Public Enterprises and the Budget in Developing Countries

Public enterprises have a substantial fiscal impact in developing countries. This has led to the enterprises impinging on the budgetary process of the government while public enterprises are burdened by budget policies and macroeconomic policies. Such difficulties may necessitate the restructuring of public enterprises, either through privatization or reform to make them more competitive with the private sector.     

Privatization Within the Chinese State

This article suggests that China's public and collective enterprises have contributed to its economic growth and socio-political stability. The efficiency of these enterprises has been improved not through the privatization of the state (transferring public ownership to private hands) but privatization within the state (decentralization, appropriation, and marketization). This article first provides statistics to juxtapose the growth of the Chinese economy to the continued expansion of public and collective enter-prises. I t then explains the causes and benefits of privatization within the Chinese state. A case study of privatization within the state in Shanghai City follows. The article concludes that China's economic reform has been a transformation of socialism, not a transition to capitalism, and that it is a less costly but more effective alternative to the privatization of the state approach. The former communist countries in Europe have painfully followed this latter approach and have suffered from its political, social, and economic consequences.     

Accountability in the Privatized State

As well as better efficiency and improved services, privatization has also often promised improved accountability. But how does the empirical evidence on this look and what are the lessons here? This article looks at the notion of accountability and the degree to which privatizing public sector activities might improve or worsen such mechanisms. It then looks specifically at the different systems of accountability existing following three privatization activities in Victoria and compares these against that existing previously under public operation. The sale of electricity sector enterprises, the operation of urban rail service franchises, and the implementation of a public–private partnership project to supply transport infrastructure are adopted as case studies. For each case study, accountability systems are articulated and the operation of these systems is discussed. Overall, the article analyses the effectiveness of accountability systems now operating in the privatized state from the perspective of stakeholders. Importantly, the degree to which trade‐offs may have been made under new accountability arrangements is also discussed. Finally, the article draws together some general lessons on accountability for future privatization activities and proposes a conceptual model for a pyramid of accountability.     

Effects of Public Ownership over Firms' Size and Overstaffing Problems

A model is presented to analyse the impact ofownership over the problem of excess of employmentgenerally found in public firms. A government has toprovide a service or build an infrastructure, underuncertainty about the valuation of the project byconsumers. Three possible ownership schemes areconsidered for the provision of this service: astate-owned firm, a private firm with a completecontingent contract, or a private firm with anincomplete contract. In all three schemes, the agentthat chooses the size of the project is always thegovernment, without any asymmetries of information.Even though multiple solutions are feasible and nodefinitive conclusion is found to be valid for allstates of nature, an evaluation of outcomes shows thata private firm tends to underprovide infrastructure orservices more often, while under public ownership thefirm is typically larger. If incomplete contracting isadded to the private firm case, the model exhibitssolutions in which outcomes could be socially worsethan those obtained by a public firm. Only changes inthe voting behaviour of workers and contracting costsare required in this model to derive these results.Thus, the paper provides an example that ownershipper se may have an effect on the size andefficiency of firms, even under symmetric informationconditions, an extreme that has been generally deniedin the literature on public firms and privatisation.     

Self-Interest, Ideological/Symbolic Politics, and Citizen Characteristics: A Cross-National Analysis of Support for Privatization

In this essay, the authors explore attitudes toward government privatization of electric utilities across two sets of nations: developed market economies (DMEs) and transition economies (TEs). They utilize generalized hierarchical linear model to analyze individual attitudes nested within these two groups of polities and discover a wide gap between the DME and TE nations in terms of preferences for privatization, with attitudes in DME nations being far more favorable. Attitudes toward the privatization of electricity are explained by a combination of ideological/symbolic predispositions, self-interest, and citizen values/characteristics. The most consistent variables in the model are the ideological/symbolic predispositions, while the weakest are citizen characteristics/values. In terms of self-interest, the analysis indicates that those who work for the public service or a public firm are more likely than others to oppose the privatization of electricity. In contrast to some public administration literature that asserts well-informed and interested citizens will oppose privatization, the authors find no convincing relationships. Instead, the most educated and politically efficacious citizens, as well as those who have confidence in the way democracy works within their nation, are more prone than others to support privatization of electricity.     

Privatizing Federal Credit Programs: Why Sallie Mae?

The federal government subsidizes lending to a number of borrowers—notably students, farmers, and homeowners. Government‐sponsored enterprises issue the securities that channel capital to many of these privileged borrowers. One of the largest of these enterprises, the Student Loan Marketing Association (Sallie Mae), is scheduled to be wholly privatized by September 30, 2008. What explains the privatization of this enterprise? To identify distinctive features of Sallie Mae that permitted or abetted privatization, we investigate the structure, related capital market innovations, and growth of three government‐sponsored enterprises. We conclude that a unique structural feature of Sallie Mae may explain the pace of privatization. The core asset of Sallie Mae, the student loan, is guaranteed and subsidized by the government. The case of Sallie Mae is an instructive yet poorly understood example of how the federal government can leverage private‐sector assets and incentives to achieve public policy missions.     

Beliefs About Corporate America and the Structure of Opinions Toward Privatization

This research analyzes the individual-level factors associated with public support for the private provision of public goods and services. Given that privatization requires the transfer of authority from public to private entities, we argue that beliefs about private companies are an important and overlooked source of heterogeneity in explaining public policy preferences toward privatization. We test this expectation using survey data from the 2014 Cooperative Congressional Election Study. We find that support for privatization is associated with positive beliefs about the motivation of private companies and with favorable views about corporate accountability relative to the accountability of government. Opposition to privatization is associated with beliefs about corporate influence in politics. Preferences for limited government are also associated with support for privatization. These results highlight the potential for beliefs about private companies to serve as a group heuristic in political reasoning and the ability of citizens to make reasoned choices on complex public policy issues.     

Preserving the Public Interest in Highway Public–Private Partnerships: A Case Study of the State of Texas

Faced with existing revenues sources that are insufficient to finance highway maintenance and construction needs, some state and local governments are using or considering highway public–private partnerships. These partnerships may be attractive as a way for a government to obtain upfront revenues from the long‐term lease of a road and to shift some of the construction and operations risks to a private firm. However, with these benefits, comes the need to preserve the public interest. This paper discusses issues related to preserving the public interest in highway public–private partnerships and presents a case study of the State of Texas. The case study focuses on an analysis of the strengths and limitations of Texas’ policies and procedures to protect the public interest in the use of long‐term leases for the financing, construction, and operation of new toll roads. The case study also discusses what other governments may be able to learn from Texas’ experiences.     

Lessons from Privatization of Argentina's National Telephone Company

Privatization, defined as the transfer of state-owned enterprises to the private sector, plays a vital role in the economic growth of developing countries and in the transformation of nationalized countries to market economies. Despite its importance, current literature focuses little attention on the effective management of privatization. Most research discusses the benefits and problems of privatization. This article provides additional insight into effective management of the privatization process using a case study of the sale of the national telephone company of Argentina. The study identifies certain conditions necessary for transferring government assets to the private sector. The analysis also identifies strategies for effective privatization and tasks after the process is complete.     

Governance and regulation of urban bus transportation: Using partial privatization to achieve the better of two worlds

Mixed delivery of public services is gaining increasing attention as a way for public managers to avoid deciding between a purely public and purely private delivery system. The unusual coexistence of public and private operators in the urban bus market in Barcelona provides an interesting context in which to analyze the challenges and opportunities posed by this system. Competition for concessions among private operators and the regulation of concessionaires generate incentives to improve efficiency and quality. Furthermore, partial privatization increases the efficiency and feasibility of public operators. In fact, competitive bidding is effective in disciplining private operators and increasing the regulators' bargaining power over both public and private firms. The reform implemented in Barcelona offers an interesting insight into all metropolitan areas that are in a position to create a number of separate concessions large enough to benefit from economies of density.     

Managing public commercial enterprises in Nigeria: The case of Kwara State commercial parastatals

Employing the usual profit criterion to evaluate performance of the commercial parastatals in Nigeria, as revealed in the case of Kwara State, the enterprises are a failure. The differences in the management of the parastatals and similar but private enterprises may have accounted for differences in performance. Among the features of management of the parastatals are the role of government in the appointment of chief executives without necessary regard to merit; the relatively poor conditions of service as obtained in the civil service; and the huge debts owed the parastatals by governments. To improve performance, the following measures should be adopted. There is need to remove commercial parastatals from the civil service to attract quality management staff while government control should be substantially relaxed. Improved funding should be guaranteed through the financial houses while government should settle their debts to the organizations. The issue of privatization is worth proper consideration with a view to selling the companies to the private sector.     

THE FINANCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY FRAMEWORK OF AUSTRALIAN PUBLIC ENTERPRISE

Abstract: This paper is concerned with the complexities of accountability for Australian public enterprise and analyses some of the conceptual issues which need to be addressed in developing a framework for reform. The analysis suggests that the matrix of financial accountability relationships is quite complex in terms of its objectives, its concern for both public interest and commercial viability issues and the number of participants. Furthermore, it operates in an intricate environment of political, administrative and control structures. Although the general financial reporting objectives for public and private enterprises may be similar from a conceptual viewpoint, the assumptions underlying the private sector agency model (a simple one-to-one shareholder-manager relationship based on profit maximisation and individual self-interest) may not allow a realistic or suitable modelling of the intricacies of this process at an operational level at least.
The analysis identifies some of the difficulties encountered when modelling the financial accountability processes for public enterprises. It then suggests a framework which takes into account the multi-layered nature of performance objectives and the unique operational environment of public enterprises. The model encompasses performance responsibilities at both the macro- and micro-economic levels, and operates through a linked chain of participants, each with distinct financial accountability obligations and information needs. It identifies several tiers of participants together with the appropriate accountability responsibilities at each level.     

Privatization and Regulatory Reform of Toll Motorways in Europe

This article analyzes current trends in toll motorway privatization in Europe as an illustration of the paradox of simultaneous deregulation/privatization and reregulation. Changes in the form of government intervention are identified as transitions from internal control on processes and inputs to external control on performance outputs. The state guarantees its capability to intervene and seek its own objectives even when giving up public property. In fact, output regulation is a partial substitute for public ownership. We analyze the hypothesis that privatization of motorways spurs price regulation. Indeed, we observe that toll regulation becomes more detailed as the private sector increases in size, which is a regular reaction across different institutional frameworks. This result is consistent with the literature on the rise of a regulatory state, which emerges with a new mode of governance based on indirect government. Moreover, the study provides evidence of the importance of temporal context in modeling public sector restructuring.     

Adam Smith or Machiavelli? Political incentives for contracting out local public services

Why do some local governments deliver public services directly while others rely on providers from the private sector? Previous literature on local contracting out and on the privatization of state-owned enterprises have offered two competing interpretations on why center-right governments rely more on private providers. Some maintain that center-right politicians contract out more because, like Adam Smith, they believe in market competition. Others claim that center-right politicians use privatization in a Machiavellian fashion; it is used as a strategy to retain power, by ??purchasing?? the electoral support of certain constituencies. Using a unique dataset, which includes the political attitudes of over 8,000 Swedish local politicians from 290 municipalities for a period of 10 years, this paper tests these ideological predictions together with additional political economy factors which have been overlooked in previous studies, such as the number of veto players. Results first indicate support for the Machiavellian interpretation, as contracting out increases with electoral competition. Second, irrespective of ideological concerns, municipalities with more veto players in the coalition government contract out fewer services.     

Outsourcing in the public services: a comparative analysis of practice,capability and impact

This article analyses thinking and practice concerning privatization and outsourcing in the public services and compares recent trends with the findings of an extensive comparative survey of outsourcing conducted at Cranfield School of Management. Particular attention is paid to the systems and processes being outsourced, their importance to the organization and the impact of outsourcing on public service organizations. The results of the survey suggest that public service managers are more skilful than managers from the private sector at handling the transactional aspects of outsourcing. However, managers from public service organizations, unlike managers from the private sector, assert that outsourcing is damaging the running of public service enterprises. It is concluded that until the political and administrative processes are more closely aligned public service managers will continue to hold a more negative view of outsourcing. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Employee buy-outs and privatization: Issues and implications for LDCs and post-communist countries of UK experience

Privatization has become an international phenomenon. Most attention has been devoted to privatization by stock market flotation or by sales to third parties. Management and employee buy-outs present a third main possibility for transferring assets from the public to the private sector. This paper discusses the scope for privatization buy-outs in LDCs and ‘post-communist’ economies in the light of conceptual issues and UK experience. The positive aspects of privatization by management and employee buy-outs concern: ownership incentives; the introduction of control mechanisms by institutional investors and various types of financing instruments; indigenous ownership, decentralized privatization; greater incentives in firms where specific skills are involved; the ability to improve trading relationships between a privatized supplier (the buy-out) and its former parent, which remains in the public sector where the supplier is heavily dependent on its former parent; and the general contribution of buy-outs to a redrawing of a state firm's spread of activities to create a more viable entity. The potential problems with buy-outs concern such issues as: absence of entrepreneurial skills; the scope of their applicability; the potentially restrictive effects of debt and debt-like finance; the need to deal with investment requirements of firms; the lack of personal wealth; the use of inside information by managers to purchase a firm at a price which is to the detriment of the public interest; and the possibility of social and political problems if individuals are perceived to enhance their personal wealth significantly as an accident of where they work. There are means by which many of these potential problems can be dealt with and the paper addresses these.     

The Financial Crisis and Varieties of Pension Privatization Reversals in Eastern Europe

Since the global financial crisis, those East European countries that had partly privatized their pension systems in the 1990s or early 2000s increasingly scaled back their mandatory private retirement accounts and restored the role of public provision. What explains this wave of reversals in pension privatization and variation in its outcomes? Proponents of pension privatization had argued that it would boost domestic capital markets and economic growth. By revealing how pension privatization helped increase sovereign debt and how large a part of pension funds' assets was invested in government bonds, the crisis strengthened the position of domestic opponents of mandatory private accounts. But these actors' capacity and determination to reverse pension privatization depended on the level of their country's public debt and on pension funds' portfolio structure. Empirically, the argument is supported with case studies of Hungarian, Polish, and Slovak pension reform.     

Towards a stages theory approach to privatization

In analysing the path of optimal sequencing of privatizations by public administrations, it is too simplistic to characterize the process as one in which in the early phase small state-owned enterprises are disposed of and, in the later stage, the larger enterprises. Such a dichotomy fails to capture fully the market failure elements, technological dimensions, sociological imperatives and political constraints that help to determine the choice and timing of enterprises to be privatized. Rather, the privatization experience of the developing and developed countries, including the former centrally planned economies, can be eclectically analysed as traditional, transitional and transformation stages in an almost inexorable movement towards a pure capitalist economy. In the traditional stage, countries have tended to privatize those enterprises for which the private sector has an obvious comparative advantage. In the transitional stage, the privatization programme includes certain important enterprises, which, despite a considerable amount of government subsidy or tariff protection, have performed ‘inefficiently’. In the stage of transformation from a still basically mixed economy to a near pure capitalist economy, there is privatization of the strategic enterprises. Although the stages approach varies between countries, the above-mentioned sequencing allows for more effective cumulative internalization of the learning experience.     

A Review of: “Corruption by Design: Building Clean Government in Mainland China and Hong Kong by Melanie Manion”

ABSTRACT

The impact of privatization on public service quality is an enduring issue in public policy and management. Advocates of privatization suggest that market forces prompt private firms to provide better quality services, while opponents point towards the potential for quality to be traded off against profits. Drawing on incomplete contract and capability theories, we explore a more nuanced possibility: that private providers of public services perform better on dimensions of public service quality that are easier to measure and monitor, and vice versa. Using panel data on service quality in prisons in England and Wales in the period 1998 to 2012, we find that privately managed prisons do perform better on dimensions of quality, such as confinement conditions and prisoner activity, which are more easily measured, whereas public prisons perform better on dimensions of quality, such as levels of order and prisoner safety, which are less easily measured and managed.     

Political Compromises: The Privatization of Small- and Medium-Sized Public Enterprises in China

One important feature of China’s privatization process is that insider privatization prevailed, and that outsiders could hardly gain access to buying state enterprises. Why was a majority of small- and medium-sized public enterprises sold to the firms’ former managers (and workers)? How did the tightened regulatory environment affect local privatization in China? Building on insights into institutional change, I argue that the choice of a specific privatization strategy results from political compromises among local officials, workers, and managers of public enterprises under specific regulatory constraints. Local officials’ incentives for privatization and their reactions to the changing regulatory environment had a great impact on the dynamics of local privatization.