Lord Cunliffe, Lloyd George, reparations and reputations at the Paris peace conference, 1919

This paper reexamines the role of Lord Cunliffe, traditionally cast (by Lloyd George, among others) as one of the villains of the Paris Peace Conference for his extremism on reparations. It argues that Lloyd George used Cunliffe as a stalking-horse to conceal his own intention of exacting maximum reparations in the face of American opposition. Lloyd George's refusal to agree a final sum, despite the pleas of almost all his senior colleagues, reflected both Cunliffe's advice and his own fears of underestimating Germany's capacity by setting too low a figure, which would be largely consumed by French claims.     

Curzon, Lloyd George and the control of British foreign policy, 1919-22: A reassessment

This article reappraises the complex relationship between Lord Curzon and Lloyd George in the years between the former's appointment as Foreign Secretary and the latter's fall from office as Prime Minister in 1922. It argues that the widely held view that Lloyd George held Curzon in contempt and marginalized him in the conduct of foreign affairs is not accurate. Their relationship is presented as being one of mutual respect and significant levels of cooperation. The article thus questions the extent to which the Foreign Office suffered an 'eclipse' in this period.     

Sidelights of a Meeting with the President of India Dr. A P J Abdul Kalam

(In the afternoon of May 3, 2006, Mr. AiPing, Council Member and Mr. Ji Ping,Associate Research Fellow of the ChineseAssociation for International Understanding calledon Indian President APJ. Abdul Kalam inRasthrapati Bhavan, New Delhi.)“Welcome to the R…     

Maynard Keynes and the 'Bamboozlement' of Woodrow Wilson: What Really Happened at Paris? (Wilson, Lloyd George, pensions and pre-armistice agreement)

Woodrow Wilson's acceptance of Lloyd George's demand for the inclusion of military pensions among the reparations payable to the Allies under the Treaty of Versailles was stigmatized by J.M. Keynes in The Economic Consequences of the Peace as the most notorious of the President's alleged breaches of faith with Germany. Keynes's damning verdict remains virtually unquestioned. This paper reconsiders the case for pensions, suggests that the question was less clear-cut than Keynes insisted, and queries his influential account of Wilson's supposed gullibility and culpability. The paper then considers Lloyd George's intentions in the Pre-armistice agreement, from which the Allied right to reparations and pensions were derived.     

A Doctrine Worthy of the Name?: George W. Bush and the Limits of Pre-Emption, Pre-Eminance, and Unilateralism

In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, the foreign policy of the Bush administration was shifted radically in its pursuit of the war on terror. As part of this change, the administration announced a new strategic doctrine in 2002 in the form of the National Security Strategy of the United States which was to become known as the Bush doctrine. At its heart this document advocated the use of pre-emption and unilateralism in its pursuit of pre-eminence. This article traces the development of this thinking and subsequent application of this doctrine, and argues that policy failures in Iraq have nothing to contribute to American foreign policy in the second term. His argued that because of this failure, it is not a doctrine worthy of the name.     

N. A. Graebner,R. D. Burns,and J. M. Siracusa,Reagan, Bush,Gorbachev: Revisiting the End of the Cold War

Faced with creating a grand strategy for American foreign policy in the post–Cold War world, the Clinton Administration launched the strategy of ‘Democratic Enlargement.’ This analysis makes two contributions to the existing literature on the topic. First, it investigates the role of Wilsonianism and the ‘Democratic Peace Thesis’ in the discourse of the strategy of ‘Democratic Enlargement’ based on public speeches with a focus on the relationship between democracy and security. Second, it utilises securitisation theory to analyse how Clinton’s Administration used the linkage of democracy and security to legitimise humanitarian interventions in Haiti and Kosovo. By addressing ‘Democratic Enlargement’ in security terms, the Administration securitised democracy promotion and, thereby, created a discourse that helped legitimise a gradual move towards a more militaristic foreign policy during Clinton’s presidency. This discourse offered arguments later utilised by the George W. Bush Administration.     

A 'visionary hope' frustrated: J.M. Keynes and the origins of the postwar international monetary order

During the 1930s and 1940s Keynes developed the vision of a world in which every country would be able to pursue its own New Deal. He believed in the Second World War that Anglo-American partnership would provide the foundations of this benevolent new order. But his enterprise was frustrated by Washington's insistence on economic orthodoxy. It was an outcome which left Keynes pessimistic about the prospects for international economic cooperation. However the prejudices of Keynes's first biographer, Roy Harrod, in combination with the political exigencies of the early cold war period, obscured the extent of his disillusionment.     

Tragedy,Realism, and Postmodernity: Kulturpessimismus in the Theories of Max Weber,E.H. Carr,Hans J. Morgenthau,and Henry Kissinger

Many realist international relations theorists characterize realism as a perspective grounded in a firm grasp of the tragic constancy of human nature and the autonomous role that power plays in human politics. Realism is thus cast in opposition to the hopeful, but often naïve, optimism of liberals who seek to steer international relations theory and ethics away from these historical realities. This paper examines the philosophical roots of theories developed by four realist thinkers, Max Weber, E.H. Carr, Hans J. Morgenthau, and Henry Kissinger, in postmodern epistemology and ethics, perspectives not often associated with constancy or notions of objective historical truths. I argue that the origin of their respective theories in Nietzschean epistemology plays a profound role in undermining their ability to develop a credible view of international ethics. Though each of them is, in his way, committed to democratic principles, their works assert an existential, private morality that is incompatible with the ethical requirements of a modern, democratic society.