A lesson from the JOBS program: Reforming welfare must be both dazzling and dull

The Job Opportunities and Basic Skills Training (JOBS) program created by the Family Support Act (FSA) of 1988 made considerable progress in expanding opportunities for welfare recipients to go to school, train for employment, and seek work. Yet federal and state officials sought further welfare reform because they were impatient with a program that was costly and produced little evidence of positive outcomes; they realized that the FSA did not address perverse incentives in the AFDC program; and they saw political gains to be reaped from reform itself. It concludes that successful reform requires leaders who can articulate a vision of welfare that dazzles enough to motivate many layers of actors and who can pay attention to the dull management details of implementing it.     

Welfare and Work: Job-Retention Outcomes of Federal Welfare-to-Work Employees

On March 8, 1997, President Clinton announced the federal government's Welfare-to-Work Initiative, a major effort to provide job opportunities for welfare recipients in federal agencies. Using data from the U.S. Office of Personnel Management's Central Personnel Data File, the authors compare differences in job-retention outcomes for Welfare-to-Work employees and similar non–Welfare-to-Work employees in federal agencies. This approach provides an innovative way to measure job-retention by comparing job-retention outcomes of Welfare-to-Work employees against non–Welfare-to-Work employees. The findings suggest that Welfare-to-Work employees have greater odds of retaining their jobs than non–Welfare-to-Work employees. The results provide useful insights into the dynamics of job retention among welfare recipients who are hired into federal-sector employment.     

在分散与统一之间——美国食品安全监管事权划分探析

美国食品安全事权划分,在形式上呈现分散特征,联邦层面有十多个机构参与食品监管事务,州、地方、部落、领地有3000多个独立的监管机构来保障本地食品安全,这种分散特征主要是由美国的宪政体制、权力结构的分散性和政策输出的不确定性造成的。但在实际运行过程中,各监管机构之间通过正式的和非正式的协调活动,彼此之间分享了权力,共享了食品安全监管标准,达到了一定的统一性。我国食品安全事权划分可在明晰监管机构间的责任、保持事权划分稳定性以培养专业能力、建立倒金字塔式的监管任务结构方面借鉴美国的经验。     

Impacts of Intergovernmental Financial Incentives on State Welfare Policymaking and Interstate Equity

Welfare policy in the United States is strongly influenced byintergovernmental factors. This analysis traces the effectsof federal financial incentives on state welfare policy decisionsacross programs and examines how changes in federal incentivesaffect state policy choices over time. The data indicate thathigher levels of federal participation are associated with substantialreductions in variance of welfare grants among the states andwith higher levels of interstate equity. These findings implythat significant shifts in welfare outputs would result froma devolution of responsibility for welfare to the states.     

State Fiscal Responses to Welfare Reform during Recessions: Lessons for the Future

The 1996 welfare reform transformed open-ended matching grants to states to fixed block grants. This article considers whether, given the new regime, states will be able and willing to meet the need for public assistance during recessions. The accumulation of large balances of unspent federal welfare funds helped states weather the first year or so of the current recession without having to cut programs for needy families. While new fiscal rules promoted positive reform during a period of economic prosperity, they may be leaving states and their most vulnerable citizens at serious risk as the economic and fiscal slowdown continues.     

The challenge ahead: the state agenda for the coming years

The mid-1990s promise to be extremely challenging years as state leaders and institutions struggle to bring accountability and predictability back into their political systems. Faced with continuing budgets troubles, increasing demands for services and a shift of responsibility from the federal to the state level, the American states will be hard pressed to satisfy constituent needs or improve state services. However, the tough times may result in long-term improvement in state government, as administrators streamline agencies, legislators trim inefficient or redundant programs and state leaders generally seek new and cost effective solutions to social and economic problems.     

LOCAL GOVERNMENTS AS IMPLEMENTORS OF PUBLIC POLICY

This study expands the growing literature in comparative public policy that examines welfare services. By now, it is accepted that a combination of economic, social, and political factors are influential in the delivery of these services by the 60 states. This paper finds that similar factors are also operating at the county level in New York state. Most notably, political factors affect the distribution of welfare benefits–despite federal and state mandates that require distribution to be based solely on need. This raises a number of issues. concerning the nature of political influence and the autonomy of local bureaucracies, which require further exploration.     

The TANF/SSI connection

Interactions and overlap of social assistance programs across clients interest policymakers because such interactions affect both the clients' well-being and the programs' efficiency. This article investigates the connections between Supplemental Security Income (SSI) and Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) and TANF's predecessor, the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program. Connections between receipt of TANF and SSI are widely discussed in both disability policy and poverty research literatures because many families receiving TANF report disabilities. For both states and the individuals involved, it is generally financially advantageous for adults and children with disabilities to transfer from TANF to SSI. States gain because the federal government pays for the SSI benefit, and states can then use the TANF savings for other purposes. The families gain because the SSI benefits they acquire are greater than the TANF benefits they lose. The payoff to states from transferring welfare recipients to SSI was substantially increased when Congress replaced AFDC with TANF in 1996. States retained less than half of any savings achieved through such transfers under AFDC, but they retain all of the savings under TANF. Also, the work participation requirements under TANF have obligated states to address the work support needs of adults with disabilities who remain in TANF, and states can avoid these costs if adults have disabilities that satisfy SSI eligibility requirements. The incentive for TANF recipients to apply for SSI has increased over time as inflation has caused real TANF benefits to fall relative to payments received by SSI recipients. Trends in the financial incentives for transfer to SSI have not been studied in detail, and reliable general data on the extent of the interaction between TANF and SSI are scarce. In addition, some estimates of the prevalence of TANF receipt among SSI awardees are flawed because they fail to include adults receiving benefits in TANF-related Separate State Programs (SSPs). SSPs are assistance programs that are administered by TANF agencies but are paid for wholly from state funds. When the programs are conducted in a manner consistent with federal regulations, the money states spend on SSPs counts toward federal maintenance-of-effort (MOE) requirements, under which states must sustain a certain level of contribution to the costs of TANF and approved related activities. SSPs are used for a variety of purposes, including support of families who are in the process of applying for SSI. Until very recently, families receiving cash benefits through SSPs were not subject to TANF's work participation requirements. This article contributes to analysis of the interaction between TANF and SSI by evaluating the financial consequences of TANF-to-SSI transfer and developing new estimates of both the prevalence of receipt of SSI benefits among families receiving cash assistance from TANF and the proportion of new SSI awards that go to adults and children residing in families receiving TANF or TANF-related benefits in SSPs. Using data from the Urban Institute's Welfare Rules Database, we find that by 2003 an SSI award for a child in a three-person family dependent on TANF increased family income by 103.5 percent on average across states; an award to the adult in such a family increased income by 115.4 percent. The gain from both child and adult transfers increased by about 6 percent between 1996 (the eve of the welfare reform that produced TANF) and 2003. Using data from the Department of Health and Human Services' TANF/SSP Recipient Family Characteristics Survey, we estimate that 16 percent of families receiving TANF/SSP support in federal fiscal year 2003 included an adult or child SSI recipient. This proportion has increased slightly since fiscal year 2000. The Social Security Administration's current procedures for tabulating characteristics of new SSI awardees do not recognize SSP receipt as TANF We use differences in reported TANF-to-SSI flows between states with and without Separate State Programs to estimate the understatement of the prevalence of TANF-related SSI awards in states with SSPs. The results indicate that the absolute number of awards to AFDC (and subsequently) TANF/SSP recipients has declined by 42 percent for children and 25 percent for adults since the early 1990s. This result is a product of the decline in welfare caseloads. However, the monthly incidence of such awards has gone up-from less than 1 per 1,000 child recipients in calendar years 1991-1993 to 1.3 per 1,000 in 2001-2003 and, for adult recipients, from 1.6 per 1,000 in 1991-1993 to 4 per 1,000 in 2001-2003. From these results we conclude that a significant proportion of each year's SSI awards to disabled nonelderly people go to TANF/SSP recipients, and many families that receive TANF/SSP support include adults, children, or both who receive SSI. Given the Social Security Administration's efforts to improve eligibility assessment for applicants, to ensure timely access to SSI benefits for those who qualify, and to improve prospects for eventual employment of the disabled, there is definitely a basis for working with TANF authorities both nationally and locally on service coordination and on smoothing the process of SSI eligibility assessment. The Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 reauthorized TANF through fiscal year 2010, but with some rules changes that are important in light of the analysis presented in this article. The new law substantially increases effective federal requirements for work participation by adult TANF recipients and mandates that adults in Separate State Programs be included in participation requirements beginning in fiscal year 2007. Thus SSPs will no longer provide a means for exempting from work requirements families that are in the process of applying for SSI, and the increased emphasis on work participation could result in more SSI applications from adult TANF recipients.     

State Capacity,Bureaucratic Politicization,and Corruption in the Brazilian State

Responding to recent articles in Governance highlighting the need for improved measurement of bureaucratic characteristics, this article describes efforts to map Brazil's federal agencies on three dimensions—capacity, autonomy, and partisan dominance—derived from data on more than 326,000 civil servants. The article provides a “proof of concept” about the utility of agency‐level measures of these variables, demonstrating how they relate to an output common to all agencies: corruption. The article provides a first step in the direction of building a comparative research program that offers objective evaluation of bureaucracies within nation‐states, with the intent of better disentangling their impact on governance outcomes.     

Beyond the categories: human service managers view the new federal aid

Social agency chief executives in six program areas--welfare, health, mental health, community action, model cities, and community mental health centers--were surveyed to determine their reaction to the recent revenue sharing/block grant efforts to decentralize the federal aid system. Despite their strong belief that social initiatives and values were advanced principally by federal action, and that excessive reliance on state and local officials could severely jeopardize social programs with weak constituencies, agency executives also recognized major weaknesses in traditional categorical grant policy and, to varying degrees, supported revenue sharing and block grant alternatives. Those agencies largely dependent on federal support for their survival--model cities, community action programs, and community mental health centers--tended to support the new aid efforts only reluctantly. Those agencies more fully integrated into the regular policy-making arrangements of local government--health, welfare, and mental health agencies--were considerably more positive in their endorsement of greater decentralization.     

The effects of administrative linkages on implementation: Welfare policy in Israel

This article focuses on the interaction between local-national relations and the implementation of welfare policy in Israel. It studies the administrative linkages between different levels of governmental jurisdictions involved in the implementing of certain policies of the Ministry of Welfare. It seeks to understand their impact on the original goals and programs of the national government and on actual services provided at the municipal level. These linkages include the arrangements for provision, funding, employment, regulations, and inspection. Without denying the importance of other explanations, the article emphasizes the significance of administrative linkages for understanding welfare policy and practices. In effect, the present study evaluates the extent to which the administrative linkages enable the national government to implement its policies on the one hand, and local authorities to influence national policies and programs on the other.The findings and analysis of administrative linkages suggest four conclusions. First contrary to Government policy the welfare system involving the Ministry, local municipalities and their agencies, is very inegalitarian; services are neither uniform nor adjusted to need. Second, the administrative linkages maximize local output and undermine the ability of the Ministry to implement its policies. Third, it is questionable whether the Israeli government can use its present Welfare Ministry to cope with major aspects of the problem. Fourth, it appears that the operations of the Israeli Welfare Ministry system are more similar to the federal than unitary model.     

DOWN TO BUSINESS: THE COMMODIFICATION OF NONPROFIT SOCIAL SERVICES

Private nonprofit organizations play a major role in delivering a range of publicly funded social services. Aggregate data from a recent Urban Institute study reveal that recent federal cutbacks have affected the services, programs and clients of NPOs. An examination of specific agencies in Maricopa County (Phoenix) reveals that many service providers have adopted a business approach to their services and clients, treating them as commodities. In general, agencies serving clients with Resource Mobilization Potential-youth and elderly-have fared better than those dealing primarily with poor adults.     

Interstate Competition and Welfare Policy

In 1996, the federal government terminated the Aid to Familieswith Dependent Children (AFDC) program and replaced it withthe Temporary Assistance for Needy Families program (TANF).Many powers once held by the federal government are now beingused by state governments. Will welfare assistance be redesignedand expanded or will states "race to the bottom?" This issueis investigated by examining state welfare policy choices duringthe latter years of AFDC(1976–1994). Because each stateunder AFDC had the authority to set the level of its welfareguarantee for families that had no income, it is possible toestimate the effects of interstate competition on AFDC guaranteelevels. By estimating a spatial autocorrelation coefficientwhile controlling for theoretically relevant variables and statefixed effects, this study finds evidence that states are sensitiveto the welfare policies of their competitors.     

Guidelines for social services grants

Guidelines for spending federal grants to the states for social services changed repeatedly between 1962 and 1975. The process of preparing guidelines changed, and so did their content. These changes are described and explained. Guidelines at all stages failed to provide intelligible and useful instructions to federal and state administrators. In part this was because the contextual supports that normally help to give effect to grant-in-aid guidelines—explicit antecedents in the law, and implicit understandings among administrators at different levels of the federal system—were lacking or seriously defective. Beyond that, in each of their different phases the guidelines proved untenable because of dysfunctions that may have been peculiar to the respective processes by which they were prepared.The trustees, officers, and other staff members of The Brookings Institution have no responsibility for the contents of this paper.     

Is ABCM Destined for Success or Failure in the Federal Government?

The days of ballooning federal budgets are over. Today, both the president and Congress continue to strive for a balanced budget, while encouraging federal agencies to improve service delivery of the various programs and entitlement benefits provided to their customers. Stakeholder involvement and public opinion about how agencies run their "businesses" are increasingly scrutinized. Trends such as competition for service delivery through franchizing, privatization, and outsourcing are causing an entirely new way of looking at how support and program services are managed. This article explains how the success or failure of activity-based costing management (ABCM) is dependent upon its ability to link the resolution of these external factors with internal business needs, while providing government managers with a better understanding of how to use ABCM to steer their organizations into the future. We also describe the current and future status of ABCM installations at various federal entities where ABCM was recently introduced and where interviews, conducted a year ago, were updated to describe how ABCM is helping these entities align external factors to internal needs. These federal entities are the Immigration and Naturalization Service, the Financial Management Service, and the Veterans Benefits Administration.     

Asymmetric Effects of Intergovernmental Grants: Analysis and Implications for U.S. Welfare Policy

Theories of federal grants to states and localities suggestthat these grants have a stimulative effect on spending, causingrecipient governments to expand and contract programs alongwith changes in the grants. However, policymakers may responddifferently to grant decreases than to grant increases becausethey face political and bureaucratic pressures to expand programs.These asymmetric reactions may depend on specific politicalstructures. Pooled time-series regressions of data from theAid to Families with Dependent Children program across 46 statesfrom 1965 to 1994 demonstrate state government responses togrant changes. Bureaucratic pressures and proposals lead statesto expand their welfare benefits upon increases in federal grants,but not to contract them upon decreases in federal grants. Withregard to the 1996 welfare reforms, this study indicates thatthe switch to block grants will lead to little or no state reductionin welfare payments.     

The Family Support Act of 1988: Federalism, Developmental Policy, and Welfare Reform

Revising the usual distinction between developmental and redistributivepolicies, I suggest that state and federal governments eachseek programs they believe will help them gain their developmentalgoals. But there is little consensus on the types of welfareprograms that actually do create economic development. Stateand federal participants in welfare reform consequently promotethe kind of federal arrangements that are likely to producethe policies they favor. The developmental politics of the FamilySupport Act of 1988 are shown through five main reform issues:child support; national minimum benefits; transitional benefits;welfare for families having both parents present; and education,training, and employment programs.     

THE SURFACE MINING CONTROL AND RECLAMATION ACT OF 1977 IN OKLAHOMA: STATE AND FEDERAL COHABITATION

The enforcement of the SMCRA in Oklahoma has led to improvements and transformations in the coal industry, state and federal regulatory agencies and the public. The catalyst for these changes was the federal takeover of inspection and enforcement of the SMCRA in Oklahoma with the state carrying on all other mining regulatory activities from 1984 through 1987. This pattern of cohabitation differed from that in Tennessee where OSM took over all enforcement of the SMCRA or that in states that enter into cooperative agreements to provide state regulation of coal mining on federal lands within the state. Cohabitation in Oklahoma produced a new, more positive attitude toward cooperative federalism by both federal and state regulatory bodies that might serve as a model for other states with OSM maintaining state agency support for policy objectives while allowing the state reasonable decisional discretion.     

On the front lines of welfare delivery: Are workers implementing policy reforms?

The impact of policy changes on the local delivery of services has been overlooked in several decades of largely unsuccessful efforts to “reform” welfare. This article uses one case of state-level welfare reform in the early 1990s to examine the implementation of policy changes in local welfare offices. Direct observation of transactions between welfare workers and clients suggests that policy reforms were not fully implemented by street-level bureaucrats. The instrumental transactions that continued to dominate interactions with clients were consistent with processing claims and rationing scarce resources, but they were poorly aligned with new policies aimed at changing the services and message delivered to welfare clients. The failure to fully implement reforms on the frontlines has implications for the achievement of policy objectives and for equity in service provision. Implementation issues will have even greater urgency as welfare is devolved from federal to state governments.