The Budget Enforcement Act in 1991: Isometric Budgeting

The immediate effect of the Budget Enforcement Act (BEA) of 1990 was to cancel a pending $110 billion sequester and to change the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings deficit targets. These and other changes allowed Congress and the administration to escape responsibility for increases in the deficit if discretionary spending was kept within the caps and no new entitlement programs or revenue enhancements were added. This assumption and others relating to the empowerment of the Appropriations Committees and the new authority of the OMB are explored in this article.     

Comparing Implementation Processes in Sweden and the United States

This article attempts a systematic comparison of how policy is implemented in Sweden and the United States. We suggest that differences might be explained by examining policymaking processes, policy content, and governmental structure. The comparison reveals differences in 'incentive structure'. Both Sweden and the U.S. have responded to the complexity and uncertainty that accompanies increased demands on central government by adopting 'softer' mechanisms for implementation. The effect of these shifts in both systems is to devolve important decisions to lower levels of government. In Sweden, this devolution is still accompanied by strong incentives for national policymakers to undertake implementation, although the incentives may not be as strong as they were in the past. In the U.S., it is accompanied by a radical weakening of incentives to carry out implementation and increasing instability in policy content and relations among key actors.     

Federal Budgeting and Finance in 1991: The Future is Now

The large federal deficits run throughout the 1980s generated concern that we were mortgaging our future. In 1991, the note came due. The potential for aggravating the long-run deficit problem constrained fiscal policy from reacting to the recession. Institutional and partisan conflict and the controls established by the Budget Enforcement Act (BEA) limited responses to a remarkable budgetary opportunity—the dissolution of the Soviet Union—and to a serious budgetary threat—exploding health care costs. The BEA controls were applied rigidly with a few minor exceptions, and credit reform was implemented successfully; on the other hand, Congress and the president made no headway on further deficit reductions even though long-run projections worsened. The agenda-setting role of the president's budget for the fiscal year 1993 diminished, as the document's format was heavily influenced by the upcoming presidential election. In contrast to this mixed record for federal budgeting, progress was made in building a financial management structure and developing accounting standards.     

Primacy Implementation of Environmental Policy in the U.S. States

Environmental regulation is frequently implemented through asystem that allows states to choose whether to assume primaryauthority, or "primacy," for implementation and enforcement.This study looks at what causes states to assume this authorityin two important areas of environmental policy: air and waterpollution. It finds that in each policy area, primacy assumptionis unrelated to the "greenness" of state environmental policygenerally and negatively related to indicators of policy innovationwithin that area. Rather than being driven by commitment tothe environment, primacy assumption appears to be driven predominatelyby other factors, which differ substantially across the airand water policy arenas. These findings call into question thewidely held view that primacy assumption is an indicator ofstate environmentalism and indicate that a more nuanced viewof what causes states to assume primacy is necessary to fullyunderstand the dynamics of intergovernmental policy implementation.     

The behavior of congressional tenure over time: 1953–1991

This paper studies the behavior of average length of tenure for cohorts of U.S. representatives who entered office from 1953–1989. Using a new methodology, it addresses the following questions. How much longer do representatives stay in office now compared to, say, twenty years ago? If an increase in tenure has occurred, when did it begin? Are reelection outcomes or voluntary departures the primary determinants of changes in congressional tenure over time? The results of this study are then applied to a number of hypotheses concerning possible causes of longer congressional stays.     

Comparing Implementation of Internet Diffusion in the United States and France: Policies,Beliefs, and Institutions

Comparing Internet diffusion policies in the United States and France from an implementation perspective brings to light institutional and historical differences, even though both countries used the same top‐down approach. We find that France not only followed the technological lead of the United States in information technology but also emulated some of its more business‐oriented approaches in the implementation of the Internet, despite its own longstanding tradition of government intervention in industrial and commercial matters. This policy shift appears to be spurred by the global economy. Traditionally state‐controlled national economies are now increasingly leveraging private interests for successful industrial policy. When applying Sabatier and Jenkins‐Smith's advocacy coalition framework to the American and French diffusion of the Internet, we find policy communities actually expanding to private and public actors, including industry captains, legislators, and civil servants. These subsystems work together through classic lawmaking and lobbying under technological and economic constraints.     

Vertical Competition in Unitary States: The Case of Italy

In unitary states – states in whichconstitutional powers are owned by thecentral government – vertical competitioncan generate stable outcomes, that isoutcomes that do not unravel througharbitrary repossessions by the center.Stability is a product of institutionalcommitment devices. Through these ademocratic government, though it cannotbind successor governments, can effectivelyoblige them to respect some of thedecisions it has made. A number of suchcommitment devices exist in Italy; theymake possible stable vertical competitionbetween central and regional governments.     

制度的十大功能:学理层面的诠释

制度具有思想、道德、文化、政策等所不能代替的特有属性和功能:转化与载体功能、抑恶与惩恶功能、护善与扬善功能、预防与教化功能、纠错与更新功能、管理与效率功能、疏通与减压功能、激励与创造功能、协调与整合功能、秩序与稳定功能。只有深刻认识这些功能,才能增强制度意识,加强制度建设和创新,为和谐社会的构建提供理论支撑和制度保证。     

The Neglected Strata: States in the City-Federal Politics of Malaysia

Another version of this paper was prepared for Conference on"The Politics of Intergovernmental Relations in Federal Systems:Urban Perspectives," Center for the Study of Federalism, TempleUniversity, Philadelphia, August 26–28, 1973. In revisingthis paper, I am indebted to Dorothy and James Guyot for theirperceptive and helpful suggestions.     

Alternative models of issue voting: The case of the 1991 and 1995 elections in Belgium

Abstract. Previous research has indicated that the success of the directional model of issue voting depends on levels of political sophistication and how party position is measured. Using 1991 and 1995 Belgian Election Surveys, the predictive power of proximity and directional measures are compared controlling for both variables. It is shown that when one uses overall mean placements, instead of mean placements by level of political sophistication, the proximity effect declines most among the highly sophisticated voters. The article also compares the performance of the proximity and directional measures across party systems. Contrary to theoretical expectations, party–system differences between Flanders and Wallonia do not affect the explanatory power of either of these measures. It is only in the cases of the liberal, socialist and extreme right parties that the directional measure is clearly superior. A closer analysis of this result indicates that the relative success of the directional measure is due to the limited number of issues from which those parties draw support.