Formulating Victory and Implications for Policy

The national debate about the decisions to intervene in Afghanistan and Iraq suggests that policymakers and scholars need more precise language and concepts to define victory in war. Without clear language for victory it is difficult for policymakers to describe what they seek to achieve from military intervention. This article discusses a framework for understanding victory and evaluates its implications for policymakers who decisions about whether to intervene with military force.     

Divided Priorities: Why and When Allies Differ Over Military Intervention

Abstract

Scholars have vigorously debated whether adversaries carefully scrutinize if states have, in the past, demonstrated toughness and whether adversaries base present and future crisis-bargaining behavior on this record. If they do—as a central strain of deterrence theory, and its contemporary defenders, maintain—hard-line policies, including limited military interventions, can bolster deterrence. We know much less about a second audience that is presumably attentive to demonstrations of resolve: allies. A common view, derived from the same logic, and which we call Hawkish Reassurance Theory, suggests that states should support and find reassuring their allies’ faraway military interventions. In contrast, we argue that such interventions call into doubt the intervener’s will and capacity to fulfill its core alliance commitments, undermine the credibility of the alliance, and threaten allies’ security in both the short and long run. Allies thus ultimately oppose powerful partners’ hawkish postures in distant conflicts, and they may even consequently explore routes to security beyond the alliance. To assess this argument, we examine the varied stances leading US allies took from the start of the US intervention in Vietnam through its end. Allied behavior was largely consistent with our expectations. We conclude that, if one reason to deploy force is to signal to allies that you will come to their aid when they call, states should not bother.     

When Does the Mission Determine the Coalition? The Logic of Multilateral Intervention and the Case of Afghanistan

Using the debate between the logic of appropriateness and consequences as a theoretical backdrop, I argue that neither is able to explain the United States' choices between unilateralism and multilateralism in post-Cold War military interventions. The logic of appropriateness is theoretically flawed because states are ultimately unwilling to compromise operational effectiveness on behalf of “oughtness,” and the logic of consequences has until now been insufficiently specified for the purposes of explaining military cooperation behavior. In this article, I suggest that “consequences” are best specified according to time horizon, which creates intertemporal tradeoffs between the long-term benefits of multilateralism and immediate payoffs of unilateralism, and the nature of the intervention, which affects the operational payoffs of multilateralism. I test this argument and the existing explanations against the case of Afghanistan. Its within-case variation—largely unilateral in combat operations and robustly multilateral in post-conflict phases—lends strong support to the logic of consequences as specified according to time horizon and operational payoff.     

Opposites Do Not Attract: The Impact of Domestic Institutions, Power, and Prior Commitments on Alignment Choices

States that choose to involve themselves in an ongoing dispute do so by choosing to align with or against one of the original disputants. What factors lead states to prefer to help one side over the other? We consider the effect of the disputants' power, political and economic institutional similarities between each disputant and the aligning state, and formal alliance commitments between each disputant and the aligning state on these alignment choices. We evaluate these expectations empirically by examining the alignment choices of states that joined with one side or another in a Militarized Interstate Dispute during the period of 1816 to 1986. The results indicate that regardless of regime type, institutional similarities matter to the aligning state's decision. We also find that power concerns matter only to autocracies; democracies do not seem to base their alignment choices on the power of the sides in the dispute. Finally, the evidence indicates that the alignment choices of democracies cannot be anticipated by their prior alliance commitments, although the alignment choices of autocracies can. These results suggest interesting implications for research on the democratic peace, the determinants of threat in the international system, and the impact of selection effects. The consistent empirical evidence that institutional similarity affects alignment decisions also increases our confidence that future investigations of institutional similarity generally, rather than an exclusive focus on joint democracy, will prove fruitful.     

The Dearth of Jointly Dyadic Democratic Interventions

The Democratic Peace Proposition, which states that no two democracies have ever gone to war with each other, has been questioned by scholars who claim that such pacific behavior among free states does not apply to lower forms of conflict. In particular, Kegley and Hermann contend that democracies intervene in the affairs of other liberal states via overt military acts or covert machinations. In many cases, they argue that dyadic democratic interventions (DDIs) occur more frequently than would be expected given the number of jointly democratic dyads in the international system. I examine their research design and suggest changes to their concepts of states, interventions, and regime type, as well as their sample size and definition of dyads in the international system. I implement these changes and retest such arguments on a sample of interventions from 1945 to 1991. I find 11 cases where a democracy intervenes against another democracy, but these cases are rare in comparison to interventions conducted by democratic and/or autocratic states in undemocratic states, or by autocratic states against democratic states. Furthermore, these DDIs are less likely to occur than the presence of democracy in the international system would suggest.     

Responsibility to Protect: Emerging Rules on Humanitarian Intervention?

This article discusses different forms of military force under or linked to the principle of the responsibility to protect (R2P) in relation to international law, with particular emphasis on humanitarian intervention. It contributes to the ongoing debate by analysing and separating the lawful forms of military force falling under Pillars II and III of the R2P from unlawful claims and extensive interpretations of R2P. Apart from the already existing legal right of the Security Council to authorise humanitarian interventions, it is argued that there are no ongoing legal customary developments of similar rights or obligations for other actors to intervene in another state (without consent) to protect populations by military force against grave crimes under the principle of R2P. The argumentation is based on a series of case studies of humanitarian interventions by the Security Council, regional organisations and “coalitions of willing states”. The article also includes legal analysis on the Uniting for Peace Procedure and the prior treaty-based consented rights to intervention under the African Union Act and the 1999 ECOWAS Protocol on the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention.     

Does Democratization Reduce the Risk of Military Interventions in Politics in Africa?

This article investigates whether there is an association between a trajectory of political liberalization, democratization, and military interventions. In what is arguably the ‘least likely case’ region in the world, this study analyzes the experience of 55 regimes in Africa between 1990 and 2004 and finds a striking regularity. Liberalizing, and in particular democratic, regimes have a significantly different track record of being subjected either to successful or failed military interventions. The analysis suggests that democratic regimes are about 7.5 times less likely to be subjected to attempted military interventions than electoral authoritarian regimes and almost 18 times less likely to be victims of actual regime breakdown as a result. Through an additional case study analysis of the ‘anomalous’ cases of interventions in democratic polities, the results are largely strengthened as most of the stories behind the numbers suggests that it is only when democratic regimes perform dismally and/or do not pay soldiers their salaries that they are at great risk of being overthrown. Legitimacy accrued by political liberalization seems to ‘inoculate’ states against military intervention in the political realm.     

When Does Putin’s Russia March Off to War?

This article examines how seven potential drivers of the Russian Federation’s military interventions played out in seven instances in which Vladimir Putin was likely to have deliberated on whether or not to use military force in foreign countries, including three instances in which the Russian leader ultimately decided to intervene and four instances in which he did not. The article contends that carefully reviewing these historical episodes could help predict Putin’s military actions in the future.     

Deciding to Intervene: An Analysis of International and Domestic Influences on United States Interventions in Intrastate Disputes

Although the United States has been the most prolific intervener in the international system since the end of World War II, there has been little consensus among scholars regarding the motivations of U.S. interventions in domestic political disputes abroad. In addition, scholars do not agree on the relative effects of international factors and domestic factors on intervention decisions by the U.S. Previous research on the motivations of U.S. interventions has occurred within at least two distinctive “streams” of literature: (1) studies of state interventions; and (2) studies of the use of military force by the U.S. Hypotheses regarding U.S. interventions in intrastate disputes are derived from the previous literature, and the hypotheses are tested using recently-compiled data on intrastate disputes and U.S. interventions in intrastate disputes occurring between 1945 and 2002. The results suggest a combination of international factors, including geographic proximity and ideological linkage, significantly influence the decisions of the U.S. to intervene in intrastate disputes. The results also suggest international factors are generally more important than domestic factors, and the effects of both domestic factors and international factors on U.S. intervention decisions may differ depending on the specific type of intervention and the time period.     

Give Me Shelter: Reexamining Military Intervention and the Monadic Democratic Peace

Increasing empirical evidence points to the existence of a monadic democratic peace. However, the quantitative literature on international conflict has yet to produce any compelling evidence that such a peace holds for one of the most prominent types of interstate force in use today, foreign military intervention. This study tests the hypotheses that democracies are less prone to intervene militarily and less likely to be the targets of such incursions. In doing so, it compares six overlapping theoretical perspectives on the monadic democratic peace. No empirical support is lent to the hypothesis that democracies intervene less often than nondemocracies, but considerable evidence indicates that democracies are rarely the targets of foreign military intervention. The latter result remains consistent across six different intervention populations from 1975 to 1996. Of the six theoretical perspectives analyzed, the institutional approach recently advanced by Bueno de Mesquita and his associates fares best. Its predictions match the empirical outcomes exactly. None of the other theoretical frameworks is even half right. In sum, it seems that democratic governance provides a barrier against foreign military intervention, but it does not limit intervention abroad.     

The value of decision analysis in mediation practice

Conclusion To be constructive and effective within the mediation process, a mediator's case evaluation must be carefully derived and reasoned, persuasively articulated, and tactfully delivered. A decision analytic approach allows the mediator to structure and present an intellectually rigorous evaluation while minimizing the risk of perceived loss of neutrality. This approach can enhance the mediator's ability to unlock or redirect participants' emotional and professional investment in litigation and to remove personal and organizational incentives for entrenchment in adversarial and costly disputes.In a particularly complex case, using computer software for decision analysis offers added value by facilitating discussion of the evaluative analysis among additional decision makers who were not at the table. It provides a neutral language and method with which the mediator can probe and challenge the parties' stated positions and tolerance for risk. By helping people focus more clearly and dispassionately on the choices they face, a decision analytic approach and its presentation on computer software should enable them to achieve intelligent settlements.She also specializes in the mediation of legal disputes and the design of curricula in negotiation and mediation practice.     

联合阵线与美国军事干涉

作为国际体系中的唯一超级大国,美国是冷战后海外用兵最为频繁、进行军事干涉行动次数最多的国家。研究者们通常认为,美国的军事干涉在决策和实施上具有很强的单边主义色彩,其突出特征是动辄使用或威胁使用武力,在决定使用武力时一意孤行,时常将自身意志凌驾于联合国和国际法之上。通过考察冷战后美国在伊拉克战争、阿富汗战争、利比亚战争等重大军事干涉行动中的选择可以发现,尽管美国在使用武力的决策上较少受到国际社会的有效约束,但它在军事干涉行动中既不是纯粹依靠自身力量单干,也不是依靠其缔造的多边或双边军事同盟,而是经常性地采取联合阵线的方式执行军事打击和战后维稳行动。联合阵线的目标确定性及手段灵活性为美国主导军事干涉行动提供了便利,而规避集体行动的困境、让伙伴承担军事行动的负担、为干涉行动寻找合法性以及减少美国的投入和损失等考量,也使得美国具有招募多国参与其军事行动的强烈动机。由于当前国际体系结构的制约,不少国家倾向于加入美国的军事干涉联合阵线,以便在美国主导的等级体系中获取安全保障和经济利益。     

Explaining Wars of Choice: An Integrated Decision Model of NATO Policy in Kosovo

This study explains the behavior of democratic states during wars of choice using an integrated decision model. Integrated models are an attractive choice for explaining multifaceted decisions, particularly when simpler, existing theories have an uneven or only partial ability to explain conflict behavior. To illustrate these points, this study assesses the behavior of key NATO members during the 1999 intervention in Kosovo. I compare the behavior of France, Germany, Italy, the U.K., and the U.S. with the expectations of theories of collective action, balance of threat neorealism, public opinion, and government institutional structures. As an alternative, I introduce a simple, integrated, decision-making model that incorporates the core concepts from the other explanations in a staged, conditional manner. The integrated model does a better job of explaining state behavior in Kosovo than do existing theories. The integrated model also is applicable to other conflicts. The results of this study, and the potential of integrated models, have implications for our thinking about foreign policy analysis, for behavior during military interventions and the fight against terrorism, and for future U.S. leadership of alliance and coalition war efforts.     

France,Britain and the intervention in Libya: an integrated analysis

This article seeks to explain the decisions by Nicolas Sarkozy's France and David Cameron's Britain to intervene in the 2011 Libyan crisis. None of the three major theories of international relations—constructivism, defensive realism and liberalism—can explain on its own such intervention decisions as the Libya case. The article's novel analytical model proposes that each theory emphasizes factors and mechanisms that explain part of the decision-making process and that these factors interact with state behaviour in complex ways. Britain and France initially began to consider intervention because they felt that the emergent norm of the ‘responsibility to protect’ applied to the Libyan case and because they believed the massive flows of refugees fleeing the violence were a threat to their border security. Both countries believed military intervention could be successful at relatively low cost and that if they did not intervene the problem would not be solved. At that point, the Sarkozy and Cameron governments engaged in initial action that made them more likely to intervene by jeopardizing their future economic relations with the Gaddafi regime and making him more likely to threaten them with future terrorist attacks. Taking initial action also meant that French and British prestige would ultimately have suffered had they not intervened to achieve a satisfactory solution to the crisis. Paris and London viewed international and regional support as a critical prerequisite for intervention and they sought and attained it. Finally, the Sarkozy and Cameron governments were able to minimize any domestic political risk of intervening because they had public and/or opposition party support.     

From the Outside Looking In: The Effect of Trading Blocs on Trade Disputes in the GATT/WTO

The increasing number and expansion of trading blocs is an important dimension of the contemporary international economy. This study examines the effects of such trading blocs on third parties and on the multilateral trading system. It is argued that trading blocs have negative economic effects on economic sectors in non-members' states. These sectors urge their governments to take political action vis-à-vis the trading bloc. Governments have several policy choices on their menu, and the attractiveness of these policies is determined by domestic and international incentives and constraints. I argue that filing a complaint in the GATT/WTO is an attractive and effective policy tool in the hands of third parties' governments. Thus, I hypothesize that the existence, deepening, and widening of trading blocs result in an increase in the number of complaints filed against their members in the multilateral trading system. I examine these propositions in the context of three important trading blocs—namely, the EU, NAFTA, and Mercosur—in the period 1948–2000. To test these hypotheses a time-series cross-section count model is performed. Controlling for conventional alternative explanations, the empirical analysis supports the theoretical framework.     

Different Threats,Different Militaries:Explaining Organizational Practices in Authoritarian Armies

Why do some states generate competent, professional military organizations, while others fail to do so even when they have the required economic, demographic, and technological endowments? Variation in states’ military organizational practices—their core policies related to promotion patterns, training regimens, command arrangements, and information management—holds the key. This article develops a typology of such practices and explains why and how they vary in response to the internal and external threats facing particular regimes. The article then subjects this argument to a carefully designed plausibility probe comparing the threat environments and military organizational practices of two states whose differences are both intuitively and theoretically puzzling: North and South Vietnam during the period 1954–1975. The initial evidence provides support for the theory and casts doubt on existing explanations of military organizational behavior focused on external threats, democracy, or the degree of political intervention in the military. The findings have important implications for foreign policy, as well as for future research on authoritarianism, civil-military relations, and military effectiveness.     

Thinking about change for development practice: a case study from Oxfam GB

Development practice is informed by theories of change, but individuals and organisations may not make them explicit. Practitioners may be unaware of the extent to which strategic choices and debates are informed by disparate thinking about how history happens and the role of purposeful intervention for progressive social change. In the past few years, some Oxfam GB staff have been creating processes to debate their theories of change as part of an effort to improve practice. In this context, the authors introduce four sets of ideas about change, with a discussion of how they have been explored in two instances, and some of the challenges emerging from this process. Through explicitly debating theories of change, organisational decision-making processes can be better informed and strategic choices made more transparent.     

International cooperation in exchange‐rate management: Coordination of U.S. and Japanese intervention, 1977–1990

What are the determinants of international cooperation in exchange‐rate management? To answer this question, coordination of foreign exchange intervention by the United States and Japan from 1977 to 1990 is analyzed. An examination of the data raises two empirical puzzles: (1) Why do the periods of active intervention and high cooperation coincide?; (2) Why does Japan intervene unilaterally more often than the United States? Some hypotheses drawn from various theories of cooperation are tested, but none of them receive strong support. Instead, intervention volume and learning by U.S. administrations account for the variance in coordination. These findings resolve the two puzzles: (1) The periods of active intervention are the time of high need for cooperation; (2) Japan is obliged to intervene unilaterally while the United States is learning to cooperate.     

Either with us or against us? Third-country alignment with EU sanctions against Russia/Ukraine

Since the mid-1990s, selected neighbours have in impressive numbers aligned with European Union (EU) foreign policy sanctions. However, much more than for any other sanctions case, neighbours have declined joining recent measures against Russia/Ukraine. This article uses freshly gathered data from the entire period of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) to analyse how the practice of alignment influences international relations in Europe. Thereby, the article demonstrates that: (1) sanctions are not a two-party game, but an instrument that impacts broadly on relations with third countries; (2) alignment with sanctions not only articulates similarity, but contributes to normative polarization in wider Europe; (3) for a high-salience case such as Russia sanctions, neighbours are reluctant to be instrumentalized for EU foreign policy purposes.