THE MANAGEMENT OF PUBLIC PROVISION

Abstract: This work addresses the special character of public management by positing some important distinctions under-represented in current academic literature. In exploring the primary distinction between public administration and public management, the analysis proceeds from a treatment of public management as control of a production process uniquely configured as a combination of policy brokerage and resource management, to a demonstration of the economic agency (value addition) of public managers. The paper also presents a contextual analysis of the scope and scale of the public sector as this pertains to a model of "public provision", and introduces some new ideas regarding the temporal characteristics of public management as it responds to a discrete set of three cycles: the budget cycle, the product cycle and the policy cycle.
This work aims to provide tools for analysis which both distinguish public administration from public management and distinguish the economic agency of private managers from that of public managers. The general argument is that the "public provision process", while similar to a conventional production process, contains unique and important responsibilities which need to be understood and defended. By the same token, public managers ought to be empowered by a knowledge and identity which express their importance as economic agents who contribute both to the commonweal and to the wealth of the nation.     

THE PUBLIC SERVICES AND CO-OPERATTVE FEDERALISM

A paper of this type clearly calls for some definition of terms. Although "The Public Services" are usually seen to comprise the State Public Services and the Australian Public Service, in reality of course, government institutionalized services to the public go beyond these seven agencies. All the statutory authorities—Commissions, Corporations, Boards and Trusts—are part of public administration; so also are local government bodies. There are in the various public services some agencies which form part of the public service proper (i.e. a Department defined as such under one or other of the Public Service Acts) whereas in others they have the independence of a corporate entity. In South Australia for instance the whole state water supply and sewerage services are provided by one public service department, the Engineering and Water Supply Department. In the other states those services are provided by more than one agency and these range from government departments and local governing bodies to statutory authorities. A similar division of responsibility exists in the road construction area where some states perform their highway undertakings through the agency of a statutory authority, while others prefer the tighter Ministerial control of a government department.     

THE ROLE OF PUBLIC PROGRAMS AND PRIVATE MARKETS IN REEMPLOYING DISPLACED WORKERS

This paper is about the reemployment difficulties of "mainstream" workers dislocated in mid-career by structural economic change. Contrary to popular assumptions, empirical evidence suggests that most workers in this category do not encounter extraordinary reemployment difficulties.
For those that do, the root problem is not dislocation per se but rather such well-known failures of the private labor market as geographic immobility, underinvestment in training, and inefficient labor exchange institutions. Public policy should be structured in terms of correcting these market failures, not in terms of dislocated workers as atarget group.     

COMPETITIVE TENDERING POLICIES IN THE PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SECTORS

Abstract: This paper compares and contrasts the application of competitive tendering policies in the public and private sectors. It is based on information derived from a large-scale survey of public and private sector organisations in New South Wales. Analysis of the survey responses suggests a common approach to the basic elements of the tendering (market-testing) process. However, there are also some important differences, the most striking of which is that public sector organisations advertise more frequently and generally review more tenders. Despite this, there appears to be little difference in the degree of effective competition achieved between the two sectors. More generally, while nearly all organisations surveyed collect information that is relevant to performance evaluation, it does not appear to be systematic or rigorous enough to secure contract compliance.     

1974—PUBLIC SERVICES UNDER THE MICROSCOPE

My Chairman, Mr H. H. Dickinson, was honoured to be offered the role of keynote speaker for the 1974 Annual Conference of the Royal Institute of Public Administration. He had proceeded a considerable distance along the road of preparing his address when he was unexpectedly called on to visit Canada on government business. On his behalf I wish to apologize to the organizers for his absence today. He regrets it very much. The address I am about to give is in some sense therefore a joint effort, encapsulating the theme judged by Mr Dickinson to be most appropriate for this occasion, within a framework which enables me to develop and expound that theme.     

BUREAUCRATS AS PURCHASERS OF HEALTH SERVICES: LIMITATIONS OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR FOR CONTRACTING

Contracting out of health services increasingly involves a new role for governments as purchasers of services. To date, emphasis has been on contractual outcomes and the contracting process, which may benefit from improvements in developing countries, has been understudied. This article uses evidence from wide scale NGO contracting in Pakistan and examines the performance of government purchasers in managing the contracting process; draws comparisons with NGO managed contracting; and identifies purchaser skills needed for contracting NGOs. We found that the contracting process is complex and government purchasers struggled to manage the contracting process despite the provision of well‐designed contracts and guidelines. Weaknesses were seen in three areas: (i) poor capacity for managing tendering; (ii) weak public sector governance resulting in slow processes, low interest and rent seeking pressures; and (iii) mistrust between government and the NGO sector. In comparison parallel contracting ventures managed by large NGOs generally resulted in faster implementation, closer contractual relationships, drew wider participation of NGOs and often provided technical support. Our findings do not dilute the importance of government in contracting but front the case for an independent purchasing agency, for example an experienced NGO, to manage public sector contracts for community based services with the government role instead being one of larger oversight. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

POLITICIANS AND THE DISTRIBUTION OF PUBLIC POLICIES

Policy scientists can make important contributions to the study of policy distribution, a question that is likely to be among the most crucial national issues to be discussed throughout this decade. One aspect of this question that has been neglected is the theoretical assumption associated with public choice theory that politicians, once elected, will reward their supporters through the distribution of policy benefits. However, empirical research indicates that policy benefits seldom are distributed in this way. Instead, politicians follow the principle of universalism. In league with bureaucracies and policy communities, politicians define need and then ask bureaucracies to allocate benefits. This makes politicians roles as distributors of policy very different than simplistic models suggest.     

THE DISCIPLINE OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND THE STUDY OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT

No doubt my colleagues in this venture will attest to the wide range of contributions which Robert Parker and Dick Spann have made to the field of public administration. I have benefited greatly from these contributions, as well as from discussions with both, in particular from those with Dick Spann during my period in the Department of Government and Public Administration at the University of Sydney. However, the breadth of their coverage has not been without some cost to the field, and in this paper I want to examine their influence on the area which I know best, that of local government.     

PUBLIC SERVANTS AND THE BRIEFING OF PARTY COMMITTEES

Abstract: Politicians need information. In recent years the practice of public servants briefing party committees has been expanded to help fill that need. In part this was due to the increased influence of caucus committees under the Labor government, but the practice has continued. Public servants provide information and explanations of policy to government and opposition members, although in the latter case public servants have to tread carefully. In December 1976 the Prime Minister tabled guidelines to govern these briefings. This innovation has implications for the doctrines of public service neutrality, for ministerial responsibility and for the capacity of the opposition to develop workable policy. Despite the potential problems that may arise, it is a practice that, if used effectively, can only assist in the improvement of political debate.     

AUSTRALIAN PUBLIC POLICY AND THE PROBLEM OF FRAGMENTATION

Abstract: Politics matters in policy. In particular, the way in which a society organises its structures for bargaining affects the extent to which it is able to solve the general problem of "externalities" resulting from private choice. Two "ideal type" societies, the corporatist and the pluralist, are contrasted. It is suggested that the apparently superior economic performance of corporatist societies may be due to the fact that they have more efficient means of making collective choices than do pluralist societies. It is argued that, as a society which is best described as fragmented rather than pluralist or corporatist, Australia may be missing out on the advantages offered by well-structured bargaining. In particular, it may be possible significantly to improve decision-making practices by means of an Accord between business and government which promotes policy-related trade-offs within an agreed general framework.