Double standards: the verdicts of western election observers in sub-Saharan Africa

This article tests whether Western election observers apply a “double standard” to elections in sub-Saharan Africa. It demonstrates that they do: Western election observers were statistically less likely to allege that significant fraud had occurred in an election in sub-Saharan Africa, than an election of the same quality held elsewhere, throughout the period from 1991 to 2012. This discrepancy exists despite controls for other factors commonly thought to influence the verdicts of observers, such as the strategic interests of Western countries. Yet, there is variation over time. Between 1991 and 2001, the double standard is partly explained by “progress bias,” a tendency to tolerate flawed elections that improved on those held previously. From 2002 to 2012, observers’ application of a double standard is much harder to explain. In that period, the analysis points to several factors that discourage Western observers from alleging fraud, including the risk of triggering electoral violence and a desire to protect relationships with strategic partners. It also identifies factors that make allegations of electoral fraud more likely, including the precedent set by past allegations of fraud and – unexpectedly – higher levels of foreign aid. None of these factors, however, account for the regional discrepancy.     

On the front lines of democracy: perceptions of electoral officials and democratic elections

Electoral officials play a crucial role in instilling confidence in elections and democracy. They are involved in the most important tasks of running elections, from registering voters to counting the ballots. This article employs survey data from 35 countries from the sixth wave of the World Values Survey (2010–2014) which asks respondents about their perceptions of electoral integrity and the quality of democracy in their country. The analysis demonstrates the relationship between perceptions of the fairness of electoral officials and two important outcomes: confidence in the fairness of the vote count, and perceptions of the overall quality of democracy. It additionally considers under which circumstances this relationship is most pronounced and shows that the relationship between an individual’s perceptions of electoral officials and perceptions of electoral integrity is more pronounced in countries where there is a low liberal democracy index.     

Fighting for a name on the ballot: constituency-level analysis of nomination violence in Zambia

ABSTRACT

What factors increase the likelihood of nomination violence? Nomination violence can be an expression of both horizontal conflict, between local political elites, and vertical conflict, between national and local elites. We theorize about factors that may increase the risks of vertical and horizontal conflict and leverage a unique dataset of constituency-level nomination violence obtained from surveys with 464 domestic election observers active in the 2016 Zambian general election. Our statistical analyses show constituencies with an incumbent standing for re-election were more likely to experience nomination violence. Also, contrary to previous research on general election violence, we theorize and find that more rural constituencies had a higher propensity for nomination violence than urban constituencies. Our findings highlight the importance of intra-party power relations and the bargaining relationship between the centre and periphery.     

Electoral violence during party primaries in Kenya

ABSTRACT

Since the restoration of multi-party democracy in Kenya in 1991, elections have witnessed intra-party violence during the primaries for selecting parliamentary and civic seats candidates. This article addresses the question of why electoral violence occurs during party primaries in Kenya and argues that violence is an outcome of the organization of political parties, which has revolved around personalities identified with ethno-regional interests rather than institutionalism. The upshot has been the absence of party institutionalization to establish structures for recruitment of members and organization of primaries. Such organizational weaknesses have denied parties the capacity to match the intense competition for tickets of ethno-regional dominant parties that guarantees nominees to win seats in their strongholds. Intra-party violence has followed. The article submits that intra-party electoral violence in Kenya is a function of the politics of clientelism and ethnicity, both of which have severely hampered the institutionalization of political parties and their capacity to cope with the stiff competition for the tickets of ethno-regional dominant parties.     

Procedural justice and perceived electoral integrity: the case of Korea's 2012 presidential election

Recently, there has been an increase in the number of scholars focusing on why voters around the world differ in their evaluations of electoral integrity. One group of scholars contends that perceived electoral integrity is determined by partisan status according to election results. Another group claims that individual perception of election quality is influenced by such political cues as institutional support for election management bodies. Although the two groups have developed this subject differently, they both underestimate the degree to which the election process affects electoral integrity. Based on the theory of procedural justice, this study argues that the more problems citizens see in the electoral process, the more negatively they tend to rate elections. An analysis of a public opinion survey conducted immediately after the December 2012 presidential election in South Korea provides credible evidence for our theoretical expectations and presents an important implication for elections of new democracies in a comparative perspective.     

A New Typology of Electoral Violence: Insights from Indonesia

ABSTRACT

Existing literature on election violence has focused on how violence suppresses voter participation or shapes their preferences. Yet, there are other targets of election violence beyond voters who have so far received little attention: candidates and government agencies. By intimidating rival candidates into dropping out of the race, political hopefuls can literally reduce the number of competitors and increase their likelihood of winning. Likewise, aspiring candidates can target government agencies perceived to be responsible for holding elections to push for electorally beneficial decisions. In this paper, we introduce a new typology of electoral violence and utilize new data of election violence that occur around executive elections in Indonesia from 2005 through 2012. The types of violence we identified differ in these ways: a) Of all cases of electoral violence observed in this article, most incidents were targeted towards candidates and government bodies; b) candidates are generally targeted before elections, whereas voter-targeting incidents are spread out evenly before and after elections and government-targeted violence tends to occur afterwards; c) pre-election violence is concentrated in formerly separatist areas, but post-election violence is more common in districts with prior ethnocommunal violence. These distinctions stress the importance of examining when and why different strategies are adopted.     

Business engagement in violence prevention and peace-building: the case of Kenya

Kenyan business was important in mitigating episodes of election violence in 2007–2008 and 2013. This article finds that this role was motivated by the ethical and moral commitments of key business leaders to further peace in times of violence; and by interests in preventing future economic loss. However, by adopting a lens that situates business roles in violence prevention and peace-building within Kenya’s conflict systems and political economy, the article finds a paradox: this lens confirms the Kenyan ‘success story’ with respect to specific violent episodes; but it also reveals a much more limited role for business in transforming the underlying sources of conflict; especially when these are congruent with key business fundamentals connected to land ownership, property rights, export-oriented production or services, or a ‘limited’ access order. Overall, the article highlights that business should leverage its comparative advantages within broader multi-stakeholder coalitions, especially in terms of its ability to influence political leaders, entry-points for informal dialogue to diffuse crises and capital to support peace-building initiatives.     

The decline of citizen participation in electoral politics in post-authoritarian Chile

Turnout among registered voters remains high in post-authoritarian Chile, but valid votes as a percentage of the voting-age population have fallen significantly in the post-authoritarian period and blank/null voting, non-registration, and abstention are on the rise. Why? This article tests three rival explanations: (1) lack of political support; (2) depoliticization; and (3) a generational shift in political culture. These theories are not mutually exclusive, but rather explain distinct contours of this electoral phenomenon. Compared to valid voters, blank/null voters exhibit less support for the political system, are less politicized, and more likely to have reached legal voting age during the democratic transition. Although non-registrants also exhibit less political support and are more depoliticized than valid voters, their behaviour is largely explained by a new political culture that stresses individual as opposed to collective participation. In addition to shedding light on this Chilean puzzle, the findings enhance the debates over electoral participation, mandatory voting, and quality of democracy in Latin America and other nascent democracies.     

Explaining violence after recent elections in Ethiopia and Kenya

A comparison of recent contested elections in Kenya and Ethiopia points to divergences in the forms of political violence. While both countries saw the use of excessive force by members of the security services, Kenya experienced more widespread and deadly inter-ethnic violence than Ethiopia. This article considers these two countries in light of competing explanations for inter-ethnic violence, and concludes that variation in the extent of constitutional reforms is critical in influencing citizens’ responses to close electoral contests. In Kenya, there has been a lack of meaningful constitutional and institutional reform since the introduction of multiparty politics in the early 1990s. By contrast, Ethiopia has seen extensive and substantive constitutional reform in a similar period, but without a negotiated pact among political elites. In both cases, electoral procedures have heightened the stakes of politics and therefore led to significant and escalating political violence, but in unforeseen ways. The important electoral issue of regionalism or devolution in both countries is also briefly considered here. The violence surrounding the elections raises concerns about how to sustain citizen engagement with elections and other democratization activities when these fail to meet voter expectations over several electoral cycles.     

Measuring the quality of election administration

How do we distinguish between a ‘genuine’, ‘free and fair’, or ‘legitimate’ election and an election that is something less? In this article, we offer an answer to this vexing question: the Election Administration Systems Index (EASI). EASI is a practical, transparent, and sustainable tool for measuring the quality of elections in the developing world. The following pages describe the current limitations in measuring election quality, detail the EASI approach, and provide a comparative analysis of the results of its pilot implementation. EASI scores are drawn from a survey of experts on elections in the target country following a recent nationwide election. The analytical framework is comprised of three electoral dimensions: participation, competition, and integrity of the process. We also divide these dimensions temporally according to the electoral cycle: either pre-election, during the election, or post-election. The final product is a set of six primary scores displayed across dimension and time. By aggregating the survey data in this fashion, we provide for a nuanced assessment of an election by each dimension and across the cycle. As our pilot results demonstrate, EASI is a diagnostic tool for identifying electoral strengths and weaknesses and serves well for comparative assessments.     

Candidate-centric systems and the politicization of ethnicity: evidence from Indonesia

When and why do electoral candidates politicize ethnicity? From the literature, we might expect this behaviour to occur during democratic transitions or under proportional rules. However, empirical support for these arguments is mixed. This article presents a new approach, arguing that candidate-centric rules offer candidates incentives to politicize ethnicity. The argument is tested in Indonesia with empirical evidence drawn from coding newspaper reports on campaign events, endorsements and group appeals. Indonesia used party-centric rules from 1997 to 2004, and even though the country democratized during this period, the politicization of ethnicity actually declined. I show how party-centric rules, coupled with a national economic crisis, encouraged candidates to campaign on broad national platforms of reform and development, thereby appealing to the poor rather than to ethnic groups. Between 2004 and 2009, the system became more candidate-centric and the politicization of ethnicity increased. I argue that changes in the system freed candidates from national party platforms and motivated them to campaign on their local connections with ethnic groups. This study is particularly pertinent amidst the push for direct candidate-centric elections in the developing world and the lack of literature on how such rules could affect ethnic politics.     

Variation in subnational electoral authoritarianism: evidence from the Russian Federation

Despite the burgeoning comparative literature on electoral authoritarian regimes, fewer studies have accounted for the emergence of hegemonic and competitive authoritarian regimes at the subnational level. This article examines the variation in subnational electoral authoritarianism with data from the Russian Federation. First, the article shows that by using a comparative regime classification most Russian subnational cases can be classified as electoral authoritarian between 1991 and 2005. Yet, there are considerable differences in competitiveness between the electoral authoritarian regimes. The article accounts for this variation by drawing on both comparative electoral authoritarianism literature as well as more context-specific explanations. Statistical analysis on 192 subnational electoral authoritarian cases shows that the determinants of Russian subnational authoritarian stability are rather similar to those found in cross-national studies. Subnational (non)competitiveness in Russia appears to be related to the structure of the regional economy and natural resource rents, and to a lesser degree to the specific Russian federal context. Authoritarian “know how” also plays a role in authoritarian regime building. The findings of the article contribute to the literature on electoral authoritarianism, subnational democratization and Russian subnational politics.     

Strategic ballot removal: an unexplored form of electoral manipulation in hybrid regimes

The literatures on electoral manipulation and rejected ballots have yet to engage one another in a compelling manner. This article provides the theoretical foundations for rejected ballots as electoral manipulation by exploring incidents of suspicious rejected ballot rates and practices around the world with a special focus on Zambia. Not only did the rate of rejected ballots in Zambia double between the 2015 and 2016 presidential elections, but a disproportionate increase was observed in president’s home province. Leveraging an original dataset, the article models a largely unnoticed form of electoral manipulation: the strategic rejection of opposition ballots by biased polling officials. Analysis reveals that more rejected ballots were associated with increased vote shares for the ruling party in the president’s home province, indicating probable electoral manipulation. Raising awareness around this difficult to detect, but likely pervasive, form of manipulation should help to improve electoral quality in hybrid regimes.     

Minority Arab voting: village dynamics and electoral observations in Israel

For all the novelty of a democratizing “Arab Spring”, there have long been pockets in the Middle East where Arabic-speaking voters have gone to the polls in competitive elections, albeit as minority citizens. This article sheds light on such voting at the grassroots level, in Israel, where passions are intense even as the issues and candidates are local. Contradictions between Western notions of electoral democracy and the power of the Arab extended family (hamula) result in what we call “electoral hamulism”. Unexamined heretofore in the scholarly literature are the variability of polling station openness and the methodology of electoral observation in the Arab electoral world. Also underappreciated are psycho-cultural consequences of electoral loss. Overall, the article takes up Valbjørn’s call for “meta-study” analysis and “self-reflective” rethinking of the study of Arab politics.     

Violence in the city that belongs to no one: urban distinctiveness and interconnected insecurities in Nairobi (Kenya)

ABSTRACT

Rapid urbanisation in the global South has prompted attention to the causes and dynamics of urban violence. Yet, much research tends to either analyse urban violence without attention to the broader conflict complexes of which it forms a part, neglecting linkages between different forms of urban violence and between urban and rural dynamics, or conversely study violence in cities without acknowledging the particularities of the urban context. In this article, we conceptualise urban violence, theorise how it is shaped by urban dynamics and explore its manifestations in Nairobi, Kenya. We find that while Nairobi is not uniquely violent inside Kenya, violence takes on distinct urban forms given city-level processes, and also that urban violence has led to policies that increase securitisation and militarisation of the city. Our analysis thus improves knowledge of how criminal and political violence is shaped by and shapes the stability of developing cities.     

Post-conflict elections and the process of demilitarizing politics: the role of electoral administration

Post-conflict elections are called upon to advance the distinct processes of both war termination and democratization. This article examines the patterns in seven cases where elections served as the final step to implement a peace agreement following a period of civil war. Such elections are shaped in part by the legacy of fear and insecurity that persists in the immediate aftermath of a protracted internal conflict. Comparative analysis suggests that interim regimes in general, and electoral administration in particular, based on joint problem solving and consultation may ‘demilitarize politics’ and help transform the institutions of war into institutions capable of sustaining peace and democratization. In Mozambique, El Salvador and, to an extent, Cambodia, processes to demilitarize politics prior to elections created a context that allowed the elections to advance both peace and democratization. In the other cases, politics remained highly militarized at the time of the vote, leading either to renewed conflict (Angola) or the electoral ratification of the militarized institutions of the civil war (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Liberia, Tajikistan). Interim electoral commissions provide an important opportunity to demilitarize politics by building consultative mechanisms and norms that increase confidence in the peace process and the legitimacy of the post-conflict elections.     

Capture the flag: local factionalism as electoral mobilization in dominant party Uganda

ABSTRACT

This article addresses a question relevant to many non-democratic regimes: how can a successful dominant party be an institutionally weak one? President Yoweri Museveni and his National Resistance Movement (NRM) have dominated Ugandan politics since coming to power in 1986. However, the NRM does not possess many of the institutional endowments that other dominant parties use to control mass and elite politics, such as central control of candidate selection, autonomous mobilizing structures, or dispensation of sufficient political finance to its candidates. Instead, the party secretariat has no real institutional power independent of the personalist Museveni regime, and its local branches house fierce internal competition each election in which most incumbents lose office. This article argues that the NRM mobilizes so well for Museveni despite its institutional deficits due to the precise nature of the competitive process its local elites go through to win its nomination (or “flag”) and the subsequent general election. This process sees self-organized and self-financed candidates and their factions rejuvenate the party and mobilize votes for the concurrent presidential election as a by-product of their competition with one another. The article makes this argument with qualitative data from three districts gathered during the 2016 elections.     

Trials,lustration, and clean elections: the uneven effects of transitional justice mechanisms on electoral manipulation

Transitional justice aims to promote democratization, but previous research has found that it has mixed effects. We address this puzzle by focussing on how transitional justice affects a necessary condition for democracy: clean elections. We test for the effects of four transitional justice mechanisms – truth commissions, lustration policies, amnesties, and trials – on two different types of electoral manipulation, using data from 187 post-transition elections held in 63 countries around the world from 1980 to 2004. We find that post-transition trials limit illegal forms of electoral manipulation, such as vote-buying and falsification of results, but have no effect on legal forms of manipulation. By contrast, lustration policies limit legal manipulation tactics, like intimidation and harassment of opponents by the security services, but do not affect illegal tactics. By showing that different aspects of transitional justice can have varying influence on electoral integrity, this project improves understanding of the mechanisms that link transitional justice and democratization.     

The transformation of political party opposition in Malaysia and its implications for the electoral authoritarian regime

Malaysia's electoral authoritarian system is increasingly coming under pressure. Indicators of this are the metamorphosis of opposition forces since 1998 and, in particular, the results of the 2008 parliamentary elections. From 1957 until 1998 political party opposition was fragmented. An initial transformation of political party opposition began at the height of the Asian financial crisis, after a major conflict within the ruling United Malays National Organization in 1998. However, the regime was able to weaken the opposition, resulting in its poor performance in the 2004 elections. Afterwards, in a second transformation that has continued until the present time, an oppositional People's Alliance (Pakatan Rakyat) has emerged that now has a serious chance of taking over the federal government. This article argues that the increase in the strength and cohesion of political party opposition since 1998 has been caused mainly by five combined factors: the emergence of pro-democratic segments within a multi-ethnic and multi-religious middle class; the intensified interaction of political parties and civil society forces; the impact of new media; the eroded legitimacy of the United Malays National Organization and other parties of the ruling coalition; and the internal reforms within the Islamist Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party (Parti Islam SeMalaysia). Consequently it has become conceivable that the country will incrementally democratize in a protracted transition. Although the 1999 and 2008 elections were not foundational, they have been transitional. They may not have inaugurated a new democratic regime, but they have marked important phases in the struggle for democracy in Malaysia.     

The role of infrastructural and coercive state capacity in explaining different types of electoral fraud

While effective state capacity can reasonably be considered a necessary condition for democratization, strong states do not automatically produce democratic regimes, nor do they guarantee their survival. Far from being sufficient conditions for democracy, strong or capable states are also thought to be indispensable for the maintenance of autocratic rule. The present article puts to the test the hypothesis that a certain level of state capacity is needed to engage in effective electoral malpractice, using general and more specific indicators of electoral fraud. This article proposes two opposing mechanisms through which state capacity can influence the quality of elections: through infrastructural state capacity and coercive state capacity. The article demonstrates that electoral fraud is more likely in countries where infrastructural state capacity is weak and that coercive state capacity plays a more ambiguous role than previously thought. The analyses also reveal that different factors are at work when looking at precise types of electoral malpractice rather than general measures: voter and candidate intimidation, fraudulent tabulation of votes, unfair media coverage of campaigns and vote buying seem to engage different sets of facilitating structures.