Trial complexity

A field experiment is reported that examines the effects of trial complexity and trial procedures on jury performance. Juror question asking and notetaking were randomly assigned to 75 civil and 85 criminal trials. Principal components analyses of judges' responses revealed three components of trial complexity: evidence complexity, legal complexity, and quantity of information. None of these components was significantly related to judge-jury verdict agreement. Each component uniquely affected jurors' assessment of the trial, but none affected theirs or the judges' verdict satisfaction. Interactions reveal that juror questions were most beneficial for assisting the jurors with legal complexity and evidence complexity. Natural variation in judges' commenting on the weight and credibility of witnesses, or summarizing the evidence, use of special verdict forms, pattern instructions, and juror orientation was also measured. Of these, the use of special verdict forms appeared to provide the greatest benefits.     

Judging Bias: Juror Confidence and Judicial Rulings on Challenges for Cause

The judge in a jury trial is charged with excusing prospective jurors who will not be impartial. To assess impartiality, prospective jurors are typically asked whether they can be fair. Using an experimental paradigm, we found that small changes in jurors' self‐reported confidence in their ability to be fair affected judges' decisions about bias but did not affect the judgments of either attorneys or jurors. We suggest why a judge's role and unique relationship with jurors is likely to foster a decision strategy based on reported juror confidence, and we discuss the implications of our analysis for current legal debates over jury selection practices. Unexpected patterns in our results also highlight the ways in which perceptions of impartiality are affected, in part, by the social characteristics of the observer.     

Attitudes,anger, and nullification instructions influence jurors’ verdicts in euthanasia cases

Courts have historically avoided informing jurors about their nullification power (i.e. the power to return a not-guilty verdict when their conscience demands it but the law directs otherwise), fearing that such knowledge would prompt disregard for the law and reliance on attitudes and emotions rather than evidence. We investigated jurors’ inclination to nullify the law in a morally ambiguous case of physician-assisted suicide, testing the impact of euthanasia attitudes on case judgments as well as moderators and mediators of that effect. Mock jurors with pro-euthanasia attitudes were overall less likely to vote guilty than anti-euthanasia jurors, especially when they were given jury instructions informing them of jurors’ power to nullify. Nullification instructions also exacerbated the effect of jurors’ attitudes on anger, disgust, and moral outrage toward the defendant – emotions that mediated the effect of attitudes on verdicts. We also tested the impact of incidentally induced anger on jurors’ reliance on their attitudes rather than the law, given anger’s propensity to increase certainty and heuristic processing. Anger enhanced mock jurors’ reliance on their attitudes under certain conditions. Theoretical and practical implications for understanding juror decision-making are discussed.     

Instructing jurors

This field experiment examines the advantages and disadvantages of two jury instruction procedures: instructing the jury prior to the evidence portion of the trial and providing the jury with a written copy of the judge's instructions to take with them to their deliberations. The presence or absence of both procedures was randomly assigned to 34 civil and 33 criminal trials in Wisconsin circuit courts. Following the trials, questionnaires were administered to judges, lawyers, and jurors. Overall, the findings do not provide any support for the hypotheses that written instructions would help the jurors to recall the judge's instructions, that they would increase the jurors' satisfaction with the trial, or that they would shorten the trial. The written copy did appear to reduce disputes among jurors about the judge's instructions. No evidence was found to support the notion that written instructions would reduce the amount of time that juries devoted to the evidence, that they would lengthen deliberations, or that they would place excessive demands on the resources of the court. The findings also did not support the hypotheses that preliminary instructions would assist the jurors with recall of the judge's instructions or the evidence, or that they would reduce juror confusion about the trial procedure, but did support the hypotheses that preliminary instructions would assist the jurors with following legal guidelines in their decision making and would increase the jurors' satisfaction with the trial process. No evidence was found to support the hypotheses that preliminary instructions would be an impractical procedure or that they would place excessive demands on the judge.Northwestern University     

Generic Prejudice and the Presumption of Guilt in Sex Abuse Trials

In 25 Canadian criminal trials involving charges of sexual abuse, 849 prospective jurors were asked under oath whether they could hear the evidence, follow the judge's instructions on the Jaw, and decide the case with a fair and impartial mind. Knowing only the nature of the charges against the accused, on average 36% of the jurors stated that they could not be impartial Some jurors explained that they themselves had been victims of abuse, others expressed fears for children, while others stated simply that they could not set aside a presumption of guilt. These findings from real trials are consistent with a body of social science literature about attitudes toward sexual abuse and sexual assault charges. The article distinguishes between prejudices arising from specific pretrial publicity and generic prejudices that cause prejudgments of the case of any defendant perceived as belonging to a general class of defendants who likely are guilty of the crime(s) charged.     

The effects of death qualification on jurors' predisposition to convict and on the quality of deliberation

This study provides a straightforward test of the proposition that people who are permitted to serve on juries in capital cases (death-qualified jurors) are more likely to convict a defendant than are people who are excluded from serving on capital juries due to their unwillingness to impose the death penalty (excludable jurors). A sample of 288 subjects classified as death-qualified or excludable under theWitherspoon standard watched a 2 1/2-hour videotape of a simulated homicide trial including the judge's instructions, and gave an initial verdict. Death-qualified subjects were significantly more likely than excludable subjects to vote guilty, both on the initial ballot and after an hour's deliberation in 12-person juries. Nine juries were composed entirely of death-qualified subjects (death-qualified juries), while 10 contained from 2 to 4 excludable subjects (mixed juries). On postdeliberation measures, with initial death-penalty attitudes controlled, subjects who had served on the mixed juries were generally more critical of the witnesses, less satisfied with their juries, and better able to remember the evidence than subjects from the death-qualified juries, suggesting that diversity may improve the vigor, thoroughness, and accuracy of the jury's deliberations.     

Juridic decisions

Pattern jury instructions have been criticized for being less than understandable to the average juror and thus for causing arbitrary juridic decisions. Two studies were conducted to establish whether these criticisms are justified and to find solutions to these problems. Both studies established the validity of the criticisms by demonstrating that the presentation of presently used Michigan negligence instructions is about as effective in helping jurors understand the laws as the presentation of no instructions at all. It was found that by rewriting these instructions in accordance with empirical knowledge of what elements affect perception, memory, and comprehension of language, their effectiveness was significantly improved. Furthermore, it was found that the presentation of instructions both at the beginning and at the end of a case would allow jurors a greater opportunity to focus their attention on relevant evidence and to remember it. The studies demonstrate the urgent need for jurisdictions around the country to improve the way jury instructions are written and delivered, if they expect jurors to reach verdicts in light of the law rather than in ignorance of it.     

The influence of prior record evidence on juror decision making

Several researchers have investigated the impact of evidence of prior convictions on jurors' decision making. Very little is known about a related issue, the impact of prioracquittal evidence introduced by the prosecution on jurors' decisions. The Supreme Court recently held (Dowling v. U.S., 1990) that the admission of prior acquittal evidence does not unfairly prejudice the defendant. We conducted a simulation study to examine the effects of prior record evidence (prior convictions, prior acquittals, and no prior record) on jurors' decisions. We also manipulated the presence of judicial instructions on the limited use jurors can make of extrinsic acts evidence. Mock jurors were more likely to convict the defendant when they had evidence of a prior conviction than when they had evidence of a prior acquittal or no record evidence. This effect was mediated by attributions about criminal propensity. Judge's limiting instructions were ineffective in guiding jurors' use of prior record evidence.     

How jurors construe “insanity”

Historically and currently, jurors who have rendered verdicts in insanity cases have themselves been criticized and maligned-accused of being simplistic and biased, of lacking understanding, and of disregarding or nullifying the judge's instructions. Are the critics right? In this study, 263 mock jurors (141 adults and 122 students) were asked to decide four insanity cases without instructions, using their own best judgment, and to identify the determinative facts for them, and the meaning of those facts. Those determinative factors were then categorized, using a seven construct schema for NGRI and guilty verdicts. The results show that jurors do make discriminations among cases in terms of constructs, and that these constructs are relevant, complex, and flexible; furthermore, the jurors' lay constructs of insanity are more complex than the legal constructs of insanity. The “simplism,” it seems, lies not with the jurors but with the insanity tests.     

Perceptions of older adult jurors: the influence of aging stereotypes and jury laws

ABSTRACT

The present study examined younger (18–30 years, N?=?100) and older adults’ (66–89 years, N?=?100) responses to a jury duty questionnaire assessing perceptions of jury duty, their capability to serve, and the capability of older adults to serve. We also explored perceptions of the senior jury opt-out law (a law that allows those over a certain age (e.g. 65 years) to opt-out of jury duty). We assessed why participants believe this law is in place and experimentally examined if informing older adults about this law impacted their jury questionnaire responses. Results demonstrated that older adults were significantly more likely to want to serve compared to younger adults; however, younger adults provided lower capability ratings of older adult jurors compared to older adults. Younger adults’ open-ended explanations for these ratings indicated negative aging stereotypes (i.e. in part, believing that older adult jurors are less capable because of declining health and biased beliefs). Older adults also had a significantly lower rate of agreement with the senior jury opt-out law. Although informing older adults about this law did not impact their perceptions of themselves as potential jurors, it did enforce more negative attitudes towards older adult jurors as a whole.     

Chaos in The Courtroom Reconsidered: Emotional Bias and Juror Nullification

A widespread presumption in the law is that giving jurors nullification instructions would result in "chaos"-jurors guided not by law but by their emotions and personal biases. We propose a model of juror nullification that posits an interaction between the nature of the trial (viz. whether the fairness of the law is at issue), nullification instructions, and emotional biases on juror decision-making. Mock jurors considered a trial online which varied the presence a nullification instructions, whether the trial raised issues of the law's fairness (murder for profit vs. euthanasia), and emotionally biasing information (that affected jurors' liking for the victim). Only when jurors were in receipt of nullification instructions in a nullification-relevant trial were they sensitive to emotionally biasing information. Emotional biases did not affect evidence processing but did affect emotional reactions and verdicts, providing the strongest support to date for the chaos theory.     

A HEAVY THUMB ON THE SCALE: THE EFFECT OF VICTIM IMPACT EVIDENCE ON CAPITAL DECISION MAKING*

The past several decades have seen the emergence of a movement in the criminal justice system that has called for a greater consideration for the rights of victims. One manifestation of this movement has been the “right” of victims or victims' families to speak to the sentencing body through what are called victim impact statements about the value of the victim and the full harm that the offender has created. Although victim impact statements have been a relatively noncontroversial part of regular criminal trials, their presence in capital cases has had a more contentious history. The U.S. Supreme Court overturned previous decisions and explicitly permitted victim impact testimony in capital cases in Payne v. Tennessee (1991) . The dissenters in that case argued that such evidence only would arouse the emotions of jurors and bias them in favor of imposing death. A body of research in behavioral economics on the “identifiable victim effect” and the “identifiable wrongdoer effect” would have supported such a view. Using a randomized controlled experiment with a death‐eligible sample of potential jurors and the videotape of an actual penalty trial in which victim impact evidence (VIE) was used, we found that these concerns about VIE are perhaps well placed. Subjects who viewed VIE testimony in the penalty phase were more likely to feel negative emotions like anger, hostility, and vengeance; were more likely to feel sympathy and empathy toward the victim; and were more likely to have favorable perceptions of the victim and victim's family as well as unfavorable perceptions of the offender. We found that these positive feelings toward the victim and family were in turn related to a heightened risk of them imposing the death penalty. We found evidence that part of the effect of VIE on the decision to impose death was mediated by emotions of sympathy and empathy. We think our findings open the door for future work to put together better the causal story that links VIE to an increased inclination to impose death as well as explore possible remedies.     

Increasing jurors' participation in trials

A field experiment is reported that examines the advantages and disadvantages of two juror participation procedures: Allowing jurors to take notes during the trial, and allowing jurors to direct questions to witnesses. The presence or absence of both procedures was randomly assigned to 34 civil and 33 criminal trials in Wisconsin circuit courts. Following the trials, questinnaires were administered to judges, lawyers, and jurors. Overall, no evidence is found to support the hypotheses that juror notetaking would serve as a useful memory aid, would assist the jury with recall of the judge's instructions, or would increase the jurors' confidence in their verdict. The hypothesis that juror notetaking would increase juror satisfaction with the trial was supported. None of the findings supported the conclusion that juror notetaking was distracting, that notetakers were overly influential during the deliberations, that the jurors' notes were inaccurate, that the notes favored the plaintiff, or that the notes heightened juror disagreement about the trial evidence. It was hypothesized, but not found, that allowing juror questions of witnesses would uncover important issues in the trial and would increase the jurors' satisfaction with the trial procedure. However, juror questions did serve to alleviate juror doubts about the trial testimony, and provided the lawyers with feedback about the jurors' perception of the trial. No evidence was found to support the expectations that juror questions would slow the trial, would upset the lawyers' strategy, or that the question-asking procedure would be a nuisance to the courtroom staff. Furthermore, the lawyers did not appear overly reluctant to object to inappropriate questions from jurors, and jurors did not report being embarassed or angry when their questions were objected to.Dispute Resolution Research Center, Northwestern University     

Clarifying Life and Death Matters: An Analysis of Instructional Comprehension and Penalty Phase Closing Arguments

We report the results of two studies designed as follow-ups to our earlier research on the comprehension of capital penalty instructions. In the first study we examine whether a California penalty instruction that was revised by the courts to improve its comprehension by jurors accomplishes this goal. In the second study we content-analyze a sample of attorney closing arguments that were given at the conclusion of actual capital penalty phases to explore whether they are likely to clarify those concepts and procedures that are so poorly comprehended in the judge's instructions. Results indicate that the revised instruction suffers from the same comprehension problems that plagued its predecessor and that attorney arguments appear unlikely to significantly reduce confusion among capital jurors.     

Cameras in the courtroom

The present experiment examined some of the key psychological issues associated with electronic media coverage (EMC) of courtroom trials. Undergraduate student subjects served as eitherwitnesses orjurors in one of three types of trials:EMC, in which a video camera was present; conventional media coverage (CMC), in which a journalist was present; or, ano-media control, in which no media representative or equipment was present. Students who served as witnesses first viewed a 5-min videotape of a reenacted armed robbery. Days later, these students testified as witnesses to the crime in front of a jury of peers. Measures assessed the following: witness and juror attitudes toward EMC, witness report and juror perceptions of nervousness and media distraction, juror perceptions of witness testimony, and witnesses' ability to accurately recall aspects of the crime event. Results showed that EMC witnesses and jurors had significantly more favorable attitudes toward EMC than participants in the other two conditions. And, although EMC witnesses and jurors both reported greater witness nervousness, distraction, and awareness than those in the CMC condition, the EMC experience did not impair witnesses' ability to accurately recall the details of the crime or witnesses' ability to communicate effectively. The psychological and legal policy implications of these findings are discussed.     

Comprehension of judges' instructions in the penalty phase of a capital trial

Comprehension of two sets of judges' penalty phase instructions for a capital trial was examined. The 115 subjects, recruited from jury lists, viewed one of two 20-min videotapes, prepared either from the instructions given in a specific North Carolina capital trial several years ago or from the present North Carolina pattern instructions. After viewing the tape, subjects responded to a series of eight questions, which probed their understanding of the legal issues presented in the instructions. Compared to the subjects exposed to the present pattern instructions, those exposed to the instructions from the specific trial displayed significantly inferior understanding of the legal criteria to be used in deciding the existence of mitigating circumstances and for incorporating mitigating circumstances into the final jury recommendation of life imprisonment or the death penalty. The results of the experiment are relevant to appeals beyond the specific appeal that prompted the research, and the methodology is applicable to a range of issues.     

Error Rates,Likelihood Ratios,and Jury Evaluation of Forensic Evidence

Forensic examiners regularly testify in criminal cases, informing the jurors whether crime scene evidence likely came from a source. In this study, we examine the impact of providing jurors with testimony further qualified by error rates and likelihood ratios, for expert testimony concerning two forensic disciplines: commonly used fingerprint comparison evidence and a novel technique involving voice comparison. Our method involved surveying mock jurors in Amazon Mechanical Turk (N = 897 laypeople) using written testimony and judicial instructions. Participants were more skeptical of voice analysis and generated fewer “guilty” decisions than for fingerprint analysis (B = 2.00, OR = 7.06, p = <0.000). We found that error rate information most strongly decreased “guilty” votes relative to no qualifying information for participants who heard fingerprint evidence (but not those that heard voice analysis evidence; B = −1.16, OR = 0.32, p = 0.007). We also found that error rates and conclusion types led to a greater decrease on “guilty” votes for fingerprint evidence than voice evidence (B = 1.44, OR = 4.23, p = 0.021). We conclude that these results suggest jurors adjust the weight placed on forensic evidence depending on their prior views about its reliability. Future research should develop testimony and judicial instructions that can better inform jurors of the strengths and limitations of forensic evidence.     

Race and the Death Penalty

Abstract

Scholars have learned a great deal about race and the death penalty. Yet the field has limitations: (1) prior research focuses on African Americans and Hispanics but ignores Asian Americans; (2) researchers have not explored Donald Black's (1989) plan to eliminate discrimination called the “desocialization of law.” Black notes that jurors who do not know the race of the offender and victim cannot discriminate. Black then outlines proposals aimed at removing race information from trials, while still providing jurors with relevant legal information. We address both issues through an experiment in which mock jurors (N = 1,233 students) recommended a sentence in a capital murder trial consisting of four conditions: (1) Asian American-white; (2) white-Asian American; (3) African American-white; (4) race of offender and victim unknown. The results suggest that Asian Americans are treated the same as whites, while African Americans continue to suffer from discrimination. Here, we consider the potential role of social status in such outcomes. The results also suggest that African American offenders and unknown offenders face the same odds of a death sentence. Here, we consider two potential interpretations. On one hand, jurors in the unknown condition could have seen an African American offender and a white victim in their “mind's eye,” effectively merging the conditions. On the other hand, death sentences could be the same in the conditions for distinct reasons: Death sentences could be high in the unknown condition because of relational distance between the juror and offender, while death sentences could be high in the African American-white condition because of discrimination. We conclude by considering the theoretical and public policy implications of both the central findings.     

Measuring damages for lost enjoyment of life: the view from the bench and the jury box

Civil jury instructions are inconsistent in defining what constitutes noneconomic damages, which may include pain, suffering, disability, disfigurement, and loss of enjoyment of life (LEL), among other injury sequelae. This inconsistency has been manifested recently in court decisions that have considered whether LEL should be treated as a separate element of noneconomic damages, distinct from pain and suffering. This paper reviews the case law on this issue and also describes a jury simulation experiment. Mock jurors awarded damages after they received instructions on noneconomic damages in which LEL was (1) not identified as a distinct element of damages; (2) defined as an element of damages distinct from pain and suffering, but participants awarded a single amount for noneconomic damages; or (3) defined as a distinct element of damages, and participants awarded separate amounts for LEL and pain and suffering. Instructions about LEL resulted in larger awards, but only when mock jurors also made a separate award for that element of damages.