The United States and the Peruvian Challenge, 1968–1975

This article explores United States–Peruvian relations during the rule of General Juan Velasco Alvarado (1968–1975). Velasco pursued a sharply nationalistic foreign policy, leading to repeated diplomatic dust-ups with the United States. Peruvian officials generally acquitted themselves quite well in these episodes, in part because of their own diplomatic acumen, and in part because broader geopolitical trends of the period undermined traditional sources of United States leverage in Latin America. The United States would ultimately have to wait for a change of government to recoup some of the influence it had lost in Peru under Velasco.     

‘Unfortunate Arabia’: The United States,Great Britain and Yemen, 1955–63

As it emerged from a long, self‐imposed diplomatic isolation after 1955 and then plunged into revolution and civil war in 1962, Yemen confronted its Arab neighbours, the United States, and Great Britain with difficult political challenges. This study of Anglo‐American diplomacy concerning Yemen in the late 1950s and early 1960s reveals the very different British and American interests and priorities in Arabia at the height of the Cold War and underscores the different tactics employed by each nation in pursuit of its regional goals. It also points out the strikingly different attitudes of officials in Washington and London to the phenomenon of Arab nationalism. Further, it highlights the importance of stability in the southwestern corner of the Arabian Peninsula to US and British strategies for ensuring the uninterrupted flow of Persian Gulf petroleum to the West. Finally, this examination of events in southwest Arabia demonstrates how traditional rivalries and animosities in the region shaped the conditions under which the United States and Britain attempted to pursue their interests there.     

Decolonizing an informal empire: Argentina,Great Britain,and the United States, 1930–1943

The key to understanding how the relationship between Argentina and Great Britain changed during the decade after 1930 lies in the evolution of the British economy and the shifting configuration of political forces within the British Commonwealth of nations after World War I that made it impossible for Great Britain to maintain the old imperial relationship with Argentina. The purpose of Argentine foreign policy during the 1930s was to buy time to alter the internal structure of dependence and allow Argentina greater flexibility in world affairs. Until the structure of the economy could be Changed, primary product exports were vital to the national interest. First the Argentines tried to salvage some portion of their relationship with Great Britain and the market stability they needed in the Roca‐Runciman Pact (1933). Next, they turned to the U.S. for help, but with no success. By 1943, the British and Argentine economies were no longer structurally compatible and the U.S. had declined to accommodate Argentine economic needs. These frustrations provoked a strong nationalist reaction in Argentina against dependence. Argentine governments‐civilian and military‐retreated to a policy of neutrality as the best means of securing the most favourable terms for the sale of the nation's exportable agricultural surplus.     

The United States Sale of Trident to Britain, 1977–1982: Deal Making in the Anglo–American Nuclear Relationship

This article provides a comparative analysis of the sales of the Trident nuclear missile system to Britain by the Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan administrations. Both governments viewed the Anglo–American nuclear partnership as a tool within their wider foreign policy kit and utilised the sale of Trident to influence British defence policy. For these reasons, each administration saw the Trident sale as part of an Anglo–American transactional defence relationship. This exegesis deepens understanding of the United States perspective on Anglo–American nuclear co-operation. Moreover, it is relevant to current debates on the replacement of Trident because it highlights the ramifications of Britain’s technical dependence and raises questions about the concessions that may have been made, or will need to be made, to the United States in exchange for the latter’s assistance with replacement.     

A western cold war: the crisis in Iceland's relations with Britain,the United States,and NATO, 1971–74

The article explores the crisis in Iceland's relations with the Western Alliance following a left-wing government's decisions, in 1971, to expand Iceland's fishery limits and to demand the withdrawal of US military forces. This sparked a cod war with Britain and a diplomatic stand-off with the United States, with NATO in the middle. It analyzes the motives behind Iceland's behaviour – especially the tension between a pro Western foreign policy course and a domestic anti Western nationalism – the Western response within the context of alliance politics and the democratic peace theory, and the role of international mediation and domestic political realignments in diffusing the crisis.     

Sticks and stones: the relationship between drone strikes and al-Qaeda’s portrayal of the United States

This article seeks to determine the relationship between the implementation of drone strikes and any changes in al-Qaeda’s portrayal of the United States. To this end, the study examines the changes in frequency of 26 different accusations made against the United States in al-Qaeda propaganda published “pre-drone strikes,” as compared to propaganda published during the “drone strike era.” The statistical significance of changes in frequency was evaluated by conducting a series of proportions tests in STATA. The results indicate that al-Qaeda has shifted from more ambiguous claims that the United States meddles in foreign countries’ affairs, tolerates immoral acts, and is an occupying force to more specific accusations that the United States cowardly commits illegal acts and indiscriminately kills civilians.     

America,Britain, and Swaraj: Anglo-American Relations and Indian Independence, 1939–1945

In the years before and during the Second World War, the Roosevelt Administration played an important and often overlooked role in encouraging Britain's disengagement from the Indian subcontinent. Roosevelt's motivations in pressing for Indian independence were varied. They included a mix of principled opposition to colonialism, practical concern for the outcome of the war and pragmatic jockeying for influence with post-colonial nations when the war was won. Churchill's government was wary of being pushed by Washington to move more quickly to “quit India” than it thought prudent. U.S. policy and actions clearly influenced the direction of events toward independence, but U.S. caution as the war ground on led to disillusionment among nationalist leaders. This reaction would have consequences once swaraj was won and India came into its own, at a time when the Cold War was becoming the dominant factor in America's view of the world.     

“These People Have an Irrevocable Right to Self-Government”: United States Policy and the Palestinian Question, 1977–1979

Upon entering office, Carter Administration officials placed a heavy emphasis on integrating human rights into United States foreign policy. They also sought to contain festering Arab–Israeli tensions in the Middle East. The intersection of these two issues was the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. This article examines the Administration's attempts to solve that conflict and to bring peace to the region. It argues that policymakers developed a sincere dedication to safeguarding Palestinian rights, but that their understanding of those rights was limited in scope and defined through the lens of United States security and strategic interests. In spite of a good-faith effort to satisfy Palestinian desires while maintaining a constructive relationship with Israel, the Administration ultimately failed to alter the status quo because of regional developments. As Washington's strategic thinking changed, so did the urgency of Palestinian rights.     

Diplomacy,terrorism, and national narratives in the United States–Iran relationship

The United States and Iran have failed repeatedly in the last thirty years to normalise diplomatic relations. Each attempt to open a dialogue has been set back by acts of terrorism or perceptions thereof, and the small openings for diplomacy were quickly shut. The difficulties of normal diplomacy should be understood in light of the national narratives that guide each country's international behaviour, narratives that include strong admonitions on terrorism and sow distrust. One method to overcome the obstacles thrown up by these national narratives is to explore their dynamics and attempt to write a new, common narrative.     

Guest Editor’s Introduction: India’s Economy: Growth,Governance, and Reform

This introduction provides the context for, summarizes, and connects the articles in the special issue.     

The United States,the Israeli Nuclear Program,and Nonproliferation, 1961–69

As was evident from the intense reaction to Donald Trump’s comments during the 2016 presidential campaign about nuclear proliferation, many analysts believe that the United States has consistently given the goal of nonproliferation a top priority since the beginning of the nuclear age. That conviction, in turn, plays a major role in policy debates among experts in this area. In this article, I show that nonproliferation does not necessarily take precedence over other important US geopolitical interests through a close examination of American policy toward the Israeli nuclear program during the 1960s. Although nonproliferation goals certainly came into play, US officials repeatedly gave priority to other key objectives and, to a real extent, even believed that Israel’s nuclearization could hold certain strategic advantages. This finding, of course, has important theoretical implications for the basic question of whether international politics still works essentially as it did in the pre-nuclear era, as well as for policy debates over nuclear proliferation.     

Moore,R. (2010). Nuclear Illusion,Nuclear Reality Britain the United States and Nuclear Weapons, 1958–64

W.N. Medlicott, Douglas Dakin and M.E. Lambert (eds.), Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919–1939, First Series, Volume XX. German Reparation and Allied Military Control 1922. Russia, March 1921‐December 1922 (London, Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1976). 970 + lxx pp. £23. ISBN 0–11–591553–2

W.N. Medlicott and Douglas Dakin (eds.), assisted by Gillian Bennett, Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919–1939, First Series, Volume XXII. Central Europe and the Balkans 1921. Albania 1921–2 (London, Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1980). 885 + cxii pp. £45. ISBN 0–11–591555–9

David S. Newhall, Clemenceau. A Life at War (The Edwin Meilen Press: Lampeter, 1991). 682 + xv pp. £35.95. ISBN 0–88946–785–4

J. Calvitt Clarke III, Russia and Italy against Hitler. The Bolshevik‐Fascist Rapprochement of the 1930s (Contributions to the Study of World History No. 21, Greenwood Press: Westport, Connecticut, 1991). 218 + xvii pp. £59.95. ISBN 0–313–27468–1

David Dutton, Simon. A political biography of Sir John Simon (Aurum Press, 1992). 364 + viii pp. £25. ISBN 1–85410–204–4

Peter Neville, Neville Chamberlain. A study in failure? (Personalities and Power Series, Hodder and Stoughton, 1992). £5. ISBN 0–340–56308–7     

“Driven to Tears”: Britain,CS Tear Gas,and the Geneva Protocol, 1969–1975

This analysis considers a controversy over whether the 1925 Geneva Protocol, the treaty prohibiting the use of chemical and biological weapons in warfare, covered CS “tear gas.” Widespread deployment of tear gases by American forces in Vietnam after 1964 attracted much international criticism as many believed the Protocol banned such agents and pressure gradually built on the British government to clarify its interpretative position. Its tabling a disarmament initiative to prohibit production and possession of biological weapons in July 1969 exacerbated the situation, provoking allegations of diverting attention from chemical weapons as a favour to America and the “Special Relationship.” Meanwhile, the outbreak of the “troubles” in Northern Ireland earlier the same year, where British forces also used CS, presented further difficulties. Britain rejected inclusion of CS under the Protocol in February 1970 but wrestled at great length over the decision and its consequences under the Harold Wilson and Edward Heath governments. Largely absent from historical accounts, this episode allows an examination of a complex, convoluted issue that had potentially wide-ranging ramifications for the interpretation of international relations and treaties. Similarly, re-creating confidential inter-departmental decision-making processes, particularly comparing scientific and legal interpretations, the processes of governmental bureaucracy and the role played by civil society demonstrates why an element with little immediate linkage to British overseas affairs proved such a conundrum.     

Russia＇s Rise and Its Relations with the United States

The trend of Russia-U.S. relations,one of the important bilateral relations in today's world,has always been an important factor affecting global strategic stability. Since the end of the Cold War,Russia's tussles with the United States     

Non-Alignment and Beyond: India’s Interest in Latin America, 1961–1972

ABSTRACT

Between 1961 and 1972, Latin America came to capture India’s diplomatic imagination. Officials within India’s Ministry of External Affairs identified strengthened ties with the region as a way to augment, restrain, and transcend the Non-Aligned Movement, further India’s international prestige and political influence, spread Indian culture, and bolster India’s economy. India’s interest in Latin America climaxed after Prime Minister Indira Gandhi prioritised the region and Pakistan strengthened diplomatic relations with Panama in autmn 1967. Yet uncertainty over the internal realities of Latin America hindered any Indian pivot. In the end, India’s aspirations for Latin America failed to materialise.     

Louis Fischer and India, 1947–1964: Gandhi’s Disciple,Nehru’s Bête Noire?

This article focuses on the shift in the attitude of the liberal American journalist Louis Fischer to India. It contrasts Fischer’s admiration of Mahatma Gandhi and his support for Indian independence, expressed vociferously and prolifically in the period 1942-47, with Fischer’s criticisms and eventual opposition to the personality and foreign policy of Jawaharlal Nehru, India’s first Prime Minister. Going beyond Fischer’s reputation as a “friend of India” earned through his works on Gandhi and his efforts for Indian independence, thus far considered as the only important prisms to study his views on India, this treatment of Fischer situates his criticism of Nehru within his personal development as an anti-communist in the late 1940s and 1950s. This shift in Fischer’s attitude from Gandhi to Nehru provides an interesting personal sidelight to the intergovernmental relations between India and America in that period.     

Eisenhower,arms control and disarmament: United States diplomatic documents, 1958–60

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–60: Volume III, Microfiche Supplement, National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament, Washington, DC: Department of State, 1998.