, offering a portrait of how sharply at odds were the various perceptions of what happened and who was responsible for the ultimate failure.     

The Confluence of Domestic and International Interests: U.S. Policy Toward Cuba, 1998–2001

This article examines the confluence of forces at work to shape U.S. policy toward Cuba since the late 1990s. Our approach examines four key factors involved in policymaking toward Cuba in this period: (1) the entry of new interest groups into the Cuba policy process and an "entrepreneurial" Congress; (2) the executive's constitutionally based interests; (3) bureaucratic interests; and (4) pressure from outside the United States. We examine U.S.–Cuba policy by describing each determinant in isolation and then by looking at the dynamic interaction among them, showing how they are linked together. In doing so, we argue that an analysis including multiple factors better explains U.S. policy toward Cuba than one that focuses on a single factor such as the power of the Cuban-American community.     

Rally 'Round the Union Jack? Public Opinion and the Use of Force in the United Kingdom, 1948–2001

This paper provides the most comprehensive and extensive analysis to date of the possibility of a "rally 'round the flag" effect—an increase in support for the government caused by involvement in international conflict—in Britain, for the years 1948–2001. We use a fractionally integrated time series model with an array of political and economic controls. Our primary dependent variable is intention to vote for the ruling party. The results confirm earlier studies that the Falklands War generated a rally effect, but they provide a more sophisticated understanding of the Gulf War rally. New results also include the findings that participation in international crises which stopped short of war did not engender rallies, and that there were no rallies for the Korean, Suez, or Kosovo Wars. The findings indicate that when they do occur rallies are heterogeneous in nature, that rallies are most likely when there is intense and direct threat to the national interest, that the relationship between multilateralism and rallies in the British case is tenuous, and that rallies for the ruling party are sometimes expressed through satisfaction with the prime minister.     

Second Image Reversed Politics: Britain's Choice of Freer Trade or Imperial Preferences, 1903–1906, 1917–1923, 1930–1932

In 1903–1906, 1917–1923, and 1930–1932 British decision makers debated whether to adopt a system of imperial preferences. Preferences were rejected in 1906 and 1923, but adopted in 1932 at the Ottawa Conference. The existing political economy literature focuses primarily on the hegemon's position in the international system, state or society centered arguments, and the role of ideas and beliefs to explain changes in a hegemon's foreign commercial policy. Using a second image reversed argument, I contend that changes in the commercial composition of the emerging contenders from a mix of liberal and nonliberal contenders in the first and second periods (1903–1906; 1917–1923) to nonliberal contenders in the third period (1930–1932) strengthened economic nationalists over free traders, contributing to Britain's adoption of imperial preferences. Although greatly diminished in strength, free traders were able to moderate theprotectionist policies through the Ottawa Agreements and the Sterling Area.     

Democratic Synergy and Victory in War, 1816–1992

This study investigates the question of why democracies are more likely to win wars than non-democracies. I argue that due to the transparency of the polities, and the stability of their preferences, once determined, democracies are better able to cooperate with their partners in the conduct of wars, and thereby are more likely to win wars. In support of my argument, the main findings in this study show that, other things being equal, the larger the number of democratic partners a state has, the more likely it is to win; moreover, democratic states are more likely to have democratic partners during wars. These results are in contrast with those in current literature about the high likelihood of prevailing by democracies in wars, which emphasize, on the one hand, the superior capacity of democratic states to strengthen military capabilities and, on the other hand, to select wars in which they have a high chance of winning.     

Energy in the World Economy, 1950–1992

Trends in energy production, trade, and consumption during 1950–1992 are analyzed, using nine world regions to highlight both North–South energy trade and the regions' differing patterns of industrialization. Following price shocks in 1973 and 1979, and the price drop of the mid–1980s, the industrialized West adjusted its patterns of energy consumption and imports, and the Middle East changed its level of exports. These relationships suggest a cobweb–type model with an equilibrium price for Mideast oil around $30/barrel. This equilibrium could result in zero growth in energy consumption in the industrialized West but continued growth of GDP as energy efficiency increases. Energy prices that are"too high"reduce GDP growth in the short term—to the detriment of both energy importers and exporters—while prices that are"too low"lead in the long term to high dependency on Middle East oil exports, which, in turn, depends on an elusive and costly political stability in that region. The analysis highlights the central role of North–South energy trade in the world economy, and the close but changing relationship of energy with overall GDP growth.     

The Probability of War, 1816–1992

What factors increase the probability that a pair of states might go to war is the focus of this study. Six hypotheses, derived from the steps to war explanation, are tested by comparing pairs of states that go to war with each other at least once in their history (from 1816 to 1992) with those that do not. It is found that as two states take the various steps to war that have been posited, the higher their probability of going to war. States whose relations are dominated by territorial disputes have a higher probability of having had a war if both sides have had outside allies, have had recurring territorial disputes, have been engaged in an enduring rivalry, and have had an arms race. As each of these factors becomes present, the probability of war progressively increases. Pairs of states whose relations are dominated by nonterritorial disputes also have their probability of war increased if these factors are present, but at a lower level. Of the various factors that increase the probability of war, outside politically relevant alliances seem to have the weakest impact.     

缅甸果敢冲突及其影响

缅甸果敢特区自治武装2009年8月与缅政府军爆发时隔20年来的首次军事冲突.果敢冲突从表面上看是因政府军缉毒而引起,实际上有着复杂的深层次原因,其与缅甸国内长期的民族矛盾、国内政治局势以及外部势力的介入等都有很大关联.果敢冲突的背后隐约可见大国的博弈.     

Reading “Threats to International Peace and Security,” 1946-2005

In the United Nations Charter the notion of the “threat to international peace and security” is designed to play a key enabling role in framing its collective security functions. Taking a 60-year period from the UN's founding, this article examines how the UN Security Council has developed the notion of the “threat to international peace and security” through its resolutions, and what this evolution might mean for the notion of collective security and the Council's role in it.     

Causes of Peace: Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations, 1885–1992

Previous studies provide strong evidence for the Kantian theory of peace, but a satisfactory evaluation requires establishing the causal influence of the variables. Here we focus on the reciprocal relations between economic interdependence and interstate conflict, 1885–1992. Using distributed-lags analyses, we find that economically important trade does have a substantively important effect in reducing dyadic militarized disputes, even with extensive controls for the influence of past conflict. The benefit of interdependence is particularly great in the case of conflict involving military fatalities. Militarized disputes also cause a reduction in trade, as liberal theory predicts. Democracy and joint membership in intergovernmental organizations, too, have im-portant pacific benefits; but we find only limited support for the role of costly signals in establishing the liberal peace. We find no evidence that democratization increases the incidence of interstate disputes; and contrary to realists' expectations, allies are not less conflict prone than states that are not allied. Democracies and states that share membership in many international organizations have higher levels of trade, but allies do not when these influences are held constant.     

Determinants of Military Strategy, 1903–1994: A Quantitative Empirical Test

Military strategy is centrally important to understanding the causes, conduct, and outcomes of war. Several foreign policy theories make predictions as to what military strategies a state will choose. This article presents the first quantitative, empirical tests of hypotheses of strategy choice. Analysis was conducted on a random sample of country-years taken from the population of all countries from the years 1903 to 1994. Military strategy is classified as being either maneuver, attrition, or punishment. Empirical findings reveal that democracies and industrialized states are more likely to choose maneuver strategies, and that a state's own experiences affect the likelihood of it choosing maneuver. Factors found not to affect strategy choice include terrain, the level of external threat, troop quality, whether a state is democratizing, whether a state is a mixed regime, whether a state is a military regime, and vicarious experiences.     

对关键节点下缅甸军方政治选择动因的分析

在当代缅甸政治发展的关键节点上,军方的政治选择往往是决定缅甸今后政治发展走向的关键。不理解军方在关键节点下做出政治选择的原因就无法理解缅甸政治发展的过去、现在和未来。通过对缅甸独立以来七次关键节点军方政治选择的案例分析,本文认为,决定军方政治选择的关键变量是军人核心利益与文官力量。影响军方政治选择的行动逻辑有两个,首先军队要坚决维护核心利益;其次军队要考虑文官力量的强弱,文官力量影响着军方政治行为的方式与规模。即便近年来缅甸民主化进程加速,军人核心利益与文官力量的分析框架仍然适用于对缅甸军人政治行为和缅甸政治发展的分析。     

Where Hobbes Meets Hobson: Core Conflict and Colonialism, 1495–1985

This study explores the connections between the Long Wave and the Leadership Cycle by examining their possible effect on long-term patterns in major power war and colonial expansion. Building directly upon the Leadership Cycle work of Modelski and Thompson, Goldstein's Long Wave analysis, and the Modern World System School, a new analytical framework is developed. This framework treats the Leadership Cycle and Long Wave as separate, though interconnected processes, and permits derivation of empirically testable hypotheses concerning the effects of the Leadership Cycle and Long Wave on armed conflict in the system, and on the timing of colonial expansion by major powers into the periphery. This phase-pair framework also allows assessment of the effect of each systemic process while controlling for the effect of the other. The results of our analysis suggest that the Long Wave and Leadership Cycle not only are associated with the most severe or systemic wars, but may affect conflict more broadly within the system. We also find strong identifiable effects of these processes on colonization. Finally, all results taken together indicate the Long Wave and Leadership Cycle should be treated as distinct, though interrelated processes.     

Patterns of Transnational Terrorism, 1970–1999: Alternative Time-Series Estimates

Using alternative time-series methods, this paper investigates the patterns of transnational terrorist incidents that involve one or more deaths. Initially, an updated analysis of these fatal events for 1970–1999 is presented using a standard linear model with prespecified interventions that represent significant policy and political impacts. Next, a (regime-switching) threshold autoregressive (TAR) model is applied to this fatality time series. TAR estimates indicate that increases above the mean are not sustainable during high-activity eras, but are sustainable during low-activity eras. The TAR model provides a better fit than previously tried methods for the fatality time series. By applying a Fourier approximation to the nonlinear estimates, we get improved results. The findings in this study and those in our earlier studies are then applied to suggest some policy implications in light of the tragic attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001.