Great powers,civil society and authoritarian diffusion in Central Asia

ABSTRACT

This article draws on the authoritarian promotion literature to assess contending pressures for democratization and authoritarianism in Central Asia. Domestic actors ultimately determine receptivity to democracy promotion, but external pressures for democratic transformation or authoritarian persistence exist in Central Asia. A brief overview of authoritarian trends in Central Asia is followed by the theoretical arguments for authoritarian persistence, with special attention to the civil society dimension in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Western programmes supporting liberal democracy and civil society have encountered resistance from authoritarian leaders in Central Asia, though the evidence for direct influence from authoritarian external actors is limited. A process of indirect authoritarian diffusion, in combination with the region’s illiberal societies and Western democracy promotion fatigue, undermines the development of civil society and makes authoritarian persistence in Central Asia likely.     

Virtual regionalism,regional structures and regime security in Central Asia

The failures of regionalism and regional structures for cooperation between the five CIS Central Asian states are well studied. However, explanations so far do not convincingly account for the apparent enthusiasm of these states for the macro-regional frameworks of the Eurasian Economic Community, the Collective Security Treaty Organization and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. This article argues that, as with previous efforts at Central Asian regional self-organization, these broader organizations still largely represent a form of ‘virtual regionalism’. But for the Central Asian states they offer a new and increasingly important function, that of ‘protective integration’. This takes the form of collective political solidarity or ‘bandwagoning’ with Russia (and China in the SCO) against processes and pressures that are perceived as challenging incumbent leaders and their political entourage. A primary motivation for Central Asian leaders' engagement in the EAEC, CSTO and SCO, therefore, is the reinforcement of domestic regime security and the resistance of ‘external’ agendas of good governance or democracy promotion. These goals are concealed behind a discourse that denigrates the imposition of external ‘values’ and continues to give pride of place to national sovereignty. This offers little to overcome the underlying fractures between states in Central Asia.