Das Parlament in der Mediengesellschaft — Verschränkungen zwischen parlamentarischer und massenmedialer Arena

The assumed decline of parliaments’ power in the political decision making process is blamed on a complex social and political transformation. Among others, changes in the structures of the public space, especially the emergence of mass communication, represent a crucial challenge for parliamentary representation. Parliaments depend on a functioning external communication, since their relations to the public are a central source of parliamentary legitimacy and power. In two fields one can observe an evident overlapping between the systems of parliament and mass media: in parliament’s management of communication and in parliament’s procedures of opinion forming and decision making. In a case study of the German Bundestag, processes of adaptation to the structures of the mass media system can be found in these areas. Adaptation comes to its limits where it collides with the necessity to provide space for bargaining processes. Furthermore, the processes of adaptation illustrate how political actors realize and structurally actualize the ambigious relationship between publicity and power.     

Legislative agenda-setting in parliamentary democracies

Various strands of literature in comparative politics regard governments as the only noteworthy initiators and mainsprings of legislative policy making in parliamentary democracies. Opposition activity in policy making is more often associated with the intention to prevent, rather than to shape, policy. Does this perception reflect real‐life politics? To answer this question, this article discusses different arguments that link institutional and policy‐related characteristics to the incentives and constraints of different government and parliamentary actors to initiate or co‐sponsor legislative bills. More specifically, it relates policy‐, office‐ and vote‐related incentives, as well as institutional and resource constraints of legislative actors, to the likelihood that these actors will take the lead in legislative agenda‐setting. These arguments are confronted with original data on the universe of all legislative bills in four parliamentary systems over one and a half decades. The article concludes that opposition and, in particular, bipartisan agenda‐setting is indeed rare. Yet, in contrast to widely held maxims, it is neither absent nor spurious, but related to the allocation of power and the intensity of ideological conflict both within and between the (coalition) government and parliament.     

Strategies of Influence: How Interest Organizations React to Changes in Parliamentary Influence and Activity1

Research has shown that interest organizations seeking influence on public decision making pay increasing attention to parliamentary actors. No distinction has, however, been made between attempts to affect law-making directly and attempts to gain influence on other parliamentary activities such as agenda setting and control of bureaucracy. Drawing on data about organizational approaches to the Danish parliament, this article demonstrates that interest organizations’ influence strategies in relation to different parliamentary activities show dissimilar patterns. Strategies in regard to law-making fluctuate with the strength of parliament vis-à-vis the government, while strategies concerned with more general parliamentary activities depend more on the level of these activities and secondarily on increases in parliamentary resources. The analysis thus confirms that organizations react to changes in the political role of parliament, but takes the understanding of this a step further by emphasizing that changes in direct parliamentary influence on law-making and in more general parliamentary activities affect different aspects of organizations’ influence strategies.     

Explaining Reforms of Parliamentary Minority Rights: A Theoretical Framework with Case Study Application

How can we explain institutional reforms that redistribute institutional power between the parliamentary majority and minority? This paper proposes an informal theoretical model to explain such reforms in European parliaments based on congressional literature and inductive explanations from case studies. The article argues that political parties as the relevant actors pursue institutional reforms based on their substantive goals, their current and expected future government status, transaction and audience costs of reforms, second-order institutions that regulate the relative influence of actors in changing parliamentary rules, and the institutional status quo. Hypotheses derived from this model are tested with a qualitative case study of all standing order reforms in the Austrian parliament from 1945 to 2014. The empirical analysis finds support for various hypotheses and their underlying causal mechanisms. As Austria constitutes a least-likely case, the evidence provides strong support for the theoretical model.     

Portfolio allocation patterns and policy-making effectiveness in minority coalition governments

Although minority coalition has become a relatively frequent form of governance, it is often considered politically ineffective in policy making. To obtain sufficient support in parliament, government bills must go through the scrutiny activities initiated by coalition partners and overcome the concerns of external support parties in opposition. By examining parliamentary scrutiny on government bills, this paper explains the surprising policy-making effectiveness in minority coalition governments. Specifically, we argue and show that different patterns of portfolio allocation with the specific ideological locations of the ministerial office-holder, the coalition partner and the external supporter, structure the extent to which government bills are scrutinized in parliament, and therefore, the effectiveness of the minority coalition on managing and implementing policies. We empirically examine bills initiated by 256 ministries in 13 Danish minority coalitions between 1985 and 2015, and we reveal robust evidence that corroborates our argument.     

Legislating or rubber-stamping? Assessing parliament's influence on law-making with text reuse

Law-making is a core function of parliaments in democratic systems. Yet, we still know little about the extent to which parliaments influence legislation and the reasons why MPs modify some bills more than others. We analyse the degree of bill amendments operated by parliament, by comparing bills before and after parliamentary deliberations with a text reuse approach. We postulate that MPs attempt to overcome the problem of limited processing capacity by prioritising certain bills over others. To this end, they use considerations related to institutional rules, attention dynamics and partisan politics. Empirically, we apply zero-inflated beta regressions on a dataset covering about 1,700 bills adopted from 1995 to 2015 in the Swiss Parliament. Moreover, we address the problem of observational equivalence affecting analyses of parliament's impact on law-making, by taking into account the government's anticipation strategy. Results highlight a reasonably high amendment activity, but with strong variations across bills. MPs change bills more if they are subject to direct democracy, rank high on the parliamentary agenda or if they attract media attention. The influence of the electoral cycle and coalition politics is not confirmed.     

Shifting the Balance? Parliament, the Executive and the British Constitution

This article examines the paradoxes of parliamentary reform. Focusing mainly on the House of Commons, the first section highlights the contradictory roles of parliament and utilizes a distinction between the 'Whig' and 'Peelite' conceptions of the Whitehall-Westminster model to demonstrate the ambiguities and tensions that exist. This framework is then applied to a case study of parliamentary reform under Labour governments since 1997 in the second section. The third section emphasizes that parliament cannot be studied in isolation. It suggests that the British constitution is at a critical historical, political and institutional juncture in which a number of inter-linked emerging agendas are altering the relationship between parliament and the executive. The significance of these emerging agendas is that, unlike internal reform of parliament, they are largely beyond the executive's control. The combined influence of these factors is likely to impel the executive, at some point, to support a coherent and far-reaching reappraisal of the structure, role and powers of parliament. Consequently the degree to which Britain ( de facto ) remains a parliamentary state will be subject to intense and increasing debate.     

Developments in Danish Parliamentary Democracy: Accountability, Parties and External Constraints

Danish parliamentary developments since the Second World War include the consolidation of minority rule, a reduction in the power of established political parties, and more external constraints on parliamentary actors. They also involve a number of more specific changes to the various steps of delegation and accountability. The evidence tends to support the thesis of a paradox in the development of parliamentary democracy. On the one hand, changes in the constitutional chain of delegation and accountability have, on the whole, favoured the principals (voters, parliament, ministers) compared with their agents (parliament, ministers, civil servants). On the other hand, the established parties have declined somewhat and there are more external constraints than there used to be. This implies that the power of democratic principals has increased within narrower limits of action. In such a situation, the principals can be said to 'decide more about less' because of the stronger national and (not least) international constraints. However, the emergence of a partially new system of governance cannot unequivocally be called better or worse than the traditional Danish system of democratic governance.     

Public and Private Think Tank Visibility in the Danish Parliament and Media

While the number of think tanks in Denmark has increased considerably in recent decades, our knowledge about their visibility in political arenas is limited. The article explores how and why the mentions of private and public think tanks in the parliamentary and media arenas has developed from 2005 to 2018. Building on insights from previous studies of think tanks, publicly funded think tanks are expected to achieve more parliamentary mentions than private think tanks because they are expected to be more heavily influenced by institutionalized norms to target inside actors through parliament. By contrast, privately funded think tanks are expected to achieve more media mentions than public think tanks, because they are policymaking outsiders and emphasize public advocacy over direct influence. Although publicly funded think tanks have been more visible in the parliamentary arena than private think tanks, their visibility has declined. Private think tanks are more visible than public think tanks, but media visibility for privately funded think tanks also drops towards the end of the period. The article concludes that public or private funding cannot fully explain changes in think tank visibility in the two arenas over time. Instead media and parliamentary mentions are driven by a handful of think tanks while most think tanks struggle to achieve and maintain parliamentary and media visibility over time.     

Horses and hippos: Why Italian government bills change in the legislative arena, 1987–2006

Scholars interested in legislative processes pay relatively little attention to the changes made to bills in parliamentary democracies. On the one hand, comparative research has often described parliamentary institutions as ineffectual vis‐à‐vis cabinets throughout the lawmaking process; on the other hand, for a long time the rational choice literature has focused more on the formal rules regulating amendatory activity than on amendatory activity itself. Hence, very few studies have tried to explain how much government bills are altered in parliament and why. This article investigates the changes made to governmental legislation in Italy. Taking the modifications occurring during the legislative process as the dependent variable, a number of explanatory hypotheses derived from both existing scholarship and original arguments are discussed and tested. This also allows the identification of some usually unobserved aspects of the decision‐making process within the cabinet. The findings can also be relevant for comparative research since Italy has been characterised during the period under scrutiny (1987–2006) by two distinct electoral systems, two extremely different party systems (pivotal and alternational), governments with various ideological orientations and range, and both partisan and technical ministers.     

Die Dimensionalität der Reichstage der Weimarer Republik von 1920 bis 1932

We analyse the dimensionality and the positioning of parliamentary party groups and single MPs in the parliament (“Reichstag”) of the Weimar Republic on the basis of all recorded votes between 1920 and 1932. On the basis of studies on the milieu-boundedness of German parties and theoretical accounts on the dimensionality of parliaments in general we develop hypotheses regarding the number and characteristics of dimensions that structured voting behaviour in the Weimar Reichstag. The expectations are tested with a full sample of recorded parliamentary votes. The results, which are based on item response models, show that two dimensions structured MP’s decision-making: this is, first, an economic left-right axis and, secondly, a pro vs. contra Weimar Republic dimension. Additionally, our results provide support for recent studies on intra-party conflict inside the German national conservatives.     

Public Preferences for Parliamentary Representation in the UK: An Overlooked Link?

Representation, both as a normative concept and a political process, has generated a rich literature across several national contexts. To develop our understanding of representational systems, scholars tend to assess the degree of policy congruence between parliamentarians and constituents as well as the role orientations adopted by elected parliamentarians and legislators. This paper contends that in order to have a complete understanding of representational systems, we must consider not only the representational roles adopted by parliamentarians, but also the publics' preferences regarding parliamentary representation. Specifically, I posit that individuals have attitudes about the type and degree of relationship that they believe should exist between elected parliamentarians, parties and constituents. Using data from a 2003 survey of the British public, I test the related hypotheses that individuals have meaningful and predictable preferences for the representational relationship they share with their members of parliament (MPs) and that these representational preferences in turn influence how individuals evaluate MPs. Finding support for both hypotheses, I argue that developing an understanding of normative public preferences for political representation is an important and overlooked component in advancing models of public support of both elected officials and governing institutions.     

Political representation and ethnic conflict in new democracies

Abstract.  This article is an exploratory analysis of the efficacy of parliamentary representation as a means to moderate ethnic conflict in new democracies. The authors agree with many others that the interests of a minority ethnic group are better protected when the group has access to decision makers, can block harmful government policies and veto potentially damaging decisions. Parliamentary representation, however, does not always allow for an effective representation of those who are not in government. Seats in the legislature may be of little use in a parliament where the executive dominates the policy process at all stages. This article focuses on the new democracies of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union between 1990 and 2000. The authors use the number of parliamentary seats obtained by minority ethnic parties as their main independent variable and the MAR ethnic protest and rebellion scores as their dependent variables. In addition, they employ the system of government (i.e., parliamentary versus presidential) as a proxy indicator of the degree of influence that parliamentary parties have over decision making. A cross-section-time-series regression analysis shows that the ameliorative effect of parliamentary representation over ethnic conflict is stronger in those legislatures where the ethnic group has effective influence over decision making. It is also shown that representation within national parliaments has no ameliorative effects over violent secessionist conflicts. When the ethnic minority's demands are too radical, parliamentary representation is simply an inadequate instrument.     

VICTORIA

The Victorian Liberal Premier, Richard Hamer, in adjourning the 1980 parliamentary session with the traditional “Christmas felicitations”, made special reference to the record number of sitting days and the longer daily average of sitting hours achieved. Labor Opposition Leader Frank Wilkes in turn drew attention to the total of 126 bills introduced during the spring session, of which 101 had been instigated by the government and 25 by private members. Such an arduous and concentrated parliamentary schedule has obvious policy implications, but also prompts a query about its administrative consequences. To what extent was the mass of legislation dealt with by the last Victorian State parliament directed towards administrative ends as well as to the Liberal government's more obvious political goals?     

Delegation to civil servants in parliamentary democracies

Abstract. This article reviews institutional arrangements that cabinet ministers and other political actors employ to influence civil servant behavior in parliamentary democracies. I then discuss how unlike other theories of bureaucratic structure, the principal–agent framework can be employed to generate testable hypotheses about systematic cross–national variation in delegation instruments. I also offer an empirical illustration of the approach, one that examines the relationship between cabinet turnover and delegation strategies on health policy. The analysis underlines the need to be cautious about making claims concerning the impact of political factors (like cabinet instability) and institutional factors (like cabinet decision–making rules) on delegation outcomes without first examining how these factors influence delegation strategies themselves.     

Defending popular sovereignty: discursive conflict in French and Swedish parliamentary debates on immigrant voting rights (1968-2017)

ABSTRACT

Through a discourse analysis of French and Swedish legislative debates from 1968 to 2017, this article examines how actors challenge and reinforce dominant ideas about the link between nationality and political rights. We argue that the broader political culture influences which discursive strategies – or ‘frames’ – are more likely to structure parliamentary debates in different national contexts. However, our analysis also shows that legislators sometimes develop new discursive frames in which they reinterpret dominant norms to make them consistent with their views. Through this incremental process of reinterpretation and reformulation of dominant ideas, debates over non-citizen voting rights have chipped away at the link between nationality and political rights. Our findings suggest that initiatives to enfranchise non-citizens trigger lower levels of conflict when they can be framed as a policy tool for immigrant integration rather than as a matter of popular sovereignty.     

Intra-Executive Competition between President and Prime Minister: Patterns of Institutional Conflict and Cooperation under Semi-Presidentialism

The article examines the dynamics of political competition over the control of the executive that shapes the coexistence of popularly elected presidents and prime ministers in semi-presidential regimes. It explores how variation in the political status of cabinet and the character of the party system, as well as differences in presidential and parliamentary powers over the cabinet, affects both the type and intensity of intra-executive conflict in democratic and semi-democratic environments. It demonstrates that presidents' and prime ministers' strategies in intra-executive relations in both types of political environment are systematically affected by the nature and extent of cabinet's political support in parliament, as well as by the degree of presidential control over cabinet.     

Political Ethics and Public Policy: Homosexuals between Moral Dilemmas and Political Considerations in Danish Parliamentary Debates

Political science has abundantly proved that politics involves power, conflict, and self-serving interests. Much less frequently does political science deal with ethics in public policymaking. This article analyses the appeal to moral principles in the political process of drafting three bills, all concerning homosexuals, in which the Danish parliamentary parties, in contrast to normal practice, allowed their members to deviate from the party line and vote in accordance with their 'conscience'. Analysis of the cases indicates that moral considerations are capable of structuring and constraining arguments and that they are decisive for some politicians' positions in some situations. The cases also raise doubts concerning the widely held view that decisions based on votes of conscience, because they are informed by 'ethical' rather than 'political' considerations, are qualitatively superior to ordinary political decisions.

MANKIND
Men, said the Devil,
Are good to their brothers:
They don't want to mend
Their own ways, but each other's.
– grook by Piet Hein

     

Rising to the Top: Gender,Political Performance,and Party Leadership in Parliamentary Democracies

Party leaders are the main actors controlling campaign strategies, policy agendas, and government formation in advanced parliamentary democracies. Little is known, however, about gender and party leadership. This article examines gendered leadership patterns across 71 political parties in 11 parliamentary democracies between 1965 and 2013. It shows that men and women have different access to, and experiences in, party leadership and that these gendered political opportunity structures are shaped by parties' political performances. Women are more likely to initially come to power in minor opposition parties and those that are losing seat share. Once selected for the position, female leaders are more likely to retain office when their parties gain seats, but they are also more likely to leave the post when faced with an unfavorable trajectory. Together, these results demonstrate that prospective female leaders are playing by a different (and often more demanding) set of rules than their male counterparts.     

Voice and trust in parliamentary representation

In both social and political matters, individuals trust those they believe will treat them fairly. Individuals in democracies have little objection to abiding by policies instituted by parties they did not vote for because the system by which the parliament is formed is considered fair. However, even among democracies, some electoral systems are fairer than others. It stands to reason that trust in parliament is affected by the perceived fairness of the electoral system. This research demonstrates that actual or perceived provision of voice in parliamentary representation does increase individual trust in parliament. Systems designed with the intent to provide fair representation and those that provide the illusion of fair representation produce higher levels of trust in parliament.