The effects of negotiation democracy: A comparative analysis

Abstract. To what extent are variations in public attitudes and outcomes of social/economic policies caused by institutions like consociational democracy, corporatism and regimes of veto players? In dealing with this question, this paper starts from a critical review of Arend Lijphart's argument in Patterns of Democracy that consensus democracies are better, kinder and gentler democracies. I agree that consociational democracy, corporatism, and regimes with veto players have different effects on attitudes and policy outcomes – even after controlling for effects of political power distribution, as well as domestic and international contexts of policymaking. However, consociational democracy is not a 'better, gentler and kinder' democracy, though neither is it worse than majoritarian democracy in governing societies. Corporatism is efficient in reducing unemployment and inflation, and in expanding public receipts and the reach of the welfare state. Finally, regimes of veto players constrain expansion of public receipts. This analysis is based on data covering 22 OECD countries, 1971–1996.     

Nonformal Education, Political Participation, and Democracy: Findings from Senegal

The relationship between nonformal education (NFE) and democracy has not been subject to empirical examination. Given the prominence that NFE has gained in many countries, such as those in Africa, this inattention is unfortunate. Using data from a survey involving a probability sample of 1484 Senegalese citizens, this paper examines the effects of education, both formal and nonformal, on political participation among rural Senegalese. The results indicate that NFE and formal education tend to have similar effects on several political behaviors, but the effect of NFE generally appears to be stronger. NFE has a positive impact on political participation. NFE increases the likelihood that one will vote and contact officials regarding community and personal problems. In addition, NFE has a strong, positive impact on community participation.Michelle T. Kuenzi, Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Nevada Las Vegas, 4505 Maryland Pkwy, Box 455029, Las Vegas, NV 89154-5029, USA (michele.kuenzi@ccmail.nevada.edu)     

Political parties, electoral systems and democracy: A cross-national analysis

Abstract.  The number of political parties and the type of electoral system may impact the level of democratic functioning within a government. Models are used to explore whether the number of political parties increases a country's democracy score on the POLITY IV measure of democracy, and whether countries with proportional representation electoral systems have higher democracy scores than those without. Multiple regression analysis reveals that countries with proportional electoral systems have higher democracy scores. Countries involved in the Third Wave of democracy may find the choice of an electoral system among the most important issues in structuring a democratic government.     

Political participation and three theories of democracy: A research inventory and agenda

Abstract.  This article proposes an agenda for political participation research aimed at providing empirical answers to questions derived from normative political theory. Based on a threefold distinction between responsive, participatory and deliberative models of democracy, the article first distinguishes three conceptions of political participation: as influencing attempts, as direct decision making, and as political discussion. Second, it is argued that each of the three models is associated with different desired consequences of political participation: equal protection of interests, self-development and subjective legitimacy. Third, a procedural standard is identified from which to evaluate the mechanism generating the three types of participation. By analogy with theories of distributive justice, this mechanism should be sensitive to incentives but insensitive to resources. The empirical questions thus implied are finally drawn together into an integrated agenda for future participation studies.     

Planning democracy in Africa: A comparative perspective on Nigeria and Ghana

Ghana and Nigeria are in the midst of government-initiated democratization programs. This paper compares the different settings, reasons, strategies, procedures, and implementation of democratization efforts in these two countries. While Nigeria's comprehensive approach to democratic planning has enabled elite continuity, it has neither assured regime stability nor enhanced state capacities. In contrast, Ghana's plan for democratic transformation, pursued in a piecemeal fashion, has resulted in regime stability and some state consolidation, but not in democratization. In both countries, there is little doubt that the unintended consequences of each approach may prove more significant than the direct results of successful policy implementation. Thus, even if the specific design for democracy may fail, the democratic project in these West African states may nevertheless be progressing.     

Political competition and economic performance: evidence from the Italian regions

We verify the predictions of the theoretical literature on the relationship between political competition and economic performance, holding that, when the predominance of an ideological dimension creates a political rent, the party exploiting it selects lower quality politicians whose policy choices worsen economic performance. We examine the sample of 15 Italian Regions from 1980 to 2002 that exploits the institutional reforms of 1995 as an exogenous shock to pre-existing rents. We find evidence that higher political competition improves economic performance, through the choice of more efficiency-oriented policies.     

Recommending a scheme of reason: Political theory,policy science,and democracy

It is the task of policy science, as of political theory generally, to recommend a scheme of reason that will presumably result in better public decisions. This may seem profoundly undemocratic, for in a democracy, should not the people be free to think precisely as they please? Yet all political theory intimates an idea of political reason and unreason. The problem then is which ideal of reason to teach in the name of a policy science of democracy. Herein I compare three common schemes of reason: utilitarian calculation, liberal rationalism, and practical reason. My conclusion is that there is no reason to suppose that the capacity for the more public-spirited forms of deliberation is less widely distributed in the population than calculated self-interest, and that either liberal rationalism or practical reason, or some combination of the two, is more compatible with democracy than utilitarian calculation.     

Negotiation democracy versus consensus democracy: Parallel conclusions and recommendations

Abstract. In spite of a large number of disagreements concerning methodological and classificatory questions between Klaus Armingeon and myself, our substantive conclusions are very similar. Armingeon concludes that all three aspects of his negotiation democracy (consociationalism, corporatism, and counter-majoritarian institutions) result in superior government performance in selected areas – a finding that I interpret as supportive of my similar claims for the executives-parties dimension of consensus democracy (which consists of consociationalism plus corporatism) as well as for the federal-unitary dimension (which is the same as Armingeon's counter-majoritarian institutions). We are therefore also in broad agreement on the advice we can give to democratic constitutional engineers.     

Satisfaction with democracy: A note on a frequently used indicator in comparative politics

Abstract. This article offers a critical investigation of one indicator of support for democracy frequently used by comparativists. Departing from a theoretical multidimensional model of political support, and drawing on large-scale public opinion surveys, we argue that the survey item 'satisfaction with the way democracy works' is not an indicator of support for the principles of democracy. Rather, it is an item that taps the level of support for the way the democratic regime works in practice. At the same time, we show that this item is far from a perfect indicator of support for the performance of a democratic regime, since it is highly sensitive to different institutional contexts. By demonstrating empirically some of the problems involved when trying to asses the levels of support for democracy in post-communist Europe, we argue for a more cautious approach when analysing problems of legitimacy in processes of democratic consolidation. We also advocate the need for multiple indicators when analysing political support.     

Industrial and economic democracy in Sweden: from consensus to confrontation

Abstract. At the beginning of the 1970s, there was a wide-spread political consensus in Sweden that something had to be done in order to increase employee influence in companies and counteract the concentration of private capital. A series of laws on industrial democracy were passed by Parliament, virtually without opposition. The reforms were followed in 1975–1976 by a push towards economic democracy in the form of so-called wage earners' funds. The trade union movement was the leading actor behind these proposals. This broader issue was much more controversial and soon became the focus of sharp disagreement between the parties and the dominant interest organizations. The article analyses the development from consensus to confrontation in industrial and economic democracy in Sweden. Special attention is given to the Public Commission on Wage Earners' Funds, which sat between 1975–1981 without being able to produce any constructive or concrete results.     

Political stability and the science of comparative politics

Abstract. The utility of comparative politics has been questioned from time to time in two ways. Doubts have been cast upon its ability to offer genuine and useful generalisations, and these doubts have been reinforced by the appearance of studies which, while statistically adventurous, are not grounded upon a sufficiently sound theoretical base. In this paper we consider Alasdair MacIntyre's objections to the idea of a science of comparative politics, and discuss the nature of law-like generalisations. We explore the extent to which MacIntyre's objections may be overcome, and indicate the form that generalisations about political stability could take. We also argue that studies of stability need a clear explanatory linkage between the empirical data they utilise and the hypotheses of a theory about political stability. This is often lacking in such studies, which seem to substitute a sophisticated statistical technique for genuine political theory.     

Islam and democracy: a response

A debate has emerged whether countries with Muslim majorities are intrinsically more likely to be autocratic. Recent studies have traced this to the allegedly repressive nature of Islam. This article replicates the most recent study on this topic, published in Public Choice (Potrafke in Public Choice 151:185–192, 2012), and demonstrates that the effect is not robust to a number of sensible alterations to the statistical specification. The effect between Islam and democracy is spurious. There is no causal relationship between Islam and democracy.     

深度契合与有限疏离:人民政协与协商民主的关联性研究

人民政协与协商民主具有深度契合性:协调与宽容的品质、合作与共识的精神、求同与存异的理念.人民政协与协商民主存在有限疏离性:协商主体理性程度不高,协商各方不平等;协商程序规范不健全,协商机构非专门化;协商过程较少公开,协商结果落实有难度.当前,人民政协协商民主的拓展路径是,提高协商各方平等化程度.培养协商主体理性化思维,提升协商程序法制化水平,加强协商机构专门化建设,实现协商结果有效化落实.人民政协协商民主具有中国特色,是国家层面协商民主的经典形式.     

Business cycle and political election outcomes: Evidence from the Chilean democracy

This paper explores the influence of economic variables in Chilean presidential elections. We use a panel where the dependent variable corresponds to the share of the vote obtained by the incumbent at a municipal level in the presidential elections of 1989, 1993 and 1999. We focus on the unemployment rate and the output gap and find that both have a significant influence on the vote. We also find that if the mayor is from the same coalition as the incumbent, people will further punish the incumbent when regional unemployment is above national unemployment.