论俄国自由派的远东经济政策（1906—1914年）

1905年10月17日,沙皇政府颁布《关于完善国家秩序的宣言》,标志俄国多党制的确立。此后,在俄国纷纷建立起持各种观点的政治派别和政党。它们通过各种途径和方法,影响和参与政府各种政策的制定与实施,起到了应有的作用。尤其是自由主义派别和政党,在政府制定远东经济政策中发挥了重要作用。     

俄国政党体制的特点(19世纪末～20世纪初)

19世纪末至20世纪初,俄国出现了数百个政党和组织,政党体制初步形成。俄国政党体制受当时社会、经济和文化发展特点的影响,具有自身的特色。从各党派的意识形态、力量对比、政治立场、政治观点、政治地位、组织情况、成立的时间和顺序等方面可以认识俄国政党体制的特点。俄国政党体制的特点是决定俄国1917年现代化进程中断的重要原因之一。     

俄罗斯政党体制的特点(19世纪末～20世纪初)

19世纪末至20世纪初，俄国出现了数百个政党和组织，政党体制初步形成。俄国政党体制受当时社会、经济和文化发展特点的影响，具有自身的特色。从各党派的意识形态、力量对比、政治立场、政治观点、政治地位、组织情况、成立的时间和顺序等方面可以认识俄国政党体制的特点。俄国政党体制的特点是决定俄国1917年现代化进程中断的重要原因之一。     

印度尼西亚伊斯兰教政党的崛起及其发展前景

伊斯兰教政党的崛起是后苏哈托时代印度尼西亚政局出现的重要变化之一,标志着印尼政党制度进一步走向完善和成熟。但由于历史和现实种种因素的影响,在未来短时间内伊斯兰教政党还不太可能在该国政治舞台上发挥主导作用。本文分析了印尼伊斯兰教政党的发展历程和未来前景,对其在印尼政治民主化进程中的影响和作用进行了初步探讨。     

俄国社会革命党建党基础述评

俄国社会革命党是俄国资本主义条件下发展起来的民粹派政党。它吸收传统民粹派和马克思主义、伯恩施坦学说,形成自己社会革命主义的建党理论。社会革命党观点矛盾、组织松散、策略幼稚,是俄国从传统到现代过渡时期社会的不成熟性在政党上的反映。虽如此,社会革命党仍不失为一个代表农民利益,兼顾部分工人和知识分子利益的革命政党。     

苏联解体后的俄罗斯社会民主主义思潮和政党

苏联解体后，社会民主主义思潮在俄罗斯相当流行，先后成立了十多个社会民主主义政党。但是，这些政党大多数存在时间较短，内部派别林立，组织涣散，多次发生分裂。2001年戈尔巴乔夫发起成立的统一的俄罗斯社会民主党在俄国政治舞台上没有发挥多大作用，目前出现新一轮改组。在作为“政权党”的“统一俄罗斯”党内，形成了社会民主主义“左翼”与自由主义“右翼”并存的局面。俄国社会民主主义政党与欧洲其他国家的社会民主党相比既有共同之点，也有很大差别。随着俄罗斯经济社会转型的进展，社会民主主义思潮在俄国的影响有进一步扩大的趋势。但是，俄罗斯社会民主党本身的前景未可乐观。     

东亚与欧美政党在民主化中的作用

本文以政党在民主化过程中的基本作用为起点，在与欧美政党相比较的基础上阐述了东亚工业化国家的政党自20世纪80年代以来在民主化过程中的作用。指出尽管政党变迁的路径各有不同，但全方位型政党及其代表性功能已经成为政党发展的重要趋势，东亚只有发展起具有一定群众性和代表性的全方位型政党才能在民主巩固过程中发挥重要作用。同时，有一个相对自由的宪政环境对于形成既有竞争性又有包容性的政党体制是不可或缺的，这是政治民主化稳定发展的重要前提。     

再论农民与布尔什维克党在十月革命中的关系（1917．3—10）——基于国外学者研究成果及列宁有关论述的新探讨

十月革命中，俄国农民作为一支重要力量投入了革命，对推动革命的进程起了极其重要的作用。布尔什维克党虽力图直接领导他们，但他们却基本上是以自发的起义形式来进行革命的，因此十月革命并非是一场以布尔什维克党领导的工农联盟的形式进行的社会主义革命。不过，农民的革命运动与布尔什维克党领导的城市工兵革命在一致反对资产阶级政权的基础上形成了客观上的革命联盟，二者共同将该政权推向孤立、孱弱的绝境之中，从而保证了十月革命得以较为容易地取得胜利。     

王绍鏊:从清末“海归”到共产党员

辛亥革命是由中国第一个资产阶级政党一一中国同盟会领导的一场民主革命运动。该会自1905年8月2()日在日本东京正式成立后,即担负起了革命政党的领导责任,几年后则以武昌起义之胜利促使各省相继独立,而最后迫使清廷退位,结束了中国长达两千年的封建专制制度。     

试析韩国的政治粉丝社团现象

以特定政治人为核心聚合起来的粉丝社团是韩国政党政治的新现象,在近十年的发展中对推动韩国政党政治发展发挥了重要作用。政治粉丝社团中,文化共享型与个人追随型社团政治色彩相对淡薄,而政党支援型、运动支援型等政治倾向型社团有着强烈的政治色彩,发挥着类政党的作用。年轻人的政治心理、政党有意推动、轰动效应、政治偏好、市民社会的发展是政治粉丝社团的成因。在政治生活中,这些社团发挥着宣传工具、党内制衡、代言工具和政治后备军的作用。同时,粉丝社团在发挥着政治"造星"功用的同时,也因过度竞争和论功行赏等试图影响政治的消极面而备受质疑。     

Reinforcing or Breaking Party Systems? Internet Communication Technologies and Party Competition in Comparative Context

Many scholars speculate about the political implications of Internet proliferation. The Internet might, for example, open new channels of communication, which should benefit ideologically extreme and electorally small parties. On the other hand, the Internet might push party systems toward normalization, ultimately reinforcing the extant dominance of incumbent parties. We draw on data from 205 small and extreme parties in 35 countries and focus on both party- and system-level outcomes to investigate some of the most pressing research questions from this debate. We find that where party systems were previously concentrated or restrictive, Internet proliferation has no effect on votes for small and extreme parties. By contrast, in more permissive settings, Internet proliferation has had the small—but measurable—effect of driving up votes for these parties. At the level of the party system as a whole, however, we find little evidence that Internet proliferation increases either polarization or fragmentation.     

Wolves in sheep clothing or victims of times? Discussing the immoderation of incumbent Islamic parties in Turkey,Egypt, Morocco,and Tunisia

This article discusses the “immoderation” of incumbent Islamic parties – defined by the pursuit of a moral agenda and by an unwillingness to compromise with the opposition – through a comparative study of four incumbent Islamic parties in the socio-politically different regimes of Turkey, Egypt, Morocco, and Tunisia. Building on literature from religion and politics, social psychology, sociology of religion, and on the inclusion-moderation hypothesis, this study argues that (1) Islamic parties’ strong organizations resulted both in their success and in the absence of internal pluralism and that (2) their dominant status in the party system consolidated their majoritarian understanding of democracy. Through its discussion of “immoderation” this study aims to contribute to the interdisciplinary literature on religion and politics.     

Dominant party systems: a framework for conceptualizing opposition strategies in Russia

This article explores the problems facing opposition political parties in Russia. In order to conceptualize the conditions in which opposition parties operate and which determine the strategies they adopt, the concept of dominant party systems is used as an analytical framework. Ideological flexibility, access to administrative resources, and the ability to mobilize key socio-economic groups (key factors in the maintenance of one-party domination) are all features associated with Russia's ‘dominant’ party, United Russia. It is argued that, whilst Russia is not a dominant party system along the lines of those which existed in Mexico and Japan, there are sufficient commonalities with such systems, in terms of the problems facing opposition political parties as to make comparison a useful exercise. The optimum strategies for opposition parties in dominant party systems (activist recruitment, ideological positioning and coalition-building) are identified and it is argued that these are all areas which Russian opposition parties need to address if they are to successfully challenge the regime and the ‘party of power’, United Russia.     

Capture the flag: local factionalism as electoral mobilization in dominant party Uganda

ABSTRACT

This article addresses a question relevant to many non-democratic regimes: how can a successful dominant party be an institutionally weak one? President Yoweri Museveni and his National Resistance Movement (NRM) have dominated Ugandan politics since coming to power in 1986. However, the NRM does not possess many of the institutional endowments that other dominant parties use to control mass and elite politics, such as central control of candidate selection, autonomous mobilizing structures, or dispensation of sufficient political finance to its candidates. Instead, the party secretariat has no real institutional power independent of the personalist Museveni regime, and its local branches house fierce internal competition each election in which most incumbents lose office. This article argues that the NRM mobilizes so well for Museveni despite its institutional deficits due to the precise nature of the competitive process its local elites go through to win its nomination (or “flag”) and the subsequent general election. This process sees self-organized and self-financed candidates and their factions rejuvenate the party and mobilize votes for the concurrent presidential election as a by-product of their competition with one another. The article makes this argument with qualitative data from three districts gathered during the 2016 elections.     

How the Media Shape Perceptions of Right-Wing Populist Leaders

It is often argued that right-wing populist party leaders are dependent on the media for their public image, which in turn is key for their electoral success. This study tests this assumption by comparing the effects of the media coverage of 2 Dutch right-wing populist leaders with the effects of the coverage of leaders of established parties, in a real-life setting, by tracking campaign developments in the Dutch 2006 national election campaign. We combine panel survey data (n?=?401) with repeated measurements of the party leaders' public images with a systematic content analysis of 17 media outlets (with a total of 1,001 stories), on the basis of the media consumption of individual respondents. Our results show significant effects of the content of media coverage on the public image of political leaders. However, only in 1 case (out of 10) is there a significant difference between right-wing populist party leaders and leaders of other parties in the strength of media effects. It thus seems that leaders of right-wing populist parties are just as dependent upon the media as leaders of other parties. The findings are discussed in the light of extant research on right-wing populist parties and media populism.     

The limited agency and life-cycles of personalized dominant parties in the post-Soviet space: the cases of United Russia and Nur Otan

Vladimir Putin's United Russia and Nursultan Nazabayev's Nur Otan represent a distinctive type of dominant party due to their personalist nature and dependence on their presidential patrons. Such personalism deprives these parties of the agency to perform key roles in authoritarian reproduction typically expected of dominant parties, such as resource distribution, policy-making and mobilizing mass support for the regime. Instead United Russia and Nur Otan have contributed to authoritarian consolidation by securing the president's legislative agenda, stabilizing elites to ensure their patron's hold on power, and assisting in perpetuating a discourse around the national leader. However, because these parties lack the agency to reproduce themselves, to entrench their position, and to play more than a supportive role in regime consolidation, the lifespan of such personalist dominant parties is likely to be significantly shorter than that of dominant parties.     

Religious parties and democracy: A comparative assessment of Israel and Turkey

Discussions of the role of religious parties in democracies can be highly misleading when they take the parties' ideologies at face value and assign them to the binary categories of moderate vs radical. Only by a careful review of how religious parties use religious and secular symbols in defining their political stances can we evaluate their roles vis-à-vis liberal democracy. The competing political ideologies of the Mafdal and Shas Parties in Israel and the National Action Party, the Prosperity Party and the Justice and Development Party in Turkey are foci of this analysis. Two controversial concepts, ‘redemption’ in Israel and ‘secularism’ in Turkey, are used to question how these parties appropriate religious symbols in their policies towards secular public and institutions. The arguments draw on a set of interviews with the religious party leaderships and a content analysis of party ideologues' views. The findings suggest that parties that adopt the strategy of sacralization (that is, assigning religious meanings to secular ideas thereby treating them as sacred) appear more moderate yet they are more likely to support authoritarian policies. However, the so-called radical religious parties tend to be more inclusive and are more likely to secularize their respective religious tradition internally by redefining secular terms. Despite their novel political agendas both groups fail to exhibit principled commitment to liberal values and fail to provide inclusive and coherent alternatives to their secularist counterparts.     

东亚政党与民众的政治沟通及其启示——以韩国和新加坡为例

政党与民众的政治沟通是衡量一个国家政党政治运行状况的重要指标。探索东亚政党与民众的政治沟通,有助于我们了解东亚政党政治的运行过程和发展规律。韩国和新加坡两国政党与民众的政治沟通模式虽各具特色,但其基本涵盖了东亚政党与民众沟通的主要模式,从政治沟通的整个过程来看,也有一定的规律和经验可循。如充分发挥政党的能动作用、采取灵活多样的沟通方式、积极主动地拓宽沟通的渠道等。借鉴东亚政党与民众沟通的经验对于完善我国执政党与民众的政治沟通模式十分必要。