Transatlantic cooperation,alliance politics and extended deterrence: European perceptions of nuclear weapons

This article discusses the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) debate regarding American nonstrategic nuclear weapons (NSNW) in Europe, given the broad spectrum of views on nuclear issues when comparing individual member states. What is striking is the gap between public attitudes – which are broadly hostile to keeping NSNW in Europe – and elite opinion, which privileges the maintenance of NATO commitments to preserve alliance cohesion. To better understand this tension, this article dissects the elements of extended nuclear deterrence in Europe, addressing the difficulties associated with current nuclear-sharing arrangements. For some NATO states, the alliance's nuclear weapons are a political liability, since nuclear sharing clashes with international disarmament and nonproliferation commitments. For other NATO members, maintaining the status quo is preferable, as long as there is no alliance-wide consensus on the question of NSNW. These debates have been put to rest, for now, with NATO's Deterrence and Defense Posture Review, which reaffirmed the purpose of the alliance's nuclear weapons. However, these divisive debates point to more fundamental issues in alliance management, namely the credibility of American commitments, the sustainability of extended nuclear deterrence in Europe and the inevitable political tensions these questions provoke at the domestic level for NATO allies.     

Security, nationalism and the pursuit of nuclear weapons and missiles: The South Korean case, 1970-82

South Korea decided to develop nuclear weapons and surface-to-surface missiles in the early 1970s. The Park Chung-hee administration made the decision because of its concern about a complete withdrawal of US forces from Korea following the Nixon Doctrine. Simultaneously, increasing nationalism within the administration, caused by its tumultuous relations with the United States, further strengthened such pursuits. Later, when faced with the US threat to withdraw security and economic assistance, the administration slowed down active development of nuclear weapons in 1976, but it continued missile development. However, the Chun Doo-hwan administration, inaugurated in 1980 after military coup and massacre, froze all weapons-related nuclear research and the missile programme. The Chun regime made such a change because it needed the support of the US to make up for its weakness in legitimacy and because the Reagan administration provided a solid defence commitment to South Korea.     

NATO,ballistic missile defense and the future of US tactical nuclear weapons in Europe

Abstract

Within the next few years, NATO will need to make a collective decision about the future of US tactical nuclear weapons (TNW) in Europe. While opinion about the value of these weapons is not as split as conventional wisdom might suggest, and while NATO will remain a nuclear alliance irrespective of this decision, balancing politics and strategy looks likely to be a difficult task. This decision is made far more complex by the determination of NATO officials to link the withdrawal of these weapons to reciprocal reductions in Russian TNW in Europe, and by the possibility of substituting the key strategic and political link they provide with a ballistic missile defense (BMD) system. This article shows how we have arrived at this position, highlights the potential benefits to NATO Europe of BMD, and considers the key questions that the Alliance will face in achieving this. Ultimately, this article shows how the future of TNW in Europe is likely to be linked to whether NATO values arms cuts with Russia, or the deployment of missile defenses, as its central priority.     

Weapons as political symbolism: the role of US tactical nuclear weapons in Europe

This study evaluates the role of tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs) for NATO today. Historically, TNWs fulfill five objectives. First, they provide a deterrent by denial capability. Second, TNWs serve to deter TNWs by other countries. Third, as the most ‘useable’ of nuclear weapons, they offer militaries solutions to a small target set of hardened targets. Fourth, they bridge the interface between nuclear and conventional forces, maintaining linkage up the ladder of escalation. Fifth, they serve as a powerful political symbol of an extended deterrent commitment. While the perception is that their utility for NATO in plausible European contingencies is low, we argue that there is variation in the political and military roles of TNWs. We submit that, in general, the first role has lost its significance but the other objectives remain relevant to NATO's present political circumstances, especially as a symbol of the transatlantic relationship and as a safeguard against Russian belligerence. Accordingly, TNWs remain a significant part of NATO's capabilities and should remain deployed in Europe.     

Keeping a Foot in the Door: Britain's China Policy, 1945-50

Based on Britain and China 1945-1950 (DBPO, 2002), this article examines four major themes in Britain's China policy between 1945 and 1950: British attitudes towards Chinese communism and China's civil war, Anglo-American relations over China, attempts to restore and sustain British commerce in China, and the future of Hong Kong. The central feature of policy was to 'keep a foot in the door', even under a communist government, to protect British interests. Only modest success was achieved. British officials were divided over the issue of Chinese communism and Britain miscalculated the timescale in the ending of the civil war. The US administration proved largely uncooperative over China, and British commerce was eventually squeezed out. Hong Kong survived as a British colony. Amidst the considerable thought given to the future of Hong Kong, and to Britain's ability to defend it, intelligence reported that the communists had no plans to seize the colony.     

Diversionary cheap talk: economic conditions and US foreign policy rhetoric, 1945-2010

ABSTRACT

This study explains how the economy affects the foreign policy rhetoric used by American presidents. When economic conditions deteriorate, presidents criticize foreign nations to boost their approval ratings. Presidents use this “diversionary cheap talk” in response to the misery index of unemployment plus inflation, which poses a unique threat to their popularity. They target historical rivals, which make intergroup distinctions most salient. Diversionary cheap talk is most influential for and most frequently used by Democratic presidents, whose non-core constituents prefer hawkish foreign policy but already expect it from Republican presidents. I test the observable implications of the theory with the American Diplomacy Dataset, an original record of 50,000 American foreign policy events between 1851 and 2010 drawn from a corpus of 1.3 million New York Times articles.     

The politics of naval aid: the foreign office, the admiralty, and Anglo-Soviet technical cooperation, 1936-37

This article examines the interdepartmental friction caused by Soviet requests for technical naval assistance from Britain between 1936 and 1937. With an eye to the deteriorating global situation, the Admiralry remained wedded to the view that any help leading to the strengthening of the Soviet navy would only wreck Germanys commitment to crucial qualitative and quantitative naval restrictions. Adopting a different tack, the Foreign Office welcomed the opportuniry to accommodate Soviet fleet requirements as a means of forging Anglo-Soviet amiry and a European balance of power. Ultimately however, the fate of Anglo-Soviet technical cooperation was determined by the exigencies of British rearmament.     

Making a Cold War in the Near East: Turkey and the Origins of the Cold War, 1945-1947

During the post-war negotiations in the years of 1945 and 1946, the Soviets launched a bitter war of nerves against Turkey in order to establish a military base in Istanbul and share control of the Straits. It was crucial for Britain that the USSR be prevented from gaining any influence in Turkey. However, as Britain was in no position to support Turkey financially, American authorities encouraged by London and Ankara took over the responsibility for Turkey. This articles examines the Great Powers rivalry over Turkey and Turkey's response to it. It argues that regional factors other than US-Soviet confrontation, such as Turkey's security search against the Soviets, also played a crucial part in starting the Cold War in the Near East.     

Entente Neo-Coloniale?: Ernest Bevin and the Proposals for an Anglo-French Third World Power, 1945-1949

Ernest Bevin made the Third World Power project his own. He sought an imperial grouping led by Britain and France with economic and defence components and social-democratic values. It was to be a way to access raw materials and bolster European economies, and in time to create a global, strategic space between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. Bevin's alternative vision failed, in part because the demands of cold war bipolarity trumped the Third World Power concept. The project was also poorly conceived and badly managed, and did not stem antagonism between Britain and France. France, unlike Britain, was also soon able to upgrade its imperial commercial interests through the European Communities.     

Globalization,risk-taking and violence: too much too soon in the late Roman Republic and pre-Renaissance Italian cities

Past research has found that globalization and political violence have been linked in both modern and less modern times. Normally, groups that have been disadvantaged or displaced by globalization are seen as responsible for these outbreaks of violence. In the case of the Late Republic of Rome and medieval Italy before the Renaissance, violence was actually prompted by major increases in wealth among those who benefited when control of the political system became much more valuable. The increased value raised the stakes of political control and underlay the resulting higher levels of violence.     

Re-animating a radioactive landscape: informal life politics in the wake of the Fukushima nuclear disaster

The earthquake, tsunami and nuclear accident of 11 March 2011 posed massive and continuing social challenges to communities in the affected areas. People from wide areas around the Fukushima No. 1 nuclear plant received vastly conflicting information about the levels of radiation released and about the likely health effects. They were left facing agonising decisions whether to remain and face possible (but uncertain) long-term health risks, or whether to move away, leaving behind homes, friends, jobs, schools and communities. Focusing on the case of the small farming community of Tōwa in Nihonmatsu City, this article examines self-help activities that have emerged in the affected areas in the wake of 3/11. The activities have included community monitoring of radiation levels and collaborative research with academic scientists to explore ways to reduce radioactive contamination in forests, farm soil and crops. The self-help activities of Tōwa residents can be seen as an example of “informal life politics” – that is, of the way in which grassroots groups respond to challenges to their livelihood or way of life by organising themselves and taking actions outside the sphere of formal governmental structures. It is argued here that the residents of Tōwa were able to respond rapidly to the challenges of the Fukushima disaster because they had already developed informal life politics practices in response to earlier challenges of local economic decline and depopulation. I also suggest that, in responding to the Fukushima disaster, the relationship between the people of Tōwa and their landscape has been profoundly changed, and that this change has implications not just for the community itself but also for the wider world.     

Europe's Last Red Terrorists: The Revolutionary Organization 17 November, 1975-2000

This article discusses and analyses the wave of bombing incidents occurring in South Africa between 1996 and the beginning of 2000, and inter alia linked to vigilante action, gang warfare and drug smuggling. An overview of measures adopted to combat what has been termed ‘urban terrorism’ is also provided. In conclusion, the point is made that it is unclear to what extent the incidents are criminally or politically motivated, or whether a combination of motives are present.