中国法治的人文道路

现时代需要一种融合中西人文主义之精髓、兼济人的认知理性与道德理性的新人文主义。从人文主义的视角看,道德人文维度与民主政治维度是构建中国法治需要着力加强的两个方面。在法治发展道路上,中国需要协调好法治的道德、功利、政治与行政四个层面,沿着自身的文化传统,打造政治和社会的理性与道德基础,开拓一种具有厚重人文底蕴的"道德的民主法治",实现仁义道德与自然权利、民主法治在现代的历史衔接。     

道德话语系统与压力型司法的路径选择

面对道德困境案件的日趋增多,司法之道德话语系统的社会意义得以凸现,法官往往需要将目光往返于法律话语系统与道德话语系统,充分反映民众的共同道德观,并自觉拒斥虚妄的民意诉求对司法的消极影响。当然,也使难办案件意义上的司法裁判被简缩为"冲击—回应"的被动过程,从而形成了一种基于外在压力影响但又需要慎重对待的压力型司法。如果现代司法放弃建立纯而又纯的法条主义之梦,而将道德话语系统融入司法的价值判断,那么压力型司法将在以道德论证弥补法律之确定性的裂缝以及以判决书说理制度增加司法判决的可接受性之方法选择中走出困境。     

On the Concept and the Nature of Law

Abstract. The central argument of this article turns on the dual‐nature thesis. This thesis sets out the claim that law necessarily comprises both a real or factual dimension and an ideal or critical dimension. The dual‐nature thesis is incompatible with both exclusive legal positivism and inclusive legal positivism. It is also incompatible with variants of non‐positivism according to which legal validity is lost in all cases of moral defect or demerit (exclusive legal non‐positivism) or, alternatively, is affected in no way at all by moral defects or demerits (super‐inclusive legal non‐positivism). The dual nature of law is expressed, on the one hand, by the Radbruch formula, which says that extreme injustice is not law, and, on the other, by the correctness argument, which says that law's claim to correctness necessarily includes a claim to moral correctness. Thus, what the law is depends not only on social facts, but also on what the law ought to be.     

Globalization and the Decline of Legal Consciousness: Torts, Ghosts, and Karma in Thailand

This study analyzes the transformation of legal consciousness associated with the process of globalization. It examines changing conceptions of injury and compensation in northern Thailand, where global economic and cultural flows have had a dramatic impact over the past twenty years. In their "injury narratives," ordinary Thai people describe the harm they have suffered, the causes they identify, the issues of responsibility with which they struggle, the obligations and remedy systems they consider relevant, and the role of law as they perceive it. These accounts, as well as litigation records from the Chiangmai Provincial Court, suggest that a transformation of Thai legal consciousness has indeed occurred, but not in the direction one might have expected. Rather than embracing liberal legalism or conceptualizing their grievances in terms of rights, injury victims in post-globalization Thailand are now less inclined to perceive their experiences in legal terms and more inclined to rely on a new form of religious discourse in which Buddhist precepts justify the injured person's decision to refrain from the pursuit of compensation. This article offers an explanation of why globalization appears to have pushed legal consciousness in the direction of religiosity rather than rights.     

Why Interpret?

Abstract. My article is about legal interpretation, but not about the question: how to interpret the law. Rather its aim is to make us consider seriously the question: Why is interpretation central to legal practices? After all not all normative practices assign interpretation such a central role. In this regard the law contrasts with morality. The reason for the contrast has to do with the status of sources in the law. There are no “moral sources” while legal sources are central to the law. Legal interpretation is primarily—I will suggest—the interpretation not of the law, but of its sources. To understand why interpretation is central to legal practices requires understanding the role of sources in the law: the reasons for having them, and hence also the ways in which they should be treated. I will show how reflections about these topics connect with some traditional jurisprudential puzzles, such as the relations between law and morality. Are there gaps in the law? Is the law or its interpretation objective or subjective?     

捍卫法条主义

在中国语境中,法条主义俨然是一个充满＂贬义＂指称的＂稻草人＂概念,但这一指称概念是由反法条主义在一种＂自我想象性＂的立场上＂型塑＂出来的。在西方,人们在对待法条主义的＂是＂与＂非＂问题上从来就没有达成过任何＂共识性＂的认识。在当下的中国,尽管人们都在极力地批判法条主义,但这种处于＂穷途末路＂的法条主义却是需要我们予以坚决捍卫的。法条主义所处的＂穷途末路＂困境恰恰说明了中国法律学研究的贫困,努力推进对中国＂法条＂的法律学研究是中国法条主义肩负的社会责任。     

On Law and Morality. A Dialogue

Abstract. The dialogue focusses on the distinctions and connections between law and morality. Morality is seen as axiological in character, whereas law is deontological. The possibility of a conceptual tie between goodness (axiology) and duty (deontology) is firmly disputed. Habermas's discursive foundation of ethics is criticized because it seems to confer on moral principles the status of a priori synthetic truths. Every moral idea has a cultural relativity which is not taken into account by Habermasian dialogue ethics. The moral and the legal points of view are kept separate: A law which does not satisfy the requirements of a "minimum content" of natural law is not said to be "law," but simply falling short of moral criteria. The possibility of introducing rational guarantees into moral discourse is not denied, but doubt remains as to whether there are "right answers" to moral questions.     

论著作人格权保护在美国的演绎

著作人格权作为一种非财产性权利,是作者享有的基于作品产生的人格利益.著作人格权制度是版权体系和作者权体系的分水岭所在.现行美国《版权法》第106条之2保护“某些作者的署名权及其保护作品完整权”,可是美国真的保护著作人格权吗？最初,美国延续版权体系的传统,无论是在版权法案中还是在司法实践中都不保护著作人格权制度.直到1988年,美国加入《伯尔尼公约》后,为了履行公约义务不得不在其版权法案中加入著作人格权的保护条款,但在司法实践中,美国仍遵循版权是财产权的理念,通过对作者和作品范围严格限定并未真正保护著作人格权.     

法律效力理论中的实效性原则

法律拥有效力部分地依赖于其所在的法律体系具有实效,即得到人们大体上的服从。这就是法律效力理论中的实效性原则。对于各种类型的法律效力理论来说,法律效力标准都需要来自法律本质、功能的道德原则的支持。表面上,作为纯粹事实的实效似乎与各种类型的法律效力理论都不协调,但实质上,法律效力依赖于实效是源于"法律的任务应该交给最具实力的人或机构来完成"这一道德原则。根据该原则,实效难题可以得到很好的解决。     

法律实证主义的强立场——兼评拉兹《法律的权威》

在法律与道德的关系上,拉兹认为有效法律的鉴别标准完全排除道德论证,这就是拉兹的渊源论.渊源论表明所有的法律都具有渊源,渊源论的论据来自权威论.权威以理由为基础,是改变行为理由的能力.法律也要主张权威,法律主张合法性权威是它的一个本质特征.权威性理由是排他性理由,排除了道德因素的可能性,权威论支持了渊源论.权威论受到了来自包容性实证主义者和德沃金的批评,他们的争论共同推进了对法律与道德关系问题的研究.     

Psychology and legal change

From its inception, research in “law and psychology” has had an explicitly applied focus. In large part, psychologists have studied legal issues and participated as experts in the legal process in order to improve law and enhance the quality of its justice. This article examines whether and how this can be done. A taxonomy of relationships between the two disciplines is presented which characterizes law and psychology research in terms of its potential for legal change. The use of psychology of effect legal change requires a bringing together of both psychological and legal paradigms. But important differences exist between the styles and methods of reasoning, proff, and justfication in psychology and law. The implications of those differences for the use of psychological data in legal change efforts are developed, as are other aspects of “legalism” that may hinder or impede the effectiveness of psychologically oriented law reform. Finally, limitations of a “factual jurisprudence” that derived from the nature of psychological data are examined.     

The Lawyer's Amoral Ethical Role: A Defense, A Problem, and Some Possibilities

This essay presents a moral justification for the current generally accepted amoral ethical role of the lawyer. The justification is premised primarily upon the values of individual autonomy, equality, and diversity. Based upon these values, the author argues that the amoral role is the correct moral stance for the lawyer as a professional, is a "good" role. The essay then responds to two of the most frequent criticisms of that moral stance: the first based upon economic inequality and the fact that lawyers'services must be purchased; the second based upon the absence of the "adversary system" context for most lawyer work. The author then elaborates a serious problem created by the conjunction of the amoral role and the dominant legal philosophy of American lawyers, "legal realism." If the limit on a lawyer's conduct under the traditional amoral role is the law, then the realist emphasis on the indeterminacy and manipulability of "law" leave the lawyer in a difficult moral position. Finally, a series of possibilities are presented to deal with this problem, the most promising of which is the "moral dialogue" between lawyer and client as an adjunct to the amoral role.     

Constructing C.A.L. tutorials

ON THE assumption that law schools should seek to foster a legal profession which takes ethics seriously, this article explores how it may promote the moral development of its students. Having examined how legal education currently fails in this regards, it explores competing psychological theories of moral development and argues that law schools should seek to start students on a ‘moral apprenticeship’ leading to the development of the necessary moral character to equip them for the ethical challenges of practice. The article then looks at the extent to which ideal methods for promoting moral development can be implemented given the current climate in legal education. In particular, it argues that an excellent and viable means of assisting in the process of moral character development is through student involvement in live‐client clinics, particularly if they are run on an extra‐curricular basis.     

警察执法的道德追问

警察执法不仅是实施法律的过程,而且也是实现道德价值的过程。忽视警察执法的道德追问,必然造成警察执法的道德缺失。警察执法应是法治化与道德化的统合。提高警察的道德素质,才能从根本上保证警察执法正当目的的确立和警察执法手段的正当行使。在依法治警的同时切实以德治警,加强对警察自由裁量权的道德约束,让“立警为公,执法为民”的道德价值理念照耀警察执法过程。     

Legisprudence as a New Theory of Legislation

Abstract. Legal theory has so far focused exclusively on judicial activity, not on legislation. This is due to the specific legal framework of reasoning, upon which it is essential to act upon rules, wherever they come from. This form of (strong) legalism is criticized and replaced by weak legalism. Weak legalism makes it possible to detect the principles of legislation that underly the activity of the legislator. Legisprudence is the theory of these principles.     

法治价值论

法治这个概念所蕴含的理念应该是具有一般性的,即排除人治的专断、维护个人自由权利、政府依法行事而且其本身受到法律规范以及守法作为一种道德承担。由此,法治的实体价值就是由法治所决定的法律在目的和后果上应遵循的社会原则,包括正义原则、自由原则和平等原则;法治的形式价值则是指向法律本身,是从法律的内部规定的具体原则和标准,包括法律至上原则、法律的普遍性原则、法律的可操作性原则、法律的程序正义原则等。法治的两种价值在取向上存在差异,这种差异决定了两者不能相互取代,不能只从一个方面去把握法治的内涵,但是两者在法治这个统一体中又是相互联系的。因此,法治应是实体与形式的统一,是人类法律、社会实践所追求的共同目标。     

The ethical identity of law students

This paper uses measures of values, moral outlook and professional identity to explore the ethical and professional identity of law students. We do so in two jurisdictions, surveying 441 students studying in England and Wales and 569 students studying in the US. The survey covers the first and final years of an undergraduate law degree and the postgraduate vocational stage in England and Wales, as well as students in all years of the JD programme in the US. We explore whether law students towards the end of their legal education have ethical identities predictive of less ethical conduct than those at the beginning of their legal education; whether law students intending careers in business law have values and profiles consistent with less ethical conduct than those intending to work for government or individuals; and what factors might explain these differences in ethical outlook. Our findings suggest that ethical identity is strongly associated with gender and career intentions. They also suggest weaker moral identities for students intending to practise business law. Ultimately, our findings support a conclusion that is more nuanced than the predominant theses about the impact of legal education on student ethicality which tend to suggest legal education diminishes ethicality.     

The difference of Chinese legalism and western legalism

This paper analyzes the origin of Chinese legalism, its major propositions and characteristics. It compares the difference between Chinese legalism and other Chinese philosophies including Confucianism, Taoism and Mohism. It also discloses the difference of Chinese legalism and Western legalism in relation with morality. Western legalism defended the rule-of-law but argued against the morality of law. In contrast, Chinese legalism, especially in the early Pre-Qin era, did not separate morality from law. However, the fidelity to law in Chinese legalism was interpreted as the fidelity to the monarch, and thus being different from the Western rule-of-law.     

The Idiom of Legalism in Bar Politics: Lawyers, McCarthyism, and the Civil Rights Era

This paper considers the political role of the organized bar from three perspectives: the historical question of the stance taken by bar associations during the major civil rights debates of the post-World War II period; the sociological question of the extent to which legal associations can act collectively on highly contentious political issues; and the legal question concerning the implications of legal formalism for the politics of the bar. Contrary to the belief that legalism is an inherently conservative means of justifying professional inaction on fundamental issues, the paper argues that in fact legalism may well be the most important basis of intra-professional consensus on those issues as well as the most powerful means by which the profession can influence state and national governments. Legalism can be understood as a common professional idiom which allows mobilization on divisive issues. It can be used in support of both liberal and conservative causes. In this sense, within certain limits, legalism is neutral–an expedient which enables the profession to act politically in circumstances which otherwise would effectively immobilize its collegial associations.     

论实质法治主义背景下的司法审查

形式法治主义向实质法治主义转型具有客观必然性,既有利于避免形式法治主义本身的局限性,也由中国现阶段的特殊国情所决定。实质法治主义的基本特征表现在：形式正义与实质正义的统一;合法性与正当性的统一;实体合法性与程序合法性的统一;形式平等与事实平等的统一。行政诉讼与司法审查,作为通过司法手段监督和支持行政机关依法行政的重要形式,在由形式法治主义向实质法治主义这一转型过程中必将发挥极为重要的作用。要把握好规则性与灵活性的统一和平衡,注重形式法治和实质法治的结合与协调。