Frame the Consolidation Debate with a Sound Argument: A Reply to a Response

The most persuasive argument in favor of city–county consolidation has been—and remains—economic development through the formation of a strong and attractive regional community identity. Empirical evidence consistently demonstrates that appeals to voters based on reducing inner-city/suburban socioeconomic inequity and enhancing administrative efficiency are a recipe for failed consolidation campaigns.     

Challenges of Local Ownership: Understanding the Outcomes of the International Community’s ‘Light Footprint’ Approach to the Nepal Peace Process

This article investigates whether a ‘light footprint’ approach to peacekeeping and peacebuilding by the international community more effectively addresses local drivers of conflict than the dominant model of large, multidimensional peace operations. It considers international engagement in the Nepalese peace process through the United Nations Mission in Nepal (UNMIN), and argues that the international community’s approach to local ownership became more focused on non-imposition and therefore less politically engaged over time as a result of both local and international factors. This facilitated local elite ownership of the process, which fundamentally undermined the international community’s capacity to support peace consolidation as elites moved away from key transformational pledges of the peace settlement.     

Predispositions and the Political Behavior of American Economic Elites: Evidence from Technology Entrepreneurs

Economic elites regularly seek to exert political influence. But what policies do they support? Many accounts implicitly assume economic elites are homogeneous and that increases in their political power will increase inequality. We shed new light on heterogeneity in economic elites' political preferences, arguing that economic elites from an industry can share distinctive preferences due in part to sharing distinctive predispositions. Consequently, how increases in economic elites' influence affect inequality depends on which industry's elites are gaining influence and which policy issues are at stake. We demonstrate our argument with four original surveys, including the two largest political surveys of American economic elites to date: one of technology entrepreneurs—whose influence is burgeoning—and another of campaign donors. We show that technology entrepreneurs support liberal redistributive, social, and globalistic policies but conservative regulatory policies—a bundle of preferences rare among other economic elites. These differences appear to arise partly from their distinctive predispositions.     

Integration of the Swedish Local Elite: The Role of Professional and Private Networks

This article uses social network data to study the integration of local elites in four Swedish municipalities. Four research questions are asked. First: How integrated are the elites? While the results modify the picture that there are two rather distinct elites in Sweden – that is, a political elite dominated by the labour movement and an economic elite dominated by business and the large business organizations – it is interesting to note that integration between elite spheres is lowest for the relation between politicians and business representatives. To a considerable degree, integration between political and economic elites is indirect, mediated through the administrative elite. The second question is: Are the inner elite circles dominated by the political, economic or administrative elite? The study indicates that local elites in Sweden are strongly dominated by political elites, and also by administrative elites. This is reassuring, since it would indicate a democratic deficit if the structural power of decision making in municipalities resided predominantly in economic actors and administrators. The third question is: What is the role of friendship relations in creating elite integration? The study indicates that private relations among elites both reinforce professional networks and extend them in important ways. The final question is: Is elite integration contingent on political stability and/or the structure of local business? The results are surprisingly stable across the four municipalities, even though the largest distinction was found between elite core and periphery in the politically most stable municipality, which was also the one with the lowest economic diversity.     

Conceptualizing community economic development strategic framework for poverty alleviation: The case of Raymond Mhlaba Local Municipality

Economic regeneration is a segment of neighbourhood renewal that boosts community economics and sustains certain principles of sustainable urbanization. The community economic development framework for poverty reduction, the implementation loop for stakeholder collaboration, and the Neo‐Marxist community economic development strategy for local economic freedom are imperative for sustaining and renewing the idealism of shared prosperity, which is the basis of collectivism and community economic development in relation to community development. Because, where there is poor economic vivacity; it is difficult, if not impossible for such community to galvanize towards the realisation of the sustainable development agenda, is tied to economic vivacity of an area. It is on this ground that this paper develops a neighbourhood regeneration model or the community economic development strategic framework for poverty alleviation for the Raymond Mhlaba Local Municipality. Data were sorted from Statistics South Africa, ScienceDirect, EBSCOHost, Proquest, and Scopus among others, and the data were cushioned with substantial qualitative analysis. Triangulation, content, and theme analysis were used to analysis the data and propose the models for the paper. It must be noted that an understanding and appreciation of this paper is dependent on the understanding of the earlier papers advanced in this series. Finding demonstrates the suitability and the need for models in empowering those at the rural areas in South Africa.     

Unlikely Democrats: Economic Elite Uncertainty under Dictatorship and Support for Democratization

Influential recent scholarship assumes that authoritarian rulers act as perfect agents of economic elites, foreclosing the possibility that economic elites may at times prefer democracy absent a popular threat from below. Motivated by a puzzling set of democratic transitions, we relax this assumption and examine how elite uncertainty about dictatorship—a novel and generalizable causal mechanism impacting democratization—can induce elite support for democracy. We construct a noisy signaling model in which a potential autocrat attempts to convince economic elites that he will be a faithful partner should elites install him in power. The model generates clear predictions about how two major types of elite uncertainty—uncertainty in a potential autocratic successor's policies produced by variance in the pool of would‐be dictator types, and uncertainty in the truthfulness of policy promises made by potential autocratic successors—impact the likelihood of elite‐driven democratization. We demonstrate the model's plausibility in a series of cases of democratic transition.     

Inside the Autonomous State: Programmatic Elites in the Reform of French Health Policy

This article combines the methods of institutionalist analysis and the sociology of elites to look inside the black box of the French state. We identify key groups of policymakers in the social policy sector and track both their policy preferences and the results of their efforts from the mid‐1980s through the late 1990s. Our conclusion is that budgetary and ideological challenges to existing policies led to the consolidation within the Ministry of Social Affairs of what we label a “programmatic elite,” whose influence derived less from the positions held by its members than from the coherence and applicability of its state‐centered policy model. The competition for legitimate authority between such programmatic elites, we conclude, is an important but often overlooked endogenous source of policy change in situations of institutional stability.     

Power-sharing negotiation and commitment in monarchies

While military and civilian dictators tend to rule through fear, absolute monarchies do not depend exclusively on it and can also derive legitimacy from the historical, cultural and religious roles they play. That opportunity provides absolute monarchs with an option (constitutional monarchy) that is unavailable to other types of dictators. On the one hand, the institutional flexibility of that option might facilitate negotiations between an absolute monarch and the regime’s elites. On the other hand, it might complicate power-sharing, as the monarch may fail to commit to the principle of non-interference, while the regime’s elites may attempt to disempower the monarch. By formalizing a power-sharing game between a monarch and the regime’s elites, this paper argues that the threat of civil disobedience contributes to the resolution of commitment problems and also explains the reasons some constitutional monarchs hold and on occasion exercise substantive political powers despite the fact that their ability to survive presumably depends on their commitment to non-interference.

     

No direct taxation without new elite representation: Industrialization and the domestic politics of taxation

The nineteenth century marked the founding period of modern public finance. We examine the domestic and non-war related determinants of direct taxation in this early democratic period and in a state building context. We argue that the reasons for the expansion of direct taxation can be found in the political competition between different elite groups in the context of industrialization. Systematically differentiating between economic and political arenas, we show that intra-elite competition in industrializing economies leads to higher levels of direct taxation only if the new economic elites are able to translate their economic power into the political arena, either through the representative system or by extra-parliamentary means. In addition, we demonstrate that these processes are directly linked to public investments in policy areas related to the interests of new economic elites such as public education. Our analysis is based on novel subnational data from the period 1850 to 1910, enabling us to concentrate on the domestic determinants of direct taxation.     

Structuring the Debate on Consolidation: A Response to Leland and Thurmaier

In their essay "When Efficiency Is Unbelievable: Normative Lessons from 30 Years of City–County Consolidations," published in the July/August 2005 issue of PAR , Leland and Thurmaier make an important contribution to understanding how city–county consolidation occurs. They revise the widely accepted Rosenbaum and Kammerer model of consolidation and posit that "strong arguments" based on economic development, especially in the absence of organized opposition, led to victory for consolidation advocates. In this response, we argue that efforts to identify a set of arguments or charter provisions that will lead to successful consolidation are misguided. The real story in consolidation campaigns is how participants use heresthetical arguments in an effort to turn their opponents into political losers. What makes arguments strong or weak is not their substantive policy focus, but how they are structured.     

Making Up the Government's Mind: Agenda Setting in a Parliamentary System

One of the most important aspects of policymaking in any political system is the pre-decision stage at which a potentially wide range of concerns and preferences are fashioned into some actionable list of proposals or a recognizable hierarchy of priorities. As well as indicating which concerns may dominate the thinking of officials who will later take formal decisions, it is at this early stage of policy development that non-government elites and other key actors may succeed or fail in their attempts to exercise significant power and influence (Schattschneider 1960; Downs 1972; Lukes 1974).     

Crashing the Party? Elites,Outsiders, and Elections

We consider an election between two parties that nominate candidates for office. The parties are polarized along a traditional cleavage, but they are also internally divided along a second issue dimension. We introduce a threat of entry from Outsider candidates, who have the prominence and resources to bypass party elites. We consider when voters will turn to Outsiders, and identify the conditions under which Outsiders will enter the election through an established party's nomination process, as opposed to circumventing established parties via a third-party challenge. We further explore when the elites will fail to respond to the threat of Outsider candidates. Our framework highlights how established parties will be especially vulnerable to Outsider primary entry in periods of intense ideological polarization between the parties, and that this vulnerability is especially heightened for the majority party.     

Politics, Economic Development, and Second-Generation Strain in India's Federal System

Since the late 1960s, India's federal system has experiencedsevere strain in center-state relations. Such strain was almostnonexistent during the first generation of Indian federalism(1950–1966). During the second generation, which followedthe death of Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri in 1966, therise of a powerful leader of the ruling Congress party, IndiraGandhi, and the emergence of dissent inside the party led toa greater emphasis on centralization and regimentation withinthe party and, thereby, the federal system as well. At the sametime, economic development had helped to produce new politicalelites from rural areas who benefited from the "green revolution"of the 1960s. These new elites challenged the professional andindustrial elites who had long controlled the Congress party,the national government, and many state governments. Feelingfrustrated in their efforts to influence national economic policyin a significant way, these new elites have formulated demandsthat call for substantial decentralization, greater state autonomy,and more tolerance for opposition parties whose electoral supportis mainly state-based.     

Economic Democracy and the Expediency of Worker Participation

The increased discussion of economic democracy in America in recent years makes sense given the context of crises in Keynesianism, the welfare state, corporate legitimacy and American 'competitiveness'. Departing from Dahl's recent analysis, this paper argues that one notion of economic democracy - the internal democratization of the firm - can be conceived and plausibly linked to objectives of increased American competitiveness and community stability. The argument rejects purist schemes of universal cooperative ownership as well as so-called shareholder democracy. It proposes a representative system for the firm based on a balance among shareholder, employee and community interests, a separation of powers between boards of directors and management, and a concept of transition based on democratic development of already widespread employee stock-ownership plans.     

Why might constructed nationalist and ethnic ideologies come into confrontation with each other?

The paper develops a model for examining ethnic conflict in Southeast Asia, using Indonesia as an illustrative case. Ethnic conflict is explained as arising not out of the facts of ethno-cultural pluralism, but rather out of the disentwining of the three visions of the nation: as civic community, as ethno-cultural community and as multicultural community.This disentwining occurs particularly in the context of pressures for democratization. Three aspects of politics are identified as promoting the disentwining so as to engender the weakening of the civic nationalist vision, and thence the confrontation between a majoritarian ethno-cultural nationalism and a minority-focused multicultural nationalism. First, the spread of ideas related to democracy generates the spread of liberal forms of the three nationalist visions, alongside the authoritarian forms, and puts the spotlight on the divergences between these visions. Ideas of democracy are then highjacked by ethnic majorities claiming majority rights, and by ethnic minorities claiming minority rights. Second, the patrimonial basis for politics in much of Southeast Asia means that ethnic majorities and minorities alike perceive democratization as the search for responsive patrons, rather than as the search for civic equality. Third, civic nationalism is further weakened by the erosion of faith in the social justice promises of state elites. While these features of politics promote ethnic tensions, they also generate countervailing factors that ensure the political disunity of ethnic minorities, and thereby inhibit the extent of ethnic conflict.     

Interest groups in Macedonia: Growing pains in a strong party state

This article examines the development of the interest group system in Macedonia since independence and the extent to which it has been able to exert any influence in the political arena. We show how security issues, slow economic development, and democratic deficits have impeded the development of an extensive interest group system able to compete freely in national politics. This has resulted in Macedonia having a bifurcated interest group system with influential power elites but low participation by citizens in formal interest groups. Despite this, there have been some diversification of the group system, restructuring of exiting associations, professionalization, and increased ability, especially that of citizens and social movements, to influence national politics.     

Corruption monitoring and the supply of politicians in China

Monitoring institutions are usually perceived as efficient instruments for improving governance. This article evaluates the link between corruption monitoring and the supply of politicians in nondemocracies. Using China as a case, I show that corruption monitoring pushes capable young elites away from seeking government positions. This effect may be driven by two possible mechanisms: economic returns and career prospects. Specifically, corruption investigations may reduce the expected economic returns for government officials, undermining capable young elite’ willingness and efforts to become government officials. In addition, corruption investigations may indicate that there are potential uncertainties and risks involved when taking on a political career, which reduce capable young elites’ desire to pursue a political career. The empirical analysis confirms these two mechanisms and provides unique evidence for the unintended negative impact of corruption monitoring institutions.     

Development law: Squaring the circle, advancing human rights in Africa

Development law is an ethos-driven law reform paradigm that examines conditions from within the country and provides a frame of reference in which to evaluate the legal regime in the political, economic, social and cultural context. Moreover, development law provides a fresh approach to assessing existing national laws effectiveness generally; it assesses whether modifications are required to promote economic, political, and social progress, including protecting the rights of minority ethnic groups and disenfranchised peoples. By protecting rights, law can be an instrument of social development and will not be alien to large segments of the population. Development law as a paradigm is the result of decision making within the country after careful examination by trained professionals whose sole interest is political, economical, social, cultural and national development. The enactment of laws and integration of customary norms that are embraced by the ruling authority, political elites, and other stake holders will best advance human rights. I thank Professor Mary Wright for reviewing and providing helpful comments on a previous draft of this article.     

Democracy and modern political community: limits and possibilities

There are various limits to what is politically possible. The exigencies of economic production and exchange represent one crucial limit to possible political structures. Inherited Marxist and liberal conceptions of the relation between economic systems and political structures are incoherent; these relations need to be reconceived, yet recent socialist political thinking has preferred to focus mainly on the political domain, pursuing a theory of self-governing community. Can there today be a coherent account of such a theory? One way of showing there cannot is by pressing the question of the contours an dsubstance of modern political community. Optimistic theorists of self-governing community rely on a self-enclosed, determinate conception of community that has its imaginative roots in a vision of ancient liberty: the demos exercising legitimate and effective agency over a particular territory. But modern political community cannot be conceived of in this way: because of the presence of global processes of economic causality, there is today no fit between the territorial identity of a political community and its effective powers of agency. Modern liberty (unlike its ancient counterpart) has no specific or determinate location: its availability depends upon an elaborate division of economic and political labour. In these circumstances, it no longer makes sense to heighten the stakes of membership in a political community, as optimistic theorists of democracy do when they call for a more active and participatory civil society. The for appraising what forms of the division of political labour may be legitimate.     

Building Regions on Economic Success: Prosperity and Regionalism in Rogaland

This article presents a political economy perspective on the growth of regionalism in Rogaland, where ever more political issues have been viewed through a regional lens over the last fifteen years. Rogaland has also experienced an economic boom since the 1970s, when it became the hub of Norway's oil adventures in the North Sea. The question is whether these developments are connected, and more specifically, whether the newfound economic prosperity can explain the growth of regionalism. After discussing the main political economy theories of regionalism, the capacity of each theory in explaining the developments in the case at hand is assessed. In particular, the article presents the theoretical argument behind the idea that economic prosperity could lead to regionalism, referring to cases such as Catalonia, Slovenia and Northern Italy. The growth of regionalism in Rogaland is demonstrated by a quantitative content analysis study, which shows that the growth in regionalism corresponds closely to the economic growth over the period 1960–2000. This leads to the conclusion that economic prosperity is the best explanation for the developments in Rogaland. The article then goes on to show specifically how the region's economic prosperity has been applied by political elites in the creation of a regionalist discourse, with examples of how regional elites have been using the region's prosperity in discussions over infrastructure investments, government representation and regional government.