Political shirking and the last term problem: Evidence for a party-administered pension system

Studies of political shirking have disagreed both over whether the voting behavior of Members of Congress changes in their last term, and over the manner in which last term shirking can be controlled: through electoral sorting, or through a pension system. This paper presents evidence that Members of Congress who leave the House to run for statewide office do alter their voting behavior between the two sessions of their last House term, and that this change includes an ideological shift toward their state party delegations. The results suggest that a party-driven pension system influences the voting of House members who aspire to higher office, but that the pension system is not sufficient to control the last term shirking likely to occur if term limitations were imposed on House members.     

Equilibrium in fiscal choices: Evidence from a budget game

This is an applied study about the stability of collective decision-making in fiscal matters and the features of individual preferences which are sufficient to reach a social ordering. It is based on data about citizens' preferences collected through a budget game played by a sample of voters in Turin, a large Italian city. By simulating a series of individual choices, a social ordering of the municipal budget items is arrived at. The role played by restricted (i.e., single-peaked, single-caved etc.) preferences to avoid cycles in choice simulations is then assessed.     

The incumbency dilemma and rent extraction by legislators

An incumbent is able to shirk or otherwise obtain rents based on his tenure of office because more senior representatives are better able to advance their legislative agendas than are more junior members. The realization of incumbent rents implies that an electoral prisoners' dilemma occurs at the level of voters across electoral districts. Pivotal voters in each district would benefit if all incumbents were replaced by challengers with similar legislative programs because the cost of incumbent rents can be avoided, but each benefits if his representative has more seniority than those from other districts.     

Effectiveness of fiscal incentives for innovation: Evidence from meta‐regression analysis

This article examines the microeconometric evidence on the impact of government support for R&D and innovation. Our meta‐regression analysis uses a dataset of empirical evidence on the effects of government R&D policies on innovation and investigates the factors that may explain the differences in the estimated effects. The meta‐analysis is structured to include both the direct and indirect government support for R&D and innovation. The estimated results reveal the heterogeneity of empirical studies with respect to the type of incentive, data, and econometric methodology used. The results indicate that the output additionality effect is on average stronger for R&D tax incentives than subsidies. Studies that use the subsample of high technology sector show a stronger additionality effect of fiscal incentives on innovation. Moreover, small and medium enterprises have a stronger input additionality effect. The results also suggest that studies considered endogeneity issues have on average stronger additionality effect.     

Intergovernmental transfers and fiscal equalization across the north-eastern states of India: Evidence from panel data

While numerous studies have tried to analyze the impact of intergovernmental transfers in fostering fiscal equalization in India, there need to be more studies in the context of north-eastern (NE) states. Situating in a geographically isolated and economically backward region, the states of NE India depend heavily on central fiscal transfers to meet expenditures and to promote various economic activities in the region. One of the essential objectives of these transfers is to achieve fiscal equity. Hence, the study attempts to analyze the fiscal equalizing nature of the intergovernmental transfers across NE India during 1991–2019. The coefficient of variation (CV) analysis results indicates that although fiscal transfers reduced the magnitude of disparity in the own-source revenue across the NE states, a significant amount of disparity still exists in the resource base across these states. The regression analysis findings suggest that the transfers across these states need to be more fiscal equalizing. The per capita gross state domestic product emerges as a positive and significant in predicting per capita transfers, and hence it questions the progressivity of central transfers. When assigning the interstate share of transfers, more weight should be placed on fiscal equalizing factors such as per capita income. The Finance Commission of India should emphasize fiscal equalizing criteria when allocating weights and recommending transfers to the NE States. Additionally, states with low incomes should be recognized in plan schemes.     

Barriers to competition and the effect on political shirking: 1953–1992

Economists and political scientists have offered a variety of explanations for why legislators might rationally choose to ignore the preferences of their constituents, political parties, and presidents. The broad conclusion of this literature is that there is an element of “shirking” in congressional voting. The objective of this paper is to suggest that the effects of shirking in congressional voting may have increased over time, largely in response to the raising of barriers to competition in congressional elections, thereby enabling legislators to vote their own preferences without fear of losing reelection. We use a quasi-experimental design that controls for the effects of party, region, electoral safety, presidential control of the White House, and constituency factors, in isolating the causal effects of barriers to entry on a continuous series of roll-calls regarding the raising of the debt limit between 1953 and 1992. We find that “shirking” in legislative voting on debt limit legislation is a post-1970s phenomenon.     

Risk illusion and organized irresponsibility in contemporary finance: rethinking class and risk society

Abstract

This paper analyzes the lead-up to and aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis to show how processes associated with risk society – the social production and distribution of systemic financial risk in a context of organized irresponsibility – are contributing to the intensification of contemporary class-based inequalities. Utilizing a framework based in Bourdieusian class resources, the analysis moves beyond Beck's rejection of the relevance of class relations to systemic risk, and his critics’ denial that risk transforms existing logics of distribution, to identify key shifts in the relation between contemporary financial risk, power and inequality. The conclusions of this study, showing how systemic financial risk in contexts of organized irresponsibility contributes to differential ‘risk-classes’, suggest that risk is a key source of contemporary inequality and that reconstructing the theory of risk society can illuminate these changes.     

The classification of electoral systems: Bringing legislators back in

It is widely assumed that electoral institutions shape politicians' incentive for personal vote-seeking, with important behavioral and policy consequences. Yet, there is a surprising lack of consensus on how to compare real-world electoral institutions. Using new data this paper examines how legislators' own perception of their electoral incentives in fifteen democracies correspond to some of the most seminal classification schemes in political science. Our survey of 2326 legislators – the empirically broadest study of personal vote orientation so far conducted – demonstrates that legislators do not always understand electoral incentives in the same way scholarly rankings do, highlighting the need for scholars of political institutions to justify their choice of classification scheme. If not, an entire body of literature may be misguided.     

On the (mis)measurement of legislator ideology and shirking

In this paper, we show that current statistical measures of legislator's shirking are implicitly based on the electoral concept of a unique majority rule equilibrium point in the policy space where elections are contested. We note that such equilibria do not exist generically and present statistical results showing that cross-sectional regressions where legislators' voting indices are predicted by district average demograhic and economic data are mis-specified. We also discuss a weaker equilibrium construct, the uncovered set, and present statistical evidence showing that differences in voting behavior between Senators from the same state are positively related to the heterogeneity of the electorate. We argue that current evidence alleged to show shirking by Senators is equally consistent with Senators who perfectly represent an idiosyncratic constituency that cannot be represented by district average data.     

State fiscal constraint and local overrides: a regression discontinuity design estimation of the fiscal effects

Public Choice - Despite abundant evidence regarding the influence of US state-imposed tax and expenditure limitations on local governments, the causes and consequences of local overrides remain...     

Cheap bribes and the corruption ban: A coordination game among rational legislators

Legislators in modern democracies (a) accept bribes that are small compared to the value of the statutes they pass and (b) allow bans against bribery to be enforced. In our model of bribery, rational legislators accept bribes smaller not only than the benefit the briber receives but than the costs the legislators incur in accepting the bribes. Rather than risk this outcome, the legislators may be willing to suppress bribery altogether. The size of legislatures, the quality of voter information, the nature of party organization, and the structure of committees will all influence the frequency and size of bribes.     

Does agency competition improve the quality of policy analysis? Evidence from OMB and CBO fiscal projections

Public management scholars often claim that agency competition provides an effective institutional check on monopoly authority, and hence, leads to improvement of administrative performance in public sector agencies. This logic was central for creating the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) in 1975 to challenge the policy information provided by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). We challenge this conventional wisdom by demonstrating that CBO has failed to enhance the quality of U.S. fiscal policy analysis on its own terms; nor has it spurred improvements in OMB's performance. Our empirical results indicate that the quality of OMB's fiscal projections has often deteriorated since the establishment of CBO as a rival bureau. We also show that both public and private information is being shared by these agencies to produce a similar caliber of task outputs. The broader implications of our study indicate that although politicians face incentives to employ agency competition in governmental settings, this type of bureaucratic strategy does not necessarily enhance the quality of administrative performance. © 2006 by the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management     

The importance of personal vote intentions for the responsiveness of legislators: A field experiment

Individual legislators can be important agents of political representation. However, this is contingent upon their responsiveness to constituency requests. To study this topic, an increasing number of studies use field experiments in which the researcher sends a standardized email to legislators on behalf of a constituent. In this paper, we report the results of an original field experiment of this genre with the members of the German Bundestag. Supplementing previous research, we explore whether constituency requests in which voters mention a personal vote intention (rather than a partisan vote intention) increase legislators’ responsiveness, and how this treatment relates to electoral system's incentives. We find that legislators treated with a personal vote intention were more likely to respond (67 per cent) and respond faster than those treated with a partisan vote intention (59 per cent). However, we also show that the treatment effect is moderated by electoral system incentives: it is larger for nominally-elected legislators than for those elected via a party list. Our results suggest that electoral system's incentives matter for legislators’ responsiveness only when constituents explicitly signals an intention to cast a personal vote.     

Belief systems concerning the environment: The general public,attentive publics,and state legislators

This paper examines multiple characteristics of belief systems among people at different levels in the policy process using the same measures in the same time period. More specifically, it analyzes belief systems concerning the environment among the general public, several attentive publics, and state legislators in Idaho. The following belief system characteristics are probed: horizontal constraint among specific issue beliefs, and between general environmental orientations and party and ideology; vertical constraint between the general environmental orientation and specific issue beliefs; and the role of general orientations in screening incoming information. Legislators are more likely to connect their environmental beliefs to partisan and ideological orientations. However, attentive and general public respondents do exhibit substantial constraintwithin the environmental issue domain; individual self-placement on a preservationist-developmentalist dimension appears to provide a cohering force in orientations to the environment. While legislators exhibit greater belief connections with general political orientations, the results also suggest an order in the public's beliefs about the environment and in the nature of conflict over the environment.     

Austerity and niche parties: The electoral consequences of fiscal reforms

Austerity policies — policies of sharp reductions of a government's budget deficint involving spending cuts and tax increases — are claimed to boost support for radical political parties. We argue, counter to popular claims, that austerity measures actually reduce support for radical and niche parties. Austerity policies force traditional left-right politics to the forefront of political debate with the traditional mainstream parties having a stronger ownership over those issues. We systematically explore the impact of austerity measures on the electoral fortunes of niche parties in 16 developed countries over a 35-year period, while controlling for a number of socio-economic variables. We find that austerity policies that rely on tax increases affect radical parties on the left and the right in different ways than fiscal adjustments based on spending cuts.