Contradictions and Constraints in Chile's Health Care and Education Decentralization

Proponents of social service decentralization often claim that transferring service administration to lower levels of government facilitates increases citizen participation and governmental accountability while improving allocative efficiency and equity in service distribution. Using the cases of health and education decentralization in Chile, this article evaluates whether and under what conditions social service decentralization programs are likely to deliver on these promises. It discusses the tensions between equity and efficiency goals and how these may play out given different accountability mechanisms in local public choice, principal-agent, and real-world "hybrid" decentralization models. The case studies illustrate the difficulty of balancing the need for central standards and funding with local autonomy, but suggest that accountability mechanisms that emerged following Chile's transition to democracy in 1990 led to improvements in both equity and efficiency in decentralized service administration.     

The promises and realities of Ghana's decentralization: a case study from the Wenchi district of Ghana

This article explores the functioning of the decentralized structures in Wenchi district of Ghana with the view of generating deeper insights into the interplay between decentralization outcomes and prevailing social, economic, and cultural realties of the people. Data were collected from both secondary and primary sources. The main findings of the study indicate that sub-district structures do not provide an effective platform for citizen participation. Elections were found to primarily be an instrument for demanding accountability from assembly members. Finally, field services were found not to be responsive to the needs of citizens.     

Self-Restraint in Search of Legitimacy: The Reform of the Argentine Supreme Court

In 2003, the Argentine executive promoted a process of Supreme Court reform that entailed limiting presidential attributions in the selection of justices. Then the renewed court implemented changes to its internal procedures that increased its own accountability mechanisms. The literature on the politics of institutional judicial independence in Latin America has developed two explanatory models: one presents reforms as an insurance policy, the other as a consequence of divided government. Both perspectives conceive of reforms as a result of political competition and as a way to limit other actors, the future government in the first case, the party in power in the second. This study, by contrast, explains the Argentine reforms as movements of strategic self-restriction, designed to build legitimacy and credibility, for the government and the court, respectively, in a context of social and institutional crisis and pressure from civil society.     

The Authoritarian Executive? Horizontal and Vertical Accountability in Nicaragua

This article uses empirical evidence from Nicaragua to examine Guillermo O'Donnell's argument that new democracies often become undemocratic delegative democracies and that vertical accountability is not enough to stop such encroaching authoritarianism. While events in the last five years have focused attention on illegal executive behavior by former president Alemán, Nicaragua's democracy actually has experienced authoritarian presidencies under all the major parties. Elections and popular mobilization have strengthened the independence of the legislature, however. Mechanisms of vertical accountability thereby have proven more effective than expected in restraining executive authoritarianism and fostering institutions of horizontal accountability. The case of Nicaragua shows that citizens can use the power balance and separate institutional mandate of presidential democracy to limit authoritarianism.     

Balancing justice and reconciliation in East Timor

Abstract

As East Timor emerges from a long Indonesian nightmare, it is seeking to balance the agendas of justice and reconciliation. The verdict on justice for East Timor is one of disappointment. The main obstacle to accountability is Indonesia, abetted by an international community that seeks its assistance in the “war on terror.” East Timor's leaders have emphasized reconciliation while promoting a healing process and good governance. Recent violence reveals just how difficult this task remains. The hybrid tribunal established in East Timor by the UN was once heralded as an important innovation in transitional justice, avoiding the high cost and lengthy proceedings of other international tribunals. However, the tribunal has been unable to hold accountable those who bear the greatest responsibility for outrages committed against Timorese and defendants did not get fair trials or competent defense. A truth commission report released in December 2005, Chega! (Enough), emphasizes justice and reparations. The political leadership soft peddles justice because they believe this makes more sense and will better serve the people. Indonesians are now being given a chance to testify in front of the Commission of Truth and Friendship (CTF), but concern is widespread concern that the CTF emphasizes reaching closure, has no judicial mandate, and only ensures impunity for ranking perpetrators. Indonesia and East Timorese can regain dignity and move beyond their shared tragedy through a process of reconciliation that is based on justice and atonement. Germany shows this is possible; Japan, that it is difficult and problematic if neglected.     

Delegation,Accountability and Legislator Moonlighting: Agency Problems in Germany

Members of parliament in many countries are legally permitted to execute (un)paid jobs in addition to their political mandate. It is often argued that such ‘moonlighting’ activities are unproblematic for the chain of democratic delegation and accountability as long as outside interests/earnings are disclosed to citizen-principals; the latter may then sanction (perceived) misconduct through the ballot box. Using principal–agent theory as an analytical framework and the German national parliament as a case study, this paper discusses why the accountability mechanisms of moonlighting disclosure and electoral control are often impaired in practice. We also illustrate that these concerns generalise beyond the German setting.     

Controlling the unruly agents – linkages between accountability and corruption within the executive structures of Botswana

ABSTRACT

Representative democracy entails delegation of power to representatives and other actors within the political system. Oftentimes, the delegating party has little insight into the actions of the person(s) to whom power is delegated. Ensuring that the power-holder does not misuse his/her powers is, therefore, a challenge. This article analyses accountability mechanisms through which the delegating party can prevent and detect misuse of power in the form of corruption. The article argues that political institutions contribute towards such mechanisms being available/unavailable to the delegating party. The analysis focuses on the case of Botswana, where executive structures stipulate the accountability mechanisms available to principals. As shown by the analysis, principals have formal access to many such mechanisms. Oftentimes, however, these mechanisms are not applied. The analysis shows that accountability alone cannot explain levels of corruption within executive structures of Botswana but that informal rules also explain the presence/absence of corrupt practices.     

Promoting empowerment? The World Bank's Village Investment Project in Kyrgyzstan

This article examines the extent to which the World Bank's community-driven Village Investment Project empowered people to influence the choice of local investments (micro-projects) and to exact accountability from their leaders. It is based on qualitative interviews and group discussions in 16 rural communities. The research demonstrates that the project provided an effective mechanism for responsive infrastructure delivery to address local priority needs. However, it did not improve accountability either within or outside the micro-project boundaries. The project's bottom-up development model was not by itself sufficient to enable people to exercise power over local government officials and informal leaders in the absence of effective horizontal accountability institutions within the state.     

俄罗斯中央与地方关系嬗变的宪法逻辑考察

俄罗斯中央与地方关系是保证国家稳定发展的重大问题。俄罗斯联邦宪法及具有宪法性法律文件是调整中央与地方关系的重要载体。从动力上,中央和地方对宪法的凝聚力是在强总统推动下逐渐实现的,总统—威权体制是中央与地方关系嬗变的动力;从趋势上看,中央与地方关系结构从分散联邦制走向了集中联邦制,职权从地方向中央聚集,并最终集中于总统;从控制上看,中央对地方官员的问责从横向政治问责转变为垂直行政问责,中央控制地方的重要手段是问责,对地方最高官员问责的提出与决定权集中于总统。实践证明,完全照搬西方的联邦制并没有带来国家的统一和安定,建立符合俄罗斯国情和现代化要求的联邦体制是中央与地方关系模式的基石,明确中央与地方权责的合理边界,是二者关系的核心;顺应民主法治化潮流,注重以法治方式构建长效稳定的关系格局,加大权力制约力度,这是维护良性关系的重要保障。     

A Tale of Three Cities: Electoral Accountability in Indonesian Local Politics

In Indonesia, local government is endowed with important policy prerogatives and local politics is key to advance social welfare. The literature on Indonesian local politics has convincingly exposed serious limitations in local democratic practices, and it has questioned the ability of local democracy to promote genuine political change. This work, however, predominantly focuses on elite politics and specific forms of accountability based on patronage and clientelism. In this paper, we study democratic accountability in Indonesia from a different perspective. Drawing from the comparative literature on voting behavior, we hypothesize that Indonesian voters evaluate local politicians for their performance, and that they vote to reward or punish them for what they do in office. The analysis of three original surveys conducted in the cities of Medan, Samarinda and Surabaya offers partial support for this argument. While there is a positive relationship between evaluations of local government performance and support for incumbents, the strength of this link varies substantially across individuals and cities. The results shed new light on voter-politician linkages in Indonesia, suggesting that forms of accountability different from clientelism may emerge in this large and diverse country.     

Building Democracy to Last: The Turkish Experience in Comparative Perspective

This study analyses the relationship between checks and balances and democracy, focusing on Turkey in comparative perspective. In a large-N setting, the effects of checks and balances on the quality of democracy are examined. The findings reinforce the essential relationship between democracy and checks and balances. The article then discusses the implications of the the findings for Turkey. It stresses the need for horizontal accountability via checks and balances vested in different state agencies. In addition to state-level checks and balances, the importance of societal actors as sources of accountability is also elaborated. The study identifies the need for vertical accountability, not only through free elections but also by creating a political setting in which pluralistic media and civil society can thrive. In light of findings, the article stresses the need for a new constitutional framework that can embrace both state- and societal-level checks and balances.     

The politics of anti-corruption enforcement in South Africa

The criminalisation of corruption recognises that the misuse of official office for private gain exacts a detrimental and distorting effect on a country's social and economic development. This is especially acute in countries undergoing rapid political system transitions. In an effort to combat corruption, governments have come under increasing pressure to enhance the monitoring and oversight of public institutions through stringent intra and inter-institutional checks. In South Africa, the evidence clearly shows that concrete and incremental steps have been introduced since the country's democratic transition to regulate malfeasance in the public sector through heightened monitoring, prevention, investigation and prosecution measures. Despite these measures, intra and inter-institutional analysis of anti-corruption enforcement indicates that the integrity of this approach, informed by principle-agent accountability arrangements, can be compromised or side-lined by collective action efforts that undermine the effectiveness of anti-corruption mechanisms. This reflects a politicisation of anti-corruption enforcement.     

Administrative Innovations and Accountability Failures: The Termination of the Spanish Telecommunications Agency

We discuss how far accountability practices may be relevant to the success of independent regulators in countries without a tradition of administrative autonomy. We develop a conceptualisation of agency accountability failures and develop an analytical framework to examine the life and termination of the Spanish regulatory agency for telecommunications, CMT (Comisión del Mercado de las Telecomunicaciones - Telecommunications Market Commission). We argue that the CMT’s termination was related, among other reasons, to accountability failures in its institutional design. The paper relies on a variety of sources, including legislation, literature, media coverage, and semistructured interviews with agency officials and several stakeholders.     

Sexual Abuse as the Core Transgression of Childhood Innocence: Unintended Consequences for Care Leavers

ABSTRACT

The decision of the Gillard government to establish a royal commission in 2012 was acclaimed by care leavers. However, they were soon disillusioned: it was not the royal commission for which they had long struggled. Its terms of reference were too broad, encompassing a range of institutions never before the subject of official inquiries, yet also too narrowly focused on sexual abuse. Care leavers who suffered other forms of abuse were excluded. This paper argues that, while care leaver advocacy contributed to the decision to establish a royal commission, the agenda was a product of other pressures fuelled by state-based inquiries about cover-ups of sexual abuse of children, particularly by clergy. Sexual abuse could no longer be regarded as a sin to be handled in-house by institutions but a crime for which the state carried superordinate responsibility. The government had to intervene to address society’s “ultimate collective shame”. The Royal Commission into Institutional Responses to Child Sexual Abuse has made a massive contribution to our understanding of child sexual abuse and to reforms in child protection policy and practice. But its mandate created unintended consequences, and questions remain about the unmet needs of care leavers who suffered other forms of abuse.     

Having Your Cake and Eating It,Too: Can Regulatory Agencies Be Both Independent and Accountable?

Independent regulatory agencies (IRAs) were created in various sectors and on different governmental levels to implement liberalization policies. This paper investigates the link between IRAs' independence, which is said to promote regulatory credibility and the use of technical expertise, and their accountability, which is related to the need for controlling and legitimizing independent regulators. The literature on the regulatory state anticipates a positive relation between the independence and accountability of IRAs, but systematic empirical evidence is still lacking. To tackle this question, this paper measures and compares the independence and the accountability of IRAs in three differentially liberalized sectors in Switzerland (telecommunications, electricity and railways). With the application of Social Network Analysis, this piece of research shows that IRAs can be de facto independent and accountable at the same time, but the two features do not necessarily co‐evolve in the same direction.     

Corruption protection: fractionalization and the corruption of anti-corruption efforts in Iraq after 2003

This paper argues that corruption protection arises because a central feature of Iraq’s institutional environment is its factionalised political system between groups (i.e. sectarian affiliation), and these groups both protect their members from corruption charges launched by other groups, and collude to protect each other from prosecution of corruption. The paper defines corruption protection as ‘action carried out to prevent perpetrators of corruption from being brought to justice’, which is a systematic attempt among corrupt agents seeking to evade accountability for primary corruption activity. The paper has identified two contrasting paths taken by these groups in power in the dynamics of corruption protection: (a) The competitive mode is illustrated by spurious allegations of corruption made by some groups against other groups. Tension between factions results in fake charges being brought against rivals which sometimes lead to wrongful imprisonment of the innocent; (b) collusive between intra-factional groups, corruptly conspiring to hide each other’s corrupt acts thereby constructing a shield which protects the entire elite in Iraq, an issue which I label ‘solidarity in corruption’. The paper will conclude that despite the apparent strength of anti-corruption framework, the reality tells us a very different story; the multiple institutions established to fight corruption and the system of accountability can also constitute a means for corruption protection.     

Health Care Reform in Vietnam: Chasing Shadows

The purpose of this paper is to analyse and assess health care reforms in Vietnam since the late 1980s. It will argue that shortcomings of the reforms centre on three related sets of measures: substitution of budgetary allocation with user charges, expansion of social insurance and promotion of decentralisation. Reduction in fiscal support for providers offered them the motive to concentrate on revenue-generating activities while user charges provided them with the means to do so. With both the motive and the means for maximising revenues in place, providers vigorously pursued income-maximisation which had the effect of raising overall expenditures while reducing access. To deal with the problem of declining access due to rising user charges, the government is in the process of vigorously expanding social insurance. However, social insurance does not deal with the root causes of the problem of rising expenditures which lie in paying providers on a fee-for-service (FFS) basis. The paper will further argue that decentralisation has aggravated the adverse effects of FFS by diluting control and accountability.     

The Problematic Relation between Direct Democracy and Accountability in Latin America: Evidence from the Bolivian Case

During the wave of constitutional reforms, which started in the late 1980s, Institutions of Direct Democracy (IDD) have been incorporated into most Latin American constitutions, and over the past fifteen years, an increased use of these instruments by Latin American governments has been observed. This article deals with two questions related to this phenomenon: (1) what motivated the adoption and use of these institutions; and (2) what consequences can be expected with regard to democratic accountability in the region? To answer these questions, first, a classification of IDD is developed. In this, special attention is paid to the ability of the various types of IDD to introduce accountability into the representative structures of presidential systems. This classification is subsequently applied to analyse constitutional frameworks and direct democratic experience in the region. The findings suggest that the rise of IDD in Latin America was mainly induced by executive‐legislative conflict and has done little to foster accountability. Finally, therefore, a detailed account of the specific constellation that led to the adoption of IDD in Bolivia is analysed in order to illustrate under which circumstances political actors choose to adopt and employ these tools.     

Playing the “Game” of Transparency and Accountability: Non-elite Politics in Kyrgyzstan’s Natural Resource Governance

ABSTRACT

This article demonstrates the role of non-elites in the struggle for transparency and accountability in Kyrgyzstan’s mining sector. Most existing accounts foreground elite strategies and political machines in the governance of post-Soviet societies. Drawing on recent anthropological work on post-Soviet politics and applying it critically to the literature on neopatrimonialism, this article sheds light on the adoption of political game strategies by community members (non-elites) to advance their interests and challenge elite dominance within the case study’s mining communities. This finding responds to recent calls to interrogate the activities of non-elites at the margins of neopatrimonial contexts. The article advances a research agenda on how practices by non-elites shape the multiple meanings and enactments of transparency and accountability by elites in natural resource governance. It also points to the need to explore how and why “communities” exert their “agency” in governing natural resources within post-Soviet contexts.     

Ending Up in Pizza: Accountability as a Problem of Institutional Arrangement in Brazil

Brazilians often complain that investigations of corruption by public servants drag on for years or bring few legal sanctions on the perpetrators. This lack of accountability is so pervasive that a slang phrase, acabou em pizza , is often invoked when investigations are inconclusive. This article investigates the role of four Brazilian public institutions charged with keeping public servants accountable. For analysis, it breaks the accountability process into its three component stages: oversight, investigation, and sanction. Through a study of six prominent cases of corruption, it shows that the weakness of the accountability process in Brazil is due not entirely to the toothlessness of individual institutions of accountability, but also to the independence of such institutions at each of the three stages. These findings suggest that institutional arrangements influence the degree of accountability, and thereby also public trust and confidence, in Latin America's largest democracy.