Voting on standardisation

This paper analyses equilibria of voting on commodity standards within the framework of a Farrell-Saloner model which takes into consideration the trade-off between network effects and losses from a reduction of variety. Social welfare implications are derived and discussed with respect to manipulations of majority rules. The findings indicate that welfare implications of standards are highly sensitive to the decision procedure and that the choice of the decision rule is non-trivial as it can at least prevent worst outcomes if not guarantee optimal results.     

Congressional Voting on Term Limits

Between 1990 and 1995,twenty-three states unilaterally imposedterm limits on their own delegations toCongress. In 1995 the House ofRepresentatives defeated a constitutionalamendment that would have limited the termsfor all of Congress. Only weeks later, theSupreme Court struck down the individualstate laws. In 1997 the House againbrought the issue to a vote, which alsofailed. This paper models congressionalvoting on term limits with a simple gamewithin an interest-group theory withlegislators as imperfect agents ofconstituents. The game foremost predictsthat members from term-limited states wouldbe more likely to support term limits inthe first vote but no more likely on thesecond vote. The empirical section employsprobit, multinomial logit, and orderedprobit maximum likelihood estimations toconfirm the stated hypotheses. Among otherresults, in particular both the joint andconditional probability of a `yea' on thefirst vote and a subsequent `nay' on thesecond vote is higher for members fromstates that had unilaterally self-imposedterm limits. The results are robust tomodel specification, estimator, andalternative sampling. Implications areproposed in the concluding comments.     

The Calculus of Voting in Compulsory Voting Systems

Compulsory voting laws have consistently been demonstrated to boost electoral participation. Despite the widespread presence of compulsory voting and the significant impact these laws appear to have on voting behavior, surprisingly little effort has been devoted to analyzing how mandatory voting alters the decision-making calculus of individual voters in these systems. Moreover, studies that investigate the influence of compulsory voting laws on electoral participation generally treat these policies monolithically, with scant attention to the nuances that differentiate mandatory voting laws across systems and to their consequences for voting rates. Analyses that explicitly and empirically examine the effects of penalties and enforcement are surprisingly rare. This study aims to fill that void by adapting rational choice models of participation in elections for compulsory voting systems. I find that the level of penalties countries impose for non-compliance and the degree of penalty enforcement impact turnout rates. Voters in mandatory voting systems abstain least when both the penalties and the likelihood of enforcement are high, and abstain most when both meaningless.

Rent-seeking in higher education: Voting on academic requirements

Research on U.S. college athletics suggests that voting on academic eligibility rules is motivated by rent-seeking behavior. Furthermore, academic eligibility rules have been criticized as being racially biased — more blacks than whites fail to meet the requirements. This paper examines whether the potential racial bias impacted voting on a specific academic eligibility rule known as Proposition 42. Evidence of customer discrimination suggests revenue generating differentials between black and white college basketball players. If rent-seeking behavior motivates voting on academic eligibility rules, then the racial composition of recruits and fans may be determinants of Proposition 42 voting. The results show that schools with more black fans were more likely to oppose Proposition 42; however, schools with a larger pool of potential black recruits tended to favor it, perhaps due to a comparative advantage in recruiting black student-athletes.     

Voting on income tax exemptions

Most itemized tax exemptions lead to significant deductions for a minority of the population only. This raises the question why the majority does not vote for the abolition of these tax privileges in exchange for lower tax rates. In this paper we show that a reform proposal may be voted down, even when the majority uses the exemption at stake below the average. Turning to an empirical application, we simulate the voting outcome on the proposal to abolish the tax deductibility of commuting expenses in Germany. Our model predicts that this proposal would be rejected, even though a comfortable majority has below-average deductions.     

Mobilization Around New Convenience Voting Methods: A Field Experiment to Encourage Voting by Mail with a Downloadable Ballot and Early Voting

Political Behavior - Election reform has allowed citizens in many states to choose among convenience voting methods. We report on a field experiment that tests messages derived from theories about...     

Retrospective Voting on the Party Level: An Icelandic Test

This research note adds to the emerging body of literature arguing that retrospective voting works on the level of political parties – for government and opposition parties alike – by investigating the generalisability of previous research findings. Furthermore, it tests whether there is a knowledge gap in retrospective voting on the party level. Using the data of the Icelandic National Election Study (ICENES), support is found for the argument that mechanisms of electoral accountability work both for incumbent and opposition parties. Second, while previous research raised doubts on the electorate’s ability to hold governments accountable, there is no evidence of a knowledge gap in retrospective voting on the party level.     

Comparing absentee and precinct voters: Voting on direct legislation

This paper addresses issues related to how absentee voters actually cast their ballots on propositions. If the liberalization of absentee laws changed either the composition or behavior of the electorate, then the outcome of the election may be affected. This paper tests whether the electoral behavior of absentee and precinct voters differs in regards to voting on propositions. The analysis is based on a sample of actual absentee and precinct voter ballots drawn from the approximately three million ballots cast in Los Angeles county for the 1992 general election. The analysis uses a nested model of voter participation and is estimated using the weighted exogenous sampling maximum likelihood method. We find that precinct and absentee voters do differ on both the propositions on which they cast votes and in their propensity to vote Yes for a proposition. For example, absentees appear to vote on fewer bonds and initiatives than do precinct voters. They also vote on fewer propositions dealing with state taxes, food taxes, and property taxes. In addition, given that a voter casts a valid vote, the propensity for absentee voters to vote Yes is higher on initiatives and propositions related to education, welfare, and health care than it is for precinct voters.     

Expressiveness and Voting

It has been suggested that voting may be an ``expressive''action taken without regard to any hope of actuallyinfluencing election outcomes on the margin. However, therehas been no real-world evidence brought to bear on thequestion of whether the propensity of an individual to voteand the propensity of that same individual to engage in otherforms of ``expressive'' behavior are correlated in anystatistically meaningful sense. Drawing from longitudinal datafound in the National Election Surveys we report compellingevidence of a strong, positive relationship between what weterm ``political expressiveness'' and the act of voting.     

Compulsory Voting Rules,Reluctant Voters and Ideological Proximity Voting

Political Behavior - Political theorists have argued that democracies should strive for high turnout, leading to an argument for the introduction of compulsory voting, one of the surest ways to...     

Making Voting Pay

Those who regard low turnout as a particular problem for democracy are sometimes led to endorse compulsory voting as a solution. However, even if there is a moral duty to vote, such legal coercion seems illiberal. This article, by appeal to the analogous case of blood donations, suggests that we should consider instead paying people incentives to vote. This would achieve the aim of increasing turnout, particularly among underrepresented groups, without threatening individual liberty in the way that compulsion seems to.     

Spatial Approval Voting

This article provides a model for analyzing approval votingelections. Within a standard probabilistic spatial voting setting,we show that principal component analysis makes it possibleto derive candidates' relative locations from the approval votes.We apply this technique to original experimental data from theFrench 2002 presidential election.     

Voting by proxy

I introduce voting by proxy for constructing and operating legislatures, and then compare it to direct representation, plurality, and single transferable vote (STV), which voting by proxy most closely resembles. When each voter uses voting by proxy to select his proxy among given legislators and elections are costless, voting by proxy maximizes the legislature's representation of the voting population. When each voter uses preferential voting by proxy, selecting a proxy during the vote count as well as a proxy in the legislature, and some ancillary rules are followed, I find that voting by proxy dominates STV and offers favorable tradeoffs against plurality. It improves representation and constituent service; eliminates gerrymandering; improves voter turnout; ranks the legislature's representatives by the proxies they hold rather than seniority; creates tighter representative-constituent links that lead to better informed voters, reducing the influence of special interests; and eliminates primary and runoff elections. Extra costs associated with its relative complexity or better representation can be made small.