The Future of Staatsrecht: Dominance,Demise or Demystification?

The relationship between the national and the European legal orders is affected by the way it is theorised by the national constitutional traditions. This article will explore the opposing constitutional assumptions in Germany that underlie two interpretations of what in Anglo-Saxon countries is known as constitutional law: Staatsrecht and Verfassungsrecht. The two contending visions are generated from different conceptions of the European Union and, especially, the state. The origins of the German constitutional traditions will be historically reconstructed. Although Staatsrecht has historically offered the dominant interpretation of public law, Verfassungsrecht has 'de-mystified' the state. To continue to offer a coherent interpretation Staatsrecht need not abandon the state as its central concept, but will need to re-examine the content of the concept in light of modern forms of constitutionalism and European integration.     

‘Playing the Judicial Card’: Litigation Strategies during the Process of Ratification of the Lisbon Treaty

During the process of ratification of the Lisbon Treaty, a number of constitutional jurisdictions were activated by political actors. In playing ‘the judicial card’, opponents of ratification decided to seek political goals through judicial means, and thus they were obliged to develop litigation strategies. This article explores such strategies and the responses that courts gave them. It shows that constitutional proceedings with regards to the Lisbon Treaty became a political battleground governed by legal logics, in which the interpretation of European clauses, the democratic deficit of the Union and the tensions underlying the European judicial dialogue were privileged objects of discussion between claimants and courts in which law and politics intertwined.     

EU constitutionalisation revisited: Redressing a central assumption in European studies

The constitutionalisation of the European Union has since the early 1990s become a truism in European studies. This article revisits the constitutionalisation theory drawing on the insights from emerging historical research and new strands of political science research. We find that the conventional constitutional narrative is less convincing when confronted with the new evidence from historical and political science research. New historical research show that Member State governments, administrations and courts have generally been rather reluctant to embrace the constitutional project of the ECJ. Furthermore, at the level of European politics, the ECJ and its case law have far from judicialized European decision‐making to the extent often claimed. Concluding, we reject the notion that the ECJ has successfully constitutionalised the EU, emphasising instead the inherent tensions in the process, which continue to complicate the efficiency of European law.     

The Idea of a European Constitution

Any abstract account of a field of law must make generalizationsthat are both faithful to the legal materials and appropriateto the subject matter's aims. The uniqueness and fluidity ofthe European Union's institutions makes such generalizationsvery difficult. A common theoretical approach to EU law (onethat is often relied upon by the Court of Justice, the Parliamentand the Commission) is to borrow directly from the theory ofdomestic constitutional law. The most recent manifestation ofthis tendency is the draft Treaty on the European Constitution,which includes many of the symbolic features of a domestic constitutionalorder. But the European Union is not a state and the constitutionalanalogy is in many ways problematic. In this article I defendthe view that a more complex theory is more appropriate to theunique combination of ordinary politics with diplomatic conferencesthat constitutes the European Union. The key to these institutionsis, in my view, a Kantian international ideal of liberal peace.The foundational constitutional principles of the EU, principlesthat both fit the current legal framework and offer its mostattractive interpretation, require the qualified autonomy ofmember states in a union of republics that create collectiveinstitutions for the purposes of liberal peace.     

National Constitutional Courts in supranational litigation: A contextual analysis

The article examines the role of national constitutional courts in supranational litigation. It firstly illustrates their value and situates well‐known judicial doctrines affecting their jurisdiction in the context of the normative claims, policy agenda and institutional framework promoted by the European Union. Against this background, it gauges the potential of national constitutional courts in countering the process of intergovernmental and technocratic encroachment of national constitutional democracies characterising the most recent evolutionary stages of the European integration process. It is claimed that constitutional courts are in the position of reinforcing, resisting or correcting Union measures with a detrimental impact on national constitutional principles. After having identified in correction the approach more coherent with their constitutional mandate, the article highlights a disturbing paradox: in remaining faithful to their constitutional role, constitutional courts contribute to the sustainability of a comprehensive institutional setting corroding the idea of constitutional democracy on which they are premised.     

A Christian or a Laïc Europe? Christian Values and European Identity

Abstract.  European constitutional traditions share a commitment to freedom of conscience and religion, but differ on their interpretation of whether such freedoms do or do not require a clear cut separation of state and church. Weiler has advocated that the writing of a Constitution for the European Union is a very apt moment to reconsider the conceptualization of freedom of conscience and religion. On constitutional and historical grounds, he has advocated that a reference to Christian values should be made in the preamble of the European fundamental law, and that this will be the alternative most respectful to the pluralistic national solutions, ranging from republican non-confessionality to the establishment of an official church. But contrary to what Weiler argues, the drafting of the constitution of the European Union is not bound by the present shape of European constitutional traditions; moreover, it is hard to conclude that the present common constitutional traditions require an explicit reference to Christianity to be included in the text. Furthermore, the claim that the individual and collective identities of Europeans are unavoidably shaped by Christian values is only tenable if we uphold a rather simplistic relation between history, memory, and identity. Finally, once one moves from law and history to practical reasoning, one finds that there are good substantive reasons why our collective identity should not contain reference to Christian values.     

A European Constitution for Citizens: Reflections on the Rethinking of Union and Community Law

Whilst the European Union or Community is not a state and does not possess a political constitution in the sense of a series of irrevocable norms existing prior to and above Community or Union law, the evolution of the European legal system might nonetheless be regarded as a fundamental constitutional process. In this light, primary and secondary European law, together with the jurisprudence of the ECJ, might be said to be subjectivising certain specifically European principles thus contributing to the legal creation of sometimes novel rights for European Citizens. In a legal process similar to that seen within 19th Century Germany, European law is seeking a compensate for an incomplete political constitution through the development of a – second best – European Charter for Citizens.     

The EU ‘Stress Tests’: The Basis for a New Regulatory Framework for Nuclear Safety

Among the constitutional tensions at the heart of the European integration process, the relationship between ‘mainstream’ EU Law (framed by the Treaty on European Union) and Euratom Law has often been overlooked. Nonetheless, the EU's response to the nuclear power plant accident in Fukushima provides an opportunity to revisit this relationship. This article specifically aims to highlight the dysfunctions of the prevailing understanding of the Euratom's provisions on nuclear safety matters as well as to identify, under a joint interpretation of all EU Treaties, how to develop a European nuclear safety regime that reinforces the compensatory role of EU law and contributes to enhance the EU's legitimacy.     

Are There Methods of Reasoning on ‘Meta‐Legislation’? The Interpretation of Legislative Competence Norms within the Methodology of European Constitutional Law

Legislative competence norms are paradigmatic elements of European constitutional law and the supranational, post‐federal era. The article aims to address legislative competence norms from the viewpoint of methodology by considering significant features of reasoning on European legislative competence norms. The discussion will be based on understanding legislative competences as ‘meta‐legislation’. That concept encompasses a substantive rather than formalistic, and a politically informed rather than strictly positivist account of legislative competences and their methodology. Against that background, the interpretation of competence norms is assessed. Subsequently, the process of interpretation is discussed according to judicial practice, constitutional theory and general legal methodology. A consideration of the significance of the—usually vast—wording of competence norms completes that discussion. Finally, consequences about the political inclusiveness of interpreting competence norms and the issue of ‘clarity’ are drawn. A conclusion summarises the results.     

R (Miller) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union: Three Competing Syllogisms

The Miller case concerned the constitutional requirements for the UK to give notice of its intention to withdraw from the EU pursuant to Article 50 of the Treaty on European Union. The parties made submissions in terms of two competing syllogisms. The Government argued that ministers, exercising Crown prerogative, had the power to give notice without statutory authorisation. The Applicants argued that the process required authorisation by Act of Parliament because the UK's withdrawal would deprive people of rights arising under EU law. However, a majority of the Supreme Court decided in favour of the Applicants based on a third and significantly different syllogism, based on the proposition that the European Communities Act had established EU law‐making and law‐interpreting institutions as new ‘sources of law’. This note assesses the three competing syllogisms and examines the constitutional significance of the majority's proposition that these new EU sources of law were integrated into UK domestic law without disrupting the principle of parliamentary sovereignty.     

Riders on the Storm: Wales,the Union,and Territorial Constitutional Crisis

The United Kingdom continues to undergo a rapid process of constitutional change, with an ongoing redistribution of law‐making and governmental powers to different parts of the Union under an expanded rubric of ‘devolution'. This article illuminates a pervasive sense of territorial constitutional crisis and opportunity in the most recent period, familiarly associated with, but not confined to, Scotland. Constructive and flexible federal‐type responses inside a famously uncodified constitution are championed. Wales, commonly treated as a junior partner in the United Kingdom, presents special challenges for constitutional and legal analysis and distinctive perspectives on the Union which have not received the attention they deserve. In tackling this deficiency, the article elaborates a ‘new Union’ concept of a looser and less hierarchical set of constitutional arrangements in which several systems of parliamentary government are grounded in popular sovereignty and cooperate for mutual benefit.     

Eclipse of the Constitution {Europe Nouveau Siècle}

The Court of Justice of the European Union has come to adopt a peculiar mode of balancing, revolving around a set of ‘general principles of law’, which results in key social rights at the core of the postwar constitutional settlement no longer being sheltered from review by reference to supranational economic freedoms. It is submitted that this does not only imply a kind of ideological restyling of European law, as noted in the literature but, more fundamentally, the erosion of Europe's composite constitutional architecture (at once European and national) resulting from playing down social rights qua ‘constitutional essentials’. As the new jurisprudence ‘obscures’ Europe's constitutional constellation, it is submitted that the Court should rule under the constitution and not over it.     

European integration and the french parliament: From ineffectual watchdog to constitutional rehabilitation and an enhanced political role

The development of the European Union is as much an opportunity as a threat to national parliaments. Our case study of the French Parliament suggests that as the process of integration has quickened in pace and broadened in scope, parliament has on successive occasions used the opportunity to strengthen its constitutional position with the introduction of Article 88‐4 and improve its capacity to scrutinise government through the adoption of a series of laws. Parliament now has the power to delay if not block the adoption of measures at European Union level by refusing to lift its scrutiny reserve. It is difficult to determine if parliament has significantly increased its influence over the government on European affairs, but it is now able to adopt potentially politically significant resolutions on all European Union issues which the government takes into account when negotiating in Union institutions. European integration has been a significant factor in the rehabilitation of the French Parliament.     

Sisters in Arms: European Community Law and Sex Equality in the Armed Forces

Abstract: Recently the European Court of Justice has been shedding a new light on the limits of Community competence for defence. This article analyses the rulings in Sirdar, Kreil, and Dory with regards to two interrelated issues. First it discusses the effect of Community law on the equality of men and women in the armed forces of the Member States. Second, it deals with the impact of these decisions on the constitutional order of the European Union. The article argues that Community law has a considerable impact on defence‐related national law. Therefore the analysis ultimately contributes to a narrow aspect of the constitutional debate: the demarcation of competencies between the Member States and the Community in matters related to defence.>     

The Collective Labour Law of the European Union

Abstract: The collective labour law of the European Union is embedded in a variety of legal measures incorporating principles of collective labour law reflecting national experience. The dynamic of its development has been the spill-over effect of these principles, through their translation into the status of EU law, and their development by decisions of the European Court of Justice. The article outlines a framework of principles which, it is argued, are currently embodied in the collective labour law of the EU. They include collectively bargained labour standards, workers' collective representation, workers' participation, and protection of strikers against dismissal. In addition, there is a parallel principle of collective solidarity emerging in the social security law of the EU. The principle of collective negotiation of labour law introduced by the Protocol and Agreement on Social Policy may be seen as the founding constitutional basis for the collective labour law of the European Union.     

Pluralism and Integrity

One of the theoretical developments associated with the law of the European Union has been the flourishing of legal and constitutional theories that extol the virtues of pluralism. Pluralism in constitutional theory is offered in particular as a novel argument for the denial of unity within a framework of constitutional government. This paper argues that pluralism fails to respect the value of integrity. It also shows that at least one pluralist theory seeks to overcome the incoherence of pluralism by implicitly endorsing monism. The integrity and coherence of European law is best preserved by considering that both the national legal order and the international or European legal orders adopt sophisticated views of their own limits.     

Another Look at Constitutional Pluralism in the European Union

Constitutional pluralism is a theory, or movement, or idea, for some perhaps even an ideal, about the relationship between the legal system of the European Union and those of its Member States. In this paper, Julio Baquero Cruz analyses its assumptions and implications in the light of historical experience and of the consequences it could have for the practice of law in Europe. To do so, constitutional pluralism is compared with the other main positions about that relationship: the national constitutional position and the position of Union law.     

‘Delegated’ Legislation in the (new) European Union: A Constitutional Analysis

This article brings classic constitutionalism to an analysis of delegated legislation in the European Union. To facilitate such a constitutional analysis, it starts with a comparative excursion introducing the judicial and political safeguards on executive legislation in American constitutionalism. In the European legal order, similar constitutional safeguards emerged in the last fifty years. First, the Court of Justice developed judicial safeguards in the form of a European non‐delegation doctrine. Second, the European legislator has also insisted on political safeguards within delegated legislation. Under the Rome Treaty, ‘comitology’ was the defining characteristic of executive legislation. The Lisbon Treaty represents a revolutionary restructuring of the regulatory process. The (old) Community regime for delegated legislation is split into two halves. Article 290 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) henceforth governs delegations of legislative power, while Article 291 TFEU establishes the constitutional regime for delegations of executive power.     

Whose Reason or Reasons Speak Through the Constitution? Introduction to the Problematics

In the following paper sources of a constitution are put in question in general, and more specifically, the constitutional culture of the European Union Law is being investigated in-depth with regard to principles of deliberative democracy and rulings of the Court of Justice of the European Union. The change of a law application paradigm as well as the change of a legal systems?? nature are taken into account.     

Cosmopolitan Law

The European Union need not choose between the two options of a federalist constitution or a loose intergovernmental association of states. There is a third possibility. This is described by Kant as an order of perpetual peace, whereby states undertake to one another to be good republics, to join in a federation of peace, and to respect the rights of each other's citizens. For Kant this corresponds to a combination of principles of constitutional law, international law and, a new category, 'cosmopolitan law'. If we adopt Kant's concepts we can see, first, that the international law of human rights has become some kind of cosmopolitan law of the international community and that, second, parts of European Community law can also be seen as cosmopolitan law for its member states. The features of cosmopolitan law are that it does not follow a conventional theory of sources of law, it does not respect traditional state sovereignty and does not require a hierarchy of institutions for its interpretation and application.